Who should lead the ‘Kurdish solution’?

 “Good things” don't happen on their own; they need “good people” who make them happen. Those “good people” should also know this; the steps taken regarding finding a solution to the Kurdish problem and the initiatives to this end are not being received negatively with society overall; quite to the contrary, they are being absorbed rather well. The most striking example of this is the lifting of capital punishment after Abdullah Öcalan was sentenced to death. Furthermore, an establishment of dialogue between the Kurdish administration of Iraq, formal-level relations with Iraq's ethnically Kurdish president, mutual visits and talks and TRT's Kurdish channel all point to the fact that there is societal support for the steps being taken and reactions will remain limited.

However, it may not be possible to manage an overall perception that a solution package (or Kurdish initiative) will come into being as a result of negotiations with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Therefore, the main basis for an encompassing “pre-solution strategy” should be political and social reforms. Among these reforms, there needs to be an emphasis on equity in constitutional reforms and a clear ban of ethnically motivated discrimination, alongside the “normalization” of Kurdish in the public arena and initiatives to make the language more visible.

However, as contact or negotiation with the PKK has become a prominent issue, receiving priority (or portraying such an image) will cause the period of resolution to become unmanageable in addition to increasing the “political bill” to an amount that cannot be withstood.

The second leg of a solution strategy requires (or should give the appearance) that while conducting the contact, talks/negotiation, laying down of arms and amnesty aspects of the process, the presidency leads the negotiations and not the government. The stance displayed by President Abdullah Gül thus has been conducive to actualizing this mission. With the president's first tour being to the Southeast, his becoming the first president following Turgut Özal to establish close ties with the people and nongovernmental organizations of the region and the dialogue he has created with Iraq's Kurdish President Jalal Talabani have all helped ease his playing an active role in this period of resolution.

The president, through playing an active role, can also fulfill the desire of Kurdish constituents to face a power that represents the government instead of “sensitive and timid” political actors.

As the main actor in the Kurdish initiative, the government may enter a phase of unsustainability when one considers the political risks and costs associated with the procedure along with the limitations on the predictability of developments and lack of opportunity for supervision. One of the ways in which the process can be made sustainable is by putting forth an authority that is above politics or the government. This should not mean that the Kurdish problem should be entrusted to powers above politics. On the contrary, I am speaking of a solution strategy in which the will of the government is in full support and legal and political steps are being taken; however, the “ownership” of the solution project is entrusted to the president.

Let me state right away one of the reasons for this. In a Kurdish solution wherein the government appears to be in the forefront, those who don't want to leave the glory of having enacted a solution in the government's hands may sabotage the efforts even if the solution seems very near and possible. In other words, those in opposition to the AK Party will not allow it to experience the honor and benefits of having solved the Kurdish problem. These include the PKK and the DTP in addition to the known opposition to the party, be they organizations, individuals or groups.

Therefore, in order for the period of solution to be managed in a politically risk- and cost-free manner by the government, and, in the event of negotiations being successful, for the “sharing of glory” of having found a solution not to be transformed into a factor for sabotage, it is more appropriate that the president is “shown” as the “address” for the solution.

27 July 2009, Monday

Opposition party appeals to military, not people

As I keep saying, the No. 1 problem in Turkish politics is the absence of a viable and democratic alternative to the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party).

To have a functioning democracy, one needs to have an alternative political movement that is capable of challenging the ruling party. Otherwise, there emerges a dominant-party system that is not healthy especially in countries like Turkey, where democracy is still in the process of being consolidated.

But the main opposition party, the Republican People's Party (CHP), does everything it can to distance itself from the democratic majority of the country. The latest example of this is its insistence to take the latest amendments in the Turkish Penal Code (TCK) and the Code on Criminal Procedure (CMK) -- which bar the trial of civilians on any account by military courts and enable the trial of military personnel who are suspect of forming gangs, terrorism, and crimes against the Constitution, which includes military coup attempts, by civilian courts -- to the Constitutional Court.

What is wrong with this new law? It is a move that enhances the civilian and democratic character of Turkey, and as such is applauded by the European Union. But somehow, the CHP is annoyed by this. Can you imagine a social democratic party advocating the trial of civilians by military courts, where, apart from military judges with law degrees, a professional officer sits as a member? They are also courts where the members are hierarchically subordinated within the military.

Moreover, CHP leader Deniz Baykal argues that coup attempts should be tried in military courts. Imagine a military institutionally committed to staging a coup and left to try its own coup-makers!

