The French disconnection

The resemblance between France and “old Turkey” is striking. One similarity regards their attitudes towards history. The French government is attempting to construct a “historical truth” for its citizens, who are not considered capable of making up their own minds about the events of the past.

I know this Jacobin attitude very well from the Kemalist experimentation in creating a “new nation” with a constructed history and identity. But France is the birthplace of imposing “good” on the minds of the “folk,” down in the streets. From this perspective, the rulers thought they knew what to believe and how to think better than ordinary citizens.

It is not a simple coincidence that French President Nicolas Sarkozy told Turkey not to interfere with French beliefs. So President Sarkozy thinks that he or Parliament is in a position to pass a law that regulates people's beliefs in any history or faith and punishes those who do not subscribe to the official belief.

This is obviously nonsense but makes perfect sense given the Jacobin legacy in France that seems to be experiencing a revival under Sarkozy's presidency.

The French Parliament, with a ridiculously low level of participation (only around 50 members of Parliament were in attendance when the bill was approved), has attempted to construct an “official belief” on the Armenian massacre of 1915.

The bill describes the 1915 massacre of Armenians as “genocide” and allows for the punishment of those who express a contradictory opinion. So France has moved into an era where it punishes the beliefs that contradict its officially imposed belief. This certainly reminds me of the Inquisition, fires, stakes and the Middle Ages.

There can be no official belief or official history in open and democratic societies. People are free to explore, experience and expose different claims to truth.

A democratic state cannot attempt to hold a monopoly on historical interpretation. Democracy is about plurality of interpretations. Only totalitarian states claim to monopolize interpretations and control people's minds.

The French Parliament has gone too far to discredit its reputation. This has been done while Turkey, despite its authoritarian state tradition, has come to face its past. Only two weeks ago Prime Minister Erdoğan apologized in the name of the state for the massacre of the Dersim people in 1937-1938. This is certainly a move forward towards confronting Turkey's troubling past.

It should also be remembered that Prime Minister Erdoğan, while referring to past atrocities directed at non-Muslims including the Armenians, stated in May 2009, “Through fascist approaches, we forced many non-Muslims to leave this country.” He asked, “Did we do any good?”

While Turkey seems to be abandoning its “official history,” it is really ironic that France is writing one for itself. It is up to the French people to decide whether they silently accept the Parliament's intervention in their freedom of expression. It is, after all, primarily the French citizens whose freedom of expression is severely violated by their Parliament's decision. If the French people accept that their government is in a better position to think and pass judgment on their behalf, it is fine for me.

Regardless, the French attitude neither helps the Armenians who suffered nor the Turks who do not acknowledge their suffering. We can right the atrocities of the past not by labeling them but by discussing them. Calling them genocide is the shortest way to close the debate.

I wrote some time ago: “Anyone who wants to close the debate on what happened to Armenians in 1915 should start by describing the events as genocide. They are, of course, free to speak as they wish. But if Turks are expected to be part of this debate, then a more constructive approach is needed. This requires avoiding language that closes the debate when, in fact, a lively discussion has already been going on.”

A war America lost

American troops left Iraq last week. President Barack Obama declared that the objectives in Iraq were accomplished.

This I do not agree with. The occupation of Iraq was a big mistake by the US, led then by a neoconservative gang. The cost of the war was high for the US. Five-thousand died, 30,000 were injured and over a trillion dollars were spent.

All these may still be bearable losses, but when we look at the Iraqi side, the scope of destruction goes beyond one's imagination. The number of dead is said to be at around 1.2 million. Those who fled from their homes numbered 2 million. These figures tell us the extent of the human cost the Iraqis had to bear.

While credit for the removal of Saddam Hussein certainly goes to the US, moral and political responsibility for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis falls on the US as well.

Despite this heavy human cost and financial burden, the US did not get what it wanted.

