Back to reactionary foreign policy?

An old issue has again occupied Turkey’s foreign policy vision: the Armenian question. On this, the Turkish government seems ready to bury all its foreign policy achievements of the last several years. Parliamentary decisions in the US and Sweden on the Armenian genocide claims are exaggerated. The reactions that we see towards these two countries are reminiscent of old policy perspectives.

Shall Turkey sever all of its relations with countries whose legislative bodies recognize the events of 1915 as genocide? If so, is it compatible with the government policy of establishing cooperative relations with all countries? Such a policy does not fit into the government’s assertive global opening policy.

In the recalling of ambassadors and threats to sever bilateral relations, I do not see a visionary and proactive position taken by Turkey’s foreign policymakers. Instead, they have fallen back to the old “reactionary” policy line. There should be more imaginative policies than recalling the Turkish ambassadors to Washington and Stockholm.

More imaginative and problem-solving steps should have been taken. This is expected of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party), given its performance in the foreign policy arena.

But it appears that the government is settling for a typical “nationalist, pro-status quo position.” This might be the result of domestic political concerns. The government, with its tough stance on the Armenian question, maybe trying to restore its “nationalist credentials,” which even some in the AK Party perceive as damaged as a result of the government’s Kurdish initiative. Such a perception is not only wrong but also misleading for policymakers.

An exaggerated reaction by the AK Party government on the Armenian issue enflames nationalist fervor in Turkey. If the AK Party does not pursue a policy of cooling down the fervor but instead stirs nationalist sentiments, it may itself be inflamed by this fervor.

The AK Party has the power and prestige to smooth nationalist reactions. What the government should do is just be consistent with its own policy of “zero problems with neighbors.” The failure to implement this policy line on normalizing relations with Armenia further weakens Turkey’s hand. On this, the government made a big mistake by not approving the protocols right away after their signature. Surrendering to nationalist reactions coming from Turkish and Azeri quarters and linking the normalization process with that of solving the Karabakh issue were incompatible with the government’s claim to have a “problem-solving” policy stance. The same mistake was committed in 2005 on the Cyprus issue, by not approving the protocol signed to expand the customs union agreement with the EU to include the “government of Cyprus.” The result of this blind policy is the current deadlock in Turkey-EU accession negotiations.

A similar hesitant attitude towards the protocols signed with the government of Armenia has
wounded the normalization process. The AK Party government should be brave not only in reopening the old issues but in solving them.


15 March 2010, Monday

Is democracy the only game in town?

For Adam Przeworski democracy is consolidated when it “becomes the only game in town, when no one can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions when all the losers want to do is to try again within the same institutions under which they have just lost.”

Sixty years since the first free and fair elections, 10 years after becoming an EU-candidate country and almost five years since the opening of accession negotiations with the EU, democracy still is not the only game in our town. There are powerful people and institutions searching for a regime other than a liberal democracy.

We have main opposition parties that oppose all kinds of democratic reforms including the Kurdish initiative, the opening of the Halki monastery, a new constitution, reforming the judiciary, and so on. As they keep losing elections they look to the military and the judiciary to do something against their political opponents. So they support the cases of political party closures by the Constitutional Court and were jubilant when the closure case against the AK Party was opened.

The military’s involvement, even intervention, in politics is welcomed by these politicians. Deniz Baykal, more than once, expressed his expectations from the military to defend “secularism” not with words but deeds. Instead of trying again within the system, our main opposition parties call in the military and the judiciary to intervene and eliminate their opponents for them. Democracy is not recognized as the only game in town even by secularist and nationalist political parties. For them, democracy is a game that they constantly lose. So they look for some other avenues to power instead of the people’s mandate. On the other hand, the military is heavily laden with officers with political ambitions.

