What does the US really want?

IHSAN DAGI
i.dagi@todayszaman.com

What does the US really want?

I wonder if the US administration is aware that the prevailing negative public perception of the US is destroying the social and psychological basis of a working relationship in the long run between the US and Turkey. Even if a rapprochement is made today on the government level, it will be very difficult to carry it out in an atmosphere of common distrust and disappointment among the Turks. In an ever-democratizing Turkey, no government can remain indifferent to the demands and opinions of the masses. At the moment both sides seem to be losing their ability to make a new start in the future. Anti-Americanism has become part of "popular culture" with novels, movies, and TV series. While I sense some sort of an orchestrated effort to impact the negative American image in public, some actions and inactions of the US administration are paving the way towards this end.

Let's be honest, the US is not viewed as an ally, a strategic partner or a friend today. The image of the US is that of an adversary, which is largely due to its inaction when it comes to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and its policy toward northern Iraq. Like it or not, many in this country have come to see the US as a national security threat and not as an ally.

The widespread belief is that the US wants Turkey to divide up along ethnic lines to create a Kurdish state. An independent Kurdish state is believed to be a reliable, long-term ally in the region for the US, whose friends are low in number both in the region and in the rest of the world. Here reliability, in fact, means "dependence" on the US. Being surrounded by enemy states and nations -- Turkey in the north, Iran in the east, Syria in the west and the Sunni Arabs in the south -- an imaginary Kurdish state will be nothing but dependent on the US for its survival. And this is the basis of a perfect ally for the US. Along with Israel, such a Kurdish state in northern Iraq under the protection of the US is believed to be the objective of the US. An independent Kurdish state is expected to be a permanent ally for the US.

Strengthening its Kurdish ally or poking their nose into trouble and thus needing US help, it is also believed that the US is encouraging the Kurds of Turkey to be part of a greater Kurdish state. Many argue that the US support is not confined to Iraqi Kurds; the PKK is armed with American weapons. There is even talk of the US sharing intelligence on the Turkish military with the PKK.
It would be a mistake to think that all these are the views of the "public." These have indeed also become the views of many policy-makers who are in the security establishment and political institutions.

I think it is getting too late for the US to convince the Turkish people and authorities of alliance and friendship. Unless it moves quickly and disproves current public perceptions, Turkish-American relations will be permanently and structurally damaged.

I still believe that the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and its leader, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, are capable of controlling the nationalist outcry. But they should be provided with some sort of gains in the fight against the PKK. Otherwise, the nationalist fever will hijack Turkish politics and crash all, including those who assist them in their politics, the military and the media, creating waves of tension and clashes both in Turkey and in its neighbors.

The US administration should realize before it's too late that the PKK is sabotaging the Turkish-US alliance -- does the US have any interest in maintaining it? The PKK is also sabotaging stability and security in Iraq and the region as a whole -- does the US have any interest in securing it? I would even argue that the PKK is sabotaging a possible Kurdish independent state in northern Iraq -- does the US have any interest in having it? Moreover, the PKK is also sabotaging the friendship and understanding between the US and the Iraqi Kurds -- does the US have any interest in keeping it?
I wonder if the Americans do not see that they are being fooled by the PKK.

Anyhow, I still think that the US administration will not sacrifice its relationship with Turkey to the PKK and will avoid going down in history as the administration that lost Turkey.
29.10.2007

Is Kemalism compatible with democracy?

I know this question is straightforward, but it is one that we have to ask and answer if we are really interested in identifying and removing the obstacles before the democratization process. Any ideology may claim to be “good” and “right,” but if an ideology claims to have a monopoly over the “truth” and secures a constitutional superiority over other sets of ideas and ideologies, it turns out to be incompatible with democracy. Democracy requires pluralism of views that compete with one another. If the founding principles of a state are reduced to a single ideology, neither democracy nor rule of law can flourish, simply because constitutional order would not protect the pluralities of ideas and ideologies, but the one on which it is based.

The notion of state ideology is incompatible with the notion of democracy. Democracy does not only welcome plurality of views, programs, and ideologies, but requires them. These contending “views” on society should be in free competition to attract the support of the people.

As a set of ideas, Kemalism certainly deserves a place among the others and is entitled to protection from the state and law, just like other views, ideas, and ideologies. But it cannot ask for a monopoly or even a privilege. It is time for the Kemalists to understand for the sake of Turkish democracy that Kemalism is one among others that compete for adherence and acceptance by the people. The state protection and privileges for Kemalism only lead to distancing it further from society, people losing faith in democracy and producing more radicalism. In the free market of ideas, the Kemalists, too, will moderate themselves in order to appeal to a greater number of people.

