Kurdish solution by offering gifts

It is good to hear the Kurdish question debated rather than read reports about violence committed by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) or the state’s security forces. This path has been re-opened by Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who certainly deserves applause.

The meeting of Kılıçdaroğlu and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan last week was important because it indicated that the “new CHP” would not exploit government initiatives to resolve the Kurdish question, which was the case during the “democratic initiative” of 2009. Back then the CHP under the leadership of Deniz Baykal accused the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) of plotting against the unity of the country by acceding to the demands of the PKK. The tactic of the opposition then was to bury the ruling party under the Kurdish question with the expectation that Turks disturbed by the AK Party initiative would gather under the CHP.

This did not happen. But it nevertheless played a part in the hesitation of the ruling party that felt alone in addressing such an important issue. Severe opposition and the continued PKK violence indeed worried the ruling party, which shelved the solution process in order to avoid the political cost of appearing to meet the demands of the PKK.

Therefore the CHP’s changing attitude has been significant in encouraging the ruling party to renew its initiative. Sharing the cost and benefits among the governing and opposition parties eases the process. But I am still not sure how far the CHP can go when models of a solution come to the table with the fear of losing its nationalist power base. The same applies to the AK Party, too. It also has a strong nationalist constituency and is concerned that giving in to the demands of the Kurds may alienate its nationalist elements. So the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) by remaining outside of such a solution poses as an alternative for the nationalist voters both in the CHP and the AK Party, which are well aware of this.

Amid such political calculations, the latest proposal of the AK Party about Kurdish being an elective course in public schools is significant. It indicates that the ruling party is still capable of taking bold political steps to address Kurdish demands. Though a selective course on Kurdish does not satisfy the demands of the Kurds, who ask for education in the Kurdish language, we should note that the latest decision of the government may indeed be a groundbreaking move leading to education in Kurdish.

The only problem here is that the government has taken such a decision without engaging with the Kurdish constituency. Like broadcasting Kurdish on the state-owned Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT), the elective courses on Kurdish come through a unilateral decision of the government. As such they are seen as “gifts” from the state to the people, not rights negotiated and then gained. This is important because unilateral decisions by the government deny agency to the Kurds. As the Kurds (or their representatives) are not engaged in the decision-making process, they feel excluded and thus obliged to reject the idea. This is, in fact, the state of mind that describes elective Kurdish courses as an “attempt of assimilation.” It may not be enough to meet the demands of the Kurds at large but it is also not an attempt to assimilate the Kurds.

To avoid such “politicking” by actors from both the Kurdish and Turkish sides we need to bring them into a process of engagement. It is not easy but a must, especially as without the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) being engaged in the process, it is hard to find a solution to the Kurdish question by taking unilateral steps. Leyla Zana’s latest statement about the AK Party and Erdoğan may open up a new avenue of dialogue and engagement between the ruling party and representatives of Kurdish demands.

The Kurds of the AK Party

Thanks to the initiative of the leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the Kurdish question is back on Turkey’s agenda in terms of achieving a resolution. It is clear from the outset that a parliamentary committee with the participation of all political parties could not be established as the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) has already positioned itself against such an initiative. Even if a lesser committee is established without the MHP, I am not optimistic about a positive outcome.

I am not optimistic because each party has its own political Achilles’ heel. The CHP has in the past played the “nationalist” on the Kurdish question and has had extreme difficulty persuading even its own constituency of its new position. Turks in the Western regions of Turkey who vote for the CHP will be upset with their party’s changing stance on the issue. When the democratic initiative was announced by the government in the summer of 2009 the CHP was its most ardent opponent. Now a new and weak party leader cannot explain or justify this collaboration with the ruling party and the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) to find an answer to the Kurdish question.

As for the Justice and Development Party (AK Party), I do not see any reason why it should take up a comprehensive new initiative. For some time the ruling party has seemed to limit its search for a solution, resolving either to finish off the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) through security measures or wait for Mesud Barzani to persuade the PKK to lay down its arms. Otherwise, the government is of the opinion that the AK Party is not responsible for the existence of the PKK, that terrorism has been a fact of life for decades preceding AK Party rule and that the people are accustomed to living with violence. In short, as the PKK violence is “bearable” for the government in political terms, it is unlikely to take an unbearable toll.

As the government regards the situation as “manageable” it naturally refrains from taking political risks. Any major policy initiative addressing the root causes of the Kurdish issue and responding to the demands of the Kurds is viewed as an unnecessary risk. The ruling party is not under any kind of pressure to hasten to find a solution. The existence and terrorist activities of the PKK do not push the government to seek a political solution; on the contrary, I believe it justifies the government’s security-centric perspective.

There is one thing likely to force the ruling party to take the Kurdish question seriously: the pressure of its own Kurds. It is a fact that more than half of the Kurds in this country vote for the AK Party. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan proudly boasts that he can travel all around the country and hold public meetings everywhere, including Kurdish areas. He has also used the Kurdish vote to enhance the popular “legitimacy” of the government. The Kurdish votes enable Erdoğan to claim that he and his party are champions of the integrity of Turkey. This strategy was employed particularly in the early years of the party, when its legitimacy was questioned by secularists and, more vehemently, by the military, as well as during the party closure case in 2008.

