From Annapolis to two Palestinian states

The objective of the Annapolis peace process was to establish peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians, leading to the establishment of a Palestinian state -- an aim the stateless Palestinians have been struggling to achieve for decades. With the success of the Annapolis process, their long-sought dream may come to fruition. The Palestinians may be happier with the outcome because they will end up having two states instead of just one, a result beyond even their dreams.

Imagine a peace conference on the Palestinian question to which the representatives of nearly 50 countries were invited, but not the representatives of the Palestinian people.

With whom can peace be established, with a handful of powerful warlords? Maybe in some crisis-driven areas of the world, but not in the Palestinian case. Without including the Palestinian people, peace will never be arrived at. It has been the struggle of the people in the streets of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to end the occupation and build an independent state. What brought the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) into the occupied territories was the resistance of the Palestinian people in the streets, the Intifada. Peace without people is wishful thinking.

Then the question arises, who is entitled to represent the Palestinian people in a peace negotiation?
Obviously, Mahmoud Abbas as the elected president of the Palestinian Authority has his people's endorsement. But not only him -- the January 2006 elections were overwhelmingly won by Hamas, capturing 76 seats of the Palestinian parliament while its rival Fatah took 43 seats, a comfortable majority to form a Hamas government. But Hamas' electoral success and popular legitimacy were not recognized. There were some points for those who boycotted the Hamas government to take hold of -- Hamas did not denounce violence as a tool for political objectives and did not accept the agreements between the Palestinian Authority and Israel. These were serious problems, but to overcome them required engagement with Hamas. The invitation extended to Khalid Meshaal to visit Turkey for a private meeting in the spring of 2006 was just such an act of engagement, meant to persuade the Hamas leaders to take some positive steps in line with the expectations of the international community. Yet it was totally misunderstood by the US and deliberately attacked by opponents of the government at home.

Western governments, including the European Union, imposed sanctions on Hamas. Encouraged by the attitude of the Western governments, the presence of Hamas even within the unity government was not tolerated. Fights between Hamas and Fatah erupted throughout Palestinian territory, resulting not only in the deaths of over 500 people but also the de facto partition of the Palestinian Authority between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Moreover, democratic experimentation has come to an end in Palestine, the place closest to democratic governance in the Arab world, given its strong political conscience developed out of its struggle to end the occupation. Palestinians have lost their belief in democratic elections and the possibility of change through the ballot box. Because of this, instead of seeking democratic legitimacy the competing parties in Palestine try to establish their power through the barrel of a gun -- a loss not only for Palestine but for the entire region of those who believe in the possibility of change through democratic means.

When it comes to building peace in the Middle East, exclusion again does not work and has never worked. We should keep in mind that a peace process without Hamas is destined to disintegrate. It is a movement with a significant degree of popular support. If there is to be peace in Palestine it cannot be without people's consent, which requires the representation of all sides, including Hamas, in the peace process. Otherwise, the best outcome we can hope for is the establishment of two Palestinian states, which will be a source of many other problems in the region.

Notwithstanding the potential problems, the main actors who were present in Annapolis, namely the US, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority, may have already agreed upon a two-state solution in Palestine.
03.12.2007

Will Alevis surrender to the state?

Instead of correcting a wrong, we try to put a right into the wrong. Personally, I do not understand the Alevis who ask from the state not merely "recognition," but also representation and patronage. A group of Alevis close to the government is working on a model that will incorporate Alevi religious leaders and institutions into the state bureaucracy. A new directorate-general for Alevi affairs is planned to be established under the Prime Minister's office. And they call it a representation of the Alevi faith in the state. Does Turkey have a system of "corporatism" along with various religions and sects? Why not then have a representation of Christians, Catholics, Protestants, and others with Turkish citizenship? What about Muslims who think that the Religious Affairs Directorate does not represent them in the state and instead have some other institutions or individuals in mind?