We certainly need “moderate Kemalism” that accepts pluralism and democracy. But this requires abandoning the claim to be the sole provider of truth for society and the state, which is a totalitarian inclination anyway. Construction of a new and homogenized society by using the coercive means of the state is unacceptable from a liberal democratic point of view. In order not to be described as the new reactionaries of Turkey in the 21st century, the Kemalists had better come to terms with democracy and pluralism. It is the engagement in the path of democracy and the free market of ideas that may make the Kemalists feel the need for moderation.

When we look at the neo-Kemalists today, they seem to have a deep fear of the values and institutions of political modernity, namely democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The modern state cannot impose a particular ideology on its citizens. This is against the very nature of the state and its raison d’etre, which is to protect individual rights against the Leviathan, not vice versa.

However, some Kemalists still imagine Turkey as an ideological state, unaware of the fact that Turkish social, economic and political realities do not allow the imposition of a state ideology.
But some think that it is possible and they try. By doing so they opt out of the rules, norms, and principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. To make people uniformly believe in a state ideology, the neo-Kemalists seem prepared to resort to authoritarian means. That is how neo-Kemalism has become an authoritarian political and social project. Their problem is viewing citizens as subservient to the state and its ideology, instead of recognizing them as autonomous moral and political entities capable of making individual and public choices.

The Kemalists also seem far from curing their strong anti-Western sentiments and position, which leads them to misinterpret the events in Turkey and abroad. Once the Islamists in Turkey thought of the West in this way, but now it is the Kemalists who think the West is the mother of all evil.

Kemalism as a state ideology above the law and principles of democracy goes against the notion of “contemporary civilization.”

Not only Kemalism but all ideologies that intend to use the state apparatus to silence and suppress other ideologies are incompatible with the principles of democracy.
04.10.2007

The future of Kemalism and the İstanbul Biennial

Does Kemalism allow academic freedoms and freedom of thought and expression? Well, if it left to “contemporary” Kemalists they would criminalize any act of criticism leveled at Kemalism of their understanding. The latest incidence of intolerance in the name of Kemalism involved Hou Hanru, the curator of the Istanbul Biennial, who made an opening speech and forwarded the Biennial catalog in which he “analyzed” Kemalism from a slightly critical perspective. He says:
“Turkey, as one of the first non-western modern republics and a key player in the modernization of the developing world has proved to be one of the most radical, spectacular and influential cases in this direction. But, a fundamentally crucial problem is that the modernization model promoted by the Kemalist project was still a top-down imposition with some unsolvable contradictions and dilemmas inherent within the system: the quasi-military imposition of reforms, while necessary as a revolutionary tool, betrayed the principle of democracy; the nationalist ideology ran counter to its embracing of the universality of humanism, and the elite-led economic development generated social division. Populist political and religious forces have managed to recuperate and manipulate the claims from the ‘bottom’ of the society and have used them to their own advantage.”

A group of academics headed by the dean of the Faculty of Fine Arts at the Marmara University issued a declaration condemning Hou Hanru for having thought of Kemalism in this way. The statement points to “delicate times Turkey passing through” and calls on the curator to be “more sensitive”.

Well, we are really passing through delicate times: the neo-Kemalists think they are waging a new war of independence against their own people who vote for anti-Kemalist (?) political parties and globalist forces. They want a new top-down revolution to redesign people, think that democracy has gone too far and they have lost control over the state, society, and economy.
In short, they react Hou Hanru not because he criticized the founding myths of Kemalism but because he implicitly disclosed what the neo-Kemalists today think and are trying to do.

Otherwise, what are wrongs with such arguments? It is a generally agreed view that the republican project of building a “nation-state” and making a “new nation” out of the remains of the Ottoman Empire was an example of top-down modernization. It is a historical fact that these were not carried out in a “democratic” regime but by a single-party government and through “revolutionary” means. Democracy with its elementary mechanisms and institutions began with 1950, which is described by many Kemalists as the beginning of “counter-revolution”. Even today we know that neo-Kemalists are extremely skeptical of democracy; they ask for the continuation of the top-down revolutionary command to control and shape the country.

