Who is ready for a Kurdish solution?

It appears that the Kurdish initiative will not receive any backing from the main opposition parties. The latest debate in Parliament last Friday showed once more how some politicians approach the initiative as an opportunity to fan the heat of Turkish nationalism instead of contributing to the solution of a long-standing problem of the country.

This is a pity, but also reality. What is left in Parliament are the governing party and the Democratic Society Party (DTP). It is certain now that these two political parties alone will work together to find a solution to the Kurdish question.

Anyway, it is not realistic to expect anything positive from the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), whose leader, speaking in Parliament, declared democracy a threat to the existence of the Turkish state. So with the ultranationalists, who do not accept even democracy as a decent ground to address a question, what can be expected?

For that matter, the main opposition party is no different. Deniz Baykal equates any solution of the Kurdish question to a concession made to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Again, it was the deputy leader of this party who applauded the Dersim massacre of 1938 in his speech in Parliament. With the Kemalists, who are still suggesting Dersim-model massacres to “resolve” the Kurdish question, what kind of cooperation can be established? They would always argue for what they know and do best: oppression.

Thus the responsibility falls on the ruling party and the DTP (and or for that matter the PKK) and on all the progressive forces of the country in and outside Parliament.

The solution cannot be sudden, it will take time and progress as the public’s confidence and support are continuously being built.

The government seems committed. Democratic reforms, some of which were outlined by Interior Minister Besir Atalay, will be introduced by the government, which has a parliamentary majority and executive power. On these, no help is needed except a positive public opinion.

Yet this is only one aspect of the question and the solution. The second part involves disarming the PKK. Unless some positive developments emerge on this side, it may be hard to keep up the momentum for democratic reforms for long, given the need for at least some degree of public support, which will only come through if the PKK seems to be disarming.

This must materialize. The PKK, whether willingly or unwillingly, in contact with Turkish government agencies or not, should contribute to this process if it claims to be a party in the Kurdish question.

The first thing the PKK should do is denounce violence and declare its intention to engage in nonviolent political struggle. Second, it should surrender its arms, for example to the UN authorities in Iraq or the Iraqi Kurdish administration, in a gesture of goodwill. Such surprising gestures of goodwill would certainly help democratic reforms pursued aggressively in Turkey and win over the support of the overwhelming majority of people in Turkey.

The question, of course, will emerge: why should the PKK act like this? My answer is very simple: If the PKK rejects claims of being an organization of self-interest-seeking people and feels responsible for the well-being of the Kurds in Turkey, it should not torpedo the process but be constructive.

In short, while on the one hand the government should be pushed for bold democratization initiatives, on the other hand, the PKK must be continuously pressured to lay down its weapons. These two must be synchronized in order to carry on with the process successfully.

The friends of the Kurds and the Turks, and those who think that the region and the world would be a better place without the Kurdish question, cannot refrain from contributing to the new Kurdish initiative. Otherwise, neither the democratic rights of the Kurds nor peace in Turkey and its region will be forthcoming. This is a scenario in which the mindset and policies of 1925 and 1938 will prevail, destabilizing the entire region.

16 November 2009, Monday

Against the radical nationalists in Turkey and Armenia

Turkey and Armenia finally signed protocols last Saturday envisaging the establishment of diplomatic contacts and development of bilateral relations. This is a huge step towards building peace in the region and reconciling the historical bitterness among the two nations.

In reaching this point, the goodwill of Turkish and Armenian officials should be praised but the efforts of the international community, mainly the American, Russian, French and European support, should not be forgotten too. Special applause, of course, goes to Swiss diplomacy for its mediation success.

It was, however, not easy for the Turkish and Armenian governments, who faced the bitter opposition of ultra-nationalists. The result is thus a victory against narrow-minded nationalism both in Turkey and Armenia. By signing the protocols to establish diplomatic contacts and develop bilateral relations the two countries demonstrated their will to look to the future instead of being imprisoned in the past.

For Armenia, this is the beginning of a new period in its foreign affairs. I think Armenia's true integration with the world will start with the normalization of its relations with Turkey. After years of independence Armenia is finally coming out of its “Iron Curtain” and opening up to the world. It can now become a regional player in the Caucasus and be in the game of energy politics. Its inclusion in Nabucco is the key to integrate Armenia in the regional balance and global game benefiting the Armenian people.

