A new state policy on the Kurdish question?

There are signs that the "state policy" toward the Kurdish question may be entering a process of change. Some retired generals, including the leader of the 1980 military coup, Gen. Kenan Evren, have admitted that they made some mistakes in the past. The ban on speaking Kurdish in public was clearly described as a mistake by Evren who, nevertheless, did not mention the treatment of the inmates under the military junta in the notorious Diyarbakir Military Prison which served, thanks to the junta's violent policies, for years as a recruitment center for the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).

But even such an admission is progress and maybe a sign of changing policy. Another sign in this direction is the proposal of Republican People's Party (CHP) leader Deniz Baykal for a cooperative relationship with the Iraqi Kurds.

CHP leader Baykal surprised many by his latest maneuvering on the issue of northern Iraq. It is really hard to understand the U-turn Baykal made last week given the fact that he had called for an immediate military operation into the region that would target the Iraqi regional government too. What has happened to prompt Baykal to come up with a list of social and political measures that go against his original idea of crushing the regional government in northern Iraq?
Some argue that he is trying to win the support of the party branches in southeastern Turkey for the CHP's upcoming party congress. Well, I do not really think so. A party and leadership so closely linked to the state elite would not move independently on such a crucial issue. Baykal's new stand might be part of a changing state policy on the Kurdish question.

Offering educational opportunities for the Iraqi Kurds, increasing the volume of trade, opening a new border post and sharing water resources evenly and cooperatively are elements of a liberal solution to the issue of how to engage with the Kurds in northern Iraq. Many other measures can be added to this, but these are geared to increase economic and social cooperation, leading to an unbreakable interdependence between the two sides.

The shift from a confrontational perspective to one of cooperation and interdependence should be welcome. But some of his critics within the party and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) spokespersons have already started questioning Baykal's loyalty to the notion of a unitary nation-state. This reminds us why we should avoid using extreme terms like treason when discussing politics. Baykal used that a lot. Now it is being used against him. Just a few weeks ago he was accusing Prime Minister Erdoğan of being Barzani's man; now he is the one whose discourse Barzani sympathizes with.

For the last 80 years neither the denial of Kurdish ethnic identity nor torture in the Diyarbakir Military Prison and the ban on speaking Kurdish in public has solved the problem.
If there is a new approach developing to address the Kurdish question it cannot help but tackle a broader issue. The century-old objective, which turned into a state tradition, of creating a homogenous nation by using the coercive apparatus of the state should be abandoned.
The republican regime should give up its tradition of fighting against the social currents through state power, a tradition that destroys pluralism, democracy and the rule of law. This is the basis of the problem. We had better understand that a Jacobin approach is no way a solution to social problems. Without questioning the Jacobin tradition of imposing the state's views and preferences on the people, be it the Kurds, the liberals, the Alevis or Muslims with headscarves, we cannot proceed with establishing social peace in this country. Repressive state policies are the main obstacle to peace, harmony and social integration. Let the people be, whatever or whoever they are. The state has no right to "define" and "impose" social, religious or ethnic identities on its people. Since we Turks have a majority in this country we cannot deny the right of the Kurds to be different and remain so. Respect for minority rights, be it ethnic, religious, political or sexual, is not only the basis of legitimacy for any polity but also of social peace.
12.11.2007

Mistakes the Americans made

We could never have imagined -- even after the end of the Cold War -- that the Turkish people and the state elite would have come to view the US as an enemy threatening Turkey’s security and integrity. Even five years ago we could never imagine that Turkish-American relations would have ended up with such poisonous mistrust and misunderstanding on both sides. But it happened. Lately, there has been a growing perception that the US supports the PKK and prefers the Iraqi Kurds to its old ally, Turkey. In short, it seems to the public and the state elite that the US is not only abandoning Turkey as an ally and friend but is also confronting it as an adversary. If you look at the way we are debating the issues of the PKK and northern Iraq, it seems as if we are on the verge of a war against the US, which has been our ally for the last 60 years.

This breakdown in relations between the two countries will have domestic, regional and global implications. The position of anti-Western circles in Turkey who call for an end to NATO membership, oppose EU membership and fight against globalization will be vindicated and strengthened. Will the US’ strategic interests be better served if Turkey comes under the influence of these forces? What are the great strategic outcomes of such an adventurist political agenda for the region or for the US?

The US needs to seriously change the attitude it has adopted towards Turkey, which is pushing Turkey to look for a strategic partnership in the East. In 2002, when such a prospect was voiced by Gen. Tuncer Kılınç, then the secretary-general of the National Security Council, it regarded as a laughing matter, a careless and visionless statement. Some five years have passed and now we see increasing numbers of people, including security elite and analysts, talking of an Eurasian union as a viable policy option.

To me, the idea of Turkey forging a strategic alliance with Russia, Iran, and China is still a fantasy -- and a dangerous one, at that. But the increasing popularity of this fantasy is a sign, among others, of Turkey’s growing disillusionment with the US over the last four years.