Instead of condemning Hanru, the neo-Kemalists can take his criticisms and, in fact, advises as a starting point for the revival of Kemalism in the new circumstances. Hanru basically underlines the reasons why Kemalism was unable to reach out to the “bottom of the society”. The contemporary Kemalists should think of new ways and languages by which they can reach society. Hanru points them out for the Kemalists: do not betray the principle of democracy, devise a more humane notion of nationalism and be sensitive to social problems. These are good pieces of advice if the neo-Kemalists are interested in reproducing Kemalism in a democratic milieu.

But they seem disinterested. In order to get acceptance from the people, the neo-Kemalists ask for favoritism. They want their notion of Kemalism to be protected and even imposed by the state and by the law. They should realize that Kemalism is one among many other “ideologies” that should compete for adherence in the free market of ideas and ideologies.

The neo-Kemalists are in fact trying to preserve their power and status within the system by hiding behind an anachronistic ideology that has nothing to do with the legacy of Ataturk himself which is alive and well respected in society at large. They are neither republican, nor democrat and modern, and as such should be disassociated from Kemal Ataturk as a historical personality who laid down the basis of modern Turkey.

Unless they do not link up Kemalism with contemporary ideas of democracy, human rights, rule of law as well as a civic notion of nationalism that is in peace with the world at large the neo-Kemalist ideology cannot survive. Anyhow neither Islamism nor Kemalism as ideologies cannot be imposed on societies through state apparatus in an open society, market economy, and globalized world.
01.10.2007

Is the Turkish state secular anyway?

“Defending secularism” has become a façade to hide the struggle to maintain the status quo. One hundred years ago it was the reactionary Islamic scholars who fought against change in the name of Islam; now it is reactionary positivist scholars who resist change in the name of secularism.

 Secularism has been used as a proper tool to control social and political opposition directed to the beneficiaries of the status quo. The rising peripheral forces with their liberal, conservative and democratic credentials are intimidated by a language of “secularism under threat.”

To demonstrate that the fight is not about secularism per se but a power struggle between the elite and peripheral forces, it is necessary to look at the practice of secularism in Turkey and see if the Turkish practice is really “secular.”

A secular state refers to a particular form of relationship between the state and religion. This relationship includes two fundamental components: first, separation of the state from religion and second, the neutrality of the state towards all religions and beliefs.

Is the current practice of secularism in Turkey in line with secularism defined in terms of the separation of the state and religion? Absolutely not. The Religious Affairs Directorate is part of the state organization with thousands of staff and hundreds of local branches. That is to say that the state is organized to serve a particular religion or maybe to keep religion under the surveillance and supervision of the state. Either way, it goes against the principles of a secular state. While some are concerned that religion, in our case Islam, is influencing state affairs, what we see in practice is that the state claims a total control over religious activities through its apparatus dealing with religious affairs. Religious groups, circles and dervish orders do not officially exist. By this, the state does not recognize a social and indeed an individual space for independent religious organizations. It is the state that interferes with religion and religious activities, and such a state cannot be called a secular one.

Is the current practice of secularism in line with secularism defined in terms of neutrality of the state towards all religions, sects, and creeds? Absolutely not. The state-organized religious affairs under the directorate impose a particular form of Islam on its citizens. As such, it is not neutral but partisan. Non-Muslim minorities are discriminated against on religious grounds by this secular state as restrictions have been imposed with regard to educational activities and properties of non-Muslim minorities. The Religious Affairs Directorate does not serve or represent non-Islamic religions which are observed by some Turkish citizens. Even more dramatic is the denial of an Islamic sect, the Alevis, by the state’s religious apparatus. The directorate teaches, preaches and practices not only Islam but a particular form of Islam: the Sunni-Hanefi version. It is not neutrality of a secular state, but the imposition of a particular form of Islam on its citizens. How can a “secular” state teach compulsory courses on a particular interpretation of Islam in elementary and high schools?

All these are serious deviations from the conception of a secular state. The state cannot and should not dominate religion and religious affairs and vice versa.

To settle the question once and for all is to build a secular state by really separating it from religion (Islam) and neutralizing it toward all religions and creeds.
20.09.2007

How to erase the legacy of the military regime: A new constitution

The debate on a new constitution requires a comprehensive questioning of the legacy of the military regime. A democratic regime cannot be thoroughly established in a constitutional order that constantly reminds us of the constituting power of the military.

In its original form, this Constitution had articles justifying a military coup, imposing unlawful bans on political party leaders beside its illiberal articles limiting freedom of expression and association. It is time for this country to prove that it is capable of making a democratic and liberal constitution both in content and the way it is made.