In this process, the Armenian Diaspora has failed to support peace and reconciliation. Their strong opposition to the protocols proves that they are out of touch with the realities of regional and global politics as well as the needs of their people in Armenia. The Diaspora appeared to be trying to keep Armenia as a hostage to their platonic Armenian nationalism while Sarksyan is prioritizing and defending the wellbeing of Armenians living in Armenia.

For Turkey, normalization with Armenia is just an extension of its “zero problems with neighbors” policy. Signing the protocols proved that the “new Turkey” is a peacemaker and peacebuilder in the region. The Armenian-Turkey rapprochement is now a new incentive to look into the Karabagh issue so that the region can resolve another longstanding conflict that poisons stability in the Caucasus.

The Azerbaijanis, instead of trying to sabotage this rapprochement, can capitalize on it to address the Karabagh issue. They should be aware that some in Turkey will try to pull them into the quarrels of Turkish domestic politics. By using Turks' solidarity with Azerbaijan, some opposition groups in Turkey are trying to weaken the government. Portraying the government that initiated the rapprochement with Armenia as selling out their “Azeri brothers” is simple politicking that the Azeris should not be part of.

Peace and stability in the Caucasus will certainly be strengthened as a result of the rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia. But another outstanding problem in the region is the Karabagh dispute. The new diplomacy in the Caucasus will certainly ease the process of finding a solution in the Karabagh dispute too. The Minsk group should gear up its efforts to start the process of a settlement for this question.

Unless the Karabagh issue is settled it will be hard to consolidate peace and stability in the Caucasus. Faced with the pressure of the Diaspora, it may be even more difficult for the Armenian government to go for a settlement in Karabagh. But without it, the current efforts will not be completed.

12 October 2009, Monday

Turkey and Armenia: The match is not over yet

It has been a year since Serzh Sarksyan and Abdullah Gül met in Yerevan, starting the process of high-level diplomatic contact between the two countries. The meeting increased expectations that normalization between the two countries was on the way.

It, however, appeared that a speedy process for normalization was not realistic, particularly due to public sensitivities. Time was needed to win public support for a rapprochement. There could be no better ground to do so than soccer.

The soccer match that brought Sarksyan and Gül together last year highlighted the will at the political level for the rapprochement. Besides, it gave a perfect opportunity to draw the attention of the public to the need and the end results of the process of normalization. And this has been achieved to a very large extent.

Moreover, “soccer diplomacy” has laid the deadline: from September 2008, when the two teams played in Armenia, to October 2009, when the second leg of the tournament is due to be played, some concrete steps had to be taken.

Given this deadline drawn by the match schedule of the two countries, the announcement of the protocol last week was a relief indicating that normalization efforts are still on the table. We now have a road map clearing the way for establishing diplomatic contact, recognizing the existing border, opening the border to trade and setting up an expert commission to look into the history.

But a key to normalization at the regional level is missing in the protocol, which is the settlement of the Karabakh issue. The Turkish government declared many times that normalization between the two countries depended on progress on the solution of the Karabakh issue. It is, of course, not directly related to bilateral relations, but the position of the Turkish side is that “normalization can only be sustainable if the conflicting issues are addressed in the region from a systemic point of view.”

This implies a comprehensive perspective on regional conflicts and that it is hard to achieve peace between Turkey and Armenia while the latter occupies a significant portion of the Azeri territory, a friend of Turkey and the Turks.

This shows the interdependent nature of peace and conflict in the region. They both reinforce each other. While sustainable peace requires the establishment of cordial relations at the regional level, conflicts have the potential to spread into the region as a whole due to deep interconnectedness at the state and society levels in the Caucasus. It is hard to maintain “bilateral peace” in a zone of conflict. That was, in fact, the idea behind the Turkish proposal for the Caucasian peace and stability pact.

Therefore, true normalization between Turkey and Armenia requires the normalization of politics and social psychology in Armenia and Azerbaijan, which requires addressing the Karabakh question, a question that has been poisoning the public psyche and the political struggle and legitimizing an uncompromising nationalistic reactionaryism. Apart from this, if Turkey and Armenia wish to normalize their relations they should move fast. An overextended debate spread over months and years on such a sensitive issue may be a victim to nationalistic reactions that are strong both in Turkey and Armenia. While there is a strong political will in both capitals, and while the public is prepared to see some progress take place, we should not wait for the nationalists to increase tension and bury the current initiative. Instead, the government should pick up the pace in burying historical animosities.

