Resolving or managing the Kurdish question?

The Kurdish question has proved to be very difficult to resolve since the actors involved are not prepared to take the risk of finding a solution.

Both the government and Kurdish nationalists are accustomed to “living with the problem” instead of taking the risk of the unknown, a settled Kurdish question.

I have reached this judgment on the basis of the fate of the 2009 opening that was torpedoed by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and abandoned by the government when national and regional conditions were really ripe for a solution.

There is now talk of a new government strategy on the Kurdish problem. Even if there is such a “new strategy,” I do not think it will produce a solution. This is so because the government is not prepared to take political risks to address the Kurdish question. The view of the government is that the Kurdish question is not the making of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and thus no one can blame the party for not finding a solution to it.

Besides, the Kurdish question does not seriously disturb the AK Party's governance of Turkey. The ruling party can live without finding a solution to the Kurdish question. Last year's election showed once more that the continuation of the Kurdish question does not prevent the AK Party from winning elections. Even among Kurds, the AK Party receives as many votes as the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP).

Will that be the case when the AK Party takes bold steps to solve the Kurdish question? That much is not guaranteed. The ruling party fears that a form of final settlement may alienate the Turks, and especially the nationalists, resulting in the risk of losing its nationalist constituency to the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).

It is ironic that the political party that came to power 10 years ago with a view to challenge the status quo today sticks to the status quo on the Kurdish question. Indeed it is ironic to defend the status quo on the Kurdish question when it is in a position to challenge and change it, but this is not surprising at all because the status quo is regarded by the AK Party as “manageable” while a solution is “unsettling.”

What is also important to note in the “new strategy” is the emphasis made on the new decision not to talk to jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and the PKK. In the near past, we know that the government engaged both Öcalan and the PKK through the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) and the special representative of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, then-Prime Ministry Undersecretary Hakan Fidan. The government will no longer talk to them. Why? The reason for this policy change might be the fact that the former talks produced no results. But it may also be equally true that the recent crisis between the judiciary and MİT could have triggered such a decision on the part of the government. That is to say that the government may be concerned that a perceived “negotiation” with the PKK and Öcalan is not only politically risky but also legally problematic, given the divergence of views between the judiciary and the government. If this is true, then we can infer that the government has given in to the pressure of the judiciary and that it is even more unlikely now that it will go along with a solution model.

The government instead seems willing to talk to the BDP, the “extension of the PKK,” as described by the prime minister himself. So long as the BDP is portrayed as totally dependent on the PKK, it is not realistic to expect it to act independently and hold genuine negotiations with the government.

The bottom line is that the government has come to the end of its “democratic initiatives”; for the last two years or so there has been no attempt at democratizing the Kurdish issue. Instead, the government seems to have adopted a tough perspective of crushing the PKK presence and eliminating its organizational network in cities through operations targeting the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK). In response to this approach, the PKK has not surrendered but challenged the government in cities, as demonstrated during Newroz, in a quest to show its strength.

To sum up, the new strategy is not a strategy but part of “managing the Kurdish question,” limiting its damage and distancing its political risks on the part of the government.

Annexing Cyprus

The fever of Turkish nationalism can be measured by looking at the position taken towards the Cyprus question. Since the 1950s the Cyprus issue has been used to spread and radicalize Turkish nationalism.

I have recently observed that, after a long break starting in the early 2000s, the nationalist fever fueled by the Cyprus question has been on the rise. And the Turkish government, prepared to confront the EU in July 2012, does not mind fanning nationalism over Turkey's “national cause”: Cyprus. The Greek Cyprus' upcoming presidency of the European Council may provide the Turkish government, if it so desires, with a perfect excuse to break with the EU and withdraw its support for a negotiated solution on the island.

Last week Turkish European Affairs Minister Egemen Bağış listed “annexing northern Cyprus to Turkey” among the options Turkey has concerning the future of the island. Claiming later that he was misunderstood, the minister underlined that Turkey's policy remains unchanged: “Our sole objective is for a solution to be reached on the island, acceptable to both Cypriot sides.” He proceeded by saying, “But if no settlement emerges, all options are on the table.”

