Is democracy the only game in town?

For Adam Przeworski democracy is consolidated when it “becomes the only game in town, when no one can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions when all the losers want to do is to try again within the same institutions under which they have just lost.”

Sixty years since the first free and fair elections, 10 years after becoming an EU-candidate country and almost five years since the opening of accession negotiations with the EU, democracy still is not the only game in our town. There are powerful people and institutions searching for a regime other than a liberal democracy.

We have main opposition parties that oppose all kinds of democratic reforms including the Kurdish initiative, the opening of the Halki monastery, a new constitution, reforming the judiciary, and so on. As they keep losing elections they look to the military and the judiciary to do something against their political opponents. So they support the cases of political party closures by the Constitutional Court and were jubilant when the closure case against the AK Party was opened.

The military’s involvement, even intervention, in politics is welcomed by these politicians. Deniz Baykal, more than once, expressed his expectations from the military to defend “secularism” not with words but deeds. Instead of trying again within the system, our main opposition parties call in the military and the judiciary to intervene and eliminate their opponents for them. Democracy is not recognized as the only game in town even by secularist and nationalist political parties. For them, democracy is a game that they constantly lose. So they look for some other avenues to power instead of the people’s mandate. On the other hand, the military is heavily laden with officers with political ambitions.

All these show that Turkey does not have a consolidated democratic regime but is in a process of democratization which is not a stable state of affairs free of tensions and conflicts. On the contrary, the very nature of democratization carries instabilities, tensions and the lack of societal and institutional consensus. While democracy is a regime with the stability of democratic institutions, a high level of consensus on the norms and the rules of political struggle, democratization is essentially a destabilizing process.

This is so because democratization means a transition of power and the establishment of rules and norms inspired by the democratic principles of legitimacy. As such, democratization challenges the beneficiaries of the “ancient regime” who are unwilling to give up their power and privileges gained in their authoritarian political system.

Thus the process of democratization prompts resistance among the forces of the “ancient regime” fearful of losing their monopoly on power in due course. They invoke secularism, unity of the state and the nation-state to block the process. The end result of this resistance is the societal tension that is currently appearing, political harshness and inter-institutional conflict.


28 December 2009, Monday

Where the state and the PKK meet

The Constitutional Court decision to close down the Democratic Society Party (DTP) once again proved who has the ultimate power to shape the political sphere in Turkey. Tutelage of extra-political forces, be it the military or the judiciary, continues to reign in Ankara.

The fate of political parties is not decided at the ballot box but in Ankara. No matter how many votes a political party may have, a few self-guardians of the regime on top of the bureaucracy may decide to silence it.

No doubt this is a decision to block progress in the Kurdish initiative. It is yet another example of bureaucratic resistance to political reform and democratization. The defense of the decision by the president of the court is not at all convincing. The court does not rule according to written rules, as has been argued; to the contrary, it is the most politicized institution and in close alignment with other pro-status quo forces inside and outside the bureaucracy.

By closing down the DTP, the court left the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) as the only representative of the nationalist Kurdish constituency, eliminating democratic representatives of Kurdish demands. They know perfectly well that it is impossible for any government to negotiate a solution with the PKK. Thus, the decision to close down the DTP struck at the very heart of the democratic initiative process. It is hard to believe that the Constitutional Court was neutral and passed a judgment in accordance with the law. The closure was a political choice.

Closing the DTP hit not only the DTP but also Parliament. A power outside Parliament ended the terms of representatives of one political party out of four currently in Parliament. As a result, the representative character of Parliament was damaged. This is an intervention in the supremacy of the national will and sovereignty and, as such, an ultimate disrespect to the will of the people, not only to the people who voted for the DTP -- amounting to 2.5 million -- but also to people at large because it presumes the bureaucracy has the right to correct wrongs arising from the national will.

Those who shut the DTP down believe sovereignty belongs to vanguard institutions and their bureaucratic leaders, not to the people.

The court’s decision was in line with the expectations and wishes of the PKK and the radical wing of the DTP. They know the closure will give them an easier way to explain to Kurds just how “limited” political methods really are and why it is that “violence” always needs to be maintained as a possible measure. The closure of the DTP offered party radicals a powerful tool with which to weaken the “defenders of political means” within the Kurdish movement.

No doubt the closure of the DTP means the “elimination of moderates.” It appears now that the “state,” including of course the Constitutional Court, prefers not moderates but hawks with whom it will find impossible to resolve the Kurdish question. In the end, the decision of the Constitutional Court revealed that the “state” does not wish to see the Kurdish problem solved.

14 December 2009, Monday

Who is ready for a Kurdish solution?

It appears that the Kurdish initiative will not receive any backing from the main opposition parties. The latest debate in Parliament last Friday showed once more how some politicians approach the initiative as an opportunity to fan the heat of Turkish nationalism instead of contributing to the solution of a long-standing problem of the country.

This is a pity, but also reality. What is left in Parliament are the governing party and the Democratic Society Party (DTP). It is certain now that these two political parties alone will work together to find a solution to the Kurdish question.

Anyway, it is not realistic to expect anything positive from the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), whose leader, speaking in Parliament, declared democracy a threat to the existence of the Turkish state. So with the ultranationalists, who do not accept even democracy as a decent ground to address a question, what can be expected?

For that matter, the main opposition party is no different. Deniz Baykal equates any solution of the Kurdish question to a concession made to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Again, it was the deputy leader of this party who applauded the Dersim massacre of 1938 in his speech in Parliament. With the Kemalists, who are still suggesting Dersim-model massacres to “resolve” the Kurdish question, what kind of cooperation can be established? They would always argue for what they know and do best: oppression.

Thus the responsibility falls on the ruling party and the DTP (and or for that matter the PKK) and on all the progressive forces of the country in and outside Parliament.

The solution cannot be sudden, it will take time and progress as the public’s confidence and support are continuously being built.

The government seems committed. Democratic reforms, some of which were outlined by Interior Minister Besir Atalay, will be introduced by the government, which has a parliamentary majority and executive power. On these, no help is needed except a positive public opinion.

Yet this is only one aspect of the question and the solution. The second part involves disarming the PKK. Unless some positive developments emerge on this side, it may be hard to keep up the momentum for democratic reforms for long, given the need for at least some degree of public support, which will only come through if the PKK seems to be disarming.

This must materialize. The PKK, whether willingly or unwillingly, in contact with Turkish government agencies or not, should contribute to this process if it claims to be a party in the Kurdish question.

The first thing the PKK should do is denounce violence and declare its intention to engage in nonviolent political struggle. Second, it should surrender its arms, for example to the UN authorities in Iraq or the Iraqi Kurdish administration, in a gesture of goodwill. Such surprising gestures of goodwill would certainly help democratic reforms pursued aggressively in Turkey and win over the support of the overwhelming majority of people in Turkey.

The question, of course, will emerge: why should the PKK act like this? My answer is very simple: If the PKK rejects claims of being an organization of self-interest-seeking people and feels responsible for the well-being of the Kurds in Turkey, it should not torpedo the process but be constructive.

In short, while on the one hand the government should be pushed for bold democratization initiatives, on the other hand, the PKK must be continuously pressured to lay down its weapons. These two must be synchronized in order to carry on with the process successfully.

The friends of the Kurds and the Turks, and those who think that the region and the world would be a better place without the Kurdish question, cannot refrain from contributing to the new Kurdish initiative. Otherwise, neither the democratic rights of the Kurds nor peace in Turkey and its region will be forthcoming. This is a scenario in which the mindset and policies of 1925 and 1938 will prevail, destabilizing the entire region.

16 November 2009, Monday

Against the radical nationalists in Turkey and Armenia

Turkey and Armenia finally signed protocols last Saturday envisaging the establishment of diplomatic contacts and development of bilateral relations. This is a huge step towards building peace in the region and reconciling the historical bitterness among the two nations.

In reaching this point, the goodwill of Turkish and Armenian officials should be praised but the efforts of the international community, mainly the American, Russian, French and European support, should not be forgotten too. Special applause, of course, goes to Swiss diplomacy for its mediation success.

