Understanding the Israeli provocation

What we have been witnessing is an attempt at the annihilation of a people, the people of Gaza. Almost 200 people, including women and children, were killed in Gaza by an Israeli attack.

It is no different from indiscriminate acts of terror.

Recognizing no rules of engagement, the Israeli state turns into the terrorist entities they criticize. What is shocking is not only the massacre itself but the war-machine-like attitude adopted by Israeli authorities. They appeared proud of what they did to the people of Gaza, toward whom they show no emotion, no sympathy, no understanding.

One would expect from Israeli government representatives a word of sympathy for those innocent victims. No, they are adamant, insensitive and emotionless -- just like a war machine. For Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, killing 200 people in Gaza was a "good operation," and the brave soldiers of Israel should only be congratulated for such a successful assault. That is it.

Representatives of Israel talk again of terrorism, jihadist terror groups, etc., but what about their own actions? Listening to them, the Israelis seem to have all reason to kill any number of Palestinians at any time under any circumstances since Palestinians are regarded not as fellow human beings but as individual weapons directed at Israel. This state of mind, blinded by a paranoid sense of "insecurity," is incapable of doing anything.

Such acts of violence will only bring about more violence, not only against Israel, but all around the world. The vicious circle of violence is perpetuated by such violence inflicted upon the Palestinian people.

The Israeli attack seems a well-calculated act to put off the search for peace in the region. It is an act to provoke Palestinian retaliation leading to a cycle of violence, a scene that will justify the Israeli massacre and force the new administration in the White House to side with Israel. This is the key to understanding the timing and the scale of the Israeli assault.

The Israeli attack on Gaza was thus not carried out in a limbo. It is an attempt to hijack the Obama presidency and dictate the terms of American policy towards the Palestinian problem. In a way it tells President-elect Barack Obama to mind his own business in the Middle East and tries to compel his administration to side with Israel in the "fight against terrorism." For the continuation of this "grand alliance against terrorism," Israel needs to present the Americans with proof of terrorism, which will be plentiful after such a provocation.

Rising tension in the Middle East after the Gaza massacre will have repercussions on regional politics. Radicalism in Middle Eastern politics will be strengthened as a result of this ruthless violence. By such acts, Israel puts all moderate forces at risk including Fatah, for which this event may be the beginning of the end.

Use of violence is not monopolized by the state of Israel. Others in the region are likely to resort to violence as well. In the emerging anger towards Israel, it will be difficult to persuade the Arab masses on any cooperative arrangement with Western powers, which appear to support Israel unconditionally. It will now also be more difficult to counter the Iranian search for developing nuclear weapons.

Israeli atrocities will certainly add to growing anti-Western and anti-Israeli sentiments in Turkey, too. This time conservative Islamic elements, which have developed more favorable views of the West in recent years, may be inclined to join the anti-Western camp if the US and the European Union fail to take a new initiative to force the sides, including Israel, to a peace settlement.

29 December 2008, Monday

The CHP and the question of the left after the elections

The loser in this election was not the left but the CHP, which ran its campaign with security-centric and nationalist jargon under the influence of some marginal neo-Kemalists. Instead of proposing a positive program to resolve real problems of the masses, the CHP chose to realign itself with the state elite, from the president to the chief of General Staff, to prompt a nationalist instinct to “save the state.” This was neither the expectation of the masses nor the social democrats. Such a realignment that became all apparent during the presidential elections crisis reinforced the CHP’s image as a party of the state and the state elite, an image doomed to be voted against in popular democracy.

After decades of defeats at the polls, the CHP is still unable to understand the rules of the game in democracy -- a party representing interests, demands and priorities of the state elite will never win in competitive elections. The CHP leaders cannot adapt themselves to the requirements of competitive democracy even years after their domination of Turkish politics under a single-party government ceased.

My advice to the CHP is that if they really want to play this game, the only game in town, they should abandon elements of authoritarianism within the party leadership, ideology and discourse. With a Recep Peker kind of world view, reincarnated in the personality of Onur Oymen, the deputy leader of the party, they will end up siding with bureaucratic despotism, not for pluralistic democracy. 

It was such personalities as Oymen who stated his complete agreement with every word of the military memorandum issued on April 27. It was him again after the election last week for whom the election results lacked any logic, which is well illustrative of his and the CHP’s respect for democracy and the will of the people. With this “logic” of theirs, they will neither be able to turn the party into a social democrat one nor win a general election for another 50 years.

