Kurdish solution by offering gifts

It is good to hear the Kurdish question debated rather than read reports about violence committed by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) or the state’s security forces. This path has been re-opened by Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who certainly deserves applause.

The meeting of Kılıçdaroğlu and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan last week was important because it indicated that the “new CHP” would not exploit government initiatives to resolve the Kurdish question, which was the case during the “democratic initiative” of 2009. Back then the CHP under the leadership of Deniz Baykal accused the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) of plotting against the unity of the country by acceding to the demands of the PKK. The tactic of the opposition then was to bury the ruling party under the Kurdish question with the expectation that Turks disturbed by the AK Party initiative would gather under the CHP.

This did not happen. But it nevertheless played a part in the hesitation of the ruling party that felt alone in addressing such an important issue. Severe opposition and the continued PKK violence indeed worried the ruling party, which shelved the solution process in order to avoid the political cost of appearing to meet the demands of the PKK.

Therefore the CHP’s changing attitude has been significant in encouraging the ruling party to renew its initiative. Sharing the cost and benefits among the governing and opposition parties eases the process. But I am still not sure how far the CHP can go when models of a solution come to the table with the fear of losing its nationalist power base. The same applies to the AK Party, too. It also has a strong nationalist constituency and is concerned that giving in to the demands of the Kurds may alienate its nationalist elements. So the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) by remaining outside of such a solution poses as an alternative for the nationalist voters both in the CHP and the AK Party, which are well aware of this.

Amid such political calculations, the latest proposal of the AK Party about Kurdish being an elective course in public schools is significant. It indicates that the ruling party is still capable of taking bold political steps to address Kurdish demands. Though a selective course on Kurdish does not satisfy the demands of the Kurds, who ask for education in the Kurdish language, we should note that the latest decision of the government may indeed be a groundbreaking move leading to education in Kurdish.

The only problem here is that the government has taken such a decision without engaging with the Kurdish constituency. Like broadcasting Kurdish on the state-owned Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT), the elective courses on Kurdish come through a unilateral decision of the government. As such they are seen as “gifts” from the state to the people, not rights negotiated and then gained. This is important because unilateral decisions by the government deny agency to the Kurds. As the Kurds (or their representatives) are not engaged in the decision-making process, they feel excluded and thus obliged to reject the idea. This is, in fact, the state of mind that describes elective Kurdish courses as an “attempt of assimilation.” It may not be enough to meet the demands of the Kurds at large but it is also not an attempt to assimilate the Kurds.

To avoid such “politicking” by actors from both the Kurdish and Turkish sides we need to bring them into a process of engagement. It is not easy but a must, especially as without the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) being engaged in the process, it is hard to find a solution to the Kurdish question by taking unilateral steps. Leyla Zana’s latest statement about the AK Party and Erdoğan may open up a new avenue of dialogue and engagement between the ruling party and representatives of Kurdish demands.

The Kurds of the AK Party

Thanks to the initiative of the leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the Kurdish question is back on Turkey’s agenda in terms of achieving a resolution. It is clear from the outset that a parliamentary committee with the participation of all political parties could not be established as the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) has already positioned itself against such an initiative. Even if a lesser committee is established without the MHP, I am not optimistic about a positive outcome.

I am not optimistic because each party has its own political Achilles’ heel. The CHP has in the past played the “nationalist” on the Kurdish question and has had extreme difficulty persuading even its own constituency of its new position. Turks in the Western regions of Turkey who vote for the CHP will be upset with their party’s changing stance on the issue. When the democratic initiative was announced by the government in the summer of 2009 the CHP was its most ardent opponent. Now a new and weak party leader cannot explain or justify this collaboration with the ruling party and the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) to find an answer to the Kurdish question.

As for the Justice and Development Party (AK Party), I do not see any reason why it should take up a comprehensive new initiative. For some time the ruling party has seemed to limit its search for a solution, resolving either to finish off the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) through security measures or wait for Mesud Barzani to persuade the PKK to lay down its arms. Otherwise, the government is of the opinion that the AK Party is not responsible for the existence of the PKK, that terrorism has been a fact of life for decades preceding AK Party rule and that the people are accustomed to living with violence. In short, as the PKK violence is “bearable” for the government in political terms, it is unlikely to take an unbearable toll.