All these show that Turkey does not have a consolidated democratic regime but is in a process of democratization which is not a stable state of affairs free of tensions and conflicts. On the contrary, the very nature of democratization carries instabilities, tensions and the lack of societal and institutional consensus. While democracy is a regime with the stability of democratic institutions, a high level of consensus on the norms and the rules of political struggle, democratization is essentially a destabilizing process.

This is so because democratization means a transition of power and the establishment of rules and norms inspired by the democratic principles of legitimacy. As such, democratization challenges the beneficiaries of the “ancient regime” who are unwilling to give up their power and privileges gained in their authoritarian political system.

Thus the process of democratization prompts resistance among the forces of the “ancient regime” fearful of losing their monopoly on power in due course. They invoke secularism, unity of the state and the nation-state to block the process. The end result of this resistance is the societal tension that is currently appearing, political harshness and inter-institutional conflict.


28 December 2009, Monday

Where the state and the PKK meet

The Constitutional Court decision to close down the Democratic Society Party (DTP) once again proved who has the ultimate power to shape the political sphere in Turkey. Tutelage of extra-political forces, be it the military or the judiciary, continues to reign in Ankara.

The fate of political parties is not decided at the ballot box but in Ankara. No matter how many votes a political party may have, a few self-guardians of the regime on top of the bureaucracy may decide to silence it.

No doubt this is a decision to block progress in the Kurdish initiative. It is yet another example of bureaucratic resistance to political reform and democratization. The defense of the decision by the president of the court is not at all convincing. The court does not rule according to written rules, as has been argued; to the contrary, it is the most politicized institution and in close alignment with other pro-status quo forces inside and outside the bureaucracy.

By closing down the DTP, the court left the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) as the only representative of the nationalist Kurdish constituency, eliminating democratic representatives of Kurdish demands. They know perfectly well that it is impossible for any government to negotiate a solution with the PKK. Thus, the decision to close down the DTP struck at the very heart of the democratic initiative process. It is hard to believe that the Constitutional Court was neutral and passed a judgment in accordance with the law. The closure was a political choice.

Closing the DTP hit not only the DTP but also Parliament. A power outside Parliament ended the terms of representatives of one political party out of four currently in Parliament. As a result, the representative character of Parliament was damaged. This is an intervention in the supremacy of the national will and sovereignty and, as such, an ultimate disrespect to the will of the people, not only to the people who voted for the DTP -- amounting to 2.5 million -- but also to people at large because it presumes the bureaucracy has the right to correct wrongs arising from the national will.

Those who shut the DTP down believe sovereignty belongs to vanguard institutions and their bureaucratic leaders, not to the people.

The court’s decision was in line with the expectations and wishes of the PKK and the radical wing of the DTP. They know the closure will give them an easier way to explain to Kurds just how “limited” political methods really are and why it is that “violence” always needs to be maintained as a possible measure. The closure of the DTP offered party radicals a powerful tool with which to weaken the “defenders of political means” within the Kurdish movement.

No doubt the closure of the DTP means the “elimination of moderates.” It appears now that the “state,” including of course the Constitutional Court, prefers not moderates but hawks with whom it will find impossible to resolve the Kurdish question. In the end, the decision of the Constitutional Court revealed that the “state” does not wish to see the Kurdish problem solved.

14 December 2009, Monday

Who is ready for a Kurdish solution?

It appears that the Kurdish initiative will not receive any backing from the main opposition parties. The latest debate in Parliament last Friday showed once more how some politicians approach the initiative as an opportunity to fan the heat of Turkish nationalism instead of contributing to the solution of a long-standing problem of the country.

This is a pity, but also reality. What is left in Parliament are the governing party and the Democratic Society Party (DTP). It is certain now that these two political parties alone will work together to find a solution to the Kurdish question.

Anyway, it is not realistic to expect anything positive from the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), whose leader, speaking in Parliament, declared democracy a threat to the existence of the Turkish state. So with the ultranationalists, who do not accept even democracy as a decent ground to address a question, what can be expected?

