Ihsan Dagi

Whose war is it anyway?

2012-02-12T12:28:00.000-08:00

Once again, Turkish politics are in turmoil. A public prosecutor in İstanbul called on the current and former undersecretaries of the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) to answer questions as “suspects.” When they did not turn up in the public prosecutor's office, an arrest warrant was issued for the MİT personnel. In response, the government has initiated legislation to protect MİT boss Hakan Fidan. Moreover, the public prosecutor who pursued the issue was removed from the case by the chief public prosecutor of İstanbul surely under the influence of the government.

This is a new crisis in Turkish politics in which the government and judiciary stand on opposing sides. What is confusing, though, is that this is supposed to be the “new judiciary” of the “new Turkey,” shaped after the constitutional referendum of September 2010 by which the old Kemalist elite ceased to dominate the judiciary.

So it is not possible to explain the crisis by referring to the clash between a democratizing Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and a pro-status quo Kemalist stronghold in the judiciary resisting change.

It seems the government has interpreted the prosecutor's move as an attempt directed not only at the government but also directly at Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Anti-government circles in the media further exaggerated this interpretation. According to media reports, the issue that led the public prosecutor to call in Mr. Fidan for testimony is the so-called Oslo talks in which the MİT and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) engaged in talks on a possible Kurdish solution. It is well known that it was Erdoğan himself who asked for this process to be started, and Mr. Fidan, then deputy undersecretary in the Prime Minister's Office, was in fact Erdoğan's representative at the talks. So this issue naturally leads to the prime minister.

But why? This is a political decision and cannot, of course, be questioned by the judiciary. It is the duty of intelligence officials to contact organizations like the PKK and strike a bargain. Why should the prosecutor target the prime minister? Prosecutor Sadrettin Sarıkaya had been appointed by the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) and was trusted by the government until the call for Mr. Fidan. He was the prosecutor in charge of the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK) investigations. So, shall we argue now that prosecutor Sarıkaya has done everything right in the KCK case but, as his only mistake, he included the MİT in his investigation?

This is difficult to say, indeed.

The same question applies to the police. The two top police officers involved in this case were reshuffled and sent to other posts in Ankara immediately after the prosecutor's request for the MİT officials. These two top police officers are also known as the key figures working not just in the KCK investigations but also the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases. Then, shall we assume these police officers did everything right in the Ergenekon and Balyoz investigations and got everything wrong when they found documents that led from the KCK operations to the MİT?

In sum, it is difficult to explain what has happened and why between the government on the one hand and the public prosecutor and police officers on the other. What is clear is that the competition for power using the apparatus of the state does not produce democracy and the rule of law. This incident should be a reminder that the number-one issue in this country is the consolidation and institutionalization of democracy and the rule of law. The AK Party government seems for some time to have forgotten this fact. I hope it takes this crisis as a warning to revisit its original agenda.

AK Party’s new mission

2012-02-05T01:53:00.000-08:00

Should a state design its institutions and policies to create a “religious generation”? Even if it does this, can it achieve such an objective? On both accounts I think Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has described his government’s objective as “bringing up religious generation,” is mistaken.

Pursuing such an objective is obviously an attempt at social engineering. It assumes a hierarchical relationship between the state and society, and assigns the state the duty and power to shape the minds, beliefs and lifestyles of the next generations. This is what the Kemalists tried to do for decades. Their mission was to “enlighten” the people with positivist ideas that were expected to erode the influence of religion over society and thus make it easy to generate loyalty for the new secular regime. They dictated to the people what to think, believe in and how to dress. To do this, the Kemalists designed education, public institutions and law. And in doing so, the Kemalists destroyed the right to choose, the right to be different, and thus strangled democracy and pluralism.

Does the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) now want to follow the same path as the Kemalists? I hope not. However, as a conservative political party they may wish to see the spread of a conservative way of life. This is natural. But once they use state authorities and public funds to generate such a society they fall into the trap of authoritarian top-down social engineering. From this moment onwards they will lose the moral ground to criticize all other attempts of social engineering at the hands of the state. No one has the right to interfere in society to create his own “imagined” society. This indicates not only an authoritarian but also a totalitarian mindset.

In the long run it is futile and also not practical. The Kemalists failed in creating their own “loyal generation.” If they had succeeded we would have all been Kemalists, positivists and non-religious. We are not. Such policies do not create new generations of either Kemalist or religious masses but only destroy pluralism and democracy. At the end of the Kemalist indoctrination that lasted for decades an ex-Islamist politician is the prime minister today.