The occupation has handed the power in Iraq to Shiite groups, a scenario of power-sharing that the Americans would have never considered prior to the war. Given the historical and theological relationship between Iraqi Shiites and Iran, it will now be very difficult to prevent the influence of Iran on Iraqi politics. Even Shiite elements that are relatively distant from Iran come under the pressure of pro-Iranian groups, as both derive their legitimacy from the teachings of Shiites, heavily influenced historically by Iranians.

After the US left Iraq, the rising power in the region is certainly Iran. The occupation of Iraq only facilitated the spread of Iranian influence in the region, and particularly in Iraq. Did American policy-makers envisage such an outcome, detrimental to their regional standing in the Middle East?

While the central government of Iraq has to a very large extent fallen to Shiites, the country appears divided along sectarian and ethnic lines. Once Iraqis fail in power-sharing among the Shiites, the Kurds, and the Sunnis, the country may fall to pieces. Thus the occupation has resulted in a new power configuration that shakes the feasibility of Iraq as a state. Will such a divided Iraq serve American interests in the region? I doubt it.

As a result of the war, the US also lost support worldwide. Before and after the invasion of Iraq, mass demonstrations were held in different parts of the world. Anti-Americanism hit its highest levels. This was not only a phenomenon in the Middle East among Muslims but was seen all over the world, including in Europe and Latin America. America lost its soft power once it used its hard power against Iraq. The global standing of the US suffered tremendously as the war dragged on, with hundreds of thousands of civilian casualties and the revelation of atrocities committed by American troops against civilians and prisoners. Only recently has the US begun to recover from its dark decade of anti-Americanism fueled by the Iraqi occupation due to worldwide affinity for President Obama.

The US also lost some of its allies. The unilateralism of the Bush administration alienated US friends in Europe. Those who supported the American war in Iraq, like Tony Blair of Britain, lost their own political battles at home.

Moreover, relations with Turkey were severely damaged as a result of the war. At some point, this even took the form of hostility. The trust between the two sides at the governmental level disappeared. Many in Turkey believed that the neocons in Washington had plotted with their Turkish supporters against the Turkish government to end the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) rule. Moreover, anti-Americanism rose to a record high among the people of Turkey. The relationship between the two sides was repaired only after the US started to contemplate withdrawal from Iraq.

In short, the occupation of Iraq shows the limits of using military power, even for a superpower. Iraq will continue to haunt America in the Middle East and the world at large.

Reforming Europe, abandoning Turkey

Looking at the economic crisis that led a number of member states to the brink of bankruptcy, some question the future of the European Union.

Whether the EU is an effective institutional framework for dealing with economic crises and bringing prosperity to its citizens may be debated, but it is premature to question the EU’s future.

The EU is the Europeans’ most ambitious project in modern history. I don’t think it will easily be given up. It is a zone of peace and prosperity despite the presence of some countries shaken by recent economic crises.

For the anti-EU circles, there is still no ground to celebrate. The union is not passé. Criticism of the EU should not underestimate the ability of the EU to overcome challenges and adapt itself to changing circumstances.

It is a union bringing together different national interests, styles, and identities. We always hear about how difficult it is to make decisions in such a big and diverse community. But we see that the union is capable of making speedy and fundamental decisions concerning itself.

Just take last week’s European Council meeting in Brussels as an example. Amid a debate on the future of the EU and the failures of its economic institutions and policies, European leaders decided to enhance integration, not loosen it. Within three months a new union treaty is going to be prepared to tighten financial management within the union.

This decision means that the current crisis will not lead to the disintegration of the union, as argued by some. On the contrary, it will trigger further integration within Europe.

This reaction of the EU to the crisis tells us an important characteristic of the union; namely, that is able to understand the change in the environment and respond accordingly.

There is indeed a history of this. Just think of the union treaties made since the end of the Cold War. Starting with Maastricht and moving on to Amsterdam and Nice, and now to the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has been more flexible, responsive and changing than it is given credit for. What we have is a union that has made four “constitutions” in the post-Cold War era, and agreed to make a new one.