The historical misfortune of the left in this country is that the CHP happens to represent the leftist political stance. For a party that views itself as the representative of the state interest and state ideology vis-à-vis the masses whose loyalty is constantly suspect, it is impossible to be the carrier of social democracy. The party was designed to protect the state from the people, not vice versa. Furthermore, the CHP took up a leftist stance without questioning Kemalism that developed as a state ideology during the single-party years, under the heavy influence of Italian fascism and Soviet Bolshevism in terms of its notions of the state, society, and ideology.

Unless the social democrats in Turkey abandon the Kemalist legacy with its authoritarian political tendencies, there is no possibility of having a real social democrat party. Kemalism as a homogenizing authoritarian state ideology is not only compatible with democracy but also with social democracy. I wonder for how long we shall wait for the social democrats to understand this simple truth.

The CHP leadership and the Kemalist elite always talk of a threat to secularism. The official line of the Kemalist elite and the CHP threatens the masses who do not share their view, but in reality, the masses regard Kemalist “secular fundamentalism” as threatening pluralistic democracy and the supremacy of the will of the nation. The result is the widening gap between the main blocks of Turkish society and the CHP.

The only option for the CHP is to start anew to build a social democrat party with a real agenda focusing on the problems and demands of the disadvantaged people in society and abandon their notion of authoritarian radical secularism. Another useful starting point for the party to explain the election defeats is that there is nothing wrong with the people but with the party, its leadership, discourse and program.

This cannot be achieved easily. As everybody knows Baykal has expelled any potential opponent in the party. Thus it is unlikely that attempts to renew the party and its world view will come from within. Social democrats who have distanced themselves from the CHP should now actively engage in transforming the party into a modern, outward-looking and peace-oriented democrat party. In this, the support of the Socialist International will be crucial, too. The external pressure over the CHP as regards the principles of social democracy will be extremely effective in pushing the party to rethink its views and positions.

30.07.2007

The future of the Kurds: democracy or partition?

For an ethnic entity under assault by a central power, there are two ways to go: to work for a central democratic regime that respects the existence and rights of that ethnicity or to attempt to secede if there is no hope of democratizing the center.

It would be wrong, however, to attribute the tendency to seek a separate state to only the nationalist drive of ethnic groups. I think the main responsibility lies with the center to demonstrate the possibility of coexistence and power sharing with ethnic minorities.

Without this, it is hard to put all the blame on the nationalist tendencies of ethnic groups. So long as their rights are denied and their demands for power sharing are ignored, no one can blame them for developing secessionist ambitions. While a separate state would not necessarily guarantee the enjoyment of these rights at the level of the individual, under such an independent political entity no one would be able to stop them from seeking such rights.

This has been the case of the Kurds of Iraq for decades.

“In 1970, a commission headed by Saddam Hussein visited Mullah Mustafa Barzani’s headquarter[s] in Saman, Arbil. There had been an ongoing Kurdish armed struggle for autonomy since 1961, and the Baghdad government was offering a new agreement in order to settle the Kurdish issue. Mullah Mustafa said that he would not lay down arms unless Baghdad recognizes the autonomy of Kurds. … Saddam Hussein accepted the conditions of Mullah Mustafa and the ceasefire began. During this meeting, [Massoud] Barzani, the son of Mullah Mustafa, asked Saddam Hussein how Baghdad would solve the democracy problem in all of Iraq. Saddam Hussein said that ‘the system [with which] we govern the rest of Iraq is none of your business. You will have autonomy in Kurdistan. Why do you care about this?’”

The relevance of Massoud Barzani’s question has come to be understood well over the years, according to Dr. Burak Bilgehan Özpek of the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) Economy and Technology University, who wrote the provocative and eye-opening article on the future of Iraqi Kurdistan from which the above has been excerpted and that was published in the summer issue of Insight Turkey (www.insightturkey.com).

In his article, titled “Democracy or Partition: Future Scenarios for the Kurds of Iraq,” Özpek warns all interested parties that the maintenance of Iraqi unity requires a functioning democracy in Baghdad and respect for power sharing between the center and the federal entity. “The centralization policy of [Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-] Maliki threatens the unity of Iraq rather than helping with consolidating the country,” according to Özpek.

Let’s read further.

“Despite the Kurds’ establishment of their regional government and attainment of increased autonomy, they have not initiated an assertive policy agenda of seeking secession from Iraq. This means that their gains have not encouraged them to go for independence. However, Kurdish politicians have started to hint that they will consider independence if the centralization of power under Nouri al-Maliki continues.”

And it continues, according to Özpek.