The 1982 constitution was drafted by a commission of the Advisory Council, the members of which were appointed by the junta named the National Security Council. The authority to finalize the draft before going for a referendum belonged to the junta. A referendum was held on Nov. 6, 1982, approving the constitution and simultaneously electing Gen. Kenan Evren, the leader of the junta as president. Other junta members maintained a “constitutional” position within the system as members of a Presidential Council. The result was a constitution carrying the junta structure and its priorities well into the era of the civilian government after 1983.

Neither the process of making the constitution nor the referendum took place in a free atmosphere. All was done under a military government when hundreds of thousands were under detention, censorship was in place and political debates were totally banned. What kind of constitution can one get in such circumstances?

Retaining the 1982 constitution demonstrates our inability to face the past as if we are destined to carry the burden of the past. We have been living with our past sins, yet pretending that we have overcome them. Not really. Not until we put an end to the legacy of the 1980 military regime.

We have not been able to confess and start with a new beginning, but our fellow Greeks have. They brought the colonels to justice and put them in prison, opening the way for the consolidation of Greek democracy and eventual membership in the EU. It took only seven years to achieve this, simply because they had the courage to face reality and change it.

What about us? We have pretended that by the end of 1983 democracy was restored without questioning the constitutional order established according to the needs and priorities of the military autocrats. The junta effectively survived until 1989. The first significant change in the constitution could only be introduced in 1995 that slightly broadened the sphere of political participation. And even then, it was not us who initiated the process with an understanding to eliminate at least some remaining elements of the military regime but rather, it was the EU. The European Parliament declared it would not approve the customs union with Turkey without some constitutional reform.

Thus it is due to the EU that a new process to amend the constitution was started. And since then almost half of the articles in the constitution were changed -- all motivated or required by the EU process. Where has been our will to establish real democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights? Even many reformists did not have the guts to call for democracy and human rights for its own sake but instead tried to justify their wish by referring to the EU membership requirement.

Now the emerging will and consensus for a new constitution is a rare opportunity to show that the “constituting” will in this country belong to people and not to the military.
17.09.2007

September 12 military regime: A reminder

Some seem to have forgotten what it was like to be under a military regime. Sept. 12 was marked by lawlessness and arbitrary rule. It was an assault on democracy and a catastrophe for civil and political rights.

Let’s take a look back. The generals dissolved Parliament and government and banned all political activities with their first “communiqué.” The leaders of four major political parties -- Süleyman Demirel, Bülent Ecevit, Necmettin Erbakan and Alpaslan Türkes -- were arrested. Martial law was declared over the whole country, and the martial law authorities were empowered to censor the press and appoint or dismiss civil servants. Two trade unions, the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers’ Unions (DİSK) and Confederation of Nationalist Workers’ Unions (MİSK) were closed down, and their leaders were arrested. The National Security Council (MGK), composed of five members of the junta, became the sole rule-making body with no authority or law above it.

All mayors and members of city councils were removed from their offices. The first two executions since 1972 were carried out immediately after the coup in October. By the end of the military regime, the number of executions reached 49. Right after the military takeover, a big hunt was launched for suspects and political activists -- 600,000 were detained; some 230,000 were tried, out of which 517 were sentenced to death and 50 were executed. The detention period without trial was officially extended to 90 days, but thousands were not brought to trial after exceeding that period. Around 400,000 people were denied passports, 14,000 were stripped of citizenship, hundreds died from torture and thousands were fired from public jobs, including from universities.

All lock-outs and strikes were declared illegal and freedom of the press was violated with many newspapers being banned indefinitely and journalists imprisoned. Mass trials were held to prosecute trade unionists, political party members, and others, with a shocking 7,000 decisions for the death penalty.

After being held in detention for a month, Ecevit and Demirel, the leaders of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Justice Party (AP), respectively, were released on the condition that they would refrain from political activities and statements. The other political leaders Erbakan and Türkes were charged with actions against the Constitution, the very Constitution that was wrecked by the military itself. Erbakan spent around a year in prison while Türkes spent five years.

To silence any political opposition, the junta issued a decree in June 1981 banning the release or publication of any political statement from former politicians and making any criticism of the ruling military regime illegal. So it was effectively forbidden to speak about politics or public affairs. Towards the end of 1981, the military formally closed down all political parties including the one established by Atatürk, the CHP. Former premier and then leader of the CHP Ecevit was given a prison sentence of four months for his political comments, contravening the MGK decree of June in his newly established weekly Arayış, which was shut down in March 1982. Ecevit was also tried and sentenced to three months for interviews he gave to the foreign press.