The problem lies in the meaning of “all options.” In his previous interview, given to a newspaper, Minister Bağış named the “options on the table” as follows: reunification agreed upon by the two communities in the island; if this fails, a two-state solution; or the annexation of Turkish Cyprus to Turkey.

Never, as far as I remember, has a minister of any Turkish government stated that “annexing the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus [KKTC]” is a policy option that is on the table. This was uttered by a number of ultranationalist politicians and opinion leaders, but not by a member of the government or a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

As has been declared numerous times, Turkey prefers and works for a negotiated settlement in the island. It has also been hinted several times that if negotiations do not progress well, Turkey will not wait forever but will consider pressing for the recognition of the KKTC. But an outright annexation has never been the policy of any Turkish government, nor of the AK Party government.

How then can we explain the minister's statement? Is it a new government policy or a slip of the tongue?

Since the government has remained silent and the minister did not denounce the option, we may assume that annexation is a policy option seriously being considered in Ankara.

But this contradicts Turkey's declared reason for the 1974 intervention on the island. Furthermore, all the defenses of this intervention that followed are de-legitimized by such a policy.

Beyond this, such a policy does a great injustice to the KKTC. Turkey officially recognizes the KKTC as a sovereign state. How can a state recognizing another as sovereign and independent talk of annexing it?

This talk is dangerous and self-defeating for Turkish diplomacy. The talk of annexing may only be an acknowledgment that Turkey keeps the KKTC under its occupation. Is this the case? If the Turkish government says yes, then its minister can talk of annexing it without consulting its government or people.

I suspect it was a movie that was watched by over 4 million people in Turkey these past few weeks, and probably the minister himself -- “Fetih 1453” (The Conquest 1453), that is to blame for this talk of “annexing Cyprus”! If Constantinople, why not Cyprus?

Is Kemalism an alternative to the AK Party?

A weak opposition unable to present itself as an alternative to the ruling party continues to be an important problem in Turkish politics. The lack of a viable alternative to the government boosts the ruling party’s self-righteous confidence and alienates dissident groups who have lost their hope in change through democratic competition resulting from engagement in politics.

The main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) is still in a state of internal strife. Its members are busy opposing their own party administration instead of their opponent, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party). Last week, the CHP held two party congresses at which changing the party’s internal code of conduct was discussed. But everyone knew that it was an occasion to question the leadership of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. Though the dissidents of the party lost the battle against the leadership, whose power was consolidated, the damage was also inflicted upon the party itself.

The CHP’s old guard seems concerned that Kılıçdaroğlu might change the party, breaking with the Kemalist tradition and ideological outlook. To me, this is a groundless fear. Even if Kılıçdaroğlu keeps the party under full control, he is unlikely and unwilling to embark on such a transformation.

There is of course pressure for the CHP to become more social democrat and less Kemalist, but the tutelage of the latter on the former within the party is almost impossible to break with. The party grassroots are overwhelmingly Kemalist and nationalist, and they view a social democrat and humanist/universalist political stance as unpatriotic. Moreover, within the party elite is a strong group of old Kemalist cadets who are ready to label proponents of change heretics and revisionists. And most important of all, Kılıçdaroğlu fears that without the support of the Kemalists, the CHP will not even get 26 percent of the vote in elections.

Anyhow, the CHP leadership should answer these questions: Does the CHP really want to win an election and rule the country? The answer is presumably yes. How, then, will this be achieved? Is the vote of the Kemalists enough to win an election? If not, whose votes will the CHP add to its own votes to win in an election?

In the last three elections, the CHP has been stuck around 20 percent of the vote. If it claims to be an alternative to replace the AK Party, it has to at least double its votes. Even if the CHP gets all of the votes of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) it cannot defeat the AK Party, which stands at around 50 percent of popular support. Thus the key to toppling the AK Party is not only for the CHP to double its votes but also to get votes that go to the AK Party. In other words, without attracting AK Party voters and persuading them to vote for the CHP, it is not possible to defeat the AK Party in elections.