We had, in fact, a perfect trial of coup makers by a military court in 1958. An army major, Samet Kuşçu, raised the alarm on the group that was planning to stage a military coup. Nine high-ranking officers were arrested and tried by the military court. The verdict was fantastic: the nine were cleared off the charge while the informer, Kuşçu, was dishonorably discharged from the army and sentenced to two years in prison for slander. But in May 1960, when the military staged the coup, the nine officers tried and released were one of the cells of the junta, and the head of the court, Cemal Tural, was also among them!

So Baykal seems to be satisfied with the justice of those who are prepared to commit a constitutional crime. There can be no other leader claiming to be a social democrat that has such faith in possible criminals within the military. I wonder what the members of Socialists International think about their Turkish colleagues and why they continue to maintain the membership of the CHP in this worldwide organization of social “democrats.”

Allying with the military does not pay off in democratic elections. This should have been properly understood by CHP leaders over the last 50 years, during which they have never won an election to form a majority government. People love and trust their military, but whenever they go to the polls they vote for the party that sits furthest from the military. So what the CHP has been doing does not make sense politically.

The CHP has been stuck with 20 percent of the vote as the main opposition party. This has not changed in the 2004 local elections, in the July 2007 general elections and in the March 2009 elections. Unless the CHP parts ways with the authoritarian elements within the military, it cannot legitimately claim to be a democratic actor that can attract people's interest.

13 July 2009, Monday

Can the islamic republic survive?

Participatory politics are hard to control for those at the height of political echelons, even if this is a regime like Iran's, which over the years has developed mechanisms of social and political engineering. Once people are asked to choose, this is it. There is no way to turn back. Participatory politics develop their own dynamics and culture.

Iran has experienced some degree of participatory politics since 1979, and no doubt, its Islamic regime has enjoyed a high level of legitimacy incomparable to many Arab regimes in the region.

But now that the top leadership, as opposition forces in Iran claim, is not respecting the outcome of people's votes, trouble has started for the regime, which cannot generate legitimacy without popular participation.

Yes, the post-revolutionary regime in Iran has enjoyed high legitimacy. But the legitimacy that was enjoyed by the regime in Iran had two pillars: First was the ideological component of the revolution, and second, was the popular base of the revolution.

As for the ideological pillar, the opposition does not seem to be challenging the “founding” principles of Iran's Islamic regime. They do not question Khomeini's theory of Velayat-i Faqih or the ideological elements in the Iranian constitution. However, the opposition argues that an Islamic republic does not mean a dictatorship of the jurists or of the Revolutionary Guards. It is a republic that respects people's choices. This means that the opposition directed at Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, who won the disputed presidential election, is one coming from within.

Mir Hossein Moussavi's revolutionary credentials cannot be questioned: He served for years as prime minister when Khomeini was the supreme leader. His point is clear and sharp: an Islamic republic should conduct free, fair and competitive elections, as happened many times in the past. His is therefore not a radical departure, denying past practices and principles. On the contrary, Moussavi and his supporters claim to fight against those who have deviated, by rigging the election, from the true spirit of the revolution.

This is a strong position that protects the opposition leader from charges of being a “counter-revolutionary,” giving him some space for maneuvering. By resisting the outright authoritarian tendencies of the current power elite, the opposition is attempting to keep very important breathing space for the ordinary people: the right to vote and choose (even among those who are selected beforehand by the Guardian Council).

The defense of the right of the masses to participate in electing their country's political leaders can indeed be justified via references to the revolution and its true spirit.

As I mentioned above, the second pillar of the revolution was its popular support. The revolution was essentially the making of the people. The 1979 upheaval was a mass movement. It was the power of the people that overthrew the Shah's regime. Thus the revolutionary leaders knew from the onset that the very legitimacy of the revolution was derived from the people's power. Out of the recognition of the power of the people, post-revolutionary leaders institutionalized popular participation in public decisions making progress that has turned out to be a self-defeating process as the power elite in Tehran now tries to limit it.

Thus the revolutionary leaders allowed participatory politics within an ideological framework, which together constituted the dual bases of legitimacy for the Islamic republic.

Yet what we are witnessing currently is the dynamics of participatory politics, which was brought into the system by the revolution itself, pushing the limits of ideological premises and radical revolutionary actors.

Without a fair participatory mechanism, Iran will turn into an utterly totalitarian regime that can survive only by sheer oppression. But for how long?

22 June 2009, Monday

Islamization of population by the Kemalists?

What happened to the non-Muslims in this country was not the making of fascism, but nationalism and the quest to establish a nation-state assumed to be free of different ethnic and religious identities. Such a project was particularly difficult for a country like Turkey, which had been the home of different ethnic and religious groups under the roof of the Ottoman Empire.