As the government regards the situation as “manageable” it naturally refrains from taking political risks. Any major policy initiative addressing the root causes of the Kurdish issue and responding to the demands of the Kurds is viewed as an unnecessary risk. The ruling party is not under any kind of pressure to hasten to find a solution. The existence and terrorist activities of the PKK do not push the government to seek a political solution; on the contrary, I believe it justifies the government’s security-centric perspective.

There is one thing likely to force the ruling party to take the Kurdish question seriously: the pressure of its own Kurds. It is a fact that more than half of the Kurds in this country vote for the AK Party. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan proudly boasts that he can travel all around the country and hold public meetings everywhere, including Kurdish areas. He has also used the Kurdish vote to enhance the popular “legitimacy” of the government. The Kurdish votes enable Erdoğan to claim that he and his party are champions of the integrity of Turkey. This strategy was employed particularly in the early years of the party, when its legitimacy was questioned by secularists and, more vehemently, by the military, as well as during the party closure case in 2008.

So the support of the Kurds has always meant more than mere numbers; it has accorded the AK Party democratic pluralism, social heterogeneity and political legitimacy. Without the Kurdish votes, the AK Party would appear to be a party of nationalist Turks.

I think Kurdish voters, local party leaders and members of parliament (said to be between 70 and 100) are unaware of their importance to the AK Party. As Erdoğan leans toward a nationalist and statist position on the Kurdish question in order to appease the nationalists in the party and appeal to MHP voters, the Kurdish constituency of the AK Party remains silent, unable to articulate its demands. While Turkey debates various aspects of the Kurdish question, the Kurdish elite of the AK Party does not engage in the debate. They cannot even speak up against the minister of the interior, who continuously downplays the sorrows of the Uludere victims.

In short, the Kurdish elite of the AK Party has failed to become an actor within the party, to push for a solution to the Kurdish question. Knowing this, and assuming that the Kurdish supporters of the AK Party have been locked down, Erdoğan and his minister of the interior safely navigate the nationalist waters of Turkish voters.

What is wrong with the AK Party?

The governing Justice and Development Party (AK Party) has increasingly been criticized for going authoritarian.