It was, however, not easy for the Turkish and Armenian governments, who faced the bitter opposition of ultra-nationalists. The result is thus a victory against narrow-minded nationalism both in Turkey and Armenia. By signing the protocols to establish diplomatic contacts and develop bilateral relations the two countries demonstrated their will to look to the future instead of being imprisoned in the past.

For Armenia, this is the beginning of a new period in its foreign affairs. I think Armenia's true integration with the world will start with the normalization of its relations with Turkey. After years of independence Armenia is finally coming out of its “Iron Curtain” and opening up to the world. It can now become a regional player in the Caucasus and be in the game of energy politics. Its inclusion in Nabucco is the key to integrate Armenia in the regional balance and global game benefiting the Armenian people.

In this process, the Armenian Diaspora has failed to support peace and reconciliation. Their strong opposition to the protocols proves that they are out of touch with the realities of regional and global politics as well as the needs of their people in Armenia. The Diaspora appeared to be trying to keep Armenia as a hostage to their platonic Armenian nationalism while Sarksyan is prioritizing and defending the wellbeing of Armenians living in Armenia.

For Turkey, normalization with Armenia is just an extension of its “zero problems with neighbors” policy. Signing the protocols proved that the “new Turkey” is a peacemaker and peacebuilder in the region. The Armenian-Turkey rapprochement is now a new incentive to look into the Karabagh issue so that the region can resolve another longstanding conflict that poisons stability in the Caucasus.

The Azerbaijanis, instead of trying to sabotage this rapprochement, can capitalize on it to address the Karabagh issue. They should be aware that some in Turkey will try to pull them into the quarrels of Turkish domestic politics. By using Turks' solidarity with Azerbaijan, some opposition groups in Turkey are trying to weaken the government. Portraying the government that initiated the rapprochement with Armenia as selling out their “Azeri brothers” is simple politicking that the Azeris should not be part of.

Peace and stability in the Caucasus will certainly be strengthened as a result of the rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia. But another outstanding problem in the region is the Karabagh dispute. The new diplomacy in the Caucasus will certainly ease the process of finding a solution in the Karabagh dispute too. The Minsk group should gear up its efforts to start the process of a settlement for this question.

Unless the Karabagh issue is settled it will be hard to consolidate peace and stability in the Caucasus. Faced with the pressure of the Diaspora, it may be even more difficult for the Armenian government to go for a settlement in Karabagh. But without it, the current efforts will not be completed.

12 October 2009, Monday

Turkey and Armenia: The match is not over yet

It has been a year since Serzh Sarksyan and Abdullah Gül met in Yerevan, starting the process of high-level diplomatic contact between the two countries. The meeting increased expectations that normalization between the two countries was on the way.

It, however, appeared that a speedy process for normalization was not realistic, particularly due to public sensitivities. Time was needed to win public support for a rapprochement. There could be no better ground to do so than soccer.

The soccer match that brought Sarksyan and Gül together last year highlighted the will at the political level for the rapprochement. Besides, it gave a perfect opportunity to draw the attention of the public to the need and the end results of the process of normalization. And this has been achieved to a very large extent.

Moreover, “soccer diplomacy” has laid the deadline: from September 2008, when the two teams played in Armenia, to October 2009, when the second leg of the tournament is due to be played, some concrete steps had to be taken.

Given this deadline drawn by the match schedule of the two countries, the announcement of the protocol last week was a relief indicating that normalization efforts are still on the table. We now have a road map clearing the way for establishing diplomatic contact, recognizing the existing border, opening the border to trade and setting up an expert commission to look into the history.

But a key to normalization at the regional level is missing in the protocol, which is the settlement of the Karabakh issue. The Turkish government declared many times that normalization between the two countries depended on progress on the solution of the Karabakh issue. It is, of course, not directly related to bilateral relations, but the position of the Turkish side is that “normalization can only be sustainable if the conflicting issues are addressed in the region from a systemic point of view.”

This implies a comprehensive perspective on regional conflicts and that it is hard to achieve peace between Turkey and Armenia while the latter occupies a significant portion of the Azeri territory, a friend of Turkey and the Turks.

This shows the interdependent nature of peace and conflict in the region. They both reinforce each other. While sustainable peace requires the establishment of cordial relations at the regional level, conflicts have the potential to spread into the region as a whole due to deep interconnectedness at the state and society levels in the Caucasus. It is hard to maintain “bilateral peace” in a zone of conflict. That was, in fact, the idea behind the Turkish proposal for the Caucasian peace and stability pact.

Therefore, true normalization between Turkey and Armenia requires the normalization of politics and social psychology in Armenia and Azerbaijan, which requires addressing the Karabakh question, a question that has been poisoning the public psyche and the political struggle and legitimizing an uncompromising nationalistic reactionaryism. Apart from this, if Turkey and Armenia wish to normalize their relations they should move fast. An overextended debate spread over months and years on such a sensitive issue may be a victim to nationalistic reactions that are strong both in Turkey and Armenia. While there is a strong political will in both capitals, and while the public is prepared to see some progress take place, we should not wait for the nationalists to increase tension and bury the current initiative. Instead, the government should pick up the pace in burying historical animosities.

07 September 2009

Public opinion on the Kurdish question

To solve the Kurdish question certainly requires a strong political will, which seems to exist, as frequently expressed by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Yet a “Kurdish solution” needs to be received positively by the public at large.

A public opinion research poll conducted by the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA) in collaboration with Pollmark indicates that people are in support of the new initiative. Forty-three percent of respondents approve the government's new Kurdish opening. Those who oppose it stand at 39 percent. The rest are still undecided, watching the developments. Despite a very strong opposition coming from the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which did everything possible to provoke Turkish nationalism on such a delicate issue, it is encouraging for the government to see that the majority is still behind the initiative.

What is more interesting is that people do not approve of the opposition's negative attitude towards the Kurdish opening. When asked if they approve of the opposition's (CHP and MHP) policies towards the government on the Kurdish initiative, only16 percent expressed support, while a huge majority (62 percent) disapproves. This shows that despite the huge difficulties of selling the idea of a Kurdish solution, the government has done better than the opposition in persuading the people. It has done so because the people, contrary to the calculations of the opposition, want to give a democratic solution a chance.

I think people are more progressive than the pro-status quo forces assume. They are aware that some new approaches need to be developed in order to solve this problem, which has cost them a lot. This is clear from another result of the SETA survey: 71 percent of respondents think that the methods used in the last 25 years to fight the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) proved “unsuccessful.” Based on this observation, they want to see some new methods employed to address the Kurdish question, the root cause of PKK terror.

Yet people wisely think that the terror issue and the Kurdish question are two different things. An overwhelming majority (65 percent) think that even if the PKK is eliminated through military means, the Kurdish question will remain unresolved. Therefore “political means” need to be considered, where people look upon political actors to join in the process.

Among the political actors, the Democratic Society Party (DTP) is rated exceptionally well. Thirty-five percent view the DTP's approach to the government initiative positively. This is an extremely high approval rating given the fact that the DTP's electoral support is around 5 to 6 percent. The more the DTP appears supportive of a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question within a united Turkey, the more likely that the DTP will become a party in Turkey not only of the Kurds. Thus the role the DTP plays in the solution process will contribute to the normalization of the party in the country. Other important data are that 46 percent of Kurds polled and 36 percent of the Turks polled stated that the DTP's views represent the views of the Kurds. This result shows that the DTP's claim to be the sole representative of the Kurdish demands does not have a social and political base.

The SETA research also demonstrates that “Turkish fear” that Kurdish rights may turn into a secessionist movement is widespread. Seventy percent of Turks polled think that Kurds want to establish an independent state. Any solution process should certainly take these concerns seriously. The fear that a solution may lead to a division of the country is likely to lock any attempt to address the question. Yet I think that this concern of Turkish people may also be the master key to opening the lock. If Turkish people are persuaded by the Kurdish political actors and the Kurdish people at large that the Kurds do really want to live together in a united Turkey, then the psychological barriers of Turks will be overcome.

