A new state policy on the Kurdish question?

There are signs that the "state policy" toward the Kurdish question may be entering a process of change. Some retired generals, including the leader of the 1980 military coup, Gen. Kenan Evren, have admitted that they made some mistakes in the past. The ban on speaking Kurdish in public was clearly described as a mistake by Evren who, nevertheless, did not mention the treatment of the inmates under the military junta in the notorious Diyarbakir Military Prison which served, thanks to the junta's violent policies, for years as a recruitment center for the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).

But even such an admission is progress and maybe a sign of changing policy. Another sign in this direction is the proposal of Republican People's Party (CHP) leader Deniz Baykal for a cooperative relationship with the Iraqi Kurds.

CHP leader Baykal surprised many by his latest maneuvering on the issue of northern Iraq. It is really hard to understand the U-turn Baykal made last week given the fact that he had called for an immediate military operation into the region that would target the Iraqi regional government too. What has happened to prompt Baykal to come up with a list of social and political measures that go against his original idea of crushing the regional government in northern Iraq?
Some argue that he is trying to win the support of the party branches in southeastern Turkey for the CHP's upcoming party congress. Well, I do not really think so. A party and leadership so closely linked to the state elite would not move independently on such a crucial issue. Baykal's new stand might be part of a changing state policy on the Kurdish question.

Offering educational opportunities for the Iraqi Kurds, increasing the volume of trade, opening a new border post and sharing water resources evenly and cooperatively are elements of a liberal solution to the issue of how to engage with the Kurds in northern Iraq. Many other measures can be added to this, but these are geared to increase economic and social cooperation, leading to an unbreakable interdependence between the two sides.

The shift from a confrontational perspective to one of cooperation and interdependence should be welcome. But some of his critics within the party and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) spokespersons have already started questioning Baykal's loyalty to the notion of a unitary nation-state. This reminds us why we should avoid using extreme terms like treason when discussing politics. Baykal used that a lot. Now it is being used against him. Just a few weeks ago he was accusing Prime Minister Erdoğan of being Barzani's man; now he is the one whose discourse Barzani sympathizes with.

For the last 80 years neither the denial of Kurdish ethnic identity nor torture in the Diyarbakir Military Prison and the ban on speaking Kurdish in public has solved the problem.
If there is a new approach developing to address the Kurdish question it cannot help but tackle a broader issue. The century-old objective, which turned into a state tradition, of creating a homogenous nation by using the coercive apparatus of the state should be abandoned.
The republican regime should give up its tradition of fighting against the social currents through state power, a tradition that destroys pluralism, democracy and the rule of law. This is the basis of the problem. We had better understand that a Jacobin approach is no way a solution to social problems. Without questioning the Jacobin tradition of imposing the state's views and preferences on the people, be it the Kurds, the liberals, the Alevis or Muslims with headscarves, we cannot proceed with establishing social peace in this country. Repressive state policies are the main obstacle to peace, harmony and social integration. Let the people be, whatever or whoever they are. The state has no right to "define" and "impose" social, religious or ethnic identities on its people. Since we Turks have a majority in this country we cannot deny the right of the Kurds to be different and remain so. Respect for minority rights, be it ethnic, religious, political or sexual, is not only the basis of legitimacy for any polity but also of social peace.
12.11.2007

Mistakes the Americans made

We could never have imagined -- even after the end of the Cold War -- that the Turkish people and the state elite would have come to view the US as an enemy threatening Turkey’s security and integrity. Even five years ago we could never imagine that Turkish-American relations would have ended up with such poisonous mistrust and misunderstanding on both sides. But it happened. Lately, there has been a growing perception that the US supports the PKK and prefers the Iraqi Kurds to its old ally, Turkey. In short, it seems to the public and the state elite that the US is not only abandoning Turkey as an ally and friend but is also confronting it as an adversary. If you look at the way we are debating the issues of the PKK and northern Iraq, it seems as if we are on the verge of a war against the US, which has been our ally for the last 60 years.