These criticisms do not come from diehard Kemalist opponents of the AK Party but from liberal circles that supported the party’s agenda of democratization. And these recent criticisms are not altogether baseless. The once reformist party of Turkey seems to have developed statist, nationalist and even Islamist tendencies, which are the likely grounds for a new authoritarian politics. These tendencies can be discerned in the government’s approach to the Uludere incident, in which 34 civilians mistaken for terrorists were killed during a military airstrike near the Turkish-Iraqi border, as well as its attempts to legislate conservative values into law. We can start with Uludere, where the government, from the beginning, acted inconsistently, first admitting there was a mistake and then making statements to the contrary. An investigation was initiated, but after six months there still is no answer to the simple question of who is responsible and what really happened on that particular day. Knowing state tradition, I do understand why we are not getting straight answers to these questions. What disturbed me most is the attitude of the government towards the victims. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan pointed to the compensation paid to the families of the victims, saying, “The government paid the compensation, even more than required by law.” Instead of apologizing Erdoğan seemed to reduce the matter to compensation. This did not fit well in his own discourse of “human-based politics.” What is more is that last week he asked “why smugglers do not step on the mines,” implying that the villagers who were killed by Turkish fighter jets were collaborating with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), while in fact it is known that this particular village was, in fact, the one armed by the state, known as a “korucu” village. The government’s Interior Minister İdris Naim Şahin went further by saying that in the Uludere incident where 34 people were killed by security forces “nothing happened that would warrant an apology on the part of the government.” He appalled many when he added, “if those villagers had not been killed, they would have been tried for smuggling anyway. Now the smuggling case against them is dropped.” For his remarks, the minister of interior was congratulated by Devlet Bahceli, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). In this picture what is obvious is that the ruling party sides with and protects state officials and security forces who made the mistake of killing 34 innocent people. This, however, not in line with the AK Party’s previous rhetoric and policies that prioritized the people over the state. The statist and nationalist tradition that was inherited from the Islamist “national view” movement is being revived within the AK Party government. The most recent debate about abortion reveals another disturbing ideological element in the AK Party. It has become an observable fact that the ruling party is trying to enact its conservative values into law. Two weeks ago this slipped out from the mouth of Erdoğan, who said, “One country, one nation, one flag, and one religion, yes I say religion.” He repeated his motto adding “one religion” into it in two subsequent speeches, but after facing severe opposition in the media he stepped back, saying that the addition of “one religion” to the motto was a mistake. Mistake or not the fact is that religion has become a constant reference point in the political arena. The process started some months ago with a statement from Prime Minister Erdoğan, who said he wants to “raise a religious generation.” This “wish” was put into practice by introducing a new education law that included optional Quran courses and courses on the Prophet’s life throughout middle and high schools. I think these were indications that the AK Party is inclined to use the “secular” state institutions to raise a “religious generation,” which is basically the Kemalist policy of “creating a new society” in reverse. Then started a new debate on abortion that is leading to a new law banning abortion. It is indeed not part of a global debate between “pro-life” and “pro-choice” lines of argument. The government’s move to ban abortion is due to a sudden discovery that abortion is a trap for the future of the nation. Prime Minister Erdoğan justified his sudden anti-abortion stand on the argument that “there is an international conspiracy to erase this nation from the world.” Welcome back to Erbakan’s world of conspiracies!!! The following statements from the government side were revealing indeed. Health Minister Recep Akdağ said: “Even if the pregnancy is due to rape the mother should give birth. If a mother does not want to raise the child, the state will look after it.” Then came another appalling statement from the head of the Human Rights Commission in Parliament, Ayhan Sefer Üstün who supported his minister’s stand that even rape victims should give birth by giving the unfortunate example of the Bosnian rape victims, saying, “Didn’t the Bosnian women give birth?” I am having difficulties in understanding the recent discourse and policies of the AK Party. It seems that something is changing dramatically. I think the state power that is now fully controlled is poisoning the AK Party.

Turkish foreign policy: Time for a re-evaluation

The foreign policy of a country is not singularly directed abroad, it may also be a tool for domestic political purposes. Even if it is not instrumental in formulating domestic politics its repercussion on domestic politics is inevitable.

Foreign policy perceptions, choices, and orientations may strengthen a particular “order of things” at home. For decades, Turkish foreign policy not only reflected but also reinforced a “siege mentality” that portrayed its neighbors as enemies with territorial ambitions on Turkey. This created a tense relationship with neighbors with whom not only the state but the people of Turkey developed a deep distrust.

Such a portrayal of the outside world made sense, especially in the cold war years. Constant threats coming from the region justified the authoritarian power structure inside. Thus people at home had to be united against immediate threats in the region and be even aware of their internal extensions. Under such a continuous existential treat the idea of a fully functioning liberal democracy, human rights, and pluralism were regarded as a luxury and even risky. The politics of survival laid the ground for an authoritarian politics supervised by the military, denial of the existence of the Kurds and Kurdish identity, delays in democratization and widespread-cross ideological nationalism. Survival and the security of the state were used as justification for authoritarian state formation. In short, the threat perception that was exemplified through practical foreign policy issues served to tie down social demands, political actors and intellectual debates in Turkish politics. This mechanism started to change after 1999 when Turkey was declared as a candidate country for EU membership. As democratization, economic development and good neighborly relations were required to be a full member in the EU the Turkish governments, as well as social forces, pushed hard to change this mechanism of foreign policy that served to the securitization of Turkish political and social spaces. As a result of what I call the “liberal turn in Turkish foreign policy” foreign policy ceased to be a ground for the securitization of Turkish politics.

A paradigm shift occurred from pure power politics to a liberal foreign policy agenda seeing the countries of the region not as adversaries, but as partners prioritizing cooperation over conflict and soft power over military might and bullying. This opened the avenues of mutual understanding, trust, and cooperation in the region elevating Turkey as a country of mediation, engagement, and multilateralism. Out of this new paradigm of cooperation, Turkish companies, civil societal organizations, think tanks, individuals entered into a deep interaction in the neighborhood. Later these social and economic actors acted as driving forces for continued political dialogue and good relationships in the region.

