Constitutional change with consensus

The Turkish Parliament passed changes to two articles of the Constitution last week. The amended constitutional articles underline equality before the law and the right to education and are meant to remove a headscarf ban currently enforced on university campuses. It, however, sparked a heated debate not only about secularism but also about the way in which constitutional amendments are carried out. One criticism was that the amendments are not carried out by "consensus." Insistence on consensus reminded me of another constitutional amendment some 70 years ago.

In 1937 the six principles of the Republican People's Party (CHP) were imported into the constitution. The party principles of nationalism, republicanism, statism, secularism, populism and revolutionism became the state's principles. It was the final step for the marriage between the state and the party. By this constitutional change, a simple single-party rule had turned into a model very much reminiscent of European fascism of the time. Along with the integration of the party's principles into the constitutional order the secretary-general of the party was appointed the interior minister, the provincial party leaders became the governors.

The "consensus" in the parliamentary session on the amendment proposed by Prime Minister İsmet İnönü was 100 percent. Members of Parliament taking part in the vote in 1937 numbered 333 and those who endorsed the amendment totaled 333. This is I think what some people today call "consensus." What they do not know is that it was not "democratic consensus" but "consensus by force" under the authoritarian control of Parliament by the party. In any event, it was not a Parliament freely elected directly by the people but rather one appointed by the party. Many of those "parliamentarians" later said that they had in fact never been to cities that they were supposed to represent.

The proposal underlined that a constitution should define the features of the republic and suggested inserting the six arrows of the party into the constitution to define the state.
During the proceedings the first speech was delivered by Şükrü Kaya, interior minister, who argued that the "history of humanity started with the Turks, if there were no Turks there would be no history and no civilization" (to applauses and bravos from Parliament). Framed with such absurd arguments the party principles turned into state principles in February 1937.

Speaking during the "debate" in Parliament, Şemsettin Günaltay, the head of the Constitutional Committee and later prime minister, drew the limits of opposing views. In response to questions on whether opposing views to those principles could be expressed, Günaltay said: "Once these principles are enacted as the constitutional principles, it will be questioned whether counter-views could be expressed. For example, would a liberal defend the principles of liberalism or a communist advocate communism? No, they will and could not defend opposing views. As any act contrary to the constitution is a crime, opposition to these principles will also be considered a crime" (to applause and bravos).

Recep Peker, former secretary-general of the party and an architect of the state-party merger, stated that "all citizens shall believe in these principles, they shall all love and obey these principles, creating national harmony."

This example displays the mindset of Jacobin republicans in the 1930s. There was no room for different political views in their minds. The difficulty for Turkish democracy is this "founding Jacobin mindset" that did not allow democratic plurality. When the Democrat Party (DP) was formed in January 1946 under new circumstances following the end of World War II, it had to declare its loyalty to the constitution, including Article 2, which was, in fact, the principles of the opposing CHP. This was not only ironic but also reflective of mental and constitutional obstacles to developing a real democracy in the years ahead. Imagine a political party that formed the state and the nation according to its own principles from the top down then with a transition to multi-party politics after 1950 forced to seek the consent and approval of the people. It has always been difficult for those who think they founded the state as they believe the people should appreciate them instead of questioning the founders' right to rule.
18.02.2008

Democracy without democratic opposition

The main problem in Turkish politics is the absence of a democratic and reformist opposition that would push the governing Justice and Development Party (AK Party) to be more assertive in its reform agenda. Such a democratic opposition would have tested the AK Party's commitment to democratization, the EU process and overall human rights reforms. Unfortunately, the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP), failing to draw any lesson from the July elections, continues to be nationalist, reactionary and pro status-quo, choosing not to rely on the people's support but on the approval of the "ideological instruments of the state."

The governing AK Party is constantly being questioned by some circles about its "Islamic" roots as a barrier to its commitment to democracy, despite the reforms it has enacted in the last five years that have strengthened Turkish democracy and brought Turkey ever closer to the European Union. But the CHP seems somehow immune from criticism about its commitment to democracy. We cannot consolidate Turkish democracy if the main opposition party does not believe in democracy.
Can anyone think of a democratic opposition party that reserves constitution-making for coup plotters? CHP leader Deniz Baykal said the other day: "Can a new constitution not be drafted? Of course, yes. … You can stage a coup, risk being hanged. And after that, the entire Constitution can be changed." This statement belongs to a leader whose party is still a member of Socialist International (SI). People are denied the right to change the Constitution by a politician who sought the people's mandate in elections. I think this tells us why the CHP has not won a single election in its entire history. Winning an election without believing in democracy and people power is not possible.
It is totally understandable to see the CHP and its leader provoke undemocratic processes, as they have already lost any hope of winning an election in democratic competition. It is enough for Baykal to be the banner of secularism, not of democracy. So long as secularism is viewed as under threat by his party's supporters, he knows very well that his leadership will not be questioned. We remember how his leadership was questioned after the July elections. Even some of his close friends left the party administration and are now campaigning for its leadership.

