Does geopolitics bring about EU membership?

“Being strategically important will not make Turkey an EU member-country.” This was the warning from a friend of Turkey, Joost Lagendijk, the co-president of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Commission, published in a commentary by the Taraf daily last week.

This is a valuable comment to keep in mind. While there have always been strong advocates of the geopolitical argument on the Turkish side, it seems that there are some in Europe who are increasingly emphasizing Turkey’s strategic importance. What should be underlined is that those advocates of the geopolitical argument, both in Turkey and in Europe, are not really enthusiastic about Turkey’s accession to the EU. They are more than prepared to settle with a “special partnership” for Turkey.

The strategic thinking that works on the Turkish side maintains that if the EU really wants, it should take Turkey in without questioning the nature of its political regime. What those who ask for such an offer do not know is that the EU is not a strategic alliance but a union of values.

Even an alliance like NATO has in the post-Cold War era developed a set of political values as the basis of the alliance, thus going beyond strategic cooperation. If Turkey asked for NATO membership today, I doubt very much that it would be qualified to be a member.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is an important aspect of the EU’s institutional and political cooperation. Yet, since the Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992 between members of the European Community, one of the objectives of the CFSP has been to promote and consolidate democracy, human rights and the rule of law worldwide.

For some in Turkey, EU membership is acceptable only if it does not require a restructuring of the state, improving democracy, enhancing human rights and the rule of law. That is to say, some want to get the benefits of the EU without paying the price in return for Turkey’s strategic contribution to the EU. The interesting thing is that the price that these circles, particularly the military, do not want to pay is democratization, human rights and the rule of law.

For sure, some regional and global developments have encouraged advocates of the strategic perspective. Turkey may serve as a transit route for the transportation of energy resources from the East to Europe. It may thus help Europe diversify its energy resources. The Iraq war and the instabilities in the Caucasus seem to have added to the strategic value of Turkey as well.
Do these developments, which underline Turkey’s geopolitical location, make Turkey an indispensable part of Europe or its strategic partner? My answer is that they only convince the Europeans that Turkey should be kept at the periphery with a strategic perspective.
Yet the “strategic thinking” seems to be reviving as Turkey loses momentum in doing what is necessary to do, and Europe still seems hesitant on the overall added value of a democratic and prosperous Turkey to Europe.

What has revived is the old trick; that is, to sell Turkey’s strategic value to the Western allies. It seems that some old guards in Turkey never abandoned this old-fashioned game of seduction. It is a great mistake to think that a strategic location is an asset on its own.

Moreover, putting emphasis on the “strategic perspective” in EU-Turkey relations is a trap for the genuine supporters of Turkey’s EU accession. As Lagendijk rightly warns, the “strategic perspective” is bound to end up with an offer from the EU for a “special partnership” instead of full-fledged membership.

10 November 2008

Obama or McCain for Turkey?

This week the American people are electing their next president. No doubt this election carries global implications. Is it time for a change, as advocated by Obama's supporters, or is it a time to be cautious and carry on with neocon American unilateralism? We will see.

Turkey has always been interested in US elections. Every election season, Turks tune in to hear what the candidates are saying about two particular issues: Cyprus and Armenian genocide claims. It is widely believed that Greeks and Armenians are powerful enough to impose their agendas on candidates during their election campaigns. A Republican president who prioritizes "interests" over "values" is expected to be more sympathetic to the Turkish cause. The logic is simple: A power-politics perspective that is informed by geopolitical necessities in the region understands and appreciates the importance of Turkey much better than an "idealist democrat" would.

This rather old-fashioned analysis was spectacularly invalidated during the presidency of George W. Bush when Turkish-American relations experienced one of their worst periods ever and the popularity of the US and its policies declined drastically.

The Bush presidency proved that instead of being interested only in what the American president thinks of Turkey, we must watch how he runs his own country to understand what he truly means to us. The foreign policies of a statesman are not independent of his general political outlook.
Sticking to an old habit from the Cold War and imprisoning Turkish-American relations to a mere strategic alliance, a policy promoted in some circles in both Ankara and Washington does nothing to improve the relationship between the two countries. What is needed is not merely a strategic alliance but a "democratic partnership."

Thus cooperation against a terror organization is a good starting point for the improvement of relations, but it is not the end of it. The US, as a "democratic partner," should do more than declare the [outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party] PKK a terror organization and share intelligence on the group with Turkey. This is an old paradigm based on the notion of fighting together against the common enemy. What about a positive vision shared between the two countries? How about a partnership to building peace and democracy in the region? It is time for a "positive alliance," one that is not based on "against" this or that, but rather "for" a shared vision.

This requires treating Turkey as a "democratic partner." An American administration that is not sensitive to Turkey's quest to perfect its democracy will lose the faith of the Turkish public by being seen as allied with anti-democratic forces. This is in fact what has happened during the last couple of years when the US administration failed to show solidarity with democratic forces in Turkey. As a result, anti-American nationalists, as well as pro-Western liberals, have grown critical of the American attitude. The result was a "double alienation" of the American administration in Turkey.
To avoid this, America should understand that its partner in Ankara is the elected government, not a "few good men in the Turkish military." Turkish-American relations have gone beyond cooperation for security and into diverse and sophisticated issues. Even in order to continue cooperating on security, America's counterpart in Ankara is the democratically elected government, not the chief of general staff. Treating Turkey as though Cold War conditions are still prevalent would be a grave mistake on the part of an administration headed by Obama or McCain since it would mean that they fail to understand the "democratic reformation" that has taken place in Turkey in recent years, a process Americans could have contributed as much to as the EU has.

I think it is time for a change in Turkish-American relations as well. An Obama presidency in the US is more likely to add a "democratic vision" to the "strategic perspective" that still prevails in Turkish-American relations.

03 November 2008