This is why I keep saying that unless the CHP abandons Kemalism it cannot open up to new voters. When the CHP won 42 percent of the vote in the 1977 election it was a social democrat, populist and anti-militarist party under Bülent Ecevit. This was also the time when the CHP was the least Kemalist in its entire history. The leadership at the time was talking about change, social justice, and solidarity, not lifestyles, republican values, and secularism. As such, the CHP of the 1970s got closer to the people as departed from Kemalism.

Defeats at the hands of the AK Party led the CHP to go backward and to uphold Kemalism as the identity and ideology of the party as well as its social base. Meanwhile, the CHP also embraced its past, including the legacy of the period of one-party rule between 1925 and 1945 as the “founder of the state.” Yet this “historical legacy” that led to the birth of a particular “image” of the CHP forms barriers for the CHP when it tries to reach out to various social groups. The “victims” of this particular past of Kemalism – among them Kurds, Muslims, non-Muslims, and liberals -- were thus distanced from the CHP, the old and the new.

The CHP’s opponent, the ruling AK Party, was very happy to see the CHP going in this direction. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan constantly identified the current CHP with the historical one that ruled during the single-party period, reminding the country of practices that included the Dersim massacre, the Independence Tribunals, the mistreatment of Muslims and non-Muslims, etc. Erdoğan knew that such a historical memory works to the advantage of the AK Party and unites all victims and opponents of the CHP behind the AK Party.

If the CHP really wishes to compete with the AK Party, it should reach out to the victims of Kemalism -- namely, the Kurds, the conservative Muslims and the liberals who overwhelmingly vote for the AK Party. And this cannot be done without denouncing the past and abandoning Kemalism.

AK Party’s new mission

Should a state design its institutions and policies to create a “religious generation”? Even if it does this, can it achieve such an objective? On both accounts, I think Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has described his government’s objective as “bringing up religious generation,” is mistaken.

Pursuing such an objective is obviously an attempt at social engineering. It assumes a hierarchical relationship between the state and society and assigns the state the duty and power to shape the minds, beliefs, and lifestyles of the next generations. This is what the Kemalists tried to do for decades. Their mission was to “enlighten” the people with positivist ideas that were expected to erode the influence of religion over society and thus make it easy to generate loyalty for the new secular regime. They dictated to the people what to think, believe in and how to dress. To do this, the Kemalists designed education, public institutions, and law. And in doing so, the Kemalists destroyed the right to choose, the right to be different, and thus strangled democracy and pluralism.

Does the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) now want to follow the same path as the Kemalists? I hope not. However, as a conservative political party, they may wish to see the spread of a conservative way of life. This is natural. But once they use state authorities and public funds to generate such a society they fall into the trap of authoritarian top-down social engineering. From this moment onwards they will lose the moral ground to criticize all other attempts of social engineering at the hands of the state. No one has the right to interfere in society to create his own “imagined” society. This indicates not only an authoritarian but also a totalitarian mindset.

In the long run, it is futile and also not practical. The Kemalists failed in creating their own “loyal generation.” If they had succeeded we would have all been Kemalists, positivists and non-religious. We are not. Such policies do not create new generations of either Kemalist or religious masses but only destroy pluralism and democracy. At the end of the Kemalist indoctrination that lasted for decades, an ex-Islamist politician is the prime minister today.

So social engineering does not work. The AK Party leadership should know this the best. But the issue is not whether it is possible to generate a “new generation,” the issue is that a government trying to do this will turn into an authoritarian one, dictating its own worldview to the people by using state authority and public funds.

It is more an issue of democracy and pluralism than secularism. Yet it clearly contradicts the notion of secularism defended by the AK Party itself as freedom of religion and conscience and neutrality of the state vis-à-vis all religions. Once the government asserts that “bringing up religious generations” is its governmental objective, this will constitute an intervention in the consciences of people. Here the term “religious generations” obviously refers to Islamic religiosity and a particular Sunni interpretation of it. Thus a state with such a mission violates the neutrality principle of secularism. In a normal secular state, even in the one so far advocated by the AK Party, it is not the duty of the state to bring up religious or non-religious generations.