In fact, the will to live together is knitted into the social fabric. One-third of Turks polled and two-thirds of the Kurds polled say that they have a relative from the other side. This result proves how Turks and Kurds are closely connected. Moreover, 70 percent of Turks and 87 percent of Kurds state that they would not be disturbed by mixed marriages among their close relatives. Despite years of conflict and tension at the political level, Kurds and Turks seem not to have given up on each other. I think this social integration despite political division is a rare phenomenon in the world of ethnic conflict.

In sum, there exists not only political will to address the Kurdish question at the moment but also public support for it, and the public will to live together in a democratic and plural country.

31 August 2009

The Kurdish initiative and Turkish opposition

By “Turkish opposition” I mean the main opposition parties of Turkey, namely the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). It has become crystal clear once more that Turkey's No. 1 problem is the lack of a “progressive and democratic opposition.”

All opposition parties place themselves on the “right” of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and oppose any “democratic openings” initiated by the government. As such, they appear reactionary. They even resist the search for a solution to the Kurdish question, a question that had consumed for decades Turkey's national resources as well as caused the loss of thousands of its youth.

It is almost impossible to generate consensus to resolve a “vital issue” like the Kurdish one acting together with such opposition. Their attitude toward the government's Kurdish initiative is incomprehensible. They treat the Kurdish question as if it were a question of the AK Party and they would not like to be part of its solution.

Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the MHP, equates any step to be taken on the Kurdish question with treason. In his recent speeches, the MHP has emerged as a party that threatens stability and social peace. His statement, “If necessary, we will stay on the mountains for 50 years,” is worrisome in the name of peace and stability in the country, and in the region, too.

In a similar vein, Deniz Baykal, the leader of the CHP, criticizes Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for meeting with DTP leader Ahmet Türk, saying, “Meeting with the DTP is the same as a meeting with the [Kurdistan Workers' Party] PKK terrorist organization.” Is this statement appropriate for a political party that is a member of the Socialist International? Are social democrats not in favor of democratization and peace?

Baykal also emphasizes that the “Turkish identity” and the definition of “Turkishness” as mentioned in Article 66 of the Constitution, calling “everyone a Turk,” cannot be altered. Are social democrats not in favor of the equality of citizens, regardless of their ethnic origin?

The CHP is not because it is no longer a social-democratic political movement but a party competing with the ultranationalist MHP by adopting an even more chauvinistic discourse. Baykal refused to meet with the coordinating minister, Beşir Atalay, to share his ideas and proposals addressing the Kurdish question. Instead, the government was criticized for not having spelled out a clear idea, a package of measures.

There is nothing new in Baykal's and the CHP's objection to “progress.” They voted against the revision of Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code (TCK), fiercely opposed a reform law on non-Muslim foundations, countered a solution to the Cyprus problem in 2002-2004, rejected a new and democratic constitution and tried to block the way of the European Union accession process.

So the CHP and Baykal not only fought in the past for a radical and undemocratic notion of secularism that threatens democracy, they are now trying to block the way for a solution to the Kurdish question, a question that blocks Turkey's full democratization. Theirs is a fear of democracy.

The CHP represents the founding mistakes of the republic -- that Turkey belongs to the “Turks” (leading to the policies of kicking out the non-Turkish populace, including the Armenians, the Greeks, and the Jews and the Turkification of the Kurds), yet the Turks cannot be left on their own to chose who is to rule in a democratic regime (establishing the vanguard of the Kemalist elite in the CHP, the military and the judiciary).

This Kemalist model is no longer sustainable. In fact, the current search for a solution to the Kurdish question is an admission of the failure of the Kemalist/nationalist model (imagining and coercively constructing a homogenous nation) that is still upheld by the CHP and the MHP.

The CHP's socialism has long been dead. If they somehow continue claiming to be socialists, they can only be called a “national socialist” party. To complete this picture Baykal only needs to grow a thin moustache.

17 August 2009

Who should lead the ‘Kurdish solution’?

 “Good things” don't happen on their own; they need “good people” who make them happen. Those “good people” should also know this; the steps taken regarding finding a solution to the Kurdish problem and the initiatives to this end are not being received negatively with society overall; quite to the contrary, they are being absorbed rather well. The most striking example of this is the lifting of capital punishment after Abdullah Öcalan was sentenced to death. Furthermore, an establishment of dialogue between the Kurdish administration of Iraq, formal-level relations with Iraq's ethnically Kurdish president, mutual visits and talks and TRT's Kurdish channel all point to the fact that there is societal support for the steps being taken and reactions will remain limited.

However, it may not be possible to manage an overall perception that a solution package (or Kurdish initiative) will come into being as a result of negotiations with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Therefore, the main basis for an encompassing “pre-solution strategy” should be political and social reforms. Among these reforms, there needs to be an emphasis on equity in constitutional reforms and a clear ban of ethnically motivated discrimination, alongside the “normalization” of Kurdish in the public arena and initiatives to make the language more visible.

However, as contact or negotiation with the PKK has become a prominent issue, receiving priority (or portraying such an image) will cause the period of resolution to become unmanageable in addition to increasing the “political bill” to an amount that cannot be withstood.

The second leg of a solution strategy requires (or should give the appearance) that while conducting the contact, talks/negotiation, laying down of arms and amnesty aspects of the process, the presidency leads the negotiations and not the government. The stance displayed by President Abdullah Gül thus has been conducive to actualizing this mission. With the president's first tour being to the Southeast, his becoming the first president following Turgut Özal to establish close ties with the people and nongovernmental organizations of the region and the dialogue he has created with Iraq's Kurdish President Jalal Talabani have all helped ease his playing an active role in this period of resolution.

The president, through playing an active role, can also fulfill the desire of Kurdish constituents to face a power that represents the government instead of “sensitive and timid” political actors.

As the main actor in the Kurdish initiative, the government may enter a phase of unsustainability when one considers the political risks and costs associated with the procedure along with the limitations on the predictability of developments and lack of opportunity for supervision. One of the ways in which the process can be made sustainable is by putting forth an authority that is above politics or the government. This should not mean that the Kurdish problem should be entrusted to powers above politics. On the contrary, I am speaking of a solution strategy in which the will of the government is in full support and legal and political steps are being taken; however, the “ownership” of the solution project is entrusted to the president.

Let me state right away one of the reasons for this. In a Kurdish solution wherein the government appears to be in the forefront, those who don't want to leave the glory of having enacted a solution in the government's hands may sabotage the efforts even if the solution seems very near and possible. In other words, those in opposition to the AK Party will not allow it to experience the honor and benefits of having solved the Kurdish problem. These include the PKK and the DTP in addition to the known opposition to the party, be they organizations, individuals or groups.

Therefore, in order for the period of solution to be managed in a politically risk- and cost-free manner by the government, and, in the event of negotiations being successful, for the “sharing of glory” of having found a solution not to be transformed into a factor for sabotage, it is more appropriate that the president is “shown” as the “address” for the solution.

27 July 2009, Monday

Opposition party appeals to military, not people

As I keep saying, the No. 1 problem in Turkish politics is the absence of a viable and democratic alternative to the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party).

To have a functioning democracy, one needs to have an alternative political movement that is capable of challenging the ruling party. Otherwise, there emerges a dominant-party system that is not healthy especially in countries like Turkey, where democracy is still in the process of being consolidated.

But the main opposition party, the Republican People's Party (CHP), does everything it can to distance itself from the democratic majority of the country. The latest example of this is its insistence to take the latest amendments in the Turkish Penal Code (TCK) and the Code on Criminal Procedure (CMK) -- which bar the trial of civilians on any account by military courts and enable the trial of military personnel who are suspect of forming gangs, terrorism, and crimes against the Constitution, which includes military coup attempts, by civilian courts -- to the Constitutional Court.

What is wrong with this new law? It is a move that enhances the civilian and democratic character of Turkey, and as such is applauded by the European Union. But somehow, the CHP is annoyed by this. Can you imagine a social democratic party advocating the trial of civilians by military courts, where, apart from military judges with law degrees, a professional officer sits as a member? They are also courts where the members are hierarchically subordinated within the military.

Moreover, CHP leader Deniz Baykal argues that coup attempts should be tried in military courts. Imagine a military institutionally committed to staging a coup and left to try its own coup-makers!