The US administration made mistakes, serious ones. It never bothered to take into account the security risks for its ally, Turkey, posed by its occupation of Iraq. It refrained from addressing the concerns of Turkey and it refused to work cooperatively. This attitude resulted in the exclusion of Turkey from the developments that took place close to its border with Iraq. As was predicted, this allowed the development of a serious threat to Turkey’s national security. Turkey’s cooperation with the US was reduced in March 2003 with the decision of Parliament to not allow American troops to pass through Turkish territory. Following this decision, Turkish institutions, including the government, the military, and even the main opposition party, came under harsh criticism from high-ranking American officials. Meanwhile, an understanding developed in Turkey that the US was “punishing Turkey” for Parliament’s decision.

What was worse was that the US administration meddled in Turkish politics at the expense of its image as an ally, which requires remaining above the squabbles of day-to-day politics. The US’s actions may be calculated to capitalize on and exploit domestic divisions between the ruling party and the opposition parties and also between the military and the government. But this pulled the US into domestic political struggles, eventually alienating all sides involved. At one stage the Americans seemed to side with the government against the military, which was criticized for not supporting the March resolution. Such incidents naturally increased sympathy for the US in AK Party circles. But the time also came when the AK Party seemed to be abandoned in the face of the military’s growing threats of intervention against the government.

We can all remember how long it took for the US administration to come out against the so-called e-memorandum threatening a direct military coup on April 27. The US was also accused of plotting against the republican regime by supporting the “moderate Islam” represented by the AK Party, which was seen as furthering the “Greater Middle East Project” of the US.

In short, by meddling in Turkish domestic politics the US has ended up alienating almost all groups.

Furthermore, Hamas’ visit to Ankara was exaggerated and turned into yet another excuse to punish Turkey by some radical elements of the Jewish lobby, which alienated not only the government but also the vast majority of people who sympathize with the Palestinians. The energy deal with Iran was also subject to overreaction, indicating that the US was not prepared to understand Turkey’s need to diversify its energy resources for its growing economy and population.

Is the US administration aware of these and other mistakes they have made? Given all these considerations and the current issue with the PKK, it is time for the Americans to rethink their stance on Turkey.
08.11.2007

Rights and wrongs in the fight against the PKK

We can live with terror, like many other nations in the world fighting against it and bearing its pains. But the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terror is different. It poses an existential threat to Turkey because it is part of a broader Kurdish question. Fighting against the PKK is not simply a fight against a terrorist organization. It requires a broader approach than security measures. The extent to which this broader Kurdish issue is addressed helps to eliminate the PKK in the medium to long term.
But once again we seem to have reduced the issue to hit the PKK presence in northern Iraq as if it will resolve the problem for good. Preoccupation with security measures makes us lose our perspective. The securitization that we are increasingly witnessing nowadays is not the solution but the problem. Since 1925, following the Sheikh Said rebellion, Turkey has chosen "securitization" to deal with the Kurdish issue. What is the outcome? The unresolved Kurdish problem has obstructed the development of Turkish democracy.

It is good to mobilize public support against terror. But what would be the target of those angry masses? They are likely to get out of hand, increasing the possibility of provocations in various parts of Turkey. We should not forget that Turkey experienced the dreadful event of Sept. 6-7, 1955, in Istanbul and Izmir, where an angry mob attacked non-Muslim citizens. Years later, it was admitted that the Sept. 6-7 event was the doing of a "special war unit" within the Turkish security forces and it was described by one of its former commanders as a "successful psychological war operation."
The public mood is ready for similar raids against "Kurdish targets" in big cities with sizeable Kurdish populations. Prevention of such a provocation should be the number-one priority for the government, much more important than a cross-border operation.

In the struggle against the PKK, the key to success is to isolate it. An isolated terror organization with its social and political bases cut off cannot survive for long. Even if it maintains some of its cells it will cease to pose an existential threat to Turkey. And we can deal with such a terror organization.
The thing to do to isolate the PKK as a terror organization and cut off its links with the Kurdish community is to eliminate the ground on which it grows -- and that is to solve the Kurdish question. For the last six to seven years Turkey has taken significant steps in improving the state of the Kurds in the cultural, political and economic domains. However limited, these should be carried on.
In this context, the continuation of the Justice and Development Party's (AK Party) link with the Kurdish people is essential to enable the representation of those people in the center of Turkish politics. Without forgetting the nationalist credentials of the AK Party, I would argue that the AK Party also represents the Kurdish identity and interest, as reflected in the latest election and referendum results. The capability of the AK Party to reach out to the Kurdish people should be maintained. We should not push the AK Party into the fire over the northern Iraq issue and break up its rapprochement with the Kurds in this country.