You may wish to live in a society in which religious values and practices are upheld. This is perfectly fine. Individuals, civil society organizations, NGOs and religious circles should be free to spread their word.

The problem is that once you try to do it by using state authority and public funds, you may end up with a state with a religious mission.

Murder as a collective crime

It was five years ago: three days after the murder of Hrant Dink, I wrote that he was “the victim of the nation-state and nationalism.”

Since then he continues to be victimized by the same mindset that prevails in Turkish security institutions, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the judiciary.

The Dink case is a reminder of how deep-rooted and widespread Turkish nationalism, which has defined itself silently vis-à-vis the Armenian question since 1915, is. I think the Turkish subconscious is marked by the events of 1915 so that it cannot recover from it and treat the remaining Armenians, including Dink, as fellow citizens and compatriots.

A year after Dink was murdered then Minister of Defense of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government Vecdi Gönül declared openly for the first time, “If the Armenians had remained where they had lived in Anatolia, we could not have established such a nation-state.” When Minister Gönül uttered these words he rightly faced criticism that he was a “Unionist,” referring to the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in power during the 1915 massacre of the Armenians. But the fact of the matter is that this is the unspoken and yet common belief among Turks, nationalists, conservatives, leftists, you name it.

By linking the establishment of a Turkish nation-state and the Armenian massacre, they implicitly endorse what was done to the Armenians in 1915. This is what I refer to as the subconscious of the Turks being marked by the Armenian question; their “presence” was only possible at the expense of the “absence” of the Armenians. This I think gives way to a guilt complex that cannot be admitted and expressed and a deep sense of insecurity. When Armenians exist, they panic that this happens at the expense of the Turks’ absence. So the presence of Dink as an Armenian in the public sphere deeply disturbed the “Turkish psyche.”

As a result, we have all kinds of barriers to the investigation of Dink’s murder. It started right after the murder. The person who killed Dink was photographed in front of a Turkish flag flanked by two soldiers when he was arrested. These photographs were distributed to the media to trigger nationalist sentiments against the Armenians. Again, right after the murder, the İstanbul chief of police declared that the murderer was motivated and led by nationalist sentiments. Hürriyet Editor-in-Chief Ertuğrul Özkök wrote that we should try to understand (i.e., sympathize with) the murderer.

All these have turned the Dink murder into an act justifiable simply because it was committed against an Armenian.

So there was complacency all over. It is now a fact that security forces in Trabzon and İstanbul knew well that a plan to assassinate Dink was being prepared. They knew and did not do anything to stop it. How can this be explained? If the “victim” is an Armenian, then “collaboration” or “silence” is the attitude. We also know for sure that he was warned and threatened by an intelligence officer in the office of the deputy governor of İstanbul before his murder.

Even the AK Party government that was receptive to the demands of minorities and in return supported by them did not stand by Dink. I do not remember any member of the AK Party government who attended the Dink’s burial (except an adviser to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan).

Later on, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the leadership of Ahmet Davutoğlu submitted a defense to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) for the Dink case in which Dink was compared to a Nazi leader, and it was argued that restrictions on his writings could not be regarded as a breach of freedom of expression since they contained “hate speech.” As if this embarrassing comparison was not enough, the defense by the Turkish government also implied that Dink’s murderers were justified: It was Dink who was to blame for his own murder because he was found guilty of insulting Turkishness by the Turkish judiciary.

Apart from this shameful “defense”, there are many cases that show authorities did not collaborate to investigate the murder case. At the end, the court placed all responsibility on a “lone wolf” without going deeper into his connections. Everyone knows this is a cover-up, not only of the network that murdered Dink but also of our relationship with Armenians. The decision of the court turns Dink’s murder into a “collective crime.”

Racism, immigrants and the state in Germany

I am not exaggerating: Not only does the durability of peace but also the future of democracy in Europe depend on the way in which immigrants are treated by their host countries.

