Declaring freedom in universities

As the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) agree on a constitutional change to lift a ban on the headscarf at universities, the dispute between those for the ban and those against it has intensified. Meeting on Friday, a group of university rectors declared that lifting the ban on the headscarf will lead to the establishment of a religious state, replacing the current secular one. The rectors' declaration was countered by a group of independent academics whose number has surpassed 2,000 at the moment of this writing. Independent academics, based on the very concept of "university," argued that universities should be places where different ideas, beliefs, and lifestyles can be freely expressed. Pointing out that there is no headscarf ban in any university in liberal democratic countries they called for a removal of the headscarf ban.

The claims of pro-prohibition rectors are baseless. As the headscarf ban does not protect secularism, lifting the ban does not endanger it, either. The headscarf ban has been in effect for more than 20 years but pro-prohibition academics still argue that secularism is under threat. If that is the case then it is obvious that the headscarf has been less than effective in eliminating the threat against secularism over the last 20 years, so it is useless for the declared objective.

But, of course, this is not the point. The issue is not the threat per se but the hegemony the pro-prohibition groups establish by using the threat to silence the majority in Turkey. So for those who advocate a continuation of the ban, the "threat to secularism" is permanent; it will never disappear. Thus, they should remain in power for good in order to "protect" secularism from the people. It is crystal clear that the "threat to secularism" is a discursive tool to generate a "right to rule" over the people.

Radical secularists at universities have increasingly been marginalized. Their hegemony is being questioned and challenged by a group of independent academics who have declared that universities should be places where freedom, not bans, are the central idea (The Web site of this campaign is universitedeozgurluk.blogspot.com). Their declaration has underlined the fact that universities are not uniform institutions in terms of ideas, lifestyles, and beliefs. Instead, they are places of utmost diversity that should be respected and celebrated as such. The declaration has displayed that officials who advocate for a continuation of the headscarf ban do not represent the whole university. These academics agree that universities should be mentioned with the freedoms they offer to academics and students as well as the contribution that they are making to knowledge.

However, it is obvious that there is a group of authoritarian academics who at the moment happen to be in power at universities. For them diversity in terms of ideas and lifestyles is regarded as a threat. What kind of university do such pro-prohibition academics desire? Could such a place be called a university?

A leading pro-prohibition academic, Mesut Parlak, the rector of Turkey's largest and oldest university, openly stated that they would not be impartial toward their students who wear headscarves after the ban is lifted. This is a shocking admission that pro-prohibition academics are biased, dogmatic and ideologically oriented and that they do not and will not treat their students with equality. I cannot imagine an academic who discriminates against his or her students based on religion, belief, opinion or sex. This is a gross violation not only of law but professional ethics as well. Yet such an admission also reflects the fact that pro-prohibition academics are not interested in liberty, equality, non-discrimination and scholarly work, but are engaged in an ideological fight. It seems that they do not care for universities as such but use universities and their academic titles to suppress those who disagree with them.

Today we know more than ever that there are pro-liberty academics at universities who think that universities should not meddle in the way in which students think or dress.
04.02.2008

Perpetual peace between Turkey and Greece

Am I too naive to talk about a "perpetual peace" between Turkey and Greece given the fact that it took 49 years for a Greek prime minister to visit Turkey? Maybe, but once the two communities overcome "security-centric" perspectives and look to each other not as historical adversaries but as contemporary partners, a significant step in this direction will be taken.

The main obstacles before this "perpetual peace" are an exaggerated concern for "security" and historical prejudice that fuel each other. Turks are led to believe that the Greek Megalo Idea is still alive and can be reactivated at any moment, that the ecumenical claim of the Greek-Orthodox Patriarchate is a threat and that Greek islands in the Aegean are to be used to strangle Turkey. Greeks keep reminding themselves how they were swept out of Anatolia -- a remembrance that constructs their national identity by otherizing the historical image of the Turk.

I think both sides are learning to not be imprisoned by a particular narrative of history and an irrational sense of insecurity. Even historical memories are being invoked to rediscover how to live together as in the past. Turks and Greeks are surprised by their similarities as they get to know each other. Many might have already been bored of talking about common food, common words in the languages and even common patterns of behavior. Soothed with personal experiences, people at large would say that they are good friends who do not have any problem with the other side. It is almost always added that the problem is between states.