Nonetheless, the history of the late Ottoman Empire in the age of nationalism provided a groundwork for the need to establish a national (Turkish) state as almost all ethnic components of the empire embraced the idea of a nation-state of their own. The non-Muslim groups, particularly the Armenians and Greeks remaining in Anatolia, emerged as “foreign elements” in the empire and then in the republic. This was to some extent a response to the history of the late Ottoman Empire, where foreign powers used the non-Muslims within the empire to expand their power and influence over the empire's territories. In the age of nationalism, each ethnic group was also prone to establish foreign alignments so as to achieve their national aspirations. The history of disintegration, especially in the Balkans and later in the Middle East, built-in Turkey a national psyche that viewed non-Muslims as the extensions of foreign powers.

Besides this, the search for a nation-state was thought to require religious and ethnic homogeneity. During the republican era, while Islam was excluded from the public sphere through radical secularization policies, the state pursued a policy of Islamization of the population. The exchange of population with Greece took religious differences as the point of departure. Those who were subjected to forced immigration were separated on the basis of their religion. The homogenization of the population was certainly a means to establish a nation-state for both Turkey and Greece.

Moreover, the homogenization of the people through the exchange of populations and forced immigration made it possible to close Turkey off from the world since the non-Muslim elements were the most cosmopolitan groups in Turkey. As they were forced to leave the country, Turkey turned ever more inward, enabling the Kemalist elite to pursue an authoritarian modernization project that situated its elite at the center of power independent of the world powers.

The result was that the creation of a nation-state out of an empire was traumatic not only for the non-Muslims but also for the Muslims since the new nation-state regarded all collective identities except the Turkish national identity as a deviation threatening the supreme state identity. The state demanded allegiances of all sorts. Any collective identity independent of the state constructed an alternative source of allegiance, thus threatening the single professed and forced identity of the state.

This was an attitude very similar to the Ottoman Empire in the age of expansion that never allowed the emergence of alternative centers of power and authority that might appear to be competing with the center.

Likewise, in the republican era, different identities, be they ethnic or religious or even ideological in more recent times, were regarded as divisive. An identity that demands allegiance from the citizens of the Republic constituted a threat to the consolidation and sustainability of the Kemalist identity.

So the problem, in essence, is the difficulty of the nation-state to live together with plural identities. It may be possible to deny and even repress ethnic or religious identities in an authoritarian polity, but contemporary liberal democracy requires respect for “difference.” To pursue a policy of assimilation or expulsion of ethnic and religious minorities is no longer possible. Yet this is not enough. Facing the past and confessing mistakes that went contrary not only to the contemporary notion of pluralism but also to the conventional Ottoman practice of tolerance and coexistence is necessary to move forward.


01 June 2009

Why is it the right time to solve the Kurdish question?

It has become increasingly clear that the Kurdish question can neither be solved through the use of force by the Turkish state nor by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). This has been understood by all sides.

The current state of affairs does not benefit anyone. The only way out of this “lose-lose” situation is a solution that is a joint settlement by the fighting sides, the PKK and the Turkish state.

Many agree that domestic, regional and international developments are forcing the sides to contemplate new moves in addressing the question. I think the state and the PKK have exhausted all options apart from goodwill in order to achieve peace.

The PKK understands it cannot win a war with the Turkish state. There is no justification for using violence for political objectives in this age of a “global war on terror” in which no political end can justify the use of force as a strategy to get it. Besides, the domestic and international ground on which the PKK took root has changed. Turkey is not the country in which a guerrilla war was waged in 1985 when the Kurdish identity and even ethnicity were denied and speaking Kurdish in public was forbidden. Back then, the Southeast was under martial law, the State Security Court (DGM) was active, sentencing anyone who mentioned the existence of Kurds, and prisons were notorious.

It is still not completely satisfactory, but Turkey's official approach to the question is dramatically different now. The Kurdish ethnicity is recognized as a reality even by the chief of general staff, let alone the prime minister and the president. A pro-Kurdish party with very close links to the PKK is represented in Parliament. Political reforms introduced since 1999 have changed the way in which the Kurdish question is seen. The expression and representation of the Kurdish identity have never been this possible in Turkey. The state established a TV station broadcasting in Kurdish, a development that would have been regarded as inconceivable only some five years ago. Even killings committed by the “deep state” in southeastern Turkey in the 1990s are being investigated as part of the Ergenekon investigation.