So social engineering does not work. The AK Party leadership should know this the best. But the issue is not whether it is possible to generate a “new generation,” the issue is that a government trying to do this will turn into an authoritarian one, dictating its own worldview to the people by using state authority and public funds.

It is more an issue of democracy and pluralism than secularism. Yet it clearly contradicts the notion of secularism defended by the AK Party itself as freedom of religion and conscience and neutrality of the state vis-à-vis all religions. Once the government asserts that “bringing up religious generations” is its governmental objective, this will constitute an intervention in the consciences of people. Here the term “religious generations” obviously refers to Islamic religiosity and a particular Sunni interpretation of it. Thus a state with such a mission violates the neutrality principle of secularism. In a normal secular state, even in the one so far advocated by the AK Party, it is not the duty of the state to bring up religious or non-religious generations.

You may wish to live in a society in which religious values and practices are upheld. This is perfectly fine. Individuals, civil society organizations, NGOs and religious circles should be free to spread their word.

The problem is that once you try to do it by using state authority and public funds, you may end up with a state with a religious mission.

Europe: a Christian continent?

2012-01-29T09:14:00.000-08:00

I think the biggest challenge for the future of Europe is to develop ways and forms of coexistence among the culturally and religiously diverse populations living on the continent. Instead of declaring multiculturalism dead, Europeans have to reinvent it.

For a start, they should stop imagining Europe as a historically and culturally Christian continent. Such an endeavor will open up cultural space to accommodate a non-Christian social presence in Europe.

In a brilliant article published in the January 2012 issue of Insight Turkey, titled “Myth of a Christian Europe and the Massacre in Norway,” Dr. Şener Aktürk from Koç University challenges the view that Europe is a Christian continent. Many mainstream conservative politicians and intellectuals, as well as extremists in Europe, are of the belief that “Europe exclusively belonged, belongs, and will belong to, Christians, not necessarily to religious, practicing Christians, but to people of Christian origins.”

Dr. Aktürk dismisses the idea of a Christian Europe as a “myth.” He persuasively argues that “Europe has been not only a Christian, but also a Jewish and Muslim continent for many centuries.” Recognition of this “historical fact” is important because imagining Europe as a historically Christian continent is not only inaccurate; it may also justify enmity and aggression towards Muslims living in Europe. It “implies that non-Christians have no place in Europe because they are ‘foreigners'.”

For him, therefore, this is not only a naive historical assertion, which is inaccurate anyway, but it is an idea “employed throughout history in most episodes of ethnic cleansing against non-Christians in Europe, from the expulsion of Jews and Muslims from Spain in 1492 to the genocidal campaign against Bosnian Muslims in the 1990s.”

Let us listen to him: “Most people on both sides of the Atlantic, including a large segment of the educated public, would agree that ‘factually' Europe was a Christian continent, to which non-Muslims have only recently arrived. But is that really true? Or is this a historical misrepresentation, a popular lie, which is at the very foundation of an age-old propaganda that produced hatred and violence against non-Christians in Europe for centuries?”

Europe has not been only Christian but also emphatically Jewish and Muslim for more than 1000 years. Muslims ruled parts of Spain and Portugal for almost eight centuries, from 711 until 1492, giving rise to a dazzling Judeo-Christo-Islamic culture in the Iberian peninsula. The completion of the Reconquista in 1492 and the Inquisition that accompanied it wiped out Muslims, Jews, and heterodox Christians, rendering the peninsula completely Catholic by 1500.

Less well known is the Islamic heritage of Sicily, which was a Muslim kingdom from the conquest of Mazara in 827 until 1091. Muslim dynasties following Islamic law provided sufficient guarantees for the island's non-Muslims, including Catholics, Jews, Muslims, and Orthodox Greeks, to live side by side, a history of coexistence that is manifested in Sicilian tombstones bearing four alphabets associated with the four main religions: Arabic, Hebrew, Greek, and Latin. Muslims were not a tiny, elite minority, either. The 13th century Muslim geographer Yaqut claimed that “most of [Sicily's] population became Muslim,” and many places in present-day Sicily have names derived from Arabic.

In Palermo, Muslim traveler Ibn Jubair said, “there are so many mosques that they are impossible to count,” whereas Ibn Hawqal, who visited Sicily in 973, claimed that there were three hundred mosques in Palermo alone. Where are the three hundred mosques of Palermo today?"