This might sound rather clichéd but there is truth in it, and a clue to settling the disputes for good. It suggests that the way to establish a perpetual peace between the two communities is to put people at the center of the relationship. This requires rescuing the fate of the two countries from a practice of "high politics" that has no room for compromise or cooperation. The practitioners of "power politics" know of nothing but military capabilities, war machines, and bullying. They even look at their own citizens, the Greeks in İstanbul and the Turks in western Trace, as hostages to be used against the other side. Let us, first of all, get rid of them.

Years ago, when Turkey and Greece were on the verge of war over the Aegean sea, Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal proposed a fresh "perspective" -- freeze politically sensitive issues for a while and instead develop economic and social interactions. This was not a solution per se but a new approach that would pave the way for solutions. The argument was a simple liberal view that economic and social engagement would in time turn high political disputes into irrelevant issues by establishing mutual benefits and unbreakable ties.

To some degree, this is being carried out. Two years ago the Greek National Bank took over Turkish Finansbank for around 3 billion Euros. The Greek company didn't just buy a bank in Turkey, it invested in the future of the country. A stable, prosperous and peace-loving Turkey that gets along with Greece is now in the interest of both the Greek and Turkish stakeholders of Finansbank.
Of course, there remain some big issues to be tackled on the table. The biggest is undoubtedly Cyprus. The Cyprus question is constantly awakening historical prejudices and mutual insecurities and legitimatizing the hardliners on both sides. Unless this dispute is somehow settled it will be really hard to expand and deepen cooperation between the two sides.

Other issues are of less significance. Opening the Greek Orthodox seminary in Turkey that was closed in 1971 is not a big deal. The ecumenical status of the patriarchate should also not be a great problem -- contrary to the exaggerations of some nationalists in Turkey. Conservative circles who oppose the ecumenical claim of the patriarchate should explain how they presume to override a right given by Mehmet the Conqueror.

In return, Greeks should overcome an insecure identity defined by reference to their historic struggle against the Turks.
28.01.2008

From Annapolis to two Palestinian states

The objective of the Annapolis peace process was to establish peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians, leading to the establishment of a Palestinian state -- an aim the stateless Palestinians have been struggling to achieve for decades. With the success of the Annapolis process, their long-sought dream may come to fruition. The Palestinians may be happier with the outcome because they will end up having two states instead of just one, a result beyond even their dreams.

Imagine a peace conference on the Palestinian question to which the representatives of nearly 50 countries were invited, but not the representatives of the Palestinian people.

With whom can peace be established, with a handful of powerful warlords? Maybe in some crisis-driven areas of the world, but not in the Palestinian case. Without including the Palestinian people, peace will never be arrived at. It has been the struggle of the people in the streets of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to end the occupation and build an independent state. What brought the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) into the occupied territories was the resistance of the Palestinian people in the streets, the Intifada. Peace without people is wishful thinking.

Then the question arises, who is entitled to represent the Palestinian people in a peace negotiation?
Obviously, Mahmoud Abbas as the elected president of the Palestinian Authority has his people's endorsement. But not only him -- the January 2006 elections were overwhelmingly won by Hamas, capturing 76 seats of the Palestinian parliament while its rival Fatah took 43 seats, a comfortable majority to form a Hamas government. But Hamas' electoral success and popular legitimacy were not recognized. There were some points for those who boycotted the Hamas government to take hold of -- Hamas did not denounce violence as a tool for political objectives and did not accept the agreements between the Palestinian Authority and Israel. These were serious problems, but to overcome them required engagement with Hamas. The invitation extended to Khalid Meshaal to visit Turkey for a private meeting in the spring of 2006 was just such an act of engagement, meant to persuade the Hamas leaders to take some positive steps in line with the expectations of the international community. Yet it was totally misunderstood by the US and deliberately attacked by opponents of the government at home.

Western governments, including the European Union, imposed sanctions on Hamas. Encouraged by the attitude of the Western governments, the presence of Hamas even within the unity government was not tolerated. Fights between Hamas and Fatah erupted throughout Palestinian territory, resulting not only in the deaths of over 500 people but also the de facto partition of the Palestinian Authority between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Moreover, democratic experimentation has come to an end in Palestine, the place closest to democratic governance in the Arab world, given its strong political conscience developed out of its struggle to end the occupation. Palestinians have lost their belief in democratic elections and the possibility of change through the ballot box. Because of this, instead of seeking democratic legitimacy the competing parties in Palestine try to establish their power through the barrel of a gun -- a loss not only for Palestine but for the entire region of those who believe in the possibility of change through democratic means.

