The liberal turn in Turkish foreign policy

For decades Turkish foreign policy was informed by a "siege mentality" that saw Turkey as surrounded by enemy nations with territorial ambitions over the country. The geopolitical position of Turkey was exaggerated to explain why foreign enemies had their eyes on it. This laid the ground for a perception of the external world in adversarial terms. The foreign policy elite believed that Turkey was located in a region where everyone was at war with everyone else, as in a Hobbesian state of nature.

Such a portrayal of the outside world was extremely convenient for domestic political purposes. Threats from outside justified the authoritarian regime inside. As Turkey was the focus of efforts emanating from the outside, the people at home had to be united against external enemies, and also beware of the internal extensions of these enemies. By such reasoning, democracy, human rights, and pluralism were regarded as luxurious and even risky, as the country was facing a constant threat to its very existence.

The politics of survival was the basis of this thinking. Everything -- any kind of authoritarian regime, radical nationalism, denial of the existence of the Kurds and delays in democratization -- could be explained or excused by reference to the primacy of survival in the face of external and internal threats.

Starting with the 1999 decision of the EU regarding Turkey's candidate status, the country learned to look at its foreign policy matters and regional affairs from a different point of view.

The 1999 candidacy move not only marked the beginning of an EU-stimulated process of domestic reform, but also the Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy. Instead of bullying in the region and projecting power over regional actors, Turkish leaders began to seek genuine peace and stability in the neighborhood, thus abandoning a conflict-based, security-centric and insecure perspective in approaching regional and global affairs. A paradigm shift occurred from pure power politics motivated by a search for survival in a hostile environment to a liberal foreign policy agenda seeing the countries of the region not as adversaries, but as partners prioritizing cooperation over conflict and soft power over military might and bullying.

The reason for this transformation was the restructuring of priorities in Turkish politics and foreign affairs in the late 1990s. Attaining the goals of "democratization, economic development, and EU accession" set the main agenda of Turkish foreign policy, as well as its domestic affairs, in the post-1999 period.

The stabilization of the region through active diplomacy, including mediation efforts, engagement with neighbors and the development of economic interaction and interdependence, have thus come to occupy the central stage. Turkey's rising regional profile has, however, led some commentators to accuse the Turkish government of departing from the West and embracing the East.

What has happened, in fact, is quite the contrary: Turkey is reiterating its "Western vocation" by brokering peace and stability in the region, as reflected in its efforts in the Caucasus and the Middle East. This is so because Turkey has realized that it has a very high stake in peace and stability in its neighborhood. Without peace and stability, it is impossible to attain its broad objectives of democratization, development and EU membership.

Yet such thinking is something new. In the old days, when Turkey offered merely its "strategic value" to allies, regional peace and stability did not matter. The more conflict-ridden, unstable and insecure the region was, the higher the "price" that would be offered to Turkey for its "strategic assets" in the region. Turkey, at the time, loved to be an "island of stability" in a region of chaos and conflict.

This has all changed due to the changing priorities of Turkey in the post-1999 era. A stabilized and war-free region is now essential for Turkey's quest to deepen its democracy, sustain its economic development and secure its accession to the EU. Being part of the conflict, tension or war will only serve the power of authoritarian elements in Turkey. Establishing peace, security, and stability in the region is, therefore, a means to foster Turkish democracy.

Turkey's quest to secure peace, security, and stability in the region by mediating between Israel and Syria, the US and Iran and Fatah and Hamas should be seen from this point of view. It is part and parcel of a liberal foreign policy that is based on cooperation, engagement, and multilateralism.

23 February 2009

The roots of a new anti-Semitism in Turkey

The latest row over the Israeli attacks on Gaza and the ensuing public reaction in Turkey has raised questions about the rise of anti-Semitism in Turkey. The recent rise of anti-Semitism is in fact related to the activities and ideology of neo-nationalist (Ulusalcı) groups.

Let me explain. A near witch-hunt of people with Jewish origin was started in early 2004 with the publication of a series of books on Sabbateanism. The authors of these books are Yalçın Küçük, an academic with a Marxist background, Soner Yalçın, a leftist journalist currently working at the Hürriyet daily, and Ergün Poyraz, a freelance journalist.

The books of these authors were sold in hundreds of thousands in recent years. The books were available not only in bookshops but in almost all newspaper kiosks throughout Turkey. Yalçın's book "Efendi," published by Doğan Yayıncılık, had been reprinted 82 times by April 2008. Poyraz's books sold over 150,000 copies just in 2007, a phenomenal success by any measure.

These publications have created a mental climate in which being a Jew or having a Jewish background is something to be ashamed of, and enough to be anti-Turkish, a mindset which prompts hatred. The picture that was emerged out of these publications was that Turkey was and has always been under the influence of Jews. These books popularized the view that almost all important public figures, past and present, were Sabbatean, of Jewish origin; that the Turkish republic was a "Jewish project"; and that the Turkish economy and political and cultural life were under the control of people of Jewish origin. These were not unknown ideas. But the important thing was that through these books, the anti-Semitic sentiment was introduced to new segments of society; people who were urban, educated, professional and secular. An idea that was hitherto popular among a very small number of radical Islamists has spread into new social and political environs.

The underlying theme was that Turkey has been controlled by a Jewish conspiracy, and, as such, a new struggle for national independence was required. Poyraz's books, entitled "The Children of Moses" and "The Rose of Moses," even went as far as to claim that President Abdullah Gül and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan are of Jewish origin. This kind of writing was part and parcel of creating a siege mentality, provoking anti-Semitism and justifying a neo-nationalist popular uprising.

Those books and the authors' TV appearances normalized anti-Semitism, camouflaged as Sabbatean "research" that turned into a campaign to discredit all influential public figures who are pro-reform and take a pro-EU stand.

This new anti-Semitism is part of an attempt to spread the neo-nationalist position into the grassroots, where the neo-nationalists have tried to forge alliances with conservatives. On Feb. 28, 2005, in an interview I gave to Neşe Düzel from the Radikal daily, I warned that anti-Semitism was being used to scare a diverse array of people, including leftists, rightists, Islamists, and socialists, and bring them together under a militarist ideology. The anti-Semitism provoked in 2004 and afterward has been part of an attempt to create the support base in society for a nationalist/militarist march to power, whether legally or illegally.

So the new anti-Semitism is the child of nationalist-militarist formations.

09 February 2009