Are the Alevis aware of the patronage to be established by incorporating the Alevi sect in the state bureaucracy? Will the Alevis be happy to find themselves in a position in which the state determines what the Alevi faith is, what the Alevi rituals are, who their proper religious leaders are?
The government should, of course, be responsive to the problems and demands of the Alevi community, but should refrain from establishing a system of patronage like the one that we already have for Sunni Muslims, namely, the Religious Affairs Directorate. Governing religious affairs is not the business of the state and it should be left to the people. What a secular state is supposed to do is treat each faith equally and refrain from interfering in religious affairs if it expects non-intervention from religion into government affairs.

Some Alevi groups are against the government's plan for a separate directorate for Alevi affairs on the grounds that the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government plans to infiltrate the Alevi community. But they still demand their share from the Religious Affairs Directorate budget. As Alevis ask for government resources to finance their institutions, personnel, and activities, they invite state intervention.

They may have financial difficulties, but the current form of Alevi organizations as part of civil society is a better model than state-ruled Alevi religious affairs. Are they not capable of running their own religious affairs?

Alevis with their current volunteer-based social networking sit at the right place to ask for proper separation of religion and state and oppose the interference of one with the other. They have survived and flourished in the civilian sphere without state support -- in other words, without state intervention. Instead of asking for inclusion into a state-dominated religious sphere, they can work for proper separation of religion and state by demanding social-volunteer based organization of Sunni Islam, too.

Instead of asking to be part of this awkward secularism, Alevis should deliberately remain outside the state patronage of religion and question the place of the Religious Affairs Directorate in a secular state. With this, the Alevis may play a significant role in the transformation of Turkey into a genuine secular system.

Alevi identity should be recognized by the state and seen as legitimate by the Sunni majority, but the Alevis should remember that this requires recognition of other religious identities like Sunni Sufi orders and other forms of religious networks. That is to say, Alevis should stop supporting radical secularism that stigmatizes and marginalizes other religious identities and communities.
26.11.2007

The Kurdish question at a crossroads

A recent crisis over the Kurdish question may turn into an opportunity for a durable solution.
I see an open window of opportunity with two components. Firstly, the military has realized the limits of a security-based approach. It is clear to them that a new approach is required to address the social and political aspects of the Kurdish question. Some high-ranking generals now talk of past mistakes and the need for “bringing down the PKK militants from the mountains” and “making them lay down their arms.” These could not be uttered a few months ago.

Secondly, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government has understood that it is no longer possible to ignore the Kurdish question in the face of increasing terrorist activities of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) coupled with developments in northern Iraq. Well, I do not think that the government has a comprehensive plan to settle the issue. Yet an inclusive dialogue that recognizes the Kurdish identity, an emphasis on democratic representation and social-economic measures might be the basis of a more detailed program to be developed.

The fact that the AK Party has recognized the Kurdish question as central to the government of Turkey is a breakthrough in itself. The AK Party is clearly in a position to push for a solution to the Kurdish question. Recently two developments have encouraged the AK Party leadership to take some initiatives on this issue. Firstly, the AK Party’s stunning election victory in the Kurdish-populated cities boosted the confidence of the party leadership to tackle this thorny issue. Secondly, it seems that the military has come to regard the AK Party as the last chance to resolve the problem within a notion of a unitary state given its electoral performance in the region. The AK Party under the leadership of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who is immensely popular among the Kurds of Turkey, can play the role of a broker in the settlement of the Kurdish question. This, to my understanding, is the prevailing view both in the security establishment and the AK Party circles.
The AK Party government used to be silent on the Kurdish question with some minor exceptions, a policy prompted by its search for acceptance from the security establishment. What the government could do was introduce some reforms within the framework of the process of EU accession. Moreover, economic policies and social spending by the government have certainly improved the economic situation in the region -- but that is it; the AK Party has never had a separate plan for the settlement of the Kurdish question.