When it comes to building peace in the Middle East, exclusion again does not work and has never worked. We should keep in mind that a peace process without Hamas is destined to disintegrate. It is a movement with a significant degree of popular support. If there is to be peace in Palestine it cannot be without people's consent, which requires the representation of all sides, including Hamas, in the peace process. Otherwise, the best outcome we can hope for is the establishment of two Palestinian states, which will be a source of many other problems in the region.

Notwithstanding the potential problems, the main actors who were present in Annapolis, namely the US, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority, may have already agreed upon a two-state solution in Palestine.
03.12.2007

Will Alevis surrender to the state?

Instead of correcting a wrong, we try to put a right into the wrong. Personally, I do not understand the Alevis who ask from the state not merely "recognition," but also representation and patronage. A group of Alevis close to the government is working on a model that will incorporate Alevi religious leaders and institutions into the state bureaucracy. A new directorate-general for Alevi affairs is planned to be established under the Prime Minister's office. And they call it a representation of the Alevi faith in the state. Does Turkey have a system of "corporatism" along with various religions and sects? Why not then have a representation of Christians, Catholics, Protestants, and others with Turkish citizenship? What about Muslims who think that the Religious Affairs Directorate does not represent them in the state and instead have some other institutions or individuals in mind?

Are the Alevis aware of the patronage to be established by incorporating the Alevi sect in the state bureaucracy? Will the Alevis be happy to find themselves in a position in which the state determines what the Alevi faith is, what the Alevi rituals are, who their proper religious leaders are?
The government should, of course, be responsive to the problems and demands of the Alevi community, but should refrain from establishing a system of patronage like the one that we already have for Sunni Muslims, namely, the Religious Affairs Directorate. Governing religious affairs is not the business of the state and it should be left to the people. What a secular state is supposed to do is treat each faith equally and refrain from interfering in religious affairs if it expects non-intervention from religion into government affairs.

Some Alevi groups are against the government's plan for a separate directorate for Alevi affairs on the grounds that the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government plans to infiltrate the Alevi community. But they still demand their share from the Religious Affairs Directorate budget. As Alevis ask for government resources to finance their institutions, personnel, and activities, they invite state intervention.

They may have financial difficulties, but the current form of Alevi organizations as part of civil society is a better model than state-ruled Alevi religious affairs. Are they not capable of running their own religious affairs?

Alevis with their current volunteer-based social networking sit at the right place to ask for proper separation of religion and state and oppose the interference of one with the other. They have survived and flourished in the civilian sphere without state support -- in other words, without state intervention. Instead of asking for inclusion into a state-dominated religious sphere, they can work for proper separation of religion and state by demanding social-volunteer based organization of Sunni Islam, too.

Instead of asking to be part of this awkward secularism, Alevis should deliberately remain outside the state patronage of religion and question the place of the Religious Affairs Directorate in a secular state. With this, the Alevis may play a significant role in the transformation of Turkey into a genuine secular system.

Alevi identity should be recognized by the state and seen as legitimate by the Sunni majority, but the Alevis should remember that this requires recognition of other religious identities like Sunni Sufi orders and other forms of religious networks. That is to say, Alevis should stop supporting radical secularism that stigmatizes and marginalizes other religious identities and communities.
26.11.2007

The Kurdish question at a crossroads

A recent crisis over the Kurdish question may turn into an opportunity for a durable solution.
I see an open window of opportunity with two components. Firstly, the military has realized the limits of a security-based approach. It is clear to them that a new approach is required to address the social and political aspects of the Kurdish question. Some high-ranking generals now talk of past mistakes and the need for “bringing down the PKK militants from the mountains” and “making them lay down their arms.” These could not be uttered a few months ago.

Secondly, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government has understood that it is no longer possible to ignore the Kurdish question in the face of increasing terrorist activities of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) coupled with developments in northern Iraq. Well, I do not think that the government has a comprehensive plan to settle the issue. Yet an inclusive dialogue that recognizes the Kurdish identity, an emphasis on democratic representation and social-economic measures might be the basis of a more detailed program to be developed.