This breakdown in relations between the two countries will have domestic, regional and global implications. The position of anti-Western circles in Turkey who call for an end to NATO membership, oppose EU membership and fight against globalization will be vindicated and strengthened. Will the US’ strategic interests be better served if Turkey comes under the influence of these forces? What are the great strategic outcomes of such an adventurist political agenda for the region or for the US?

The US needs to seriously change the attitude it has adopted towards Turkey, which is pushing Turkey to look for a strategic partnership in the East. In 2002, when such a prospect was voiced by Gen. Tuncer Kılınç, then the secretary-general of the National Security Council, it regarded as a laughing matter, a careless and visionless statement. Some five years have passed and now we see increasing numbers of people, including security elite and analysts, talking of an Eurasian union as a viable policy option.

To me, the idea of Turkey forging a strategic alliance with Russia, Iran, and China is still a fantasy -- and a dangerous one, at that. But the increasing popularity of this fantasy is a sign, among others, of Turkey’s growing disillusionment with the US over the last four years.

The US administration made mistakes, serious ones. It never bothered to take into account the security risks for its ally, Turkey, posed by its occupation of Iraq. It refrained from addressing the concerns of Turkey and it refused to work cooperatively. This attitude resulted in the exclusion of Turkey from the developments that took place close to its border with Iraq. As was predicted, this allowed the development of a serious threat to Turkey’s national security. Turkey’s cooperation with the US was reduced in March 2003 with the decision of Parliament to not allow American troops to pass through Turkish territory. Following this decision, Turkish institutions, including the government, the military, and even the main opposition party, came under harsh criticism from high-ranking American officials. Meanwhile, an understanding developed in Turkey that the US was “punishing Turkey” for Parliament’s decision.

What was worse was that the US administration meddled in Turkish politics at the expense of its image as an ally, which requires remaining above the squabbles of day-to-day politics. The US’s actions may be calculated to capitalize on and exploit domestic divisions between the ruling party and the opposition parties and also between the military and the government. But this pulled the US into domestic political struggles, eventually alienating all sides involved. At one stage the Americans seemed to side with the government against the military, which was criticized for not supporting the March resolution. Such incidents naturally increased sympathy for the US in AK Party circles. But the time also came when the AK Party seemed to be abandoned in the face of the military’s growing threats of intervention against the government.

We can all remember how long it took for the US administration to come out against the so-called e-memorandum threatening a direct military coup on April 27. The US was also accused of plotting against the republican regime by supporting the “moderate Islam” represented by the AK Party, which was seen as furthering the “Greater Middle East Project” of the US.

In short, by meddling in Turkish domestic politics the US has ended up alienating almost all groups.

Furthermore, Hamas’ visit to Ankara was exaggerated and turned into yet another excuse to punish Turkey by some radical elements of the Jewish lobby, which alienated not only the government but also the vast majority of people who sympathize with the Palestinians. The energy deal with Iran was also subject to overreaction, indicating that the US was not prepared to understand Turkey’s need to diversify its energy resources for its growing economy and population.

Is the US administration aware of these and other mistakes they have made? Given all these considerations and the current issue with the PKK, it is time for the Americans to rethink their stance on Turkey.
08.11.2007

Rights and wrongs in the fight against the PKK

We can live with terror, like many other nations in the world fighting against it and bearing its pains. But the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terror is different. It poses an existential threat to Turkey because it is part of a broader Kurdish question. Fighting against the PKK is not simply a fight against a terrorist organization. It requires a broader approach than security measures. The extent to which this broader Kurdish issue is addressed helps to eliminate the PKK in the medium to long term.
But once again we seem to have reduced the issue to hit the PKK presence in northern Iraq as if it will resolve the problem for good. Preoccupation with security measures makes us lose our perspective. The securitization that we are increasingly witnessing nowadays is not the solution but the problem. Since 1925, following the Sheikh Said rebellion, Turkey has chosen "securitization" to deal with the Kurdish issue. What is the outcome? The unresolved Kurdish problem has obstructed the development of Turkish democracy.