07 September 2009

Public opinion on the Kurdish question

To solve the Kurdish question certainly requires a strong political will, which seems to exist, as frequently expressed by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Yet a “Kurdish solution” needs to be received positively by the public at large.

A public opinion research poll conducted by the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA) in collaboration with Pollmark indicates that people are in support of the new initiative. Forty-three percent of respondents approve the government's new Kurdish opening. Those who oppose it stand at 39 percent. The rest are still undecided, watching the developments. Despite a very strong opposition coming from the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which did everything possible to provoke Turkish nationalism on such a delicate issue, it is encouraging for the government to see that the majority is still behind the initiative.

What is more interesting is that people do not approve of the opposition's negative attitude towards the Kurdish opening. When asked if they approve of the opposition's (CHP and MHP) policies towards the government on the Kurdish initiative, only16 percent expressed support, while a huge majority (62 percent) disapproves. This shows that despite the huge difficulties of selling the idea of a Kurdish solution, the government has done better than the opposition in persuading the people. It has done so because the people, contrary to the calculations of the opposition, want to give a democratic solution a chance.

I think people are more progressive than the pro-status quo forces assume. They are aware that some new approaches need to be developed in order to solve this problem, which has cost them a lot. This is clear from another result of the SETA survey: 71 percent of respondents think that the methods used in the last 25 years to fight the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) proved “unsuccessful.” Based on this observation, they want to see some new methods employed to address the Kurdish question, the root cause of PKK terror.

Yet people wisely think that the terror issue and the Kurdish question are two different things. An overwhelming majority (65 percent) think that even if the PKK is eliminated through military means, the Kurdish question will remain unresolved. Therefore “political means” need to be considered, where people look upon political actors to join in the process.

Among the political actors, the Democratic Society Party (DTP) is rated exceptionally well. Thirty-five percent view the DTP's approach to the government initiative positively. This is an extremely high approval rating given the fact that the DTP's electoral support is around 5 to 6 percent. The more the DTP appears supportive of a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question within a united Turkey, the more likely that the DTP will become a party in Turkey not only of the Kurds. Thus the role the DTP plays in the solution process will contribute to the normalization of the party in the country. Other important data are that 46 percent of Kurds polled and 36 percent of the Turks polled stated that the DTP's views represent the views of the Kurds. This result shows that the DTP's claim to be the sole representative of the Kurdish demands does not have a social and political base.

The SETA research also demonstrates that “Turkish fear” that Kurdish rights may turn into a secessionist movement is widespread. Seventy percent of Turks polled think that Kurds want to establish an independent state. Any solution process should certainly take these concerns seriously. The fear that a solution may lead to a division of the country is likely to lock any attempt to address the question. Yet I think that this concern of Turkish people may also be the master key to opening the lock. If Turkish people are persuaded by the Kurdish political actors and the Kurdish people at large that the Kurds do really want to live together in a united Turkey, then the psychological barriers of Turks will be overcome.

In fact, the will to live together is knitted into the social fabric. One-third of Turks polled and two-thirds of the Kurds polled say that they have a relative from the other side. This result proves how Turks and Kurds are closely connected. Moreover, 70 percent of Turks and 87 percent of Kurds state that they would not be disturbed by mixed marriages among their close relatives. Despite years of conflict and tension at the political level, Kurds and Turks seem not to have given up on each other. I think this social integration despite political division is a rare phenomenon in the world of ethnic conflict.

In sum, there exists not only political will to address the Kurdish question at the moment but also public support for it, and the public will to live together in a democratic and plural country.

31 August 2009

The Kurdish initiative and Turkish opposition

By “Turkish opposition” I mean the main opposition parties of Turkey, namely the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). It has become crystal clear once more that Turkey's No. 1 problem is the lack of a “progressive and democratic opposition.”

All opposition parties place themselves on the “right” of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and oppose any “democratic openings” initiated by the government. As such, they appear reactionary. They even resist the search for a solution to the Kurdish question, a question that had consumed for decades Turkey's national resources as well as caused the loss of thousands of its youth.