For that matter, the main opposition party is no different. Deniz Baykal equates any solution of the Kurdish question to a concession made to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Again, it was the deputy leader of this party who applauded the Dersim massacre of 1938 in his speech in Parliament. With the Kemalists, who are still suggesting Dersim-model massacres to “resolve” the Kurdish question, what kind of cooperation can be established? They would always argue for what they know and do best: oppression.

Thus the responsibility falls on the ruling party and the DTP (and or for that matter the PKK) and on all the progressive forces of the country in and outside Parliament.

The solution cannot be sudden, it will take time and progress as the public’s confidence and support are continuously being built.

The government seems committed. Democratic reforms, some of which were outlined by Interior Minister Besir Atalay, will be introduced by the government, which has a parliamentary majority and executive power. On these, no help is needed except a positive public opinion.

Yet this is only one aspect of the question and the solution. The second part involves disarming the PKK. Unless some positive developments emerge on this side, it may be hard to keep up the momentum for democratic reforms for long, given the need for at least some degree of public support, which will only come through if the PKK seems to be disarming.

This must materialize. The PKK, whether willingly or unwillingly, in contact with Turkish government agencies or not, should contribute to this process if it claims to be a party in the Kurdish question.

The first thing the PKK should do is denounce violence and declare its intention to engage in nonviolent political struggle. Second, it should surrender its arms, for example to the UN authorities in Iraq or the Iraqi Kurdish administration, in a gesture of goodwill. Such surprising gestures of goodwill would certainly help democratic reforms pursued aggressively in Turkey and win over the support of the overwhelming majority of people in Turkey.

The question, of course, will emerge: why should the PKK act like this? My answer is very simple: If the PKK rejects claims of being an organization of self-interest-seeking people and feels responsible for the well-being of the Kurds in Turkey, it should not torpedo the process but be constructive.

In short, while on the one hand the government should be pushed for bold democratization initiatives, on the other hand, the PKK must be continuously pressured to lay down its weapons. These two must be synchronized in order to carry on with the process successfully.

The friends of the Kurds and the Turks, and those who think that the region and the world would be a better place without the Kurdish question, cannot refrain from contributing to the new Kurdish initiative. Otherwise, neither the democratic rights of the Kurds nor peace in Turkey and its region will be forthcoming. This is a scenario in which the mindset and policies of 1925 and 1938 will prevail, destabilizing the entire region.

16 November 2009, Monday

Against the radical nationalists in Turkey and Armenia

Turkey and Armenia finally signed protocols last Saturday envisaging the establishment of diplomatic contacts and development of bilateral relations. This is a huge step towards building peace in the region and reconciling the historical bitterness among the two nations.

In reaching this point, the goodwill of Turkish and Armenian officials should be praised but the efforts of the international community, mainly the American, Russian, French and European support, should not be forgotten too. Special applause, of course, goes to Swiss diplomacy for its mediation success.

It was, however, not easy for the Turkish and Armenian governments, who faced the bitter opposition of ultra-nationalists. The result is thus a victory against narrow-minded nationalism both in Turkey and Armenia. By signing the protocols to establish diplomatic contacts and develop bilateral relations the two countries demonstrated their will to look to the future instead of being imprisoned in the past.

For Armenia, this is the beginning of a new period in its foreign affairs. I think Armenia's true integration with the world will start with the normalization of its relations with Turkey. After years of independence Armenia is finally coming out of its “Iron Curtain” and opening up to the world. It can now become a regional player in the Caucasus and be in the game of energy politics. Its inclusion in Nabucco is the key to integrate Armenia in the regional balance and global game benefiting the Armenian people.

In this process, the Armenian Diaspora has failed to support peace and reconciliation. Their strong opposition to the protocols proves that they are out of touch with the realities of regional and global politics as well as the needs of their people in Armenia. The Diaspora appeared to be trying to keep Armenia as a hostage to their platonic Armenian nationalism while Sarksyan is prioritizing and defending the wellbeing of Armenians living in Armenia.