Moving from Italy to France, perhaps the quintessential “Western” country, one encounters diverse religious groups including Cathars, Waldensians, Muslims, Jews, and Huguenots and a history of their eradication. The Muslim presence in France has a thousand year history. Muslims invaded France and clashed with Charles Martel's armies between Poitiers and Tours in 732, in what Edward Gibbon called “an encounter which would change the history of the world.” Less known is the fact that a sizable Muslim population settled in Fraxinetum in southeast France from 889 onwards, resulting in “Arab/Muslim control of the Alpine passes which connect Italy with the remainder of Western Europe for a number of decades in the 10th century.

Around 1900, Thessalonica was 40 percent Jewish and 35 percent Muslim. A significant proportion of the latter were both, as the descendents of Jews who, following their messiah Rabbi Shabbatai Tzevi, converted to Islam in 1666. Mark Mazower's brilliant book on the city is titled City of Ghosts with good reason: The city's non-Christian communities are virtually non-existent today. A true foreigner, the proverbial “martian,” visiting Thessalonica in 2011 would have no clue that this was an overwhelmingly Judeo-Islamic city in 1911.

Sadly, Auschwitz and Srebrenica are factual proofs of Europe's Jewish and Muslim history and heritage, because one cannot mass murder a people who do not exist. With Freud's house in Bergstrasse 19, Kafka's grave in Prague, the Dohany street synagogue and the Gul Baba tomb in the “mosque street” of Budapest, it seems that non-Christian people existed in Europe for a while and contributed to European civilization.

Murder as a collective crime

2012-01-22T10:31:00.000-08:00

It was five years ago: In my second column in Today’s Zaman, only three days after the murder of Hrant Dink, I wrote that he was “the victim of the nation-state and nationalism.”

Since then he continues to be victimized by the same mindset that prevails in Turkish security institutions, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the judiciary.

The Dink case is a reminder of how deep-rooted and widespread Turkish nationalism, which has defined itself silently vis-à-vis the Armenian question since 1915, is. I think the Turkish subconscious is marked by the events of 1915 so that it cannot recover from it and treat the remaining Armenians, including Dink, as fellow citizens and compatriots.

A year after Dink was murdered then Minister of Defense of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government Vecdi Gönül declared openly for the first time, “If the Armenians had remained where they had lived in Anatolia, we could not have established such a nation-state.” When Minister Gönül uttered these words he rightly faced criticism that he was a “Unionist,” referring to the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in power during the 1915 massacre of the Armenians. But the fact of the matter is that this is the unspoken and yet common belief among Turks, nationalists, conservatives, leftists, you name it.

By linking the establishment of a Turkish nation-state and the Armenian massacre, they implicitly endorse what was done to the Armenians in 1915. This is what I refer to as the subconscious of the Turks being marked by the Armenian question; their “presence” was only possible at the expense of the “absence” of the Armenians. This I think gives way to a guilt complex that cannot be admitted and expressed and a deep sense of insecurity. When Armenians exist, they panic that this happens at the expense of the Turks’ absence. So the presence of Dink as an Armenian in the public sphere deeply disturbed the “Turkish psyche.”

As a result we have all kinds of barriers to the investigation of Dink’s murder. It started right after the murder. The person who killed Dink was photographed in front of a Turkish flag flanked by two soldiers when he was arrested. These photographs were distributed to the media to trigger nationalist sentiments against the Armenians. Again, right after the murder, the İstanbul chief of police declared that the murderer was motivated and led by nationalist sentiments. Hürriyet Editor-in-Chief Ertuğrul Özkök wrote that we should try to understand (i.e., sympathize with) the murderer.

All these have turned the Dink murder into an act justifiable simply because it was committed against an Armenian.

So there was complacency all over. It is now a fact that security forces in Trabzon and İstanbul knew well that a plan to assassinate Dink was being prepared. They knew and did not do anything to stop it. How can this be explained? If the “victim” is an Armenian, then “collaboration” or “silence” is the attitude. We also know for sure that he was warned and threatened by an intelligence officer in the office of the deputy governor of İstanbul before his murder.

Even the AK Party government that was receptive to the demands of minorities and in return supported by them did not stand by Dink. I do not remember any member of the AK Party government who attended the Dink’s burial (except an adviser to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan).