In order not to increase its vulnerability in the eyes of the state elite, the AK Party has refrained from pursuing assertive policies on the Kurdish question. But what seems to be emerging today is that the AK Party can bridge the gap between the Kurdish people and the Turkish state and by doing so also make itself indispensable to the state elite. I think this is a historic opportunity for the AK Party government to prove that it is a party that unites all, Turks and Kurds. This is also a chance for the AK Party to resolve its sense of insecurity and vulnerability within the system.

Yet it is not only up to the government and the security establishment. Turkey’s western friends can and should play a constructive role in the process by separating the PKK and the Kurdish question and displaying their commitment to a democratic, inseparable and EU member Turkey.

The Democratic Society Party (DTP) is another player that needs to demonstrate its goodwill and democratic maturity by distancing itself from violence and defining itself as a capable political agent. By then the Kurdish question may be debated and eventually resolved without being seen as an existential threat to Turkey.
22.11.2007

How to understand new activism in Turkish foreign policy

Domestic quarrels notwithstanding, Turkey’s regional and global weight is on the rise. We should, however, neither misjudge its basis nor be misguided by excessive self-confidence.

Meeting with US President George W. Bush, hosting King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and bringing Israeli President Shimon Peres and the head of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas together before the Turkish Parliament marks a new activism in Turkish foreign policy. All these high-level diplomatic contacts clearly indicate an ever-growing “engagement” of Turkey with the world, as diplomacy does not take place in a void.

However, a couple of points need to be clarified. Bullying policies in the region do not necessarily elevate Turkey to the status of a regional power. On the contrary, such an attitude would isolate Turkey in the region and prompt searches among regional and global forces for alignments to counter-balance Turkey. So the military might is the last thing to rely on to exert influence over developments in the region. Moreover, active military engagement in regional politics is also highly likely to aggravate the already problematic issue of civilian control over the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). Turkish policymakers should always remember that an aggressive foreign policy disrupts not only regional balances but also civilian-military relations at home. We should always keep in mind that the militarist culture with authoritarian political tendencies is fed by foreign policy issues by justifying a world-view based on enmity and mistrust.

Turkish policymakers seem aware of these traps. Behind the increasing activism in Turkish foreign policy, we see more of the “soft power” components of Turkey. No doubt a growing and stable Turkish economy is an asset for Turkish foreign policy as well. An economy with a YTL 400 billion volume is both a source of attraction and deterrence. Turkish goods and companies are all over the Middle East, including northern Iraq. An ever-increasing amount of Gulf capital is flowing into the Turkish economy.

Strengthened by robust economic performance, Turkish civil society gets involved in international affairs, adding to activism at the governmental level. We know very well how civil society organizations have lobbied for Turkey’s accession process to the EU, but what was not noticed were their activities in other parts of the world, including the Middle East. Having Peres and Abbas together in Ankara addressing the Turkish Parliament was largely made possible by the efforts of the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB), which established the Ankara Forum for Economic Cooperation with its counterparts in Israel and Palestine and is working to set up industrial parks in the West Bank and Gaza.

The analysts with a sole “power politics” perspective would disagree, but Turkish democracy is also an asset for Turkish foreign policy. Undemocratic regimes make weak governments with constant problems of legitimacy. Turkish democracy is a source of strength for Turkey. It is also an attribute of Turkey that is envied in the region. Transparency, the rule of law and an accountable government have their attractions. Turkey manages to reach the people on the street in the region with its credentials as a democratic country. An effective public diplomacy is being conducted, the result of which is Turkey’s ever-high popularity in the region, especially in the Arab Middle East.

To be in a position of negotiating accession to the EU adds to the strength of Turkey’s global and regional standing. We must not forget this in order to resist the temptation, as championed by some anti-Western circles in Turkey, for opting out to be a “regional power” on its own, cooperating with Russia, China and Iran when necessary. Anchoring to the EU is the key to Turkey’s political as well as economic stability, without which Turkey will lose an important component of its soft power. Turkey’s EU accession brings Europe ever closer to the Middle East and carries the Middle East into Europe, and both ways lay the groundwork for economic prosperity and political stability for its immediate neighborhood.