This tells us about the EU’s ability to renew itself in the face of crisis, and also its flexibility to change despite a heavy Brussels bureaucracy and diverse membership profile. This is so, I think because the Europeans are still convinced that peace, prosperity, and liberty will best be brought about by European-level cooperation that requires working together instead of going on their own.

Compare the EU’s responsiveness to the changing circumstances in terms of coming up with a new set of rules and norms to Turkey. We have been ruled by a military-made Constitution since 1982. There were numerous amendments introduced since then, but we failed to make a new one despite overwhelming public demand. Even now it is rather doubtful if the new Parliament will reach an agreement on a new democratic constitution.

In trying to catch up with the EU, Turkey sped up its reforms since the late 1990s, strengthening its democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. But as of today, the EU lost its role to push Turkey for democratic reform not only because Turkey reached a point at which it does not need an external stimulus for democratization but also because the EU is no longer willing or cares to play such a role.

Such thinking prevails on both sides and neither serves the interests of Turkey nor those of Europe. I hope Turkey won’t be an abandoned or failed case of Europeanization as a result of ignorance or false confidence.

Abandoning the old paradigm in the Cyprus dispute

Abandoning an ever-widening scope of Turkish foreign policy, the Cyprus question no longer occupies center stage as it once used to. Yet it is still likely to emerge as an important issue in the coming year. Two imminent developments make this inevitable: The first is the upcoming rotating presidency of the European Council by the “Republic of Cyprus” and the second is the exploration of natural resources around the island.

Perhaps it is in response to these that negotiations seemed to have been sped up. The last round of negotiations among parties in New York at the end of last month was deemed positive and productive. Thus they have raised expectations. However, there are still delicate issues to agree upon before an agreement is reached.

Yet even if an agreement is reached between Turkish and Greek political leaders on the island, the people of both sides, who are still skeptical, will still have the final word. The referendum in 2004 proved that public opinion does matter. Unless each community is fully prepared to live together with risks and opportunities, their political leaders cannot resolve the dispute among themselves. It is not an issue to address at the top but requires engaging the people at the grassroots.

Hopefully, there will be new initiatives taken up by non-governmental actors in Cyprus to bring members of the two communities together with a common agenda. One such new civic initiative is the Cyprus Academic Dialogue (CAD) established by Turkish and Greek Cypriots to work towards preparing the public, pressuring governments and coming up with concrete suggestions on controversial issues.

This unique group organized a workshop this weekend in İstanbul bringing academics, journalists, and writers from both sides of Cyprus and Turkey together. For the first time, Cypriot Greeks and Turks as academics and intellectuals worked together to agree upon a joint statement in which the main parameters of a solution were outlined. This is, I think, a historic initiative. Civil society on both sides of the island is taking the matter (that is, in fact, their common future) into their own hands.

Such initiatives are important because they come from the people, the ultimate source of legitimacy and sovereignty. We know that even if an agreement is reached at the political level, it has to be sold to the public. Therefore, CAD's efforts are paving the way to build a “common vision” for the island by engaging in a constructive and courageous search for alternatives in settling the dispute on the island.

We know that their task is really difficult. This is because finding a solution on the island requires abandoning the old paradigm of the “national idea” that still prevails on both sides. I do not blame them for this. Given that the history of the conflict on the island and looking at the experiences of mainland Turkey and Greece, the idea of living together with the principle of political equality in an ethnically and religiously diverse state seems very difficult to “imagine.” In fact, the modern history of Turkey and Greece is the history of a quest to create a “nation-state” with ethnic and religious homogeneity.

I think we, Turks and Greeks, are the victims of our “nation-states,” imagined as survival units necessitating subordination and, if possible, the elimination of ethnic and religious diversities. The result is that we, Greeks and Turks on the mainland and on the island, have forgotten how to live and share with the “other.”

Now we are asking Cypriots to forget this “national idea” and form a “federal state.” This totally goes against our experiences. The islanders have the memory of a short-lived experiment in the early 1960s that only vindicated their separate “national ideas.”