It is good to mobilize public support against terror. But what would be the target of those angry masses? They are likely to get out of hand, increasing the possibility of provocations in various parts of Turkey. We should not forget that Turkey experienced the dreadful event of Sept. 6-7, 1955, in Istanbul and Izmir, where an angry mob attacked non-Muslim citizens. Years later, it was admitted that the Sept. 6-7 event was the doing of a "special war unit" within the Turkish security forces and it was described by one of its former commanders as a "successful psychological war operation."
The public mood is ready for similar raids against "Kurdish targets" in big cities with sizeable Kurdish populations. Prevention of such a provocation should be the number-one priority for the government, much more important than a cross-border operation.

In the struggle against the PKK, the key to success is to isolate it. An isolated terror organization with its social and political bases cut off cannot survive for long. Even if it maintains some of its cells it will cease to pose an existential threat to Turkey. And we can deal with such a terror organization.
The thing to do to isolate the PKK as a terror organization and cut off its links with the Kurdish community is to eliminate the ground on which it grows -- and that is to solve the Kurdish question. For the last six to seven years Turkey has taken significant steps in improving the state of the Kurds in the cultural, political and economic domains. However limited, these should be carried on.
In this context, the continuation of the Justice and Development Party's (AK Party) link with the Kurdish people is essential to enable the representation of those people in the center of Turkish politics. Without forgetting the nationalist credentials of the AK Party, I would argue that the AK Party also represents the Kurdish identity and interest, as reflected in the latest election and referendum results. The capability of the AK Party to reach out to the Kurdish people should be maintained. We should not push the AK Party into the fire over the northern Iraq issue and break up its rapprochement with the Kurds in this country.

The PKK leaders should be very happy about the last couple of weeks. Their terror acts have reached their objective of elevating the PKK to the place of a relevant entity in both Turkish and regional politics. We have caused the entire world to talk of the PKK. Our anger and reaction provided the PKK with a perfect propaganda outlet. This is not the way to fight terrorism. Gen. İlker Başbuğ complained the other week that Turkey had failed in preventing new PKK recruits. But this attitude of exaggerating the power of the PKK paves the way for new requirements to the terror organization. The power of the PKK is in no way comparable to that of the early 1990s when it was even poised to take control of some cities in the region.

I think Turkey should not exaggerate the PKK -- on the contrary, it should ignore it altogether. There are understandable reasons for the recent outrage against PKK violence. Yet we should be able to play it down and reduce the tension among the people. We may even direct this anger and resentment into a positive direction, like a national campaign for an embracing between Turks and Kurds.
Public sympathy and support for the PKK are waning. People in the region want peace, prosperity and cultural/ethnic recognition, all of which have been increasingly provided in recent years. As I explained earlier, this is the reason for an increase in the terrorist activities of the PKK -- it is out of the realization that it has become irrelevant to the solution to the Kurdish problem.

Instead of abandoning it, the Turkish government should launch an aggressive reform package demonstrating its will to manage its own agenda. Continuing reform with even surprising speed will put the PKK into a more irrelevant position over the Kurdish issue.

Turkey should not give the opportunity to the anti-reformist camp by abandoning the reform process. What has happened to the new constitution? The PKK and the hawks in Turkey should not be allowed to hijack Turkey's reform agenda. Cutting the PKK's social base requires continuing with the reform process.

More democratization, not securitization, is the way out of this crisis. We should not lose our perspective.
01.11.2007

What does the US really want?

IHSAN DAGI
i.dagi@todayszaman.com

What does the US really want?

I wonder if the US administration is aware that the prevailing negative public perception of the US is destroying the social and psychological basis of a working relationship in the long run between the US and Turkey. Even if a rapprochement is made today on the government level, it will be very difficult to carry it out in an atmosphere of common distrust and disappointment among the Turks. In an ever-democratizing Turkey, no government can remain indifferent to the demands and opinions of the masses. At the moment both sides seem to be losing their ability to make a new start in the future. Anti-Americanism has become part of "popular culture" with novels, movies, and TV series. While I sense some sort of an orchestrated effort to impact the negative American image in public, some actions and inactions of the US administration are paving the way towards this end.