We had, in fact, a perfect trial of coup makers by a military court in 1958. An army major, Samet Kuşçu, raised the alarm on the group that was planning to stage a military coup. Nine high-ranking officers were arrested and tried by the military court. The verdict was fantastic: the nine were cleared off the charge while the informer, Kuşçu, was dishonorably discharged from the army and sentenced to two years in prison for slander. But in May 1960, when the military staged the coup, the nine officers tried and released were one of the cells of the junta, and the head of the court, Cemal Tural, was also among them!

So Baykal seems to be satisfied with the justice of those who are prepared to commit a constitutional crime. There can be no other leader claiming to be a social democrat that has such faith in possible criminals within the military. I wonder what the members of Socialists International think about their Turkish colleagues and why they continue to maintain the membership of the CHP in this worldwide organization of social “democrats.”

Allying with the military does not pay off in democratic elections. This should have been properly understood by CHP leaders over the last 50 years, during which they have never won an election to form a majority government. People love and trust their military, but whenever they go to the polls they vote for the party that sits furthest from the military. So what the CHP has been doing does not make sense politically.

The CHP has been stuck with 20 percent of the vote as the main opposition party. This has not changed in the 2004 local elections, in the July 2007 general elections and in the March 2009 elections. Unless the CHP parts ways with the authoritarian elements within the military, it cannot legitimately claim to be a democratic actor that can attract people's interest.

13 July 2009, Monday

Can the islamic republic survive?

Participatory politics are hard to control for those at the height of political echelons, even if this is a regime like Iran's, which over the years has developed mechanisms of social and political engineering. Once people are asked to choose, this is it. There is no way to turn back. Participatory politics develop their own dynamics and culture.

Iran has experienced some degree of participatory politics since 1979, and no doubt, its Islamic regime has enjoyed a high level of legitimacy incomparable to many Arab regimes in the region.

But now that the top leadership, as opposition forces in Iran claim, is not respecting the outcome of people's votes, trouble has started for the regime, which cannot generate legitimacy without popular participation.

Yes, the post-revolutionary regime in Iran has enjoyed high legitimacy. But the legitimacy that was enjoyed by the regime in Iran had two pillars: First was the ideological component of the revolution, and second, was the popular base of the revolution.

As for the ideological pillar, the opposition does not seem to be challenging the “founding” principles of Iran's Islamic regime. They do not question Khomeini's theory of Velayat-i Faqih or the ideological elements in the Iranian constitution. However, the opposition argues that an Islamic republic does not mean a dictatorship of the jurists or of the Revolutionary Guards. It is a republic that respects people's choices. This means that the opposition directed at Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, who won the disputed presidential election, is one coming from within.

Mir Hossein Moussavi's revolutionary credentials cannot be questioned: He served for years as prime minister when Khomeini was the supreme leader. His point is clear and sharp: an Islamic republic should conduct free, fair and competitive elections, as happened many times in the past. His is therefore not a radical departure, denying past practices and principles. On the contrary, Moussavi and his supporters claim to fight against those who have deviated, by rigging the election, from the true spirit of the revolution.

This is a strong position that protects the opposition leader from charges of being a “counter-revolutionary,” giving him some space for maneuvering. By resisting the outright authoritarian tendencies of the current power elite, the opposition is attempting to keep very important breathing space for the ordinary people: the right to vote and choose (even among those who are selected beforehand by the Guardian Council).

The defense of the right of the masses to participate in electing their country's political leaders can indeed be justified via references to the revolution and its true spirit.

As I mentioned above, the second pillar of the revolution was its popular support. The revolution was essentially the making of the people. The 1979 upheaval was a mass movement. It was the power of the people that overthrew the Shah's regime. Thus the revolutionary leaders knew from the onset that the very legitimacy of the revolution was derived from the people's power. Out of the recognition of the power of the people, post-revolutionary leaders institutionalized popular participation in public decisions making progress that has turned out to be a self-defeating process as the power elite in Tehran now tries to limit it.

Thus the revolutionary leaders allowed participatory politics within an ideological framework, which together constituted the dual bases of legitimacy for the Islamic republic.

Yet what we are witnessing currently is the dynamics of participatory politics, which was brought into the system by the revolution itself, pushing the limits of ideological premises and radical revolutionary actors.

Without a fair participatory mechanism, Iran will turn into an utterly totalitarian regime that can survive only by sheer oppression. But for how long?

22 June 2009, Monday

Islamization of population by the Kemalists?

What happened to the non-Muslims in this country was not the making of fascism, but nationalism and the quest to establish a nation-state assumed to be free of different ethnic and religious identities. Such a project was particularly difficult for a country like Turkey, which had been the home of different ethnic and religious groups under the roof of the Ottoman Empire.

Nonetheless, the history of the late Ottoman Empire in the age of nationalism provided a groundwork for the need to establish a national (Turkish) state as almost all ethnic components of the empire embraced the idea of a nation-state of their own. The non-Muslim groups, particularly the Armenians and Greeks remaining in Anatolia, emerged as “foreign elements” in the empire and then in the republic. This was to some extent a response to the history of the late Ottoman Empire, where foreign powers used the non-Muslims within the empire to expand their power and influence over the empire's territories. In the age of nationalism, each ethnic group was also prone to establish foreign alignments so as to achieve their national aspirations. The history of disintegration, especially in the Balkans and later in the Middle East, built-in Turkey a national psyche that viewed non-Muslims as the extensions of foreign powers.

Besides this, the search for a nation-state was thought to require religious and ethnic homogeneity. During the republican era, while Islam was excluded from the public sphere through radical secularization policies, the state pursued a policy of Islamization of the population. The exchange of population with Greece took religious differences as the point of departure. Those who were subjected to forced immigration were separated on the basis of their religion. The homogenization of the population was certainly a means to establish a nation-state for both Turkey and Greece.

Moreover, the homogenization of the people through the exchange of populations and forced immigration made it possible to close Turkey off from the world since the non-Muslim elements were the most cosmopolitan groups in Turkey. As they were forced to leave the country, Turkey turned ever more inward, enabling the Kemalist elite to pursue an authoritarian modernization project that situated its elite at the center of power independent of the world powers.

The result was that the creation of a nation-state out of an empire was traumatic not only for the non-Muslims but also for the Muslims since the new nation-state regarded all collective identities except the Turkish national identity as a deviation threatening the supreme state identity. The state demanded allegiances of all sorts. Any collective identity independent of the state constructed an alternative source of allegiance, thus threatening the single professed and forced identity of the state.

This was an attitude very similar to the Ottoman Empire in the age of expansion that never allowed the emergence of alternative centers of power and authority that might appear to be competing with the center.

Likewise, in the republican era, different identities, be they ethnic or religious or even ideological in more recent times, were regarded as divisive. An identity that demands allegiance from the citizens of the Republic constituted a threat to the consolidation and sustainability of the Kemalist identity.

So the problem, in essence, is the difficulty of the nation-state to live together with plural identities. It may be possible to deny and even repress ethnic or religious identities in an authoritarian polity, but contemporary liberal democracy requires respect for “difference.” To pursue a policy of assimilation or expulsion of ethnic and religious minorities is no longer possible. Yet this is not enough. Facing the past and confessing mistakes that went contrary not only to the contemporary notion of pluralism but also to the conventional Ottoman practice of tolerance and coexistence is necessary to move forward.


01 June 2009

Why is it the right time to solve the Kurdish question?

It has become increasingly clear that the Kurdish question can neither be solved through the use of force by the Turkish state nor by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). This has been understood by all sides.

The current state of affairs does not benefit anyone. The only way out of this “lose-lose” situation is a solution that is a joint settlement by the fighting sides, the PKK and the Turkish state.

Many agree that domestic, regional and international developments are forcing the sides to contemplate new moves in addressing the question. I think the state and the PKK have exhausted all options apart from goodwill in order to achieve peace.

The PKK understands it cannot win a war with the Turkish state. There is no justification for using violence for political objectives in this age of a “global war on terror” in which no political end can justify the use of force as a strategy to get it. Besides, the domestic and international ground on which the PKK took root has changed. Turkey is not the country in which a guerrilla war was waged in 1985 when the Kurdish identity and even ethnicity were denied and speaking Kurdish in public was forbidden. Back then, the Southeast was under martial law, the State Security Court (DGM) was active, sentencing anyone who mentioned the existence of Kurds, and prisons were notorious.