The fact that the AK Party has recognized the Kurdish question as central to the government of Turkey is a breakthrough in itself. The AK Party is clearly in a position to push for a solution to the Kurdish question. Recently two developments have encouraged the AK Party leadership to take some initiatives on this issue. Firstly, the AK Party’s stunning election victory in the Kurdish-populated cities boosted the confidence of the party leadership to tackle this thorny issue. Secondly, it seems that the military has come to regard the AK Party as the last chance to resolve the problem within a notion of a unitary state given its electoral performance in the region. The AK Party under the leadership of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who is immensely popular among the Kurds of Turkey, can play the role of a broker in the settlement of the Kurdish question. This, to my understanding, is the prevailing view both in the security establishment and the AK Party circles.
The AK Party government used to be silent on the Kurdish question with some minor exceptions, a policy prompted by its search for acceptance from the security establishment. What the government could do was introduce some reforms within the framework of the process of EU accession. Moreover, economic policies and social spending by the government have certainly improved the economic situation in the region -- but that is it; the AK Party has never had a separate plan for the settlement of the Kurdish question.

In order not to increase its vulnerability in the eyes of the state elite, the AK Party has refrained from pursuing assertive policies on the Kurdish question. But what seems to be emerging today is that the AK Party can bridge the gap between the Kurdish people and the Turkish state and by doing so also make itself indispensable to the state elite. I think this is a historic opportunity for the AK Party government to prove that it is a party that unites all, Turks and Kurds. This is also a chance for the AK Party to resolve its sense of insecurity and vulnerability within the system.

Yet it is not only up to the government and the security establishment. Turkey’s western friends can and should play a constructive role in the process by separating the PKK and the Kurdish question and displaying their commitment to a democratic, inseparable and EU member Turkey.

The Democratic Society Party (DTP) is another player that needs to demonstrate its goodwill and democratic maturity by distancing itself from violence and defining itself as a capable political agent. By then the Kurdish question may be debated and eventually resolved without being seen as an existential threat to Turkey.
22.11.2007

How to understand new activism in Turkish foreign policy

Domestic quarrels notwithstanding, Turkey’s regional and global weight is on the rise. We should, however, neither misjudge its basis nor be misguided by excessive self-confidence.

Meeting with US President George W. Bush, hosting King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and bringing Israeli President Shimon Peres and the head of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas together before the Turkish Parliament marks a new activism in Turkish foreign policy. All these high-level diplomatic contacts clearly indicate an ever-growing “engagement” of Turkey with the world, as diplomacy does not take place in a void.

However, a couple of points need to be clarified. Bullying policies in the region do not necessarily elevate Turkey to the status of a regional power. On the contrary, such an attitude would isolate Turkey in the region and prompt searches among regional and global forces for alignments to counter-balance Turkey. So the military might is the last thing to rely on to exert influence over developments in the region. Moreover, active military engagement in regional politics is also highly likely to aggravate the already problematic issue of civilian control over the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). Turkish policymakers should always remember that an aggressive foreign policy disrupts not only regional balances but also civilian-military relations at home. We should always keep in mind that the militarist culture with authoritarian political tendencies is fed by foreign policy issues by justifying a world-view based on enmity and mistrust.

Turkish policymakers seem aware of these traps. Behind the increasing activism in Turkish foreign policy, we see more of the “soft power” components of Turkey. No doubt a growing and stable Turkish economy is an asset for Turkish foreign policy as well. An economy with a YTL 400 billion volume is both a source of attraction and deterrence. Turkish goods and companies are all over the Middle East, including northern Iraq. An ever-increasing amount of Gulf capital is flowing into the Turkish economy.

Strengthened by robust economic performance, Turkish civil society gets involved in international affairs, adding to activism at the governmental level. We know very well how civil society organizations have lobbied for Turkey’s accession process to the EU, but what was not noticed were their activities in other parts of the world, including the Middle East. Having Peres and Abbas together in Ankara addressing the Turkish Parliament was largely made possible by the efforts of the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB), which established the Ankara Forum for Economic Cooperation with its counterparts in Israel and Palestine and is working to set up industrial parks in the West Bank and Gaza.

The analysts with a sole “power politics” perspective would disagree, but Turkish democracy is also an asset for Turkish foreign policy. Undemocratic regimes make weak governments with constant problems of legitimacy. Turkish democracy is a source of strength for Turkey. It is also an attribute of Turkey that is envied in the region. Transparency, the rule of law and an accountable government have their attractions. Turkey manages to reach the people on the street in the region with its credentials as a democratic country. An effective public diplomacy is being conducted, the result of which is Turkey’s ever-high popularity in the region, especially in the Arab Middle East.