My point is that it is really challenging to get out of this old but comfortable paradigm and go for a “post-national state.” It is not easy to materialize such a mental transformation.

Are the people of Cyprus prepared to live together even in a bi-communal and bi-zonal community? I am not sure. I think people are anxious. The issues of returnees, the rotating presidency, cross-voting, etc., are all related to this anxiety.

The root of the anxiety is that this “federal” model goes against the notion of “good” and “ideal state,” as we have grown to learn in our separate “national idea.”

I think Cypriots also feel that they are going against the current. As the world gets ever more fragmented along ethnic lines and witnesses the emergence of new nation-states, they are asked to become united and forget about their national ideas.

Well, this sense of going against the current makes a united federal Cyprus even more worthwhile. Cypriots, who once achieved this, may set a new example and trend with a moral high ground. It is a relief to see that there are people on both sides of Cyprus who defend a “post-national” united state as a way out of the deadlock.

Are the Islamists ready to govern?

The Arab Spring is not only an opportunity for Islamists but also a test case. How the Ennahda movement of Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt respond to the challenges will determine the future of both the Arab Spring and the Islamists.

Islamist political movements in Tunisia and Egypt are poised to come to power through the electoral process. This is a new challenge for democracy expected to emerge from the Arab Spring. The question is whether Islamists, once in power, will remain committed to and respectful of democratic institutions and processes. As such, it is also a challenge for Islamists as well, who used to be excluded and oppressed by the prevailing authoritarian regimes in the region.

It is a challenge for Islamists to adapt themselves to the new circumstances. Their ability to change is being tested. Political Islamism is designed as an opposition movement. In an authoritarian political environment where all dissenting voices were suppressed, opposition in the name of Islam was the only remaining ground to challenge the oppressive governments. This is what happened in almost all Muslim countries in the Middle East. Opposition in the name of Islam appeared as the only legitimate form of opposition, with discursive superiority over authoritarian ruling regimes, and it also promised strong popular support, given the influence of religion in the formation of Muslim's identities.

Thus from the 1970s onwards, political Islam emerged as a platform for the opposition, a kind of protest movement challenging the established order. It called for a change in the midst of the stagnant political orders of Arab authoritarianism. Following the failures of Arab nationalism and other secular ideologies, the simple slogan of “Islam is the solution” made sense to the Arab masses and attracted them. It was expected to resolve all the problems of the Muslims, from unemployment to healthcare, from education to housing. Islamism was the blueprint. What the secular-nationalist Arab regimes failed to produce was to be provided by the Islamists.

Islamist opposition movements, however, never developed a comprehensive program on how to resolve all the problems the people encountered. It did not really matter because the authoritarian Arab regimes never allowed them to perform in government. And it was unlikely for the Islamists to one day be in a position to make good on their promises. The Islamists in the region remained for a very long period in opposition, a position in which they could freely criticize the regimes without having to offer anything as an alternative. This was really comfortable. They did not have to offer something concrete in terms of programs and projects as a solution to the problems of the people. They remained in the opposition, comfortably criticizing the government in a way that also increased radicalism and the sweeping political stance of the Islamists.

It was not therefore only the oppression the Islamists experienced that radicalized them, but also the absence of governmental responsibility.

With the Arab Spring, the Islamists now face, at least in Tunisia and Egypt, a new situation.

First, they have been freed from governmental oppression. Now they are in a position to express themselves and appeal to the masses with a positive agenda, not just a series of criticisms directed against the ruling regimes, as in the old days. So they have to develop reasonable programs and come up with sensible projects to address the problems of the people. The old days in which mere criticism of the regimes and an assertion that “Islam is the solution” are gone, and this will not be enough to come to and then remain in power.

Thus the Islamists in the region face their first serious challenge before the people. Will they be able to deliver what they promise?