It is still not completely satisfactory, but Turkey's official approach to the question is dramatically different now. The Kurdish ethnicity is recognized as a reality even by the chief of general staff, let alone the prime minister and the president. A pro-Kurdish party with very close links to the PKK is represented in Parliament. Political reforms introduced since 1999 have changed the way in which the Kurdish question is seen. The expression and representation of the Kurdish identity have never been this possible in Turkey. The state established a TV station broadcasting in Kurdish, a development that would have been regarded as inconceivable only some five years ago. Even killings committed by the “deep state” in southeastern Turkey in the 1990s are being investigated as part of the Ergenekon investigation.

Under these circumstances, it is impossible to justify the use of force in the name of “Kurdish rights.” I think this is the sense shared by most Kurds in the region. Political means developed so far are capable of bringing about a peaceful solution. The rise of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) in the region and among Kurds in general also indicates that the Kurds demand not only a recognition of their identity but also welfare and peace. People are tired of the downward spiral of violence.

Moreover, international circumstances force Kurdish politics and the PKK to search for accommodation. The PKK has been listed as a terrorist organization by the European Union and the US, making its political and economic activities in these areas very difficult. Furthermore, these two powerful blocks are increasingly rediscovering Turkey's importance in the region as an ally. Without Turkey, it is hard to make and maintain peace in the Middle East and the Caucasus. Turkey's role as a democratic and secular state is extremely valuable for the West in efforts to avoid a clash of civilizations. Securing energy transfer from Eurasia to Europe in a diversified way requires Turkey's cooperation. Above all, the EU is conducting full membership negotiations with Turkey. Thus it looks for a stabilized Turkey that can develop peaceful relations with neighboring countries to the west, the east and the south.

The US also attributes great value to Turkish cooperation in light of its experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. As Turkey's political weight increases, as has been the case in recent years, Turkey's ability to use it as leverage over the PKK increases as well. Thus Turkey's Western allies are evermore inclined to buy Turkey's arguments, which are accompanied by a series of reforms on the domestic front toward the Kurds.

What is also important is the attitude of the Iraqi Kurds. After establishing their position in northern Iraq, they began viewing the PKK as an irritant for the consolidation of their power there. The presence of PKK camps in northern Iraq turns this region into a target for Turkey. But Turkey's goodwill is necessary for the economic and political viability of the regional authority. The Kurds in Iraq also see the PKK as a source of tension for their working relationship with the US, without which they cannot survive in the region.

Take all these together, and it becomes clear that the use of violence is neither justifiable nor sustainable. These are thus the best days to find a solution. President Abdullah Gül, in coordination with some state institutions, is taking bold steps. They should be reciprocated before it becomes too late, as some have already moved to weaken President Gül's political power and legitimacy by opening up a legal way for his trial.

25 May 2009, Monday

The militarist right as an alternative to the AK Party

It is an old habit in Turkey to design popular politics by political engineering at the top. As democracy is all about the choices people make at the ballot box among competing parties, some elites in the center hopelessly try to influence this process by introducing “fake” political parties to manipulate the political realm. But the Turkish history of democracy is a graveyard of such political parties and projects.

The latest example of the attempt for political engineering at the top is the election of Hüsamettin Cindoruk as the leader of the Democrat Party (DP) in the extraordinary party congress this weekend. It is a project that is impossible: to convince the center-right people it meant to reach out to. I will explain why.

The DP was originally founded in 1946 by Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, and others. Four years after its establishment, in 1950, it won Turkey's first free and competitive elections, taking over the government from the Republican People's Party (CHP), which had ruled the country in a single-party regime since 1923.

The victory of the DP in 1950 was a reflection of the people's longing for an accountable and representative government after years of an authoritarian single-party regime. By 1950, the public started to matter, power was transferred to the people from the bureaucracy dominated by the CHP.

The DP was a liberal party; instead of dictating what people should think, believe in or wear, it was more concerned with bringing about services to people, fighting poverty, the modernization of agriculture and industrialization, as well as anchoring Turkey in the West by becoming a member of NATO.

From the 1950s onward, the CHP, which represents the ideology of the bureaucratic center, has never won a majority in the Parliament to form a government of its own. As the agent of the single-party rule in the '20s, '30s, and '40s, it was as if the CHP was cursed to lose in a democracy. The DP won two more elections in 1954 and 1957.

But the bureaucratic center hit back with a military coup in 1960, overthrowing the government, closing down the Parliament and establishing a special tribunal to try the DP government and members of Parliament. The military regime eventually closed down the party and hanged Prime Minister Menderes along with two other members of his government.

As such, 1960 not only started a chain of military coups but, due to what it did to the DP, it also shaped the democratic conscience of the Turkish people, at least the people with a center-right orientation, underlining the supremacy of national will and the Parliament vis-à-vis bureaucratic interventions of the judiciary and the military.

Center-right politics thus developed, attributing the greatest value to the supremacy of the Parliament and the elected vis-à-vis the appointed, which includes the military and judiciary. Such political virtues and non-ideological developmentalist approaches to politics in the center-right, under different political parties, dominated Turkish politics in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s as well.

The DP re-entered the Turkish political scene just before the July 2007 elections as part of a project to unite the center-right. But it got only 5 percent of the vote, losing the center-right voters to the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) once more. One of the reasons for this was that DP leaders sided with undemocratic interventions of the time, like the 367 quorum debate in Parliament for the election of the president and the April 27, 2007 e-memorandum issued by the military.

The person who was elected as the new leader of the DP was one of the architects of these pre-2007 election undemocratic intervention attempts. Moreover, Cindoruk had actively supported the Feb. 28, 1997 military intervention, too. Such a personality cannot represent the tradition of the DP and the center-right, let alone unite them. What he can unite is not the center-right, but the “militarist right.”

What is disappointing is that some circles still expect Cindoruk to come up with an alternative. I think they are incapable of understanding the dynamics of Turkish politics. The True Path Party (DYP) and the Motherland Party (ANAVATAN) disappeared in the 2007 elections because they looked to be collaborating with the bureaucratic center (the military and the judiciary) to design politics by non-democratic means. They were punished then. This new attempt led by a politician who champions the military and judiciary's role in intervening in politics will be punished as well. No one should underestimate the democratic conscience and reactions of the masses.

What Turkey needs, as I keep writing, is a political party that is more progressive than the AK Party and one which is committed to democracy, a market economy and membership in the EU.

18 May 2009, Monday

Davutoğlu: Turkey’s new foreign policy chief

With the recent Cabinet reshuffle, Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu has been appointed as Turkey's minister of foreign affairs. Such an appointment was hardly a surprise since it is no secret that he has been the architect of Turkey's foreign policy under the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government as the chief foreign policy advisor to the prime minister.

Professor Davutoğlu's appearance on the stage is timely. He brings a strong personality to tackle tough issues such as the Armenian rapprochement, the rebuilding of Turkish-US relations and the brokering of peace in the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Afghanistan. His vision, experience, and personal contacts, all backed up now by political power in the Cabinet, will be needed to address these issues.

He is presented as a "strategist" due to his seminal book, "Strategic Depth," but such a label undervalues his vision for Turkish foreign policy. During the AK Party years, he initiated policies that went beyond simple realpolitik strategic calculations.

Take the example of policy of "zero problems with neighbors," which marks a revolutionary change in the Turkish perception of the external world. I say revolutionary because it is a radical departure from the conventional view that Turkey is surrounded by enemy countries against which it should be prepared to defend itself. This was a worldview based on an amalgam of insecurity, antagonism, confrontation, and short-sighted realism. Moreover, this "siege mentality" was used to create and justify authoritarian elements in Turkish politics.

The zero problems policy has redefined Turkey's relations with its neighbors. The avenues of mutual understanding, trust, and cooperation were opened with this change of perspective. As such, a liberal approach based on cooperation instead of confrontation was inserted in foreign policy, embracing a non-zero sum strategy benefiting all parties involved.