“Maliki, through his efforts to centralize power by controlling the strategic ministries, the military, the electoral commission and the economy, and by excluding Sunni and Kurdish figures from the political and bureaucratic system, is undermining the de facto power-sharing tradition implemented in Iraq after the US invasion.”

Massoud Barzani, president of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), defines Maliki as a dictator and, as quoted by Özpek, has said: “Unfortunately, after many years, the situation is being changed and turned into the previous version. We don’t accept the return of dictatorship. … The problem here is not only the Kurds, it is with all Iraq. If Iraq was democratic, federal and plural then it will be one and united. We don’t threaten the unity of Iraq; it is dictatorship that threatens the unity of Iraq.”

Massoud Barzani also said that “a dictator in Baghdad cannot rule Kurdistan and if Baghdad attempts to do so the Kurds would go their separate way. The process has already begun and it is only [a] matter of time and regional development to decide when and how it happens.”

While the Maliki government aims to subordinate the KRG by cutting their budget and imposing an Arab identity on the military, the KRG regards such attempts as those of a dictator to consolidate his power and centralize the political system. Thus, Maliki’s strategy reminds Kurds of their historical fears inherited from Baathist Iraq, which was a perfect model of a strong and central state.

If he were to meet Maliki, Massoud Barzani might ask the same question he asked Saddam Hussein 42 years ago and remind Maliki what happened to Iraq after Saddam’s arrogant response.

Unless a full-fledged democracy is established, it will be impossible to put an end to the secessionist tendencies of strong ethnic minorities that even hold regional autonomy. This is a lesson that Turkey should also seriously consider.

Good for the Kurds, bad for the Turks?

The Syrian crisis has turned into a crisis testing Turkey's attitude towards the Kurdish question and the Kurds. The likelihood of the Syrian Kurds gaining control of some northern parts of the country and eventually gaining some sort of autonomy from the center has alarmed the Turks and the Turkish government alike.

Almost all commentaries published in Turkish media have told the story with great concern. The prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs have stated that if it becomes necessary, Turkey will not hesitate to intervene in Syria. The opposition has started to accuse the government of idly watching the establishment of a second Kurdish entity on its borders.

Underlying all these reactions is the assumption that developments in favor of the Kurds in the region constitute a threat to Turkey. It is thus inferred that Turkey would prefer the Kurds being ruled by dictators like Saddam Hussein and Bashar al-Assad instead of having a say in their own future.

This is awkward, impossible to justify on any ethical or even practical ground. It is of course obvious that such an unethical position is the result of the security concerns of the state. Or, to put more accurately, it is due to the fact that there are demands from the Kurds of Turkey concerning their political and cultural rights. Once there is an emergence of a new entity populated by Kurds that provides the Kurds with more rights and freedoms, Turkey becomes worried that such improvements may set a “bad example” for its own Kurds. The well-being of Kurds thus is to be prevented by Turkey.

It is futile to try to build a future on the misfortune of the Kurds. Besides, in a world of changes towards democracy and self-government, it is unrealistic to assume that the Kurds will remain under the yoke of this or that nation or dictator. As the world transforms it is normal that the Kurds, too, are increasingly gaining their democratic rights and improving their standard of living.

Therefore this reflex of the government and the public at large of regarding any improvement in the conditions of the Kurds as automatically threatening Turkey is not realistic, prudent or right.

Even if there is a zero-sum game between the Turks and the Kurds, what about the Kurds of Turkey? Which side of the equation are they on?

In this line of thinking, the Turkish public and officials thus miss a fundamental point that there are Kurds in this country, and these Kurds enthusiastically welcome developments both in Iraq and Syria through which their ethnic relatives are likely to be better off politically and economically as a result.

It is not unnoticed or regarded as unimportant that the official prevailing view that what is good for the Kurds is bad for the Turks alienates the Kurds of Turkey from this country. Such an attitude serves to justify the position of the secessionists Kurds. The Kurds of Turkey tend to think that they do not have a common bond with the Turks and the Turkish state.

I think it is time to rethink and refute this presumption. And this requires constructing a new language about the “outside Kurds” who are not outsiders in fact to our politics and society.

So long as the gains of the Kurds are regarded as the losses of the Turks there can be no persuasive argument for a common future between the Kurds of Turkey and the Turks. This is simply because it excludes the Kurds from a common “us.” If we do not include the Kurds as part of “us” in practice, it is impossible to tell them that we really want to live together as equal citizens.

Emergence of the ‘new AK Party'

The Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government enjoys the advantage of being without an alternative. That is certainly a luxury, in a country where the average life of a government in the democratic era before the emergence of the AK Party did not exceed two years.