For Turkey, normalization with Armenia is just an extension of its “zero problems with neighbors” policy. Signing the protocols proved that the “new Turkey” is a peacemaker and peacebuilder in the region. The Armenian-Turkey rapprochement is now a new incentive to look into the Karabagh issue so that the region can resolve another longstanding conflict that poisons stability in the Caucasus.

The Azerbaijanis, instead of trying to sabotage this rapprochement, can capitalize on it to address the Karabagh issue. They should be aware that some in Turkey will try to pull them into the quarrels of Turkish domestic politics. By using Turks' solidarity with Azerbaijan, some opposition groups in Turkey are trying to weaken the government. Portraying the government that initiated the rapprochement with Armenia as selling out their “Azeri brothers” is simple politicking that the Azeris should not be part of.

Peace and stability in the Caucasus will certainly be strengthened as a result of the rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia. But another outstanding problem in the region is the Karabagh dispute. The new diplomacy in the Caucasus will certainly ease the process of finding a solution in the Karabagh dispute too. The Minsk group should gear up its efforts to start the process of a settlement for this question.

Unless the Karabagh issue is settled it will be hard to consolidate peace and stability in the Caucasus. Faced with the pressure of the Diaspora, it may be even more difficult for the Armenian government to go for a settlement in Karabagh. But without it, the current efforts will not be completed.

12 October 2009, Monday

Turkey and Armenia: The match is not over yet

It has been a year since Serzh Sarksyan and Abdullah Gül met in Yerevan, starting the process of high-level diplomatic contact between the two countries. The meeting increased expectations that normalization between the two countries was on the way.

It, however, appeared that a speedy process for normalization was not realistic, particularly due to public sensitivities. Time was needed to win public support for a rapprochement. There could be no better ground to do so than soccer.

The soccer match that brought Sarksyan and Gül together last year highlighted the will at the political level for the rapprochement. Besides, it gave a perfect opportunity to draw the attention of the public to the need and the end results of the process of normalization. And this has been achieved to a very large extent.

Moreover, “soccer diplomacy” has laid the deadline: from September 2008, when the two teams played in Armenia, to October 2009, when the second leg of the tournament is due to be played, some concrete steps had to be taken.

Given this deadline drawn by the match schedule of the two countries, the announcement of the protocol last week was a relief indicating that normalization efforts are still on the table. We now have a road map clearing the way for establishing diplomatic contact, recognizing the existing border, opening the border to trade and setting up an expert commission to look into the history.

But a key to normalization at the regional level is missing in the protocol, which is the settlement of the Karabakh issue. The Turkish government declared many times that normalization between the two countries depended on progress on the solution of the Karabakh issue. It is, of course, not directly related to bilateral relations, but the position of the Turkish side is that “normalization can only be sustainable if the conflicting issues are addressed in the region from a systemic point of view.”

This implies a comprehensive perspective on regional conflicts and that it is hard to achieve peace between Turkey and Armenia while the latter occupies a significant portion of the Azeri territory, a friend of Turkey and the Turks.

This shows the interdependent nature of peace and conflict in the region. They both reinforce each other. While sustainable peace requires the establishment of cordial relations at the regional level, conflicts have the potential to spread into the region as a whole due to deep interconnectedness at the state and society levels in the Caucasus. It is hard to maintain “bilateral peace” in a zone of conflict. That was, in fact, the idea behind the Turkish proposal for the Caucasian peace and stability pact.

Therefore, true normalization between Turkey and Armenia requires the normalization of politics and social psychology in Armenia and Azerbaijan, which requires addressing the Karabakh question, a question that has been poisoning the public psyche and the political struggle and legitimizing an uncompromising nationalistic reactionaryism. Apart from this, if Turkey and Armenia wish to normalize their relations they should move fast. An overextended debate spread over months and years on such a sensitive issue may be a victim to nationalistic reactions that are strong both in Turkey and Armenia. While there is a strong political will in both capitals, and while the public is prepared to see some progress take place, we should not wait for the nationalists to increase tension and bury the current initiative. Instead, the government should pick up the pace in burying historical animosities.