In sum, the Davutoğlu perspective has broken the siege mentality in Turkey's regional politics, contributing democratic openings at home while establishing good neighborly relationships with surrounding countries. That is to say that democratic peace at home turned into a vision for peace in the neighborhood.

All these help Turkey emerge as a center of "soft power" in the region. Davutoğlu, the architect of this policy, made clear that "Turkey's most important soft power tool is its democracy." Thus, it is expected that Turkish foreign policy under Davutoğlu is likely to also contribute to democratization in order to improve Turkey's attractiveness in the region.

Engaging with all actors in the region to settle problems will also continue in the new era. Turkey has invested much to win the trust of all actors in the region. No one doubts Turkey's sincerity. This is due to the fact that Turkey does not see its engagements with regional actors as means to increase its influence in the region, but to build peace in the surrounding area, because peace and stability are needed for Turkey to continue with the consolidation of democracy at home, secure full membership in the EU and sustain its economic development. Nothing else.

We will continue to see culture and identity being brought into Turkish foreign policymaking. This is, in fact, in line with the theoretical discovery of these issues in international relations literature.

Turkey's cultural and economic space goes beyond its political boundaries, as is the case for many other countries. The trick is to conduct foreign policy that goes in line with this reality. Turkey's wider cultural geography may enable it to reach out to people in the region and develop contacts at the inter-societal level, thus creating a social bond of understanding and interaction, while its wider economic geography establishes unbreakable linkages and interdependencies.

All this is likely to make cooperation stronger and even unbreakable by engaging with social and economic sectors, rather than mere political entities.

Yet Davutoğlu's emphasis on multi-dimensional and integrated foreign policy may be interpreted by some circles as turning away from the West, including the EU. He may be portrayed as a person preferring Turkey's greater engagement in the East and the region with a "neo-Ottoman" perspective. On this, I think Davutoğlu should be very careful and emphasize that Turkey's engagement in the region is complementary to its Western vocation.

04 May 2009

The Armenian question, Turkey and the US

US President Barack Obama spoke but did not use the word "genocide," though he meant it, while describing the events of 1915 as a "great atrocity." He had given the signal that he would do so while on his visit to Turkey a few weeks earlier. So another April has passed without major trouble for Turkish diplomacy. Let's see what happens next year.

Can you imagine a foreign policy strategy in which a particular issue turns into a constant source of problems that cannot be resolved permanently? I am personally fed up with this issue and the way in which it has been dealt with by Turkish diplomacy year after year. It appears that Turkish foreign policy has been taken hostage by the genocide issue and as if Turkey is prepared to do anything to make the word "genocide" be forgotten or prevent it from being spelled out. I think Turkey has more important things to do then devote such a large amount of energy into bargaining over what to say and what not to say on the Armenian question.

Such a position only narrows Turkey's foreign policy perspective and wastes its potential. The issue at hand is largely historical, constructed and imagined on both sides. As such, it does not have much to do with current policies, challenges, and opportunities. It is just a matter of how 1915 is seen: genocide or mutual atrocities that claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands from both the Armenians and the Turks.

Yet attributing such great symbolic and even political importance to the way in which 1915 is viewed gives much leverage to foreign governments to use against Turkey. It's very simple: First, move closer to the Armenian perspective of history and then use it as a bargaining chip against Turkey to get whatever you want in return for changing your position on what happened in 1915. This simple! Turkey has created this trap for itself over the years. It is time to get rid of it. A Turkish foreign policy that is free of such burdens as the Armenian issue and the Cyprus question can fully reach its potential.

The day before the American president was to make his annual speech, Turkey and Armenia agreed on a roadmap for normalization of relations, which is expected to involve the establishment of diplomatic ties, an opening of their mutual border and setting up a commission of historians.

Turkey can and should start the normalization process with Armenia, but this should not appear as a move to prevent the US president from saying the "g-word." Turkey's policy of "no problems with neighbors" necessitates Turkey having a working relationship with Armenia. Moreover, while trying to mediate between conflicting parties in the region -- between the Israelis and the Syrians, for instance -- it would be inconceivable for Turkey not to engage with Armenia and settle issues that fester between the two countries. The process of normalization between Turkey and Armenia has its own logic independent of what the US president says or what the US Congress decides upon.

It is diplomatically wrong to link Armenian rapprochement with American policies as it weakens Turkey's bargaining position vis-à-vis the US. By not saying the "g-word," the Americans do not give Turkey anything concrete; they simply refrain from saying a word. Then in return, they think (in fact, we Turks make them think) that they can ask for something in return.

Such linkage is politically wrong, too, for it gives the impression that Turkey's efforts to normalize ties with Armenia are being sought by the Americans. Such an impression renders the mobilization of public support for this policy even more difficult, provoking further nationalist sentiment.

The rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia should go further, but both sides cannot afford to have it appear as an American project.

27 April 2009, Monday

Turkey between Armenia and Azerbaijan

Is Turkey going to establish diplomatic representation with Armenia and open its border with this neighboring country? Since the Turkish president's attendance at a soccer match between the two countries' national teams in Yerevan last year, a process of rapprochement has been on the table.

The need for stability in the Caucasus and the increasing assertiveness of Russia in the region, as well as the imperative for addressing historical animosity between the peoples of the two countries, requires a properly working relationship between Turkey and Armenia.

This is a rational choice. But governments do not act only on rationality. They are sentimental, like individuals. Yet the sentimentality of the Turks and the Armenians has not brought anything but enmity between these two peoples and their imprisonment in history. Now the two neighboring countries are being tested: They will either move along a path toward removing the burden of the past, seeing many opportunities along the way or remain hostage to history.

Anyhow, it is not civilized to be neighbors and keep the borders closed and not establish diplomatic contacts.

It is a question of whether they will surrender to nationalism or not. We know that the Armenian issue in Turkey and the Turkish question among the Armenians fan nationalism. Some groups on both sides have obvious interests in keeping this issue bleeding so that nationalism can remain alive.

Visionary politicians can change history. The pain and suffering of the past are real. But how long can we live in the past? Politicians should, of course, be respectful to the past generations that suffered, but they also have responsibilities for living people and for future generations.

We are at a crossroads. There are now some positive signs that the dialogue between Turkey and Armenia may result in some concrete steps. Yet it appears that Azerbaijan is unhappy with the diplomatic contacts between Turkey and Armenia. Some in Azerbaijan are even furious, regarding such a rapprochement as a betrayal. There is no doubt that the Armenians should withdraw from the occupied Azerbaijani territories. Neither international law nor universal ethics allow for the annexation of territory by force. The Armenians should be persuaded or forced to withdraw from Azeri territories.

Armenia's international and regional standing will be enhanced with a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Otherwise, it will be isolated in the region with support coming only from Russia. But Armenia's reliance or even dependence on Russia seriously hamper its standing in its relations with the West. If the tension between Russia and Europe or the US increases, Armenia will be pushed further into the Russian orbit. So in order to reduce its dependence on Russia and be a free agent in global politics, Armenia should resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.

The Azerbaijanis should also be prepared for a negotiated settlement. The country cannot surrender to those who use the Nagorno-Karabakh issue to mobilize the masses and garner political legitimacy and power. It is not hard to see that this issue functions in Azerbaijan as the Cyprus issue functions in Turkey: fanning nationalism and justifying authoritarian tendencies and practices by pointing out a national "enemy" or cause.

This is not the time to play such a simple and silly game.

Concerning the role Turkey plays in the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, Azerbaijanis should ask this question: Has Turkey's boycott of Armenia brought about a solution? It may be time to come up with some new initiatives to resolve the territorial dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Stability and peace in the southern Caucasus require a solution to this problem. No party involved can benefit from disturbances in the region.

Azerbaijan's strong reaction to Turkey is not reasonable at all. It is likely to push Azerbaijan toward Russia, the primary supporter of Armenia's occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh. Can the Azerbaijani leadership explain this to its people: turning their back on Turkey and embracing Russia, the ally of Armenia, to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh question?

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has threatened to cut off natural gas sales to Turkey. It has not been mentioned yet, but he can also close the Baku-Ceyhan-Tbilisi pipeline. These would certainly harm Turkey, but they would result in Azerbaijan's dependence on Russia. They should understand that Turkey is their only outlet for reaching out to the world beyond Russia.