It is almost impossible to generate consensus to resolve a “vital issue” like the Kurdish one acting together with such opposition. Their attitude toward the government's Kurdish initiative is incomprehensible. They treat the Kurdish question as if it were a question of the AK Party and they would not like to be part of its solution.

Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the MHP, equates any step to be taken on the Kurdish question with treason. In his recent speeches, the MHP has emerged as a party that threatens stability and social peace. His statement, “If necessary, we will stay on the mountains for 50 years,” is worrisome in the name of peace and stability in the country, and in the region, too.

In a similar vein, Deniz Baykal, the leader of the CHP, criticizes Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for meeting with DTP leader Ahmet Türk, saying, “Meeting with the DTP is the same as a meeting with the [Kurdistan Workers' Party] PKK terrorist organization.” Is this statement appropriate for a political party that is a member of the Socialist International? Are social democrats not in favor of democratization and peace?

Baykal also emphasizes that the “Turkish identity” and the definition of “Turkishness” as mentioned in Article 66 of the Constitution, calling “everyone a Turk,” cannot be altered. Are social democrats not in favor of the equality of citizens, regardless of their ethnic origin?

The CHP is not because it is no longer a social-democratic political movement but a party competing with the ultranationalist MHP by adopting an even more chauvinistic discourse. Baykal refused to meet with the coordinating minister, Beşir Atalay, to share his ideas and proposals addressing the Kurdish question. Instead, the government was criticized for not having spelled out a clear idea, a package of measures.

There is nothing new in Baykal's and the CHP's objection to “progress.” They voted against the revision of Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code (TCK), fiercely opposed a reform law on non-Muslim foundations, countered a solution to the Cyprus problem in 2002-2004, rejected a new and democratic constitution and tried to block the way of the European Union accession process.

So the CHP and Baykal not only fought in the past for a radical and undemocratic notion of secularism that threatens democracy, they are now trying to block the way for a solution to the Kurdish question, a question that blocks Turkey's full democratization. Theirs is a fear of democracy.

The CHP represents the founding mistakes of the republic -- that Turkey belongs to the “Turks” (leading to the policies of kicking out the non-Turkish populace, including the Armenians, the Greeks, and the Jews and the Turkification of the Kurds), yet the Turks cannot be left on their own to chose who is to rule in a democratic regime (establishing the vanguard of the Kemalist elite in the CHP, the military and the judiciary).

This Kemalist model is no longer sustainable. In fact, the current search for a solution to the Kurdish question is an admission of the failure of the Kemalist/nationalist model (imagining and coercively constructing a homogenous nation) that is still upheld by the CHP and the MHP.

The CHP's socialism has long been dead. If they somehow continue claiming to be socialists, they can only be called a “national socialist” party. To complete this picture Baykal only needs to grow a thin moustache.

17 August 2009

Who should lead the ‘Kurdish solution’?

 “Good things” don't happen on their own; they need “good people” who make them happen. Those “good people” should also know this; the steps taken regarding finding a solution to the Kurdish problem and the initiatives to this end are not being received negatively with society overall; quite to the contrary, they are being absorbed rather well. The most striking example of this is the lifting of capital punishment after Abdullah Öcalan was sentenced to death. Furthermore, an establishment of dialogue between the Kurdish administration of Iraq, formal-level relations with Iraq's ethnically Kurdish president, mutual visits and talks and TRT's Kurdish channel all point to the fact that there is societal support for the steps being taken and reactions will remain limited.

However, it may not be possible to manage an overall perception that a solution package (or Kurdish initiative) will come into being as a result of negotiations with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Therefore, the main basis for an encompassing “pre-solution strategy” should be political and social reforms. Among these reforms, there needs to be an emphasis on equity in constitutional reforms and a clear ban of ethnically motivated discrimination, alongside the “normalization” of Kurdish in the public arena and initiatives to make the language more visible.

However, as contact or negotiation with the PKK has become a prominent issue, receiving priority (or portraying such an image) will cause the period of resolution to become unmanageable in addition to increasing the “political bill” to an amount that cannot be withstood.

The second leg of a solution strategy requires (or should give the appearance) that while conducting the contact, talks/negotiation, laying down of arms and amnesty aspects of the process, the presidency leads the negotiations and not the government. The stance displayed by President Abdullah Gül thus has been conducive to actualizing this mission. With the president's first tour being to the Southeast, his becoming the first president following Turgut Özal to establish close ties with the people and nongovernmental organizations of the region and the dialogue he has created with Iraq's Kurdish President Jalal Talabani have all helped ease his playing an active role in this period of resolution.