The ruling party is now in its 10th year in government and still does not have any significant challenger. It is very likely that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will be elected as president in 2014 if things continue as they are, and that his party will win another round of general elections in 2015.

Such predictions of continued success naturally boost the confidence of the party and its leadership. It is extremely difficult to tell a political party that sustains the support of more than half the population that it is doing something wrong.

Even if you tell them they will not listen to you. What counts in a competitive democracy is the number of votes. As long as a political party garners the support of enough people to bring it to power, the very objective of its political activity will be fulfilled. There can be no stronger incitement to change than a drop in the number of the votes, which does not seem to be on the cards with regard to the AK Party.

As a result, the government, instead of deepening democratic reforms, resolving the Kurdish question and making a new constitution, opts for populist conservatism, with economic and social policies designed to satisfy its supporters. This strategy manifests clearly: While the demands of conservative members of society are met with symbolic gestures, such as reintroducing the religious schools, building a gigantic mosque in Istanbul and debating the banning of abortion, funds are deftly spent on social projects for the creation of a loyal conservative bourgeoisie.

The result is perfectly satisfactory both for the party and the people at large, despite expressions of disappointment from some liberal and democrat circles claiming that the AK Party has abandoned its original reformist, democratizing and pluralistic political characteristics.

It is no surprise, of course, to see that this transformative agent of Turkey over the last decade, the AK Party, has also transformed itself. It would be a grave mistake to confuse the current AK Party with the one that emerged in 2002, which was regarded as an anomaly by the establishment, or with the one that was threatened by a coup attempt in 2007 over the election of the president, or the one that faced a closure case in 2008. All have passed, and by passing have transformed the AK Party.

Now the party has established itself within the system and become capable of utilizing the available instruments, including the military, the ideological educational structure and the centralized religious institution, the Directorate of Religious Affairs. By coercive means and through the ideological instruments of the state, the “new AK Party” is now capable of perpetuating its political power, social legitimacy, and economic strength.

Thus the AK Party today occupies all social and political space, leaving almost nothing outside its reach. This is further justified by the discourse that the AK Party is the party of the whole nation and that every person should find a place for himself or herself within the party. This “invitation” to all is understandable. But it also implies that the party sees itself as the embodiment of the nation, the same way the Republican People's Party (CHP) viewed itself in the 1930s.

We should not forget that to claim to represent all different ideas, identities, and interests within a single party is a homogenizing attitude that does not leave a free social and political space for autonomous self-expression of difference. If the agency is monopolized by a single actor that sees itself as the embodiment of the state, there will be no room for democracy and pluralism.

Who can solve the Kurdish question?

Hopes of resolving the Kurdish question are never exhausted. This is not because the likelihood of settling the issue is high and all sides are eager for a solution. I think hopes are always high because we wish to see an end to the bloodshed. Sometimes these high hopes turn us into unrealistic, naïve beings. We tend to see the positive and ignore the negative and exaggerate good-willed steps and play down the obstacles -- in short, blow the slightest possibility out of proportion.

This is obviously risky as we cannot separate between the imagined and the real. One day it is the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that we invest our hopes in to resolve the Kurdish question, and the next it is Abdullah Öcalan. Once they are unable to meet our expectations for peace we turn to Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) leader Massoud Barzani, or senior Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Murat Karayılan and the “moderates” in the Kandil Mountains.

So the search for peace continues. Whoever appears to give a chance for peace raises hopes across the country among both the Kurds and Turks. The meeting of Leyla Zana with Erdoğan was yet another such occasion. Just before, the meeting between Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), with Erdoğan had similarly raised hopes. But within days, expectations for a new process faded as both leaders went back to making heavy accusations against each other.

Does the Zana-Erdoğan meeting mark the beginning of a new process? Again, we hope so… But I have personally gotten tired of disappointments and so try not to raise any hopes for this latest round of initiatives. Besides, I have started to think that the actors capable of resolving the question on both sides are not really willing to resolve the question. The comfort of the current state of affairs, however, marked by violence it is, seems to be preferred to the risks of a settlement. I do not mean, of course, risks for the Turks and the Kurds in general, but the risks for the political leaders on both sides.

Violence and confrontation have become routine, part of daily life and in fact, the meaning of life. Without a Kurdish question, for example, the Kurdish leadership team, the Turkish security forces, and the nationalist bloc are not sure how they can justify their existence. Thus established habits, structures, mentalities and political practices prevent both sides from making decisive decisions to settle the issue.