So the support of the Kurds has always meant more than mere numbers; it has accorded the AK Party democratic pluralism, social heterogeneity and political legitimacy. Without the Kurdish votes, the AK Party would appear to be a party of nationalist Turks.

I think Kurdish voters, local party leaders and members of parliament (said to be between 70 and 100) are unaware of their importance to the AK Party. As Erdoğan leans toward a nationalist and statist position on the Kurdish question in order to appease the nationalists in the party and appeal to MHP voters, the Kurdish constituency of the AK Party remains silent, unable to articulate its demands. While Turkey debates various aspects of the Kurdish question, the Kurdish elite of the AK Party does not engage in the debate. They cannot even speak up against the minister of the interior, who continuously downplays the sorrows of the Uludere victims.

In short, the Kurdish elite of the AK Party has failed to become an actor within the party, to push for a solution to the Kurdish question. Knowing this, and assuming that the Kurdish supporters of the AK Party have been locked down, Erdoğan and his minister of the interior safely navigate the nationalist waters of Turkish voters.

What is wrong with the AK Party?

The governing Justice and Development Party (AK Party) has increasingly been criticized for going authoritarian.

These criticisms do not come from diehard Kemalist opponents of the AK Party but from liberal circles that supported the party’s agenda of democratization. And these recent criticisms are not altogether baseless. The once reformist party of Turkey seems to have developed statist, nationalist and even Islamist tendencies, which are the likely grounds for a new authoritarian politics. These tendencies can be discerned in the government’s approach to the Uludere incident, in which 34 civilians mistaken for terrorists were killed during a military airstrike near the Turkish-Iraqi border, as well as its attempts to legislate conservative values into law. We can start with Uludere, where the government, from the beginning, acted inconsistently, first admitting there was a mistake and then making statements to the contrary. An investigation was initiated, but after six months there still is no answer to the simple question of who is responsible and what really happened on that particular day. Knowing state tradition, I do understand why we are not getting straight answers to these questions. What disturbed me most is the attitude of the government towards the victims. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan pointed to the compensation paid to the families of the victims, saying, “The government paid the compensation, even more than required by law.” Instead of apologizing Erdoğan seemed to reduce the matter to compensation. This did not fit well in his own discourse of “human-based politics.” What is more is that last week he asked “why smugglers do not step on the mines,” implying that the villagers who were killed by Turkish fighter jets were collaborating with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), while in fact it is known that this particular village was, in fact, the one armed by the state, known as a “korucu” village. The government’s Interior Minister İdris Naim Şahin went further by saying that in the Uludere incident where 34 people were killed by security forces “nothing happened that would warrant an apology on the part of the government.” He appalled many when he added, “if those villagers had not been killed, they would have been tried for smuggling anyway. Now the smuggling case against them is dropped.” For his remarks, the minister of interior was congratulated by Devlet Bahceli, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). In this picture what is obvious is that the ruling party sides with and protects state officials and security forces who made the mistake of killing 34 innocent people. This, however, not in line with the AK Party’s previous rhetoric and policies that prioritized the people over the state. The statist and nationalist tradition that was inherited from the Islamist “national view” movement is being revived within the AK Party government. The most recent debate about abortion reveals another disturbing ideological element in the AK Party. It has become an observable fact that the ruling party is trying to enact its conservative values into law. Two weeks ago this slipped out from the mouth of Erdoğan, who said, “One country, one nation, one flag, and one religion, yes I say religion.” He repeated his motto adding “one religion” into it in two subsequent speeches, but after facing severe opposition in the media he stepped back, saying that the addition of “one religion” to the motto was a mistake. Mistake or not the fact is that religion has become a constant reference point in the political arena. The process started some months ago with a statement from Prime Minister Erdoğan, who said he wants to “raise a religious generation.” This “wish” was put into practice by introducing a new education law that included optional Quran courses and courses on the Prophet’s life throughout middle and high schools. I think these were indications that the AK Party is inclined to use the “secular” state institutions to raise a “religious generation,” which is basically the Kemalist policy of “creating a new society” in reverse. Then started a new debate on abortion that is leading to a new law banning abortion. It is indeed not part of a global debate between “pro-life” and “pro-choice” lines of argument. The government’s move to ban abortion is due to a sudden discovery that abortion is a trap for the future of the nation. Prime Minister Erdoğan justified his sudden anti-abortion stand on the argument that “there is an international conspiracy to erase this nation from the world.” Welcome back to Erbakan’s world of conspiracies!!! The following statements from the government side were revealing indeed. Health Minister Recep Akdağ said: “Even if the pregnancy is due to rape the mother should give birth. If a mother does not want to raise the child, the state will look after it.” Then came another appalling statement from the head of the Human Rights Commission in Parliament, Ayhan Sefer Üstün who supported his minister’s stand that even rape victims should give birth by giving the unfortunate example of the Bosnian rape victims, saying, “Didn’t the Bosnian women give birth?” I am having difficulties in understanding the recent discourse and policies of the AK Party. It seems that something is changing dramatically. I think the state power that is now fully controlled is poisoning the AK Party.