To be in a position of negotiating accession to the EU adds to the strength of Turkey’s global and regional standing. We must not forget this in order to resist the temptation, as championed by some anti-Western circles in Turkey, for opting out to be a “regional power” on its own, cooperating with Russia, China and Iran when necessary. Anchoring to the EU is the key to Turkey’s political as well as economic stability, without which Turkey will lose an important component of its soft power. Turkey’s EU accession brings Europe ever closer to the Middle East and carries the Middle East into Europe, and both ways lay the groundwork for economic prosperity and political stability for its immediate neighborhood.

Culture, history and identity matter in foreign policy. Turkey, at last, seems to be successfully bringing such a post-realist, and I would also say post-Kemalist, dimension into its foreign policy-making. Listening to Peres’s appreciative remarks about the way in which the Jews have historically been treated by the Turks is one point to ponder.
15.11.2007

A new state policy on the Kurdish question?

There are signs that the "state policy" toward the Kurdish question may be entering a process of change. Some retired generals, including the leader of the 1980 military coup, Gen. Kenan Evren, have admitted that they made some mistakes in the past. The ban on speaking Kurdish in public was clearly described as a mistake by Evren who, nevertheless, did not mention the treatment of the inmates under the military junta in the notorious Diyarbakir Military Prison which served, thanks to the junta's violent policies, for years as a recruitment center for the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).

But even such an admission is progress and maybe a sign of changing policy. Another sign in this direction is the proposal of Republican People's Party (CHP) leader Deniz Baykal for a cooperative relationship with the Iraqi Kurds.

CHP leader Baykal surprised many by his latest maneuvering on the issue of northern Iraq. It is really hard to understand the U-turn Baykal made last week given the fact that he had called for an immediate military operation into the region that would target the Iraqi regional government too. What has happened to prompt Baykal to come up with a list of social and political measures that go against his original idea of crushing the regional government in northern Iraq?
Some argue that he is trying to win the support of the party branches in southeastern Turkey for the CHP's upcoming party congress. Well, I do not really think so. A party and leadership so closely linked to the state elite would not move independently on such a crucial issue. Baykal's new stand might be part of a changing state policy on the Kurdish question.

Offering educational opportunities for the Iraqi Kurds, increasing the volume of trade, opening a new border post and sharing water resources evenly and cooperatively are elements of a liberal solution to the issue of how to engage with the Kurds in northern Iraq. Many other measures can be added to this, but these are geared to increase economic and social cooperation, leading to an unbreakable interdependence between the two sides.

The shift from a confrontational perspective to one of cooperation and interdependence should be welcome. But some of his critics within the party and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) spokespersons have already started questioning Baykal's loyalty to the notion of a unitary nation-state. This reminds us why we should avoid using extreme terms like treason when discussing politics. Baykal used that a lot. Now it is being used against him. Just a few weeks ago he was accusing Prime Minister Erdoğan of being Barzani's man; now he is the one whose discourse Barzani sympathizes with.

For the last 80 years neither the denial of Kurdish ethnic identity nor torture in the Diyarbakir Military Prison and the ban on speaking Kurdish in public has solved the problem.
If there is a new approach developing to address the Kurdish question it cannot help but tackle a broader issue. The century-old objective, which turned into a state tradition, of creating a homogenous nation by using the coercive apparatus of the state should be abandoned.
The republican regime should give up its tradition of fighting against the social currents through state power, a tradition that destroys pluralism, democracy and the rule of law. This is the basis of the problem. We had better understand that a Jacobin approach is no way a solution to social problems. Without questioning the Jacobin tradition of imposing the state's views and preferences on the people, be it the Kurds, the liberals, the Alevis or Muslims with headscarves, we cannot proceed with establishing social peace in this country. Repressive state policies are the main obstacle to peace, harmony and social integration. Let the people be, whatever or whoever they are. The state has no right to "define" and "impose" social, religious or ethnic identities on its people. Since we Turks have a majority in this country we cannot deny the right of the Kurds to be different and remain so. Respect for minority rights, be it ethnic, religious, political or sexual, is not only the basis of legitimacy for any polity but also of social peace.
12.11.2007