This is the question. In opposition, they were radical, uncompromising and comfortable. When they are in power on their own or share it with others on the political terrain, things will be fundamentally different. Responsibility in government requires meeting demands and delivering services. What also changes under governmental responsibility is the radicalism of the Islamists, who will not be able to hold on to their radical political stance.

This will be so because people who bring the Islamists to power will not be satisfied by mere radical rhetoric; they will also ask for concrete achievements in delivering services.

So, as the Islamists get closer to taking over governments through democratic means, like in Tunisia and Egypt, they moderate their discourse, embrace non-Muslim social groups and appeal to the West.

The success of the Arab Spring will be measured by the extent to which people's power is institutionalized in the form of democracy. This requires the integration of the Islamist movements in the democratic process, which in turn requires that the Islamists transform their political language and strategies to adopt the “rules of the game.”

New constitution: Is it possible?

The people's overwhelming demand for a new constitution has forced political parties to work together in Parliament. For this, a parliamentary commission consisting of four political parties, each with three members, was set up.

The first meeting of the Constitutional Reconciliation Commission, whose mission is to prepare a draft, is expected to take place this week. Because this is a historic opportunity to make a “democratic constitution” with the true participation of the people for the first time in history, expectations are high.

But we have to be realistic. It is not easy to reach a consensus among political actors as diverse as the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the Republican People's Party (CHP) on one hand, and the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) on the other.

Before tackling the content of the new constitution, the Reconciliation Commission has to agree on the procedure for reaching a decision. A 100 percent agreement among the participating parties may be desirable but it is almost impossible on contentious issues like citizenship, secularism, compulsory religious education, Kemalism, the composition and elections of the high court and so on. A kind of qualified majority may be sought to pass decisions, but in this case, three-fourths of the commission may bypass the AK Party and reach an agreement among themselves, disregarding the AK Party's parliamentary majority, which precludes approval by Parliament, let alone the people's approval in a referendum. This is not a baseless concern, as something similar happened last year in a referendum on a constitutional amendment.

On the other hand, to give the AK Party a kind of veto power in the commission, given its parliamentary majority, will not be acceptable to other political parties, which accepted Parliament speaker Cemil Çiçek's invitation to the commission on the principle that each party is equally represented in the commission. Whether the draft prepared by the Reconciliation Commission will get through the formal Constitutional Commission, where the AK Party has the majority, is another issue to be resolved.

All these have to be resolved before there is a debate on the content of the new constitution. The “good office” of the speaker of Parliament may not be enough to resolve the differences in the procedure and the content of the new constitution in the preparation period.

Besides, it would be naïve to think that political parties will act “responsibly and constructively” in this process. The politicking will continue, this time in the background of the new constitution. The AK Party will try to appear enthusiastic about a new constitution, knowing that giving the nation a new constitution will be its own success in the end. It will discursively push for it because a new constitution is a great opportunity for the ruling party to underline its “reformist credentials,” which slowly fade away after years in power.

For the CHP, the making of a new constitution is a new battleground to fight against losing the constitutional bases of Kemalism as an ideology and the independence of its institutions from the government. The attempt at reinterpreting secularism in the constitution may provoke the CHP supporters.

For the MHP, the making of the new constitution is a perfect occasion to argue that the ruling AK Party is giving in to the demands of the Kurds and, should the CHP play soft on secularism, to show that it has abandoned its secularist sensitivities. The MHP will use this process in any way possible to make gains at the expense of the AK Party and the CHP, which manipulates the Kurdish question and secularism.

As for the BDP, the constitution-making process is an excellent opportunity to voice its demands for “democratic autonomy,” education in Kurdish, referring to Kurds as a constituent ethnic element in the constitution and so on. Let us assume that the BDP has decided not to exploit the situation, but be constructive and offer to work with the AK Party on the new constitution. Even in this scenario, I think the AK Party will refrain from making a new constitution with the support of the BDP, due to concerns about the possible reaction of the Turks and the MHP's exploitation of the situation at the expense of the AK Party.