The PKK leaders should be very happy about the last couple of weeks. Their terror acts have reached their objective of elevating the PKK to the place of a relevant entity in both Turkish and regional politics. We have caused the entire world to talk of the PKK. Our anger and reaction provided the PKK with a perfect propaganda outlet. This is not the way to fight terrorism. Gen. İlker Başbuğ complained the other week that Turkey had failed in preventing new PKK recruits. But this attitude of exaggerating the power of the PKK paves the way for new requirements to the terror organization. The power of the PKK is in no way comparable to that of the early 1990s when it was even poised to take control of some cities in the region.

I think Turkey should not exaggerate the PKK -- on the contrary, it should ignore it altogether. There are understandable reasons for the recent outrage against PKK violence. Yet we should be able to play it down and reduce the tension among the people. We may even direct this anger and resentment into a positive direction, like a national campaign for an embracing between Turks and Kurds.
Public sympathy and support for the PKK are waning. People in the region want peace, prosperity and cultural/ethnic recognition, all of which have been increasingly provided in recent years. As I explained earlier, this is the reason for an increase in the terrorist activities of the PKK -- it is out of the realization that it has become irrelevant to the solution to the Kurdish problem.

Instead of abandoning it, the Turkish government should launch an aggressive reform package demonstrating its will to manage its own agenda. Continuing reform with even surprising speed will put the PKK into a more irrelevant position over the Kurdish issue.

Turkey should not give the opportunity to the anti-reformist camp by abandoning the reform process. What has happened to the new constitution? The PKK and the hawks in Turkey should not be allowed to hijack Turkey's reform agenda. Cutting the PKK's social base requires continuing with the reform process.

More democratization, not securitization, is the way out of this crisis. We should not lose our perspective.
01.11.2007

What does the US really want?

IHSAN DAGI
i.dagi@todayszaman.com

What does the US really want?

I wonder if the US administration is aware that the prevailing negative public perception of the US is destroying the social and psychological basis of a working relationship in the long run between the US and Turkey. Even if a rapprochement is made today on the government level, it will be very difficult to carry it out in an atmosphere of common distrust and disappointment among the Turks. In an ever-democratizing Turkey, no government can remain indifferent to the demands and opinions of the masses. At the moment both sides seem to be losing their ability to make a new start in the future. Anti-Americanism has become part of "popular culture" with novels, movies, and TV series. While I sense some sort of an orchestrated effort to impact the negative American image in public, some actions and inactions of the US administration are paving the way towards this end.

Let's be honest, the US is not viewed as an ally, a strategic partner or a friend today. The image of the US is that of an adversary, which is largely due to its inaction when it comes to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and its policy toward northern Iraq. Like it or not, many in this country have come to see the US as a national security threat and not as an ally.

The widespread belief is that the US wants Turkey to divide up along ethnic lines to create a Kurdish state. An independent Kurdish state is believed to be a reliable, long-term ally in the region for the US, whose friends are low in number both in the region and in the rest of the world. Here reliability, in fact, means "dependence" on the US. Being surrounded by enemy states and nations -- Turkey in the north, Iran in the east, Syria in the west and the Sunni Arabs in the south -- an imaginary Kurdish state will be nothing but dependent on the US for its survival. And this is the basis of a perfect ally for the US. Along with Israel, such a Kurdish state in northern Iraq under the protection of the US is believed to be the objective of the US. An independent Kurdish state is expected to be a permanent ally for the US.

Strengthening its Kurdish ally or poking their nose into trouble and thus needing US help, it is also believed that the US is encouraging the Kurds of Turkey to be part of a greater Kurdish state. Many argue that the US support is not confined to Iraqi Kurds; the PKK is armed with American weapons. There is even talk of the US sharing intelligence on the Turkish military with the PKK.
It would be a mistake to think that all these are the views of the "public." These have indeed also become the views of many policy-makers who are in the security establishment and political institutions.

I think it is getting too late for the US to convince the Turkish people and authorities of alliance and friendship. Unless it moves quickly and disproves current public perceptions, Turkish-American relations will be permanently and structurally damaged.

I still believe that the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and its leader, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, are capable of controlling the nationalist outcry. But they should be provided with some sort of gains in the fight against the PKK. Otherwise, the nationalist fever will hijack Turkish politics and crash all, including those who assist them in their politics, the military and the media, creating waves of tension and clashes both in Turkey and in its neighbors.

The US administration should realize before it's too late that the PKK is sabotaging the Turkish-US alliance -- does the US have any interest in maintaining it? The PKK is also sabotaging stability and security in Iraq and the region as a whole -- does the US have any interest in securing it? I would even argue that the PKK is sabotaging a possible Kurdish independent state in northern Iraq -- does the US have any interest in having it? Moreover, the PKK is also sabotaging the friendship and understanding between the US and the Iraqi Kurds -- does the US have any interest in keeping it?
I wonder if the Americans do not see that they are being fooled by the PKK.

Anyhow, I still think that the US administration will not sacrifice its relationship with Turkey to the PKK and will avoid going down in history as the administration that lost Turkey.
29.10.2007