It is time to bury historical animosities in the southern Caucasus.

13 April 2009

Islamic identity in post-Kemalist Turkey and the West

The new US president, Barack Obama, is visiting Turkey in early April. It is going to be Obama’s first visit to an Islamic country. Many commentators attributed this early visit to the value of Turkey’s “identity” for Obama’s foreign policy priorities, not to its “geopolitical location” as it used to be.

The value of Turkey lies in its ability to reconcile its Islamic identity with democratic politics, free-market economy and pro-Western foreign policy orientation. Thus the “new Turkish identity” has become a more valuable “strategic asset” to prevent a clash of civilizations.

With such attributes the new Turkey is ever more capable of bridging the Islamic world and the West, contributing to the global coexistence of different cultures and civilizations.

What enabled this was not the practice of “authoritarian secularism” in an Islamic country but, on the contrary, an embracing of modern political values such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law by Islamic circles, leading to a transformation of Islamic political identity in Turkey over the last decade. Questioning their past identity, political strategy, discourse, and objectives, the Islamic elements have abandoned the notion of an Islamic state -- not only out of political prudence but also incompatibility between Islam and an ideological Islamic state. In the end, they have settled for a democratic Turkey aiming for EU membership.

The process of rethinking Islamic identity and its political model was begun by confronting the old notions of the West and Westernization. The trauma of the early encounters in the 19th century between Islam and the West was overcome as Muslims have grown confident in their relationship with the West after the years of modernization and economic development. A century after being labeled the “sick man of Europe,” Turkey is now a country with the biggest army in NATO after the US, the 16th largest economy in the world and the sixth-largest in Europe. This self-image has helped change Turkey’s positioning vis-à-vis the West.

In rethinking the West, the experience of the Turks living in Europe was also crucial for demonstrating that it is possible after all to be in the West, part of the West and still remain Muslim. Moreover, they realized they were better off in Europe in terms of freedom of belief, as the European states interfered less in the way they dressed, organized and practiced their religion than Turkey, especially in the late 1990s.

Thus, Islamic groups, under the pressure of the authoritarian Kemalist institutions at home, started to view the EU as an opportunity to curb the power of those Kemalist/secularist centers. In this context, Islamic groups realized that the EU demands for greater democratization, respect for human rights and a restrained military role in politics overlapped with their practical priorities.

Moreover, following Sept. 11 and the Justice and Development Party’s (AK Party) ascendance to power in Turkey, the new justification for Turkey’s membership in the EU -- namely the “alliance of civilizations” argument -- led the Islamic groups to embrace the EU accession project. Turkish membership was no longer presented as the accession of a successful “secular” but authoritarian model in the Middle East, but of a “Muslim” democratic country with capabilities for bridging Islam and the West. It should be noted that the latter rationale is embracing and presuming the “Muslim identity” of Turkey while the former is reflective of Turkey’s republican departure from the past/Islam. Islam was no longer an identity abandoned but preserved in the EU context.

Thus the EU membership process served as a catalyst for the Islamic circles to revisit their historical stand about the West and the Westernization. Mainstream Islamic circles in the social realm, in politics and in business turned to be strong adherents of Turkey’s EU membership, a goal they used to oppose as part of their anti-West stance. The departure of the Islamic elite from a conventional anti-Western position to embrace modern political values and the EU membership constitute a unique opportunity to construct a new Islamic “political” identity in the 21st century, disproving the thesis of a clash of civilizations and abandoning a burden of the past that produces animosity.

This is an opportunity not to miss. Western leaders like Obama are on trial. It is time to see the potential of a post-Kemalist democratic Turkey.

16 March 2009

Who will stop the AK Party?

As we approach the local elections scheduled for March 29, it appears, according to opinion polls, that the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) will hold on to its popular support, which had reached 47 percent in the 2007 general elections.

So it is time to rethink the strategies that have been employed against the AK Party since 2002. The number one mistake of the opponents of the AK Party was their unprincipled pragmatism, using any means available to get rid of the AK Party, including undemocratic means, which proved ineffective over the years, depriving the opposition of democratic credibility and pushing the democratic masses to support the AK Party.

In April 2007 a memorandum was issued warning the government and, in fact, Parliament about presidential elections. The main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) supported the military's attempt at intervening in the business of Parliament. CHP leader Deniz Baykal even referred to the military as a "civil-society organization." Imagine a professor of political science back in the 1970s describing the military in that way. I am sure Baykal himself did not believe what he said. But this was politics for him: to get rid of the AK Party by any means necessary. Yet, angry about the military's intervention in politics, people voted for the AK Party in the subsequent general elections.

Then in March last year the judiciary, another ally of the opponents of the AK Party, moved in and opened a closure case against the ruling party in the Constitutional Court. The opponents of the AK Party welcomed this undemocratic attempt and supported it at the expense of their democratic credentials. However, political prudence on the part of the court and other segments of the bureaucracy averted the closure.

Then came the global economic crisis. It was the last hope to get rid of the AK Party government. After all, it was the 2001 economic crisis that brought the AK Party to power in 2002. So with the hardship that would fall on the people at large, the AK Party was expected to lose popular support. But this has not happened, either. Despite the effects of the economic crisis, the AK Party has maintained, even increased, its support base. Even Baykal set the AK Party's success threshold at 52 percent, preparing himself to call the AK Party unsuccessful if it manages to get just 50 percent of the vote! By the way, Baykal considers the CHP's 26 percent vote to be significant!

Many have denied the fact that the problem is not the AK Party, but the lack of a viable, principled and democratic opposition. The opponents of the AK Party should understand that people are not stuck to the AK Party. Once they see the ruling party not performing well, they will vote for another one. But for this, they need an alternative party to vote for.

The recent history of elections in Turkey shows that people's preferences are not unchangeable. Just remember the five elections that Turkey had from 1987 to 2002. In five elections we had five different parties winning in the elections: in 1987 the Motherland Party (ANAVATAN) of Turgut Özal, in 1991 the True Path Party (DYP) of Suleyman Demirel, in 1995 the Welfare Party (RP) of Necmettin Erbakan, in 1999 the Democratic Left Party (DSP) of Bülent Ecevit and in 2002 the AK Party of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

These results demonstrate the people's will, ability and power to change governments depending on their performance. So the AK Party, too, has not been elected for good. It has the mandate to rule the country until the next election. Meanwhile, the thing to do is to come up with one, two or even three viable, credible and principled alternatives. If the opponents of the AK Party still expect Baykal to bring down the AK Party, they are doomed to fail. Can you imagine a leader who lost two general elections and who will, by the end of this month, have lost two local elections against the AK Party still being the only option the opponents of the AK Party can come up with?

The question is not the ruling party -- we have one -- but an alternative, which we still do not have.

09 March 2009, Monday

Is democracy possible with this military?

With each passing day it becomes quite obvious that establishing a full-fledged democracy in Turkey requires a radical transformation of civilian-military relations.

The military has been a "political power" with a vested interest in the undemocratic character of Turkish politics that enables them to extract and exercise enormous power.

This is not a baseless and abstract assertion, but a fact. It is the military that has interrupted Turkish democracy four times in the last 50 years. The first such coup in 1960 set a poisonous precedent for the intervention of the military in politics, executed in order to establish and sustain its power and privileges. The justification for unlawful intervention has changed over the years: protect the Constitution, establish public order, fight against communism, stop secessionist Kurdish movements, protect secularism, etc. What has not changed is the objective: keep power and resources in the grip of the military leadership.

This was evident once more in the release last week of a leaked conversation of İsmail Hakkı Karadayı, the former chief of general staff. Everyone interested in civilian-military relations in Turkey should get a copy of this tape, which is an honest confession by a retired chief of the Turkish military about conspiracies against democracy carried out from the 1960s to the end of the 1990s.
The content and style of his remarks remind us that a politicized Turkish military constitutes one of the greatest obstacles to achieving a genuine democracy in Turkey. From the tape we can see that the tradition of toppling democratically elected governments by the use of force is part of the institutional culture in the military, which sees itself as above the law, democratic principles and the will and wishes of the nation; they regard themselves as untouchables.