The AK Party cannot make a new constitution on its own. It needs the support of other parties. The most likely candidate is still the CHP. This is because the CHP has lost is traditional power base in state institutions like the military, judiciary, and universities. Thus it needs, like all groups that feel insecure vis-à-vis the state power, constitutional protection. If the CHP leadership and supporters forget about their fixation on secularism and seek protection from the AK Party-controlled state, then they can push the AK Party for a genuinely liberal, pluralist and democratic constitution.

In short, Turkey certainly needs a pluralist and democratic constitution that is non-ideological and ethnically blind, but the likelihood of it coming through is slim.

A post-Kemalist constitution for Turkey

The Parliament elected in the June elections has gathered to begin its legislative activities.

The new constitution is high on its agenda. Political parties seem to have agreed to set up a special commission in Parliament to work together on the new constitution. It will certainly not be easy for political parties that differ fundamentally from each other to reach a consensus.

I have not paid much attention to the details. The most important thing is to make a new constitution liberating Turkey from the ideological straightjacket of Kemalism. The new Turkey needs a post-Kemalist constitution. I understand the call for a liberal and democratic constitution as a demand for a non-ideological constitutional base of the state.

This does not mean denouncing Kemalism as an “ideology,” but leave it to the people to choose among the set of ideologies available from the free market of ideas. Let the people follow ideologies if they chose, but keep the state neutral as the basis of a wider consensus on the mechanism of living together without threatening each other.

Turkey is too developed and diversified to be ruled by any ideology upheld in the constitution. The age of ideological states has passed, passed with great pains, agonies, and disappointments. What matters now is a state that provides people not with ideas, ideologies or lifestyles, but with services and protection.

Ideological states, be they socialist, fascist or Kemalist, have failed to meet their promises. They have failed to produce freedom, welfare, and security for their citizens.

To build anew or maintain an ideological state is practically impossible in the contemporary complexities of the global economy, social networks, and political interactions. It is a struggle against the current that risks confronting not only global trends but also the demands of the people at home. People want liberty, welfare, and security, which cannot be provided by an ideological state, as proven by the political history of the 20th century.

Any ideological state formations cannot survive in a flourishing open society, deepening market economy and penetrating globalization. So it is futile to resist.

The demand for a new constitution reflects the crisis of Kemalism in itself. First, it is the crisis of Kemalism as the elitist modernization model. With its revolutionary ethos, Kemalism does not allow for the establishment of a full democracy since it does not trust the choice of people. It is not inclined to leave the people to choose their lifestyles, leaders, and beliefs. People need to be guided, enlightened and ruled. This notion of tutelage that appoints vanguard institutions and actors over the people can no longer be sustained. People do not want tutelage from anyone, including the military and anything involving Kemalism. Thus, a new and post-Kemalist constitution is needed to form a polity that secures and enables the people to rule themselves through liberal democracy.

A new constitution has also become urgent due to the crisis of secularism established and practiced by Kemalism. It is now impossible to dictate that secularism is a way of life, and that those who are not secular in their lifestyles are treated unequally. Such a notion of secularism that excludes the conservatives and religious masses cannot be sustained. Thus a post-Kemalist constitution is needed to remove the authoritarian model of secularism and eliminate the artificial tension between the religious and non-religious groups, the latter being favored by the state and the constitution.

And third, we need a post-Kemalist constitution because the current Constitution's notion of a homogenized nation is not true. There is no point in pretending that there is only one ethnicity in Turkey called Turks. We have to accept the plurality of ethnicities among the citizens of Turkey. Not every citizen of this country is a Turk. But Kemalism from its inception imagined homogenous nationhood and those who did not subscribe to this notion were denied, suppressed and forced to be assimilated.

All the above explains why we need a new constitution to remove the major clashes between social reality and the official imagination of the state based on Kemalism.

Therefore, a post-Kemalist constitution will be a prelude to a fully functioning democracy and the rule of law in Turkey as well as to a peaceful relationship between the Kurds and the conservatives on the one hand and the state on the other.