Take the example of the ruling party. The AK Party leadership team is well aware of the fact that a continuation of the current state of the Kurdish question will not cost it to lose an election. Limited violence and activities of the PKK do not cause much harm but, on the contrary, underlines the need for a strong government, an attribute of the AK Party. Besides no one can blame the AK Party for creating the Kurdish question. The party can always and rightly claim to have changed Turkey’s decades-old policies of denial, thus becoming the one who has contributed to the betterment of Kurds’ lives.

What about the PKK? I do not think that the PKK is ready to risk a solution, either. It is an organization designed to wage guerilla warfare with an outdated ideology. Labeling itself as the organizational embodiment of the Kurdish nation, it does not tolerate any dissenting voices within its ranks or among Kurds. So it is not a “normal” political party that can adapt itself to the conditions of “normal politics” after a solution. Thus they encounter this big question: Is there a life for the PKK after the solution? This is the toughest question for the PKK cadres. They are the ones who have been making sacrifices in the mountains for years, but the “white Kurds” who have not been involved will take the trophy of a solution away in an actual struggle. The best they can hope for is the life of a refugee in a European city.

In short, we have gotten accustomed to living with the Kurdish question and its accompanying violence.

It is thus not surprising that following the meeting of Zana and Erdoğan, all kind of confusing statements came from the PKK, the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) and government circles. I think Zana could no longer resist the pressures of being her own “actor” which she has been experiencing since her release from prison in 2004. But the complexities of Turkish and Kurdish politics are unlikely to give way to the well-intended initiative of Zana. The question is rooted in the structure of the success and survival system of Turkish and Kurdish politics, and thus it can hardly be resolved by individual actors and initiatives. Let’s see what happens to Zana’s initiative, but it is better to be realistic.

Kurdish solution by offering gifts

It is good to hear the Kurdish question debated rather than read reports about violence committed by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) or the state’s security forces. This path has been re-opened by Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who certainly deserves applause.

The meeting of Kılıçdaroğlu and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan last week was important because it indicated that the “new CHP” would not exploit government initiatives to resolve the Kurdish question, which was the case during the “democratic initiative” of 2009. Back then the CHP under the leadership of Deniz Baykal accused the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) of plotting against the unity of the country by acceding to the demands of the PKK. The tactic of the opposition then was to bury the ruling party under the Kurdish question with the expectation that Turks disturbed by the AK Party initiative would gather under the CHP.

This did not happen. But it nevertheless played a part in the hesitation of the ruling party that felt alone in addressing such an important issue. Severe opposition and the continued PKK violence indeed worried the ruling party, which shelved the solution process in order to avoid the political cost of appearing to meet the demands of the PKK.

Therefore the CHP’s changing attitude has been significant in encouraging the ruling party to renew its initiative. Sharing the cost and benefits among the governing and opposition parties eases the process. But I am still not sure how far the CHP can go when models of a solution come to the table with the fear of losing its nationalist power base. The same applies to the AK Party, too. It also has a strong nationalist constituency and is concerned that giving in to the demands of the Kurds may alienate its nationalist elements. So the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) by remaining outside of such a solution poses as an alternative for the nationalist voters both in the CHP and the AK Party, which are well aware of this.

Amid such political calculations, the latest proposal of the AK Party about Kurdish being an elective course in public schools is significant. It indicates that the ruling party is still capable of taking bold political steps to address Kurdish demands. Though a selective course on Kurdish does not satisfy the demands of the Kurds, who ask for education in the Kurdish language, we should note that the latest decision of the government may indeed be a groundbreaking move leading to education in Kurdish.

The only problem here is that the government has taken such a decision without engaging with the Kurdish constituency. Like broadcasting Kurdish on the state-owned Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT), the elective courses on Kurdish come through a unilateral decision of the government. As such they are seen as “gifts” from the state to the people, not rights negotiated and then gained. This is important because unilateral decisions by the government deny agency to the Kurds. As the Kurds (or their representatives) are not engaged in the decision-making process, they feel excluded and thus obliged to reject the idea. This is, in fact, the state of mind that describes elective Kurdish courses as an “attempt of assimilation.” It may not be enough to meet the demands of the Kurds at large but it is also not an attempt to assimilate the Kurds.

To avoid such “politicking” by actors from both the Kurdish and Turkish sides we need to bring them into a process of engagement. It is not easy but a must, especially as without the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) being engaged in the process, it is hard to find a solution to the Kurdish question by taking unilateral steps. Leyla Zana’s latest statement about the AK Party and Erdoğan may open up a new avenue of dialogue and engagement between the ruling party and representatives of Kurdish demands.