In order to understand why Baykal is aggressive about the latest constitutional amendments, we should remember that in March the CHP will have an extraordinary party congress in which Baykal's leadership will be challenged. The more Turkey is plunged into the secularism debate, the stronger Baykal's position will be within his own party. Baykal is pleased that with the headscarf debate the CHP's electoral performance under his leadership will fall on deaf ears.

The AK Party is being criticized by some on the ground of benefiting from the unsolved headscarf problem, which enables the party to manipulate the issue and attract popular support. This might be true to some degree, but the benefits the AK Party derived from the unresolved headscarf issue cannot be compared to those of the CHP. The AK Party's popular support has been growing ever since the 2002 elections. It started out with 34 percent in 2002, reached 42 percent in 2004 local elections and went up 47 percent in the elections held in 2007.

The main opposition party, with a stagnant 20 percent rate of support in the last three elections, is a single-issue party -- and that is "secularism." "Defense of secularism" is the only asset the CHP has. Imagine if a political party had a single argument concerning Turkish politics. Would it like for that issue to be resolved? The CHP's position is simple: sticking to its single issue, exaggerating, using and manipulating it in order to maintain even its 20 percent support -- even at the expense of democracy.
11.02.2008

Declaring freedom in universities

As the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) agree on a constitutional change to lift a ban on the headscarf at universities, the dispute between those for the ban and those against it has intensified. Meeting on Friday, a group of university rectors declared that lifting the ban on the headscarf will lead to the establishment of a religious state, replacing the current secular one. The rectors' declaration was countered by a group of independent academics whose number has surpassed 2,000 at the moment of this writing. Independent academics, based on the very concept of "university," argued that universities should be places where different ideas, beliefs, and lifestyles can be freely expressed. Pointing out that there is no headscarf ban in any university in liberal democratic countries they called for a removal of the headscarf ban.

The claims of pro-prohibition rectors are baseless. As the headscarf ban does not protect secularism, lifting the ban does not endanger it, either. The headscarf ban has been in effect for more than 20 years but pro-prohibition academics still argue that secularism is under threat. If that is the case then it is obvious that the headscarf has been less than effective in eliminating the threat against secularism over the last 20 years, so it is useless for the declared objective.

But, of course, this is not the point. The issue is not the threat per se but the hegemony the pro-prohibition groups establish by using the threat to silence the majority in Turkey. So for those who advocate a continuation of the ban, the "threat to secularism" is permanent; it will never disappear. Thus, they should remain in power for good in order to "protect" secularism from the people. It is crystal clear that the "threat to secularism" is a discursive tool to generate a "right to rule" over the people.

Radical secularists at universities have increasingly been marginalized. Their hegemony is being questioned and challenged by a group of independent academics who have declared that universities should be places where freedom, not bans, are the central idea (The Web site of this campaign is universitedeozgurluk.blogspot.com). Their declaration has underlined the fact that universities are not uniform institutions in terms of ideas, lifestyles, and beliefs. Instead, they are places of utmost diversity that should be respected and celebrated as such. The declaration has displayed that officials who advocate for a continuation of the headscarf ban do not represent the whole university. These academics agree that universities should be mentioned with the freedoms they offer to academics and students as well as the contribution that they are making to knowledge.

However, it is obvious that there is a group of authoritarian academics who at the moment happen to be in power at universities. For them diversity in terms of ideas and lifestyles is regarded as a threat. What kind of university do such pro-prohibition academics desire? Could such a place be called a university?

A leading pro-prohibition academic, Mesut Parlak, the rector of Turkey's largest and oldest university, openly stated that they would not be impartial toward their students who wear headscarves after the ban is lifted. This is a shocking admission that pro-prohibition academics are biased, dogmatic and ideologically oriented and that they do not and will not treat their students with equality. I cannot imagine an academic who discriminates against his or her students based on religion, belief, opinion or sex. This is a gross violation not only of law but professional ethics as well. Yet such an admission also reflects the fact that pro-prohibition academics are not interested in liberty, equality, non-discrimination and scholarly work, but are engaged in an ideological fight. It seems that they do not care for universities as such but use universities and their academic titles to suppress those who disagree with them.

Today we know more than ever that there are pro-liberty academics at universities who think that universities should not meddle in the way in which students think or dress.
04.02.2008