Later on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the leadership of Ahmet Davutoğlu submitted a defense to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) for the Dink case in which Dink was compared to a Nazi leader, and it was argued that restrictions on his writings could not be regarded as a breach of freedom of expression, since they contained “hate speech.” As if this embarrassing comparison was not enough, the defense by the Turkish government also implied that Dink’s murderers were justified: It was Dink who was to blame for his own murder because he was found guilty of insulting Turkishness by the Turkish judiciary.

Apart from this shameful “defense” there are many cases that show authorities did not collaborate to investigate the murder case. At the end the court placed all responsibility on a “lone wolf” without going deeper into his connections. Everyone knows this is a cover-up, not only of the network that murdered Dink but also of our relationship with Armenians. The decision of the court turns Dink’s murder into a “collective crime.”

Racism, immigrants and the state in Germany

2012-01-15T01:56:00.000-08:00

I am not exaggerating: Not only does the durability of peace but also the future of democracy in Europe depend on the way in which immigrants are treated by their host countries.

Racism, discrimination and right-wing violence may now appear to be directed at immigrants, but they will in the end destroy European civilization as we know it. Racists and those who are silent and complacent in the face of racism cannot cleanse Europe from immigrants without destroying Europe's democratic civilization. What is at stake thus is not only the life and welfare of immigrants in Europe but the very values Europe claims to uphold.

Some two months ago a link between the murders of nine immigrants, eight of them Turks, between 2000 and 2006 and the neo-Nazi National Socialist Underground (NSU) came to light. The disclosures disturbed many, especially when alleged links were established between the neo-Nazi NSU and German intelligence units. With such shocking allegations in mind, I wondered how Turks in Germany felt. They must have felt vulnerable, unprotected and abandoned.

Last week I got my answers from research conducted by Dr. Murat Erdoğan from Hacettepe University's Center for Immigration and Politics. The research, titled “Racist neo-Nazi murders in Germany: Opinions and Feelings of Turks,” provided very valuable information for anyone interested in the way in which Turks living in Germany react to neo-Nazi violence, the German state and the German people. In a nutshell, the Turks in Germany think that the neo-Nazi murderers were protected or tolerated by German authorities.

For the Turks, who were invited to Germany as “guest workers” by the state itself 50 years ago, this is a shocking end. Did the state that invited them 50 years ago conspire with the neo-Nazi gangs to kill their compatriots? This in itself is unimaginable. Yet the research, based on an empirical survey among Turkish immigrants by Dr. Erdoğan, shows that the trust between Turks in Germany and the German state has been broken.

It displays that the prevailing feeling is one of sorrow (74 percent), while 12 percent feel anger and only 8 percent sense “fear.” The racist murders seem to prompt not fear but rage. What is alarming for the “host country” is the perception among immigrant Turks that the “German state supported or protected the neo-Nazi murderers.” This perception stands at 66 percent among the Turks of Germany, while 21 percent do not see such support and protection on the part of the German state. This is really worrisome. It points not to the anger or fear but to the sense of insecurity among immigrants, whose murderers are link to the state that is supposed to protect them.

Maybe the most critical question of the survey is whether the Turks are considering leaving Germany and returning to Turkey due to such racist killings. It is really interesting to see that 77 percent of Turks do not consider this as an option. They demonstrate their determination to continue to live in Germany. If the objective of the neo-Nazis targeting the Turks is to intimidate, terrorize and thus force them to leave Germany, it is clear that they will not reach their objective.

Those who say they will return to Turkey number only 9 percent. This means Turks living there have become a permanent feature of Germany after all.

Despite the fact than an overwhelming majority of Turks there is suspicious of the German state when it comes to the neo-Nazi connection, the Turks still seek shelter under the roof of the German state. This is still good news. But in return the German state owes these people one single and simple thing: security, the most basic function and responsibility of a state.

You may remember that, after the new discoveries about the murders, the Bundestag expressed shame and regret, and issued an apology. Dr. Erdoğan's research also asks Turks about this apology to understand their reaction. The majority of the Turks interviewed did not find the apology sincere (58 percent). This is understandable given their perception that the state did not protect them or properly investigate the racist murders.

The lack of trust among Turkish immigrants is discernible. Sixty-two percent think the apology is part of a cover-up, while 70 percent do not see this as a sign of regret. Those who believe German politicians regret the events and are trying to find a solution stand at a mere 35 percent. Trust has been lost.