Racism, discrimination and right-wing violence may now appear to be directed at immigrants, but they will, in the end, destroy European civilization as we know it. Racists and those who are silent and complacent in the face of racism cannot cleanse Europe from immigrants without destroying Europe's democratic civilization. What is at stake, thus, is not only the life and welfare of immigrants in Europe but the very values Europe claims to uphold.

Some two months ago a link between the murders of nine immigrants, eight of them Turks, between 2000 and 2006 and the neo-Nazi National Socialist Underground (NSU) came to light. The disclosures disturbed many, especially when alleged links were established between the neo-Nazi NSU and German intelligence units. With such shocking allegations in mind, I wondered how Turks in Germany felt. They must have felt vulnerable, unprotected and abandoned.

Last week I got my answers from research conducted by Dr. Murat Erdoğan from Hacettepe University's Center for Immigration and Politics. The research, titled “Racist neo-Nazi murders in Germany: Opinions and Feelings of Turks,” provided very valuable information for anyone interested in the way in which Turks living in Germany react to neo-Nazi violence, the German state, and the German people. In a nutshell, the Turks in Germany think that the neo-Nazi murderers were protected or tolerated by German authorities.

For the Turks, who were invited to Germany as “guest workers” by the state itself 50 years ago, this is a shocking end. Did the state that invited them 50 years ago conspire with the neo-Nazi gangs to kill their compatriots? This in itself is unimaginable. Yet the research, based on an empirical survey among Turkish immigrants by Dr. Erdoğan, shows that the trust between Turks in Germany and the German state has been broken.

It displays that the prevailing feeling is one of sorrow (74 percent), while 12 percent feel anger and only 8 percent sense “fear.” The racist murders seem to prompt not fear but rage. What is alarming for the “host country” is the perception among immigrant Turks that the “German state supported or protected the neo-Nazi murderers.” This perception stands at 66 percent among the Turks of Germany, while 21 percent do not see such support and protection on the part of the German state. This is really worrisome. It points not to the anger or fear but to the sense of insecurity among immigrants, whose murderers are linked to the state that is supposed to protect them.

Maybe the most critical question of the survey is whether the Turks are considering leaving Germany and returning to Turkey due to such racist killings. It is really interesting to see that 77 percent of Turks do not consider this as an option. They demonstrate their determination to continue to live in Germany. If the objective of the neo-Nazis targeting the Turks is to intimidate, terrorize and thus force them to leave Germany, it is clear that they will not reach their objective.

Those who say they will return to Turkey number only 9 percent. This means Turks living there have become a permanent feature of Germany after all.

Despite the fact than an overwhelming majority of Turks there is suspicious of the German state when it comes to the neo-Nazi connection, the Turks still seek shelter under the roof of the German state. This is still good news. But in return, the German state owes these people one single and simple thing: security, the most basic function and responsibility of a state.

You may remember that, after the new discoveries about the murders, the Bundestag expressed shame and regret, and issued an apology. Dr. Erdoğan's research also asks Turks about this apology to understand their reaction. The majority of the Turks interviewed did not find the apology sincere (58 percent). This is understandable given their perception that the state did not protect them or properly investigate the racist murders.

The lack of trust among Turkish immigrants is discernible. Sixty-two percent think the apology is part of a cover-up, while 70 percent do not see this as a sign of regret. Those who believe German politicians regret the events and are trying to find a solution stand at a mere 35 percent. Trust has been lost.

This is important, especially given the fact that 66 percent expect the racist killings to continue. So they think that they will be targeted and sense that they cannot trust the state that is supposed to protect them. What is promising, though, is the separation between the Germans as a whole and the racists. Sixty-eight percent of the Turks think that racist attacks are the doing of a marginal group. So while there is a deep crisis of trust between the German state and Turkish immigrants, there is still room to mend the problem as the Turks in Germany still disassociate the German people from the racists.

In sum, unless immigrants feel safe, social peace, harmony, integration and the long-term sustainability of democracy cannot be secured in Europe.