Gen. Karadayı admits his role in military coups from the 1960s onwards. On the more recent coup of 1997, carried out when he was the chief of general staff, Karadayı explains how they threatened an elected government in order to force them to resign, then how they offered the government to a political party, and how the president at the time, Süleyman Demirel, worked with them. He referred to Demirel as the one who "did whatever we asked him to do." I cannot repeat here how Gen. Karadayı referred to former Prime Ministers Tansu Çiller and Mesut Yılmaz!

This and other revelations about the military's role in the "power game" in Ankara explain a lot about Turkish domestic politics and foreign affairs. They have naturally resisted -- and will continue to resist -- reforms that take away those powers deemed unacceptable in a normal democracy. Since the EU noted in 1997 (Agenda 2000) that the nature of civilian-military relations in Turkey was an obstacle to Turkey's accession, the military has guarded the nation against the EU and related reforms.

The military has resisted Turkey's march into an EU membership and an engagement with globalizing dynamics because they want Turkey to be ruled in Ankara, where they have the ultimate say, if not a veto power over economic and political decisions. The military is much aware that its rule over Ankara will not continue if Turkey becomes a member of the EU, so we hear them referring to the need to keep "Turkish independence and the nation-state" intact, a move to justify their resistance. So the position is clear: Keep Turkey ruled in Ankara and don't bring Brussels into the power game played over in Turkey. Isolation of Turkey from the outside world, including the EU, is key for the military to continue to exercise its political power in Turkey. Therefore market economy, democratization, globalization, and the EU accession process are viewed as the greatest threats to the military's established interest to rule Turkey.

When the military starts minding its own business instead of intervening in politics, we will get closer to achieving a contemporary democratic civilization. The question is: Who will persuade or force the military to withdraw to its barracks?

02 March 2009

The liberal turn in Turkish foreign policy

For decades Turkish foreign policy was informed by a "siege mentality" that saw Turkey as surrounded by enemy nations with territorial ambitions over the country. The geopolitical position of Turkey was exaggerated to explain why foreign enemies had their eyes on it. This laid the ground for a perception of the external world in adversarial terms. The foreign policy elite believed that Turkey was located in a region where everyone was at war with everyone else, as in a Hobbesian state of nature.

Such a portrayal of the outside world was extremely convenient for domestic political purposes. Threats from outside justified the authoritarian regime inside. As Turkey was the focus of efforts emanating from the outside, the people at home had to be united against external enemies, and also beware of the internal extensions of these enemies. By such reasoning, democracy, human rights, and pluralism were regarded as luxurious and even risky, as the country was facing a constant threat to its very existence.

The politics of survival was the basis of this thinking. Everything -- any kind of authoritarian regime, radical nationalism, denial of the existence of the Kurds and delays in democratization -- could be explained or excused by reference to the primacy of survival in the face of external and internal threats.

Starting with the 1999 decision of the EU regarding Turkey's candidate status, the country learned to look at its foreign policy matters and regional affairs from a different point of view.

The 1999 candidacy move not only marked the beginning of an EU-stimulated process of domestic reform, but also the Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy. Instead of bullying in the region and projecting power over regional actors, Turkish leaders began to seek genuine peace and stability in the neighborhood, thus abandoning a conflict-based, security-centric and insecure perspective in approaching regional and global affairs. A paradigm shift occurred from pure power politics motivated by a search for survival in a hostile environment to a liberal foreign policy agenda seeing the countries of the region not as adversaries, but as partners prioritizing cooperation over conflict and soft power over military might and bullying.

The reason for this transformation was the restructuring of priorities in Turkish politics and foreign affairs in the late 1990s. Attaining the goals of "democratization, economic development, and EU accession" set the main agenda of Turkish foreign policy, as well as its domestic affairs, in the post-1999 period.

The stabilization of the region through active diplomacy, including mediation efforts, engagement with neighbors and the development of economic interaction and interdependence, have thus come to occupy the central stage. Turkey's rising regional profile has, however, led some commentators to accuse the Turkish government of departing from the West and embracing the East.

What has happened, in fact, is quite the contrary: Turkey is reiterating its "Western vocation" by brokering peace and stability in the region, as reflected in its efforts in the Caucasus and the Middle East. This is so because Turkey has realized that it has a very high stake in peace and stability in its neighborhood. Without peace and stability, it is impossible to attain its broad objectives of democratization, development and EU membership.

Yet such thinking is something new. In the old days, when Turkey offered merely its "strategic value" to allies, regional peace and stability did not matter. The more conflict-ridden, unstable and insecure the region was, the higher the "price" that would be offered to Turkey for its "strategic assets" in the region. Turkey, at the time, loved to be an "island of stability" in a region of chaos and conflict.

This has all changed due to the changing priorities of Turkey in the post-1999 era. A stabilized and war-free region is now essential for Turkey's quest to deepen its democracy, sustain its economic development and secure its accession to the EU. Being part of the conflict, tension or war will only serve the power of authoritarian elements in Turkey. Establishing peace, security, and stability in the region is, therefore, a means to foster Turkish democracy.

Turkey's quest to secure peace, security, and stability in the region by mediating between Israel and Syria, the US and Iran and Fatah and Hamas should be seen from this point of view. It is part and parcel of a liberal foreign policy that is based on cooperation, engagement, and multilateralism.

23 February 2009

The roots of a new anti-Semitism in Turkey

The latest row over the Israeli attacks on Gaza and the ensuing public reaction in Turkey has raised questions about the rise of anti-Semitism in Turkey. The recent rise of anti-Semitism is in fact related to the activities and ideology of neo-nationalist (Ulusalcı) groups.

Let me explain. A near witch-hunt of people with Jewish origin was started in early 2004 with the publication of a series of books on Sabbateanism. The authors of these books are Yalçın Küçük, an academic with a Marxist background, Soner Yalçın, a leftist journalist currently working at the Hürriyet daily, and Ergün Poyraz, a freelance journalist.

The books of these authors were sold in hundreds of thousands in recent years. The books were available not only in bookshops but in almost all newspaper kiosks throughout Turkey. Yalçın's book "Efendi," published by Doğan Yayıncılık, had been reprinted 82 times by April 2008. Poyraz's books sold over 150,000 copies just in 2007, a phenomenal success by any measure.

These publications have created a mental climate in which being a Jew or having a Jewish background is something to be ashamed of, and enough to be anti-Turkish, a mindset which prompts hatred. The picture that was emerged out of these publications was that Turkey was and has always been under the influence of Jews. These books popularized the view that almost all important public figures, past and present, were Sabbatean, of Jewish origin; that the Turkish republic was a "Jewish project"; and that the Turkish economy and political and cultural life were under the control of people of Jewish origin. These were not unknown ideas. But the important thing was that through these books, the anti-Semitic sentiment was introduced to new segments of society; people who were urban, educated, professional and secular. An idea that was hitherto popular among a very small number of radical Islamists has spread into new social and political environs.

The underlying theme was that Turkey has been controlled by a Jewish conspiracy, and, as such, a new struggle for national independence was required. Poyraz's books, entitled "The Children of Moses" and "The Rose of Moses," even went as far as to claim that President Abdullah Gül and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan are of Jewish origin. This kind of writing was part and parcel of creating a siege mentality, provoking anti-Semitism and justifying a neo-nationalist popular uprising.

Those books and the authors' TV appearances normalized anti-Semitism, camouflaged as Sabbatean "research" that turned into a campaign to discredit all influential public figures who are pro-reform and take a pro-EU stand.

This new anti-Semitism is part of an attempt to spread the neo-nationalist position into the grassroots, where the neo-nationalists have tried to forge alliances with conservatives. On Feb. 28, 2005, in an interview I gave to Neşe Düzel from the Radikal daily, I warned that anti-Semitism was being used to scare a diverse array of people, including leftists, rightists, Islamists, and socialists, and bring them together under a militarist ideology. The anti-Semitism provoked in 2004 and afterward has been part of an attempt to create the support base in society for a nationalist/militarist march to power, whether legally or illegally.

So the new anti-Semitism is the child of nationalist-militarist formations.

09 February 2009