When the Arab revolutions occurred many expected Turkey’s cooperation and dialogue-based soft power approach would continue. But the resistance of the Syrian regime to change last year and Turkey’s inability to persuade Syrian President Bashir al-Assad to introduce reforms has displayed the limits of Turkey’s soft power to influence change in Syria on which the Turkish leaders believed to have great leverage. Realizing that their very image in the “neighborhood” as a capable country is at stake the Turkish leaders have moved from persuasion to coercion against Syria.

Meanwhile after the total withdrawal of the US in Iraq, the central government under Nouri al-Maliki backed by Iran and driven by the Syrian crisis confronted Turkey. While Turkish business in Baghdad suffers from this change of wave in the bilateral relations the government in Ankara realizes again the limits of its soft power to persuade Maliki to mend the damage. The same goes for Iran which regards Turkey as a regional rival.

The Arab spring and the ensuing debate about “Turkey as a model” has added to the overconfidence of Turkish political actors. The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs started to talk about “constructing a new order” and “a new Middle East” under the leadership of Turkey. This new language goes obviously beyond the liberal premises of the AK Party’s earlier stand of cooperation, engagement, and dialogue. Questions are increasingly raised as to whether Turkey has abandoned the “zero problem policy” and “soft power” approach, and embraced a policy of regional hegemony even domination.

My concern is that these indicators of yet another paradigm shift in Turkish foreign policy might be due to internal political developments like whether Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will run as the presidential candidate in 2014 and who will replace him in the ruling party. An internal power struggle may radicalize Turkish foreign policy in the near future.

Changing positions in Turkish politics

Instead of a structural change, Turkish politics brings a change to a tradition of the elite serving in old structures. It is, in fact, a matter of the loyalty of the elite -- whether loyalty is directed towards Kemalism and its institutional representatives or towards the agencies of the “new Turkey” under the Justice and Development Party’s (AK Party) rule.

Allegiance is certainly important; public authorities should have allegiances towards democratically elected rulers of the country, not towards an ideology and its vanguard within the state. Yet the change that Turkey needs should transcend a simple shift in loyalty. Interestingly for some, including the government, this seems satisfactory enough.

The changing attitude towards the military is the case in point. Only one or two years ago the military used to be regarded by the government and its allies as an obstacle to full democracy. Its personnel and activities were thus constantly scrutinized and transparency and accountability were demanded. Now thinking that it is in full control of the appointments within the military and thus breaking the autonomy of the military, the government is in defense of the military, its operations, and secrecy.

The Uludere incident in which 34 Kurdish civilians were massacred by Turkish jets by “mistake” is an example. Even after it became clear that Turkish jets made an incredible mistake and bombed innocent civilians, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan congratulated the military and the chief of General Staff. To this day the Uludere controversy continues and Prime Minister Erdoğan has not moved from his position of defending the military. It is still unknown what happened on that particular day, who gave the order to bomb and why. What we hear instead from the government and its allies in the media is that “we should trust our military and not weaken its spirit in the fight against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party [PKK].”

Surprisingly though, the main opposition party has become very critical of the military. Its leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, questioned the stance on the Uludere incident the other day asking, “Who is governing the country, the government or the military?” This displays the changing positions of the actors towards the military depending on the shifting loyalties on the part of institutions.

Another most recent case is a column written by journalist Bekir Coşkun, a strong Kemalist and an old ally of the military, who wrote a fable about a dog called Paşa. The column undoubtedly criticized the new form of relationship between the generals and the AK Party government. The military issued a strongly worded statement, just like the old days when such statements were issued against the conservatives and liberal writers and newspapers. It was the herald of the new relationship between the government and the military in which the Turkish military issued a statement condemning a Kemalist journalist. This time, while the conservative media remained silent against the statement, the Kemalist writers and newspapers reacted. Over this issue, Prime Minister Erdoğan called on all generals to sue Coşkun for insulting all paşas, including Kemal Atatürk. Indeed, the General Staff headquarters eventually filed a complaint against Coşkun, the most famous Kemalist writer and journalist.