Let's be honest, the US is not viewed as an ally, a strategic partner or a friend today. The image of the US is that of an adversary, which is largely due to its inaction when it comes to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and its policy toward northern Iraq. Like it or not, many in this country have come to see the US as a national security threat and not as an ally.

The widespread belief is that the US wants Turkey to divide up along ethnic lines to create a Kurdish state. An independent Kurdish state is believed to be a reliable, long-term ally in the region for the US, whose friends are low in number both in the region and in the rest of the world. Here reliability, in fact, means "dependence" on the US. Being surrounded by enemy states and nations -- Turkey in the north, Iran in the east, Syria in the west and the Sunni Arabs in the south -- an imaginary Kurdish state will be nothing but dependent on the US for its survival. And this is the basis of a perfect ally for the US. Along with Israel, such a Kurdish state in northern Iraq under the protection of the US is believed to be the objective of the US. An independent Kurdish state is expected to be a permanent ally for the US.

Strengthening its Kurdish ally or poking their nose into trouble and thus needing US help, it is also believed that the US is encouraging the Kurds of Turkey to be part of a greater Kurdish state. Many argue that the US support is not confined to Iraqi Kurds; the PKK is armed with American weapons. There is even talk of the US sharing intelligence on the Turkish military with the PKK.
It would be a mistake to think that all these are the views of the "public." These have indeed also become the views of many policy-makers who are in the security establishment and political institutions.

I think it is getting too late for the US to convince the Turkish people and authorities of alliance and friendship. Unless it moves quickly and disproves current public perceptions, Turkish-American relations will be permanently and structurally damaged.

I still believe that the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and its leader, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, are capable of controlling the nationalist outcry. But they should be provided with some sort of gains in the fight against the PKK. Otherwise, the nationalist fever will hijack Turkish politics and crash all, including those who assist them in their politics, the military and the media, creating waves of tension and clashes both in Turkey and in its neighbors.

The US administration should realize before it's too late that the PKK is sabotaging the Turkish-US alliance -- does the US have any interest in maintaining it? The PKK is also sabotaging stability and security in Iraq and the region as a whole -- does the US have any interest in securing it? I would even argue that the PKK is sabotaging a possible Kurdish independent state in northern Iraq -- does the US have any interest in having it? Moreover, the PKK is also sabotaging the friendship and understanding between the US and the Iraqi Kurds -- does the US have any interest in keeping it?
I wonder if the Americans do not see that they are being fooled by the PKK.

Anyhow, I still think that the US administration will not sacrifice its relationship with Turkey to the PKK and will avoid going down in history as the administration that lost Turkey.
29.10.2007

Is Kemalism compatible with democracy?

I know this question is straightforward, but it is one that we have to ask and answer if we are really interested in identifying and removing the obstacles before the democratization process. Any ideology may claim to be “good” and “right,” but if an ideology claims to have a monopoly over the “truth” and secures a constitutional superiority over other sets of ideas and ideologies, it turns out to be incompatible with democracy. Democracy requires pluralism of views that compete with one another. If the founding principles of a state are reduced to a single ideology, neither democracy nor rule of law can flourish, simply because constitutional order would not protect the pluralities of ideas and ideologies, but the one on which it is based.

The notion of state ideology is incompatible with the notion of democracy. Democracy does not only welcome plurality of views, programs, and ideologies, but requires them. These contending “views” on society should be in free competition to attract the support of the people.

As a set of ideas, Kemalism certainly deserves a place among the others and is entitled to protection from the state and law, just like other views, ideas, and ideologies. But it cannot ask for a monopoly or even a privilege. It is time for the Kemalists to understand for the sake of Turkish democracy that Kemalism is one among others that compete for adherence and acceptance by the people. The state protection and privileges for Kemalism only lead to distancing it further from society, people losing faith in democracy and producing more radicalism. In the free market of ideas, the Kemalists, too, will moderate themselves in order to appeal to a greater number of people.