A difficult period for the AK Party

In June of last year, the ruling party won the elections with 50 percent of the vote after almost 10 years in power.

Since then, public opinion polls have shown that its votes are not unstable but continue to rise, though slowly, while support for other political parties is either stagnant or falling.

Given such a political scene, how can one talk of “a difficult period” for the Justice and Development Party (AK Party)? This is certainly a legitimate question, and I will explain why.

When the AK Party came to power in 2002 it represented people power vis-à-vis the state power. It was the state power that had oppressed the conservative masses and their political, social and economic agents during the Feb. 28 process in the late 1990s on the one hand and looted banks during the crisis and redistributed their resources to İstanbul and the “white Turks,” the supporters of the state elite.

After winning the elections in 2002, the AK Party was very careful not to lose its support and so tried hard to isolate its opponents and fortify a wide front against them. To do so, it pursued a policy of building alliances both at home and abroad with pro-reform democrat groups as a “defense line” against the secularist/militarist elements within the state. The agenda of democratization, which included curbing the military's power, spreading welfare to the masses and seeking EU membership, was thus linked to the AK Party's search for security vis-à-vis the state that was controlled by Kemalist-secularist institutions and actors that regarded the AK Party as an anomaly.

The struggle within the state and society continued between the AK Party based on conservative social support and aligned with pro-reform democrats, and the secularists/Kemalists that held significant institutional power and enjoyed widespread media backing.

Out of this struggle, it appeared that while the AK Party was in power holding the majority in Parliament it acted as if it were an opposition party trying to overcome the resistance put up by the Kemalist state elite to democratization. This relationship constantly rejuvenated the AK Party's democratic credentials within the system in comparison to other political currencies and institutional traditions. It thus emerged as the most progressive and reformist party.

But, it continued to face bureaucratic resistance. The military as an institution directly called on the government to step down and refrain from electing a president in April 2007 -- the 27 memorandum of the military. Holding almost two-thirds of the majority in Parliament, the AK Party was obstructed from electing a president due to the military's unacceptable interference and an unlawful decision made by the Constitutional Court. Even after the AK Party's victory in the 2007 elections the state power continued to intimidate the ruling party. It was almost shut down by the Constitutional Court in 2008.

In short, the AK Party was in government but not in control of the military, judiciary and high bureaucracy, largely regarded as the “state.” This historical binary between the state and the government worked to the advantage of the AK Party and made the ruling party almost immune from criticism. The priority of the AK Party was to take the state under the control of the democratically elected government. This, to a very large extent, was achieved by a constitutional referendum on Sept. 12, 2010, which changed the balance of power within the state in favor of the elected government.

Now the AK Party seems to hold the state power while at the same time representing people power. And here comes the predicament for the ruling party: No longer can it hide behind the excuse that it cannot control the “reactionary forces within the state.” Thus, the AK Party government is accountable for whatever the “state” does, including bombing to death 35 civilians in Sirnak.

The intelligence mistakes that the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) makes, whose president is the appointee of the government, are the mistakes of the AK Party government. It is no longer possible to escape criticism by pointing to the state. Such a defense is no longer possible. The state is the AK Party.

The operational mistakes of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), whose commanders are appointed by the government, are the mistakes of the AK Party. So when the Taraf daily runs a headline like “The state bombs its own people,” it is a state that includes the AK Party. Knowing this, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan comes out and says, “The state does not bomb its own people.” But it was him who apologized only a week ago for the massacre of the people in Dersim by the state, which bombed the entire area back in 1937-1938. A government in control of the “state” is accountable to the people for whatever the state does.

Any judicial mistakes made by the courts, whose central institutions -- including the High Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) -- are determined by the government, will be the mistakes of the AK Party. So, for all the detentions, long prosecution periods, miscarriages of justice, etc., it is the government that is accountable and responsible.

The AK Party cannot hide behind the excuse that it cannot control certain “reactionary” institutions within the state. It is now in a position -- and proud to be -- where it can determine all these institutions. Yet by “defending” the state, the AK Party risks becoming a pro-status quo power and diminishing its democratic credentials.