07 September 2009

Public opinion on the Kurdish question

To solve the Kurdish question certainly requires a strong political will, which seems to exist, as frequently expressed by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Yet a “Kurdish solution” needs to be received positively by the public at large.

A public opinion research poll conducted by the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA) in collaboration with Pollmark indicates that people are in support of the new initiative. Forty-three percent of respondents approve the government's new Kurdish opening. Those who oppose it stand at 39 percent. The rest are still undecided, watching the developments. Despite a very strong opposition coming from the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which did everything possible to provoke Turkish nationalism on such a delicate issue, it is encouraging for the government to see that the majority is still behind the initiative.

What is more interesting is that people do not approve of the opposition's negative attitude towards the Kurdish opening. When asked if they approve of the opposition's (CHP and MHP) policies towards the government on the Kurdish initiative, only16 percent expressed support, while a huge majority (62 percent) disapproves. This shows that despite the huge difficulties of selling the idea of a Kurdish solution, the government has done better than the opposition in persuading the people. It has done so because the people, contrary to the calculations of the opposition, want to give a democratic solution a chance.

I think people are more progressive than the pro-status quo forces assume. They are aware that some new approaches need to be developed in order to solve this problem, which has cost them a lot. This is clear from another result of the SETA survey: 71 percent of respondents think that the methods used in the last 25 years to fight the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) proved “unsuccessful.” Based on this observation, they want to see some new methods employed to address the Kurdish question, the root cause of PKK terror.

Yet people wisely think that the terror issue and the Kurdish question are two different things. An overwhelming majority (65 percent) think that even if the PKK is eliminated through military means, the Kurdish question will remain unresolved. Therefore “political means” need to be considered, where people look upon political actors to join in the process.

Among the political actors, the Democratic Society Party (DTP) is rated exceptionally well. Thirty-five percent view the DTP's approach to the government initiative positively. This is an extremely high approval rating given the fact that the DTP's electoral support is around 5 to 6 percent. The more the DTP appears supportive of a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question within a united Turkey, the more likely that the DTP will become a party in Turkey not only of the Kurds. Thus the role the DTP plays in the solution process will contribute to the normalization of the party in the country. Other important data are that 46 percent of Kurds polled and 36 percent of the Turks polled stated that the DTP's views represent the views of the Kurds. This result shows that the DTP's claim to be the sole representative of the Kurdish demands does not have a social and political base.

The SETA research also demonstrates that “Turkish fear” that Kurdish rights may turn into a secessionist movement is widespread. Seventy percent of Turks polled think that Kurds want to establish an independent state. Any solution process should certainly take these concerns seriously. The fear that a solution may lead to a division of the country is likely to lock any attempt to address the question. Yet I think that this concern of Turkish people may also be the master key to opening the lock. If Turkish people are persuaded by the Kurdish political actors and the Kurdish people at large that the Kurds do really want to live together in a united Turkey, then the psychological barriers of Turks will be overcome.

In fact, the will to live together is knitted into the social fabric. One-third of Turks polled and two-thirds of the Kurds polled say that they have a relative from the other side. This result proves how Turks and Kurds are closely connected. Moreover, 70 percent of Turks and 87 percent of Kurds state that they would not be disturbed by mixed marriages among their close relatives. Despite years of conflict and tension at the political level, Kurds and Turks seem not to have given up on each other. I think this social integration despite political division is a rare phenomenon in the world of ethnic conflict.

In sum, there exists not only political will to address the Kurdish question at the moment but also public support for it, and the public will to live together in a democratic and plural country.

31 August 2009