We certainly need “moderate Kemalism” that accepts pluralism and democracy. But this requires abandoning the claim to be the sole provider of truth for society and the state, which is a totalitarian inclination anyway. Construction of a new and homogenized society by using the coercive means of the state is unacceptable from a liberal democratic point of view. In order not to be described as the new reactionaries of Turkey in the 21st century, the Kemalists had better come to terms with democracy and pluralism. It is the engagement in the path of democracy and the free market of ideas that may make the Kemalists feel the need for moderation.

When we look at the neo-Kemalists today, they seem to have a deep fear of the values and institutions of political modernity, namely democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The modern state cannot impose a particular ideology on its citizens. This is against the very nature of the state and its raison d’etre, which is to protect individual rights against the Leviathan, not vice versa.

However, some Kemalists still imagine Turkey as an ideological state, unaware of the fact that Turkish social, economic and political realities do not allow the imposition of a state ideology.
But some think that it is possible and they try. By doing so they opt out of the rules, norms, and principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. To make people uniformly believe in a state ideology, the neo-Kemalists seem prepared to resort to authoritarian means. That is how neo-Kemalism has become an authoritarian political and social project. Their problem is viewing citizens as subservient to the state and its ideology, instead of recognizing them as autonomous moral and political entities capable of making individual and public choices.

The Kemalists also seem far from curing their strong anti-Western sentiments and position, which leads them to misinterpret the events in Turkey and abroad. Once the Islamists in Turkey thought of the West in this way, but now it is the Kemalists who think the West is the mother of all evil.

Kemalism as a state ideology above the law and principles of democracy goes against the notion of “contemporary civilization.”

Not only Kemalism but all ideologies that intend to use the state apparatus to silence and suppress other ideologies are incompatible with the principles of democracy.
04.10.2007

The future of Kemalism and the İstanbul Biennial

Does Kemalism allow academic freedoms and freedom of thought and expression? Well, if it left to “contemporary” Kemalists they would criminalize any act of criticism leveled at Kemalism of their understanding. The latest incidence of intolerance in the name of Kemalism involved Hou Hanru, the curator of the Istanbul Biennial, who made an opening speech and forwarded the Biennial catalog in which he “analyzed” Kemalism from a slightly critical perspective. He says:
“Turkey, as one of the first non-western modern republics and a key player in the modernization of the developing world has proved to be one of the most radical, spectacular and influential cases in this direction. But, a fundamentally crucial problem is that the modernization model promoted by the Kemalist project was still a top-down imposition with some unsolvable contradictions and dilemmas inherent within the system: the quasi-military imposition of reforms, while necessary as a revolutionary tool, betrayed the principle of democracy; the nationalist ideology ran counter to its embracing of the universality of humanism, and the elite-led economic development generated social division. Populist political and religious forces have managed to recuperate and manipulate the claims from the ‘bottom’ of the society and have used them to their own advantage.”

A group of academics headed by the dean of the Faculty of Fine Arts at the Marmara University issued a declaration condemning Hou Hanru for having thought of Kemalism in this way. The statement points to “delicate times Turkey passing through” and calls on the curator to be “more sensitive”.

Well, we are really passing through delicate times: the neo-Kemalists think they are waging a new war of independence against their own people who vote for anti-Kemalist (?) political parties and globalist forces. They want a new top-down revolution to redesign people, think that democracy has gone too far and they have lost control over the state, society, and economy.
In short, they react Hou Hanru not because he criticized the founding myths of Kemalism but because he implicitly disclosed what the neo-Kemalists today think and are trying to do.

Otherwise, what are wrongs with such arguments? It is a generally agreed view that the republican project of building a “nation-state” and making a “new nation” out of the remains of the Ottoman Empire was an example of top-down modernization. It is a historical fact that these were not carried out in a “democratic” regime but by a single-party government and through “revolutionary” means. Democracy with its elementary mechanisms and institutions began with 1950, which is described by many Kemalists as the beginning of “counter-revolution”. Even today we know that neo-Kemalists are extremely skeptical of democracy; they ask for the continuation of the top-down revolutionary command to control and shape the country.