All these events tell us that once loyalty of institutions and their administrators have shifted, the stances change as well: Old-time pro-military Kemalists turn against the military while the conservatives, once the victims of the military, come around and defend the generals. Another case in point is the Higher Education Board (YÖK). Last month an academic who is also a columnist in a conservative daily wrote, “Apart from its name, nothing is left to change in YÖK.” This reflects the attitude towards the old institutions inherited from the Kemalist era: So long as they are staffed by “our men,” there is no need for structural change.

Everyone knows that YÖK is one of the key institutions established by the military regime in 1982. The liberals, democrats, socialists, and conservatives have criticized it for its centralized, commanding and ideologically driven administration. Instead of regulating higher education, it tried to turn it into an ideological instrument of the state. As a result, throughout Turkey students were suppressed for wearing headscarves, or using Kurdish in their activities, and academics were intimidated.

These days are over but the structure remains unchanged. However, trusting in the new rulers at the top, can we say, “Nothing is left to change?” This is the greatest challenge for the “new Turkey” if we are interested in building democracy instead of simply replacing the old Kemalist tutelage.

Post-Kemalist tutelage

Kemalism is dead. No longer does it command the Turkish state. The bureaucratic elite that traditionally acted as the spokesperson of Kemalism has lost its status within the state apparatus, while the business elite have queued up to collect the benefits distributed by the state run now by a non-Kemalist political elite. The military and the judiciary, the two strongholds of Kemalism, have bowed to their new master.

Ideologically speaking, too, Kemalism is dead. The two faces of Kemalism, namely radical secularism and ethnic nationalism, desperately need facelifts. Secularism as a mechanism to exclude and oppress the conservatives cannot be sustained. It should be included in a democratic content that enables all faith groups to exercise full freedom for their activities. An imagined “single nation of the Turks” is not convincing, even for nationalist Turks. Recognition of the Kurdish ethnicity and identity is a must to build social peace and political order.

All of these would be good for the practice of democracy in Turkey if only the “new elite” were immune to the bad habits of the old elite. We see continuities in the usage of the state apparatus to construct a “particular type of person”. It seems that “state-made citizens” is the constant objective of governments in Turkey, be them Kemalist or conservative. The end results they seek may be different in form and in terms of values, but the means used and objectives sought have not changed.

What I am trying to say is that social engineering at the hands of the state is somehow continuing with the Justice and Development (AK Party) government. This has become visible in the field of education and cultural policies. It seems that Primer Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's stated objective “to raise religious generations” is shaping the government's educational and cultural policies. The use of state power to “form” the minds, habits, and lifestyles of citizens obviously cannot be reconciled with liberal values. For the AK Party, such a policy would be defended as part and parcel of its conservative identity.

But the problem is that once the AK Party uses the state apparatus to construct “conservative citizens,” by, for instance, reorganizing the educational system “to raise religious generations,” it appears to be following the path of Kemalism, which for years sought to create “secular and nationalist Turkish citizens.”

Such a path is not only unethical but is also impractical. One should also not forget the tension and conflict generated by cultural policies to create uniform citizens by state intervention.

It is futile to construct “identities” through state institutions and policies. If a particular identity is imposed by the state, it will either fail or succeed. If such a project were to fail, it would mean the resources used to this end would have been wasted. Additionally, there would be the cost of the conflict likely to erupt between the society subjected to identity transformation and the state imposing its own values.

If such a policy succeeds, you end up with a society subservient to and dependent on the state that has lost its dynamism, creativity, and plurality.

This has been the case in Turkey since the formation of the republic, when the Kemalist state imposed its own secular and ethnic values on the masses and the people resisted these state-imposed identities.

So, it is futile to try again, with the state this time imposing conservatives values that are “nationalized” by the state.

Besides, such a state would not only be dictating conservative values to “secular” people, it would also be imposing a particular set of conservative values on the conservatives who may be denied their own choice of conservatism. The teaching religion in all schools, as envisaged by the recent change in the education system, will empower the state over society and grant it greater presence in religious affairs, which is supposed to belong to the realm of society.