Under these circumstances, it is impossible to justify the use of force in the name of “Kurdish rights.” I think this is the sense shared by most Kurds in the region. Political means developed so far are capable of bringing about a peaceful solution. The rise of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) in the region and among Kurds in general also indicates that the Kurds demand not only a recognition of their identity but also welfare and peace. People are tired of the downward spiral of violence.

Moreover, international circumstances force Kurdish politics and the PKK to search for accommodation. The PKK has been listed as a terrorist organization by the European Union and the US, making its political and economic activities in these areas very difficult. Furthermore, these two powerful blocks are increasingly rediscovering Turkey's importance in the region as an ally. Without Turkey, it is hard to make and maintain peace in the Middle East and the Caucasus. Turkey's role as a democratic and secular state is extremely valuable for the West in efforts to avoid a clash of civilizations. Securing energy transfer from Eurasia to Europe in a diversified way requires Turkey's cooperation. Above all, the EU is conducting full membership negotiations with Turkey. Thus it looks for a stabilized Turkey that can develop peaceful relations with neighboring countries to the west, the east and the south.

The US also attributes great value to Turkish cooperation in light of its experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. As Turkey's political weight increases, as has been the case in recent years, Turkey's ability to use it as leverage over the PKK increases as well. Thus Turkey's Western allies are evermore inclined to buy Turkey's arguments, which are accompanied by a series of reforms on the domestic front toward the Kurds.

What is also important is the attitude of the Iraqi Kurds. After establishing their position in northern Iraq, they began viewing the PKK as an irritant for the consolidation of their power there. The presence of PKK camps in northern Iraq turns this region into a target for Turkey. But Turkey's goodwill is necessary for the economic and political viability of the regional authority. The Kurds in Iraq also see the PKK as a source of tension for their working relationship with the US, without which they cannot survive in the region.

Take all these together, and it becomes clear that the use of violence is neither justifiable nor sustainable. These are thus the best days to find a solution. President Abdullah Gül, in coordination with some state institutions, is taking bold steps. They should be reciprocated before it becomes too late, as some have already moved to weaken President Gül's political power and legitimacy by opening up a legal way for his trial.

25 May 2009, Monday

The militarist right as an alternative to the AK Party

It is an old habit in Turkey to design popular politics by political engineering at the top. As democracy is all about the choices people make at the ballot box among competing parties, some elites in the center hopelessly try to influence this process by introducing “fake” political parties to manipulate the political realm. But the Turkish history of democracy is a graveyard of such political parties and projects.

The latest example of the attempt for political engineering at the top is the election of Hüsamettin Cindoruk as the leader of the Democrat Party (DP) in the extraordinary party congress this weekend. It is a project that is impossible: to convince the center-right people it meant to reach out to. I will explain why.

The DP was originally founded in 1946 by Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, and others. Four years after its establishment, in 1950, it won Turkey's first free and competitive elections, taking over the government from the Republican People's Party (CHP), which had ruled the country in a single-party regime since 1923.

The victory of the DP in 1950 was a reflection of the people's longing for an accountable and representative government after years of an authoritarian single-party regime. By 1950, the public started to matter, power was transferred to the people from the bureaucracy dominated by the CHP.

The DP was a liberal party; instead of dictating what people should think, believe in or wear, it was more concerned with bringing about services to people, fighting poverty, the modernization of agriculture and industrialization, as well as anchoring Turkey in the West by becoming a member of NATO.

From the 1950s onward, the CHP, which represents the ideology of the bureaucratic center, has never won a majority in the Parliament to form a government of its own. As the agent of the single-party rule in the '20s, '30s, and '40s, it was as if the CHP was cursed to lose in a democracy. The DP won two more elections in 1954 and 1957.

But the bureaucratic center hit back with a military coup in 1960, overthrowing the government, closing down the Parliament and establishing a special tribunal to try the DP government and members of Parliament. The military regime eventually closed down the party and hanged Prime Minister Menderes along with two other members of his government.

As such, 1960 not only started a chain of military coups but, due to what it did to the DP, it also shaped the democratic conscience of the Turkish people, at least the people with a center-right orientation, underlining the supremacy of national will and the Parliament vis-à-vis bureaucratic interventions of the judiciary and the military.

Center-right politics thus developed, attributing the greatest value to the supremacy of the Parliament and the elected vis-à-vis the appointed, which includes the military and judiciary. Such political virtues and non-ideological developmentalist approaches to politics in the center-right, under different political parties, dominated Turkish politics in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s as well.

The DP re-entered the Turkish political scene just before the July 2007 elections as part of a project to unite the center-right. But it got only 5 percent of the vote, losing the center-right voters to the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) once more. One of the reasons for this was that DP leaders sided with undemocratic interventions of the time, like the 367 quorum debate in Parliament for the election of the president and the April 27, 2007 e-memorandum issued by the military.

