The AK Party After Elections: Performance and Prospects

The election results shall be the basis on which political parties will evaluate their performance in the last five years and develop new strategies for the future after drawing necessary lessons.

The Justice and Development Party (AK Party), with a record 47 percent of the vote, won a rare second-term election victory. It emerged as the only truly national party in Turkey capable of representing almost every part of the country. The AK Party won this election because it was perceived by the masses to be the carrier of the idea of more democracy, greater liberties, respect for ethnic and religious identities and integration with the world -- especially with the EU -- as well as stability, development and social reformation.

The main challenge ahead for the AK Party is to maintain a broad coalition of the liberals, the democrats and the conservatives who united in this election under the AK Party ticket against the nationalist block posing to revive the old model of an authoritarian state and disciplinarian society after cutting Turkey off from global dynamics. The task of holding this broad coalition together, which is the key to governing Turkey for the AK Party, first of all, requires starting a new and comprehensive program for further political reforms and EU integration. In this context, rolling back radical nationalism is essential and urgent. Unless nationalism is brought under control, the new AK Party government cannot move ahead on the issues of political reforms and EU integration. They should understand the message that the people want the EU and what is necessary to achieve this objective. The AK Party leaders should keep it on their minds that despite a huge and orchestrated propaganda campaign against the EU, the support for the membership still holds at 54 percent.

Another challenge for the party is to reorganize the party administration and the government in line with the diversity of people who voted for it. The AK Party voters constitute a great heterogeneity. The party managed to appeal to people from almost all social classes, regions, ideologies and ethnic and religious groups. This diversity at the grassroots level should be reflected in the party administration and the government formation in a way to keep the interaction continuing between the top and the bottom of the party.

It seems that the AK Party will have another four or five years without a significant opposition posing as a capable “alternative.” An alternative to the AK Party can only come from the center-right, given the inability of the CHP to transform itself from a Kemalist into a social democrat party. But there is also no center-right party left except the AK Party after the self-destructive merger between the True Path Party (DYP) and the Motherland Party (ANAVATAN) before the elections and the defeat of the former on July 22. What is left is the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) in Parliament as the alternative to the AK Party from the right. But the MHP, with its peculiar history, image and set of ideas will never be able to reach out and embrace the center of society. Thus the MHP in Parliament as the only right-wing opposition to the AK Party will result in strengthening the AK Party’s centrist image and position in Turkish politics.

Understanding anti-Americanism in Turkey

Understanding anti-Americanism in Turkey

Anti-American sentiment among Turkish people seems to have made a world record in the last year with only 9 percent of the people viewing the US favorably. Growing anti-Americanism is a symptom of the mismanaging of Turkish-American relations, which have not been adapted to the changing post-Cold War situation. At the beginning of the new period, over the occupation of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein in 1990, a new rationale for an alliance was formulated by the efforts of Turgut Ozal. In time, however, allies Turkey and the US, first “providing comfort” to the Kurds in the north and then “posing to strike” against Saddam Hussein’s army, came to see that they do not necessarily share a common vision for the region. As a result, a mutual distrust developed, especially among the security sectors of both sides supposedly cooperating in safeguarding and supervising northern Iraq. Given membership in NATO and Turkey’s frontline position in the East-West rivalry, Turkish officers used to have a highly positive view of the US. During the Cold War years, the army cadets in Turkey were educated with a sense of alliance solidarity. The brightest of them were sent to US military schools and those serving in NATO posts were the most likely to get promoted. Yet for quite some time this sense of Cold War solidarity has gone. No longer do the militaries of both nations view each other as comrades in arms. In this, the Iraq question played a significant role. Turning the term “alliance” into mere rhetoric was the occupation of Iraq by American forces with the support of the Kurdish elements in 2003 as Turkey remained non-cooperative, not allowing passage of American troops. From then on the US was accused of plotting to establish an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq at the expense of Turkey’s national interests. Incidents like the one in Sulaimaniya, where several Turkish officers were held and interrogated by American troops, magnified the distrust of the US among Turks in general as well as the Turkish military. Novels were published while TV serials and movies were produced telling stories of American invasions of Turkey and vice versa. The public mood moved by a nationalist defensiveness was deeply penetrated by these cultural activities that normalized hostility, an inconceivable phenomenon of the past, between the two countries. Eventually, we ended up with a public opinion suggesting that 31 percent of the population believed in the possibility of a US invasion of Turkey. Anti-Western and anti-American sentiments have become more visible not only among people at large but in the Turkish military as well. In the context of Turkey’s bid to join the EU and the hard-to-swallow political reforms and fearful of losing their privileged position within the system, a Third-Worldist, anti-Western, anti-imperialistic and anti-globalization ideological currency with a fixation on full independence has gained ground in the military circles. Apart from this, anti-Americanism has ideological roots in Turkey. The Turkish left has a tradition of anti-American sentiment dating back to the 1960s. The new leftist movements of the late 1960s distinguished themselves with a strong anti-American and anti-NATO position. This was symbolized by an incident at the Middle East Technical University (METU) campus in 1969 when the car of the US ambassador was set on fire, a leftist legend. In the 1970s, when the CHP under the leadership of Bulent Ecevit had a brief period in government, Turkish-American relations were marked by a degree of tension, first over the issue of opium and then the Cyprus intervention. Ecevit always had some bitterness towards the US, certainly inspired by his ideological outlook. This leftist tradition, blended with a newly discovered nationalism, has been revived in recent years, particularly as part of the opposition to globalization, the war in Iraq and general American policy towards the Middle East. Islamism too breeds a high degree of anti-Americanism since such an ideological position is to a large extent constructed by its opposition to the west, including the US. In their anti-American stand, issues like the US policy towards Islam and Islamic countries after 9/11, intervention in Afghanistan and occupation of Iraq play a central role. The view that the fight against terrorism was deliberately directed against Islam finds supporters among many Muslims who are not Islamists at all. American support of Israel and perceived Jewish influence over the policies of the US are also important ingredients of Islamist discourse fueling and justifying their anti-American stand. The neo-Kemalists, suspicious of anything “foreign” and preoccupied with conspiracy theories against Turkey, think the US and the West, in general, are plotting to revive the Treaty of Sèvres. A Kurdish entity in northern Iraq under the protection of the US is seen as a prelude to dividing Turkey into ethnic pieces. The liberals with favorable views towards the US have also become disappointed with the American attitude after 9/11 that seemed to be ready to sacrifice liberties for security, encouraging and vindicating the anti-reform groups in Turkey. While struggling to overcome resistance to the EU-motivated reforms, the liberals are concerned that the US has emerged as a bad example justifying sacrifices in the fields of liberties, human rights, and democratization. The key to open a new period in Turkish-American relations requires addressing the northern Iraq and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) issue on the part of the Americans and dealing with the provoked nationalism on the part of the Turkish government; each will ease the other.

02.07.2007