Are all of these actions acceptable, tolerable, desirable or bearable today? Only torturers and executioners would want another military regime in this country. A democratic regime is the key to having a decent and honorable life, so it is necessary that we nurture democracy and work hard to strengthen it. Yet in a country in which the leader of the main opposition party -- which also claims to be a social democrat one -- declares that democracy is threatening the republic, we still have a long way to go.
13.09.2007

From isolationism to nationalism and then to authoritarianism?

The latest Transatlantic Trends, a global public opinion survey issued by the German Marshall Fund, reveals some alarming data that are likely to block Turkey’s quest for opening up to the world economically and politically. A question arises if the government will face an even stronger nationalist resistance from society at large in response to its integrationist policies towards the EU in particular and global economy in general as people become seemingly more skeptical about the outside world.

According to the survey, while 40 percent of Turks favor Turkey’s EU membership, only 26 percent anticipate an eventual membership. A majority of Turkish people -- 56 percent -- see the leadership of the EU in world affairs as being undesirable. Only 35 percent view Turkey’s NATO membership as being essential for its security. The overall Turkish attitude towards world nations is rather “cool” and distanced. On a scale starting from 100, Palestinians score the highest with 42, followed by Iran (30), China (28), the EU (26), Russia (21) and the US (11).

These are symptoms of inward-looking, insecure and distrustful minds likely to create an asocial society in the family of nations, which is not only a disturbing factor for an international community but also a risk for an open, democratic society in this country. The distance between isolationist nationalism to an authoritarian society and state is not far.

It seems that the discourse surrounding Turkey being targeted by the outside world, particularly in the last couple of years, has been effective in winning the minds of Turks. With such a mindset we cannot go on with a policy of integration with the EU. The government should start effectively addressing issues that inflame isolationist and nationalist sentiments, which are fertile grounds for a reactionary and xenophobic nationalism. The killings of Father Andrea Santaro in Trabzon, missionaries in Malatya and Hrant Dink in İstanbul took place within such a social and political background. Fanning the flame of xenophobia disguised as nationalism should be stopped.

Firstly all political parties should abandon provoking and promoting a nationalist hysteria. We all remember how political parties’ election campaigns were shaped by an odd rivalry for nationalism. Each tried senselessly to prove that the “most nationalist” was theirs. In Turkey’s entire history we have never had an election period like the one we recently witnessed -- in which the flag of political parties was overshadowed by the national flag as a symbol of nationalism superimposed on all political parties.

Opposition parties like the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) based their election campaigns on their attempts to prove that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the leader of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party), was soft on Turkey’s national interests. He was accused of selling Turkey out because of privatization policies and the selling of properties to the foreign nationals. The government was also accused of selling out Cyprus for its policies of supporting a settlement in Cyprus, of being subordinate to the demands of the EU and the US. Erdoğan was also accused of protecting Massoud Barzani as he refrained from invading northern Iraq.

We also recall how the opposition’s strong language forced the AK Party to respond by trying hard to prove that it too is a nationalist party. Both Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül referred to their nationalist credentials in the past to escape from the opposition’s accusations. Moreover, the AK Party hardly mentioned its EU performance during its election campaign in an attempt to avoid the accusation of having sold Turkey out to the EU. The AK Party’s İstanbul meeting, where around 1 million supporters gathered, was dominated by Turkish flags instead of party flags. The AK Party, too, was taken hostage by the nationalist upsurge.

But this cannot go on. Unless the surge in nationalism is brought under control, no political party can rule this country in a way to build a free and prosperous future. After the elections, many expect a new process of normalization which can only come through reducing the nationalist hysteria in people’s attitude and behavior.

The government is equipped to” tame” nationalism, which is a ticking bomb in its hands, too. Given the presence of nationalist elements within the AK Party and the nationalist credentials of its leader, Erdoğan, it is capable of doing so in the period ahead. Instead of conceding the nationalist fever as a constraint, the AK Party should pursue policies of “rehabilitation” for the growing nationalism in Turkey. This is an issue prone to be manipulated by the statist, elitist and anti-globalization groups in the face of attempts to introduce further economic and political reforms.

Unless we put the genie of nationalism back into the bottle, we will sink into a self-destructive isolationism or irredentism.
10.09.2007