Culture, history and identity matter in foreign policy. Turkey, at last, seems to be successfully bringing such a post-realist, and I would also say post-Kemalist, dimension into its foreign policy-making. Listening to Peres’s appreciative remarks about the way in which the Jews have historically been treated by the Turks is one point to ponder.
15.11.2007

A new state policy on the Kurdish question?

There are signs that the "state policy" toward the Kurdish question may be entering a process of change. Some retired generals, including the leader of the 1980 military coup, Gen. Kenan Evren, have admitted that they made some mistakes in the past. The ban on speaking Kurdish in public was clearly described as a mistake by Evren who, nevertheless, did not mention the treatment of the inmates under the military junta in the notorious Diyarbakir Military Prison which served, thanks to the junta's violent policies, for years as a recruitment center for the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).

But even such an admission is progress and maybe a sign of changing policy. Another sign in this direction is the proposal of Republican People's Party (CHP) leader Deniz Baykal for a cooperative relationship with the Iraqi Kurds.

CHP leader Baykal surprised many by his latest maneuvering on the issue of northern Iraq. It is really hard to understand the U-turn Baykal made last week given the fact that he had called for an immediate military operation into the region that would target the Iraqi regional government too. What has happened to prompt Baykal to come up with a list of social and political measures that go against his original idea of crushing the regional government in northern Iraq?
Some argue that he is trying to win the support of the party branches in southeastern Turkey for the CHP's upcoming party congress. Well, I do not really think so. A party and leadership so closely linked to the state elite would not move independently on such a crucial issue. Baykal's new stand might be part of a changing state policy on the Kurdish question.

Offering educational opportunities for the Iraqi Kurds, increasing the volume of trade, opening a new border post and sharing water resources evenly and cooperatively are elements of a liberal solution to the issue of how to engage with the Kurds in northern Iraq. Many other measures can be added to this, but these are geared to increase economic and social cooperation, leading to an unbreakable interdependence between the two sides.

The shift from a confrontational perspective to one of cooperation and interdependence should be welcome. But some of his critics within the party and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) spokespersons have already started questioning Baykal's loyalty to the notion of a unitary nation-state. This reminds us why we should avoid using extreme terms like treason when discussing politics. Baykal used that a lot. Now it is being used against him. Just a few weeks ago he was accusing Prime Minister Erdoğan of being Barzani's man; now he is the one whose discourse Barzani sympathizes with.

For the last 80 years neither the denial of Kurdish ethnic identity nor torture in the Diyarbakir Military Prison and the ban on speaking Kurdish in public has solved the problem.
If there is a new approach developing to address the Kurdish question it cannot help but tackle a broader issue. The century-old objective, which turned into a state tradition, of creating a homogenous nation by using the coercive apparatus of the state should be abandoned.
The republican regime should give up its tradition of fighting against the social currents through state power, a tradition that destroys pluralism, democracy and the rule of law. This is the basis of the problem. We had better understand that a Jacobin approach is no way a solution to social problems. Without questioning the Jacobin tradition of imposing the state's views and preferences on the people, be it the Kurds, the liberals, the Alevis or Muslims with headscarves, we cannot proceed with establishing social peace in this country. Repressive state policies are the main obstacle to peace, harmony and social integration. Let the people be, whatever or whoever they are. The state has no right to "define" and "impose" social, religious or ethnic identities on its people. Since we Turks have a majority in this country we cannot deny the right of the Kurds to be different and remain so. Respect for minority rights, be it ethnic, religious, political or sexual, is not only the basis of legitimacy for any polity but also of social peace.
12.11.2007

Mistakes the Americans made

We could never have imagined -- even after the end of the Cold War -- that the Turkish people and the state elite would have come to view the US as an enemy threatening Turkey’s security and integrity. Even five years ago we could never imagine that Turkish-American relations would have ended up with such poisonous mistrust and misunderstanding on both sides. But it happened. Lately, there has been a growing perception that the US supports the PKK and prefers the Iraqi Kurds to its old ally, Turkey. In short, it seems to the public and the state elite that the US is not only abandoning Turkey as an ally and friend but is also confronting it as an adversary. If you look at the way we are debating the issues of the PKK and northern Iraq, it seems as if we are on the verge of a war against the US, which has been our ally for the last 60 years.