A state that teaches the people their religion steps into the realm of society, which is where religion belongs. Out of this, a hierarchical relationship will be built between the state and society, in favor of the former.

In short, using the same Kemalist means and methods “to create a conservative society” will result in a post-Kemalist tutelage, not a post-Kemalist democracy. Conservative social forces will not be better off under such a regime because the state will occupy all social space, eliminating independent social forces, including the conservative ones.

What do the Kurds want?

The quest for a new constitution continues despite the fact that the hope for its realization is dim. Almost every day public events are held in various cities, proposals are made and new research is conducted. All these indicate the determination of the Turkish people to make their own constitution.

It is widely acknowledged that one of the reasons why Turkey needs a new constitution is to address the Kurdish question. Issues about general rights, citizenship, the language of education and the administrative structure all have a bearing on the Kurdish question.

What about the Kurds? What do they expect from a new constitution? Recent research by the Center for Political and Social Research (SAMER), a Diyarbakır-based think tank, conducted an important survey assessing the expectations of Kurds in east and southeast Turkey.

According to SAMER’s research, 87 percent of the people in the region point to the need for a new constitution. The Kurds surveyed are also of the view that the new constitution should be made through the widest possible participation of individuals, civil society associations, trade unions, political parties, and similar groups. But the concern is expressed about the accessibility of the Constitutional Reconciliation Commission, in charge of drafting the constitution. Fifty-seven percent believe that their views have not been heard by the commission while 33 percent think that their views have been heard by the commission somewhat or to a satisfactory extent.

The top problem of Kurds in the region is cited as the Kurdish question (51 percent), followed by the economy (34 percent). This shows that two problems dominate for Kurds in the East and Southeast: identity and poverty.

On the relationship between the Kurdish question and the new constitution, people were asked: “To what extent would a democratic, civil and pluralistic constitution resolve the Kurdish question?” Responses showed hope is high. People surveyed expect that the new constitution will resolve the question. While 52 percent say the new constitution will resolve the question completely, 23 percent expect it to resolve the problem partially. We will see if these expectations can be met or not by political parties in Ankara.

Kurds of the region expect the new constitution to be based on democracy, human rights and the rule of law (95 percent), and the recognition of plurality in society (93 percent). Apart from desiring that these highly praised values be included in the new constitution, there are some values that the respondents wish to see excluded. For example, only 18 percent want the new constitution to be based on Kemalist nationalism. In short, Kurds of the East and Southeast want a democratic and pluralistic constitution and not a Kemalist one.

When it comes to the status of the Kurds in the new constitution, the respondents’ preferences are as follows: 19 percent favor independence, 41 percent favor democratic autonomy, 12 percent favor the current federal governance and 9 percent favor a decentralized system.

As for the issue of Turkey’s official language, 44 percent favor “Turkish as an official language while all other languages should be freely used,” 19 percent prefer naming Turkish and Kurdish as official languages, with others to be freely used. Similar results appear about the issue of the language of instruction in schools. Only 8 percent approve of the current model. Thirty-five percent think that education should be conducted in the mother tongue and other languages should be elective. There is also major support for education being in Turkish but Kurdish being an elective language in education (35 percent). This shows that Kurdish elective courses will address the demands of one-third of the Kurds.

Concerning ethnic references in the constitution, the Kurds are very clear: They reject the current model based on “Turkishness.” Thirty-three percent prefer no ethnic reference in the constitution while 62 percent want to see Turkish, Kurdish and other ethnicities referred to together. When asked what term should be used instead of “the Turkish nation” in the new constitution, 13 percent respond “citizens of Turkey,” 32 percent say “people of Turkey” and 42 percent favor “all citizens.”

In short, the Kurds have high expectations of the new constitution. Whether they will be met or not will determine the allegiance of these Kurds towards the Republic of Turkey. A final note: As for the demands and expectations of the Kurds, the SAMER research does not find much difference in responses between voters who support the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) and those who support the Justice and Development Party (AK Party). I think this is extremely important to take note of for the ruling party.