Instead of condemning Hanru, the neo-Kemalists can take his criticisms and, in fact, advises as a starting point for the revival of Kemalism in the new circumstances. Hanru basically underlines the reasons why Kemalism was unable to reach out to the “bottom of the society”. The contemporary Kemalists should think of new ways and languages by which they can reach society. Hanru points them out for the Kemalists: do not betray the principle of democracy, devise a more humane notion of nationalism and be sensitive to social problems. These are good pieces of advice if the neo-Kemalists are interested in reproducing Kemalism in a democratic milieu.

But they seem disinterested. In order to get acceptance from the people, the neo-Kemalists ask for favoritism. They want their notion of Kemalism to be protected and even imposed by the state and by the law. They should realize that Kemalism is one among many other “ideologies” that should compete for adherence in the free market of ideas and ideologies.

The neo-Kemalists are in fact trying to preserve their power and status within the system by hiding behind an anachronistic ideology that has nothing to do with the legacy of Ataturk himself which is alive and well respected in society at large. They are neither republican, nor democrat and modern, and as such should be disassociated from Kemal Ataturk as a historical personality who laid down the basis of modern Turkey.

Unless they do not link up Kemalism with contemporary ideas of democracy, human rights, rule of law as well as a civic notion of nationalism that is in peace with the world at large the neo-Kemalist ideology cannot survive. Anyhow neither Islamism nor Kemalism as ideologies cannot be imposed on societies through state apparatus in an open society, market economy, and globalized world.
01.10.2007

Is the Turkish state secular anyway?

“Defending secularism” has become a façade to hide the struggle to maintain the status quo. One hundred years ago it was the reactionary Islamic scholars who fought against change in the name of Islam; now it is reactionary positivist scholars who resist change in the name of secularism.

 Secularism has been used as a proper tool to control social and political opposition directed to the beneficiaries of the status quo. The rising peripheral forces with their liberal, conservative and democratic credentials are intimidated by a language of “secularism under threat.”

To demonstrate that the fight is not about secularism per se but a power struggle between the elite and peripheral forces, it is necessary to look at the practice of secularism in Turkey and see if the Turkish practice is really “secular.”

A secular state refers to a particular form of relationship between the state and religion. This relationship includes two fundamental components: first, separation of the state from religion and second, the neutrality of the state towards all religions and beliefs.

Is the current practice of secularism in Turkey in line with secularism defined in terms of the separation of the state and religion? Absolutely not. The Religious Affairs Directorate is part of the state organization with thousands of staff and hundreds of local branches. That is to say that the state is organized to serve a particular religion or maybe to keep religion under the surveillance and supervision of the state. Either way, it goes against the principles of a secular state. While some are concerned that religion, in our case Islam, is influencing state affairs, what we see in practice is that the state claims a total control over religious activities through its apparatus dealing with religious affairs. Religious groups, circles and dervish orders do not officially exist. By this, the state does not recognize a social and indeed an individual space for independent religious organizations. It is the state that interferes with religion and religious activities, and such a state cannot be called a secular one.

Is the current practice of secularism in line with secularism defined in terms of neutrality of the state towards all religions, sects, and creeds? Absolutely not. The state-organized religious affairs under the directorate impose a particular form of Islam on its citizens. As such, it is not neutral but partisan. Non-Muslim minorities are discriminated against on religious grounds by this secular state as restrictions have been imposed with regard to educational activities and properties of non-Muslim minorities. The Religious Affairs Directorate does not serve or represent non-Islamic religions which are observed by some Turkish citizens. Even more dramatic is the denial of an Islamic sect, the Alevis, by the state’s religious apparatus. The directorate teaches, preaches and practices not only Islam but a particular form of Islam: the Sunni-Hanefi version. It is not neutrality of a secular state, but the imposition of a particular form of Islam on its citizens. How can a “secular” state teach compulsory courses on a particular interpretation of Islam in elementary and high schools?

All these are serious deviations from the conception of a secular state. The state cannot and should not dominate religion and religious affairs and vice versa.

To settle the question once and for all is to build a secular state by really separating it from religion (Islam) and neutralizing it toward all religions and creeds.
20.09.2007