This breakdown in relations between the two countries will have domestic, regional and global implications. The position of anti-Western circles in Turkey who call for an end to NATO membership, oppose EU membership and fight against globalization will be vindicated and strengthened. Will the US’ strategic interests be better served if Turkey comes under the influence of these forces? What are the great strategic outcomes of such an adventurist political agenda for the region or for the US?

The US needs to seriously change the attitude it has adopted towards Turkey, which is pushing Turkey to look for a strategic partnership in the East. In 2002, when such a prospect was voiced by Gen. Tuncer Kılınç, then the secretary-general of the National Security Council, it regarded as a laughing matter, a careless and visionless statement. Some five years have passed and now we see increasing numbers of people, including security elite and analysts, talking of an Eurasian union as a viable policy option.

To me, the idea of Turkey forging a strategic alliance with Russia, Iran, and China is still a fantasy -- and a dangerous one, at that. But the increasing popularity of this fantasy is a sign, among others, of Turkey’s growing disillusionment with the US over the last four years.

The US administration made mistakes, serious ones. It never bothered to take into account the security risks for its ally, Turkey, posed by its occupation of Iraq. It refrained from addressing the concerns of Turkey and it refused to work cooperatively. This attitude resulted in the exclusion of Turkey from the developments that took place close to its border with Iraq. As was predicted, this allowed the development of a serious threat to Turkey’s national security. Turkey’s cooperation with the US was reduced in March 2003 with the decision of Parliament to not allow American troops to pass through Turkish territory. Following this decision, Turkish institutions, including the government, the military, and even the main opposition party, came under harsh criticism from high-ranking American officials. Meanwhile, an understanding developed in Turkey that the US was “punishing Turkey” for Parliament’s decision.

What was worse was that the US administration meddled in Turkish politics at the expense of its image as an ally, which requires remaining above the squabbles of day-to-day politics. The US’s actions may be calculated to capitalize on and exploit domestic divisions between the ruling party and the opposition parties and also between the military and the government. But this pulled the US into domestic political struggles, eventually alienating all sides involved. At one stage the Americans seemed to side with the government against the military, which was criticized for not supporting the March resolution. Such incidents naturally increased sympathy for the US in AK Party circles. But the time also came when the AK Party seemed to be abandoned in the face of the military’s growing threats of intervention against the government.

We can all remember how long it took for the US administration to come out against the so-called e-memorandum threatening a direct military coup on April 27. The US was also accused of plotting against the republican regime by supporting the “moderate Islam” represented by the AK Party, which was seen as furthering the “Greater Middle East Project” of the US.

In short, by meddling in Turkish domestic politics the US has ended up alienating almost all groups.

Furthermore, Hamas’ visit to Ankara was exaggerated and turned into yet another excuse to punish Turkey by some radical elements of the Jewish lobby, which alienated not only the government but also the vast majority of people who sympathize with the Palestinians. The energy deal with Iran was also subject to overreaction, indicating that the US was not prepared to understand Turkey’s need to diversify its energy resources for its growing economy and population.