The president, through playing an active role, can also fulfill the desire of Kurdish constituents to face a power that represents the government instead of “sensitive and timid” political actors.

As the main actor in the Kurdish initiative, the government may enter a phase of unsustainability when one considers the political risks and costs associated with the procedure along with the limitations on the predictability of developments and lack of opportunity for supervision. One of the ways in which the process can be made sustainable is by putting forth an authority that is above politics or the government. This should not mean that the Kurdish problem should be entrusted to powers above politics. On the contrary, I am speaking of a solution strategy in which the will of the government is in full support and legal and political steps are being taken; however, the “ownership” of the solution project is entrusted to the president.

Let me state right away one of the reasons for this. In a Kurdish solution wherein the government appears to be in the forefront, those who don't want to leave the glory of having enacted a solution in the government's hands may sabotage the efforts even if the solution seems very near and possible. In other words, those in opposition to the AK Party will not allow it to experience the honor and benefits of having solved the Kurdish problem. These include the PKK and the DTP in addition to the known opposition to the party, be they organizations, individuals or groups.

Therefore, in order for the period of solution to be managed in a politically risk- and cost-free manner by the government, and, in the event of negotiations being successful, for the “sharing of glory” of having found a solution not to be transformed into a factor for sabotage, it is more appropriate that the president is “shown” as the “address” for the solution.

27 July 2009, Monday

Opposition party appeals to military, not people

As I keep saying, the No. 1 problem in Turkish politics is the absence of a viable and democratic alternative to the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party).

To have a functioning democracy, one needs to have an alternative political movement that is capable of challenging the ruling party. Otherwise, there emerges a dominant-party system that is not healthy especially in countries like Turkey, where democracy is still in the process of being consolidated.

But the main opposition party, the Republican People's Party (CHP), does everything it can to distance itself from the democratic majority of the country. The latest example of this is its insistence to take the latest amendments in the Turkish Penal Code (TCK) and the Code on Criminal Procedure (CMK) -- which bar the trial of civilians on any account by military courts and enable the trial of military personnel who are suspect of forming gangs, terrorism, and crimes against the Constitution, which includes military coup attempts, by civilian courts -- to the Constitutional Court.

What is wrong with this new law? It is a move that enhances the civilian and democratic character of Turkey, and as such is applauded by the European Union. But somehow, the CHP is annoyed by this. Can you imagine a social democratic party advocating the trial of civilians by military courts, where, apart from military judges with law degrees, a professional officer sits as a member? They are also courts where the members are hierarchically subordinated within the military.

Moreover, CHP leader Deniz Baykal argues that coup attempts should be tried in military courts. Imagine a military institutionally committed to staging a coup and left to try its own coup-makers!

We had, in fact, a perfect trial of coup makers by a military court in 1958. An army major, Samet Kuşçu, raised the alarm on the group that was planning to stage a military coup. Nine high-ranking officers were arrested and tried by the military court. The verdict was fantastic: the nine were cleared off the charge while the informer, Kuşçu, was dishonorably discharged from the army and sentenced to two years in prison for slander. But in May 1960, when the military staged the coup, the nine officers tried and released were one of the cells of the junta, and the head of the court, Cemal Tural, was also among them!

So Baykal seems to be satisfied with the justice of those who are prepared to commit a constitutional crime. There can be no other leader claiming to be a social democrat that has such faith in possible criminals within the military. I wonder what the members of Socialists International think about their Turkish colleagues and why they continue to maintain the membership of the CHP in this worldwide organization of social “democrats.”

Allying with the military does not pay off in democratic elections. This should have been properly understood by CHP leaders over the last 50 years, during which they have never won an election to form a majority government. People love and trust their military, but whenever they go to the polls they vote for the party that sits furthest from the military. So what the CHP has been doing does not make sense politically.

The CHP has been stuck with 20 percent of the vote as the main opposition party. This has not changed in the 2004 local elections, in the July 2007 general elections and in the March 2009 elections. Unless the CHP parts ways with the authoritarian elements within the military, it cannot legitimately claim to be a democratic actor that can attract people's interest.

13 July 2009, Monday