The person who was elected as the new leader of the DP was one of the architects of these pre-2007 election undemocratic intervention attempts. Moreover, Cindoruk had actively supported the Feb. 28, 1997 military intervention, too. Such a personality cannot represent the tradition of the DP and the center-right, let alone unite them. What he can unite is not the center-right, but the “militarist right.”

What is disappointing is that some circles still expect Cindoruk to come up with an alternative. I think they are incapable of understanding the dynamics of Turkish politics. The True Path Party (DYP) and the Motherland Party (ANAVATAN) disappeared in the 2007 elections because they looked to be collaborating with the bureaucratic center (the military and the judiciary) to design politics by non-democratic means. They were punished then. This new attempt led by a politician who champions the military and judiciary's role in intervening in politics will be punished as well. No one should underestimate the democratic conscience and reactions of the masses.

What Turkey needs, as I keep writing, is a political party that is more progressive than the AK Party and one which is committed to democracy, a market economy and membership in the EU.

18 May 2009, Monday

Davutoğlu: Turkey’s new foreign policy chief

With the recent Cabinet reshuffle, Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu has been appointed as Turkey's minister of foreign affairs. Such an appointment was hardly a surprise since it is no secret that he has been the architect of Turkey's foreign policy under the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government as the chief foreign policy advisor to the prime minister.

Professor Davutoğlu's appearance on the stage is timely. He brings a strong personality to tackle tough issues such as the Armenian rapprochement, the rebuilding of Turkish-US relations and the brokering of peace in the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Afghanistan. His vision, experience, and personal contacts, all backed up now by political power in the Cabinet, will be needed to address these issues.

He is presented as a "strategist" due to his seminal book, "Strategic Depth," but such a label undervalues his vision for Turkish foreign policy. During the AK Party years, he initiated policies that went beyond simple realpolitik strategic calculations.

Take the example of policy of "zero problems with neighbors," which marks a revolutionary change in the Turkish perception of the external world. I say revolutionary because it is a radical departure from the conventional view that Turkey is surrounded by enemy countries against which it should be prepared to defend itself. This was a worldview based on an amalgam of insecurity, antagonism, confrontation, and short-sighted realism. Moreover, this "siege mentality" was used to create and justify authoritarian elements in Turkish politics.

The zero problems policy has redefined Turkey's relations with its neighbors. The avenues of mutual understanding, trust, and cooperation were opened with this change of perspective. As such, a liberal approach based on cooperation instead of confrontation was inserted in foreign policy, embracing a non-zero sum strategy benefiting all parties involved.

In sum, the Davutoğlu perspective has broken the siege mentality in Turkey's regional politics, contributing democratic openings at home while establishing good neighborly relationships with surrounding countries. That is to say that democratic peace at home turned into a vision for peace in the neighborhood.

All these help Turkey emerge as a center of "soft power" in the region. Davutoğlu, the architect of this policy, made clear that "Turkey's most important soft power tool is its democracy." Thus, it is expected that Turkish foreign policy under Davutoğlu is likely to also contribute to democratization in order to improve Turkey's attractiveness in the region.

Engaging with all actors in the region to settle problems will also continue in the new era. Turkey has invested much to win the trust of all actors in the region. No one doubts Turkey's sincerity. This is due to the fact that Turkey does not see its engagements with regional actors as means to increase its influence in the region, but to build peace in the surrounding area, because peace and stability are needed for Turkey to continue with the consolidation of democracy at home, secure full membership in the EU and sustain its economic development. Nothing else.

We will continue to see culture and identity being brought into Turkish foreign policymaking. This is, in fact, in line with the theoretical discovery of these issues in international relations literature.

Turkey's cultural and economic space goes beyond its political boundaries, as is the case for many other countries. The trick is to conduct foreign policy that goes in line with this reality. Turkey's wider cultural geography may enable it to reach out to people in the region and develop contacts at the inter-societal level, thus creating a social bond of understanding and interaction, while its wider economic geography establishes unbreakable linkages and interdependencies.

All this is likely to make cooperation stronger and even unbreakable by engaging with social and economic sectors, rather than mere political entities.

Yet Davutoğlu's emphasis on multi-dimensional and integrated foreign policy may be interpreted by some circles as turning away from the West, including the EU. He may be portrayed as a person preferring Turkey's greater engagement in the East and the region with a "neo-Ottoman" perspective. On this, I think Davutoğlu should be very careful and emphasize that Turkey's engagement in the region is complementary to its Western vocation.

04 May 2009