Is the US administration aware of these and other mistakes they have made? Given all these considerations and the current issue with the PKK, it is time for the Americans to rethink their stance on Turkey.
08.11.2007

Rights and wrongs in the fight against the PKK

We can live with terror, like many other nations in the world fighting against it and bearing its pains. But the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terror is different. It poses an existential threat to Turkey because it is part of a broader Kurdish question. Fighting against the PKK is not simply a fight against a terrorist organization. It requires a broader approach than security measures. The extent to which this broader Kurdish issue is addressed helps to eliminate the PKK in the medium to long term.
But once again we seem to have reduced the issue to hit the PKK presence in northern Iraq as if it will resolve the problem for good. Preoccupation with security measures makes us lose our perspective. The securitization that we are increasingly witnessing nowadays is not the solution but the problem. Since 1925, following the Sheikh Said rebellion, Turkey has chosen "securitization" to deal with the Kurdish issue. What is the outcome? The unresolved Kurdish problem has obstructed the development of Turkish democracy.

It is good to mobilize public support against terror. But what would be the target of those angry masses? They are likely to get out of hand, increasing the possibility of provocations in various parts of Turkey. We should not forget that Turkey experienced the dreadful event of Sept. 6-7, 1955, in Istanbul and Izmir, where an angry mob attacked non-Muslim citizens. Years later, it was admitted that the Sept. 6-7 event was the doing of a "special war unit" within the Turkish security forces and it was described by one of its former commanders as a "successful psychological war operation."
The public mood is ready for similar raids against "Kurdish targets" in big cities with sizeable Kurdish populations. Prevention of such a provocation should be the number-one priority for the government, much more important than a cross-border operation.

In the struggle against the PKK, the key to success is to isolate it. An isolated terror organization with its social and political bases cut off cannot survive for long. Even if it maintains some of its cells it will cease to pose an existential threat to Turkey. And we can deal with such a terror organization.
The thing to do to isolate the PKK as a terror organization and cut off its links with the Kurdish community is to eliminate the ground on which it grows -- and that is to solve the Kurdish question. For the last six to seven years Turkey has taken significant steps in improving the state of the Kurds in the cultural, political and economic domains. However limited, these should be carried on.
In this context, the continuation of the Justice and Development Party's (AK Party) link with the Kurdish people is essential to enable the representation of those people in the center of Turkish politics. Without forgetting the nationalist credentials of the AK Party, I would argue that the AK Party also represents the Kurdish identity and interest, as reflected in the latest election and referendum results. The capability of the AK Party to reach out to the Kurdish people should be maintained. We should not push the AK Party into the fire over the northern Iraq issue and break up its rapprochement with the Kurds in this country.

The PKK leaders should be very happy about the last couple of weeks. Their terror acts have reached their objective of elevating the PKK to the place of a relevant entity in both Turkish and regional politics. We have caused the entire world to talk of the PKK. Our anger and reaction provided the PKK with a perfect propaganda outlet. This is not the way to fight terrorism. Gen. İlker Başbuğ complained the other week that Turkey had failed in preventing new PKK recruits. But this attitude of exaggerating the power of the PKK paves the way for new requirements to the terror organization. The power of the PKK is in no way comparable to that of the early 1990s when it was even poised to take control of some cities in the region.

I think Turkey should not exaggerate the PKK -- on the contrary, it should ignore it altogether. There are understandable reasons for the recent outrage against PKK violence. Yet we should be able to play it down and reduce the tension among the people. We may even direct this anger and resentment into a positive direction, like a national campaign for an embracing between Turks and Kurds.
Public sympathy and support for the PKK are waning. People in the region want peace, prosperity and cultural/ethnic recognition, all of which have been increasingly provided in recent years. As I explained earlier, this is the reason for an increase in the terrorist activities of the PKK -- it is out of the realization that it has become irrelevant to the solution to the Kurdish problem.

Instead of abandoning it, the Turkish government should launch an aggressive reform package demonstrating its will to manage its own agenda. Continuing reform with even surprising speed will put the PKK into a more irrelevant position over the Kurdish issue.

Turkey should not give the opportunity to the anti-reformist camp by abandoning the reform process. What has happened to the new constitution? The PKK and the hawks in Turkey should not be allowed to hijack Turkey's reform agenda. Cutting the PKK's social base requires continuing with the reform process.

More democratization, not securitization, is the way out of this crisis. We should not lose our perspective.
01.11.2007