This is important, especially given the fact that 66 percent expect the racist killings to continue. So they think that they will be targeted and sense that they cannot trust the state that is supposed to protect them. What is promising, though, is the separation between the Germans as a whole and the racists. Sixty-eight percent of the Turks think that racist attacks are the doing of a marginal group. So while there is a deep crisis of trust between the German state and Turkish immigrants, there is still room to mend the problem as the Turks in Germany still disassociate the German people from the racists.

In sum, unless immigrants feel safe, social peace, harmony, integration and the long-term sustainability of democracy cannot be secured in Europe.

General Başbuğ: Who was he?

2012-01-08T03:55:00.000-08:00

He was “a very modern general” according to The Economist. Now he is under arrest accused by a public prosecutor of plotting to topple the Turkish government. I would not think that “a modern general” concentrating on his own job would face such a fate. The court seems to have been convinced by evidence and statements from other suspects who were comrades-in-arms of Gen. İlker Başbuğ, so it decided to arrest him.

Was he really “a modern general” as claimed by The Economist in February 2009? Maybe he was, as regards his “lifestyle” and “appearances.” Back in February 2010 I asked about his commitment to “modern political values.” Does he believe in the virtue of democracy?

Here is my answer published in Today's Zaman on Feb. 15, 2009:

“In his deeds, we do not see any sign that Başbuğ is prepared to accept the end of military political tutelage in Turkey. On the contrary, he seems extremely nervous about developments that undermine the political power of the military. He declares that coup plotters cannot remain in the military, but in practice, coup plots are covered up (today we know why).

“Does Gen. Başbuğ abide by the principles of the rule of law as ‘a modern general'? He is a commander who is very reluctant to start legal proceedings against military personnel who are accused of illegal and extra-duty activities. In his last interview with Habertürk, he complained that judicial investigations have destroyed his military's morale. This “modern general” was also criticized by the European Commission in its 2009 report for putting pressure on the judiciary.

“Does he respect freedom of expression? Gen. Başbuğ constantly accuses critics of militarism and military intervention in politics of being part of a plot to weaken the military and serving foreign interests. He claims that these critics are implementing a ‘psychological operation against the military.'

“Can a general constantly making remarks about domestic political developments be regarded as “modern”? We do not hear Gen. Başbuğ speaking on important security issues, technological developments in the area of warfare, the modernization of the Turkish military, etc. He always talks about domestic political affairs.

“Is this the attitude expected of a ‘modern general' in the West? Or is it only tolerable in Turkey? Well, some in the West and those who write for the Western media may think such things are tolerable in Turkey. But for me, and I am sure for many democrats who demand a world-class democratic regime in Turkey, such a top military officer is neither tolerable nor acceptable.

“Does a modern general give two lengthy interviews to two newspapers within a week making comments about domestic politics? I would not know the name of the chief of general staff if he were a “modern” one, as is the case for an ordinary British or French citizen.

“I would really love to have a ‘modern' chief of general staff. I would not write an article about a modern chief of general staff. If Başbuğ were a modern general, I would not care who he is, what he thinks and what he does, since it would all be irrelevant to understanding and explaining Turkish politics.

“A modern general does not threaten his own citizens as Gen. Başbuğ has done on a couple of occasions. Even in his last interview, Başbuğ continued to intimidate citizens, journalists, intellectuals and politicians by threatening to disclosing the information that they have. He said: ‘If we run out of patience, we will start sharing with the public all we know. We have lots of information.'

“I now wonder what a ‘modern general' will do when he runs out of patience. Stage a military coup or start a dirty campaign against critics of the military?”

This was my analysis of İlker Başbuğ some two years ago. Now he is in a position to answer these questions before the court. I wished he were a really “modern general” and remained separate from plots like those for which he has been indicted by the public prosecutor. But given his views and deeds as displayed when he was chief of General Staff, I am not sure if he can persuade the court that he is innocent.

A difficult period for the AK Party

2012-01-01T22:41:00.000-08:00

In June of last year the ruling party won the elections with 50 percent of the vote after almost 10 years in power.

Since then, public opinion polls have shown that its votes are not unstable but continue to rise, though slowly, while support for other political parties is either stagnant or falling.

Given such a political scene, how can one talk of “a difficult period” for the Justice and Development Party (AK Party)? This is certainly a legitimate question, and I will explain why.

When the AK Party came to power in 2002 it represented people power vis-à-vis the state power. It was the state power that had oppressed the conservative masses and their political, social and economic agents during the Feb. 28 process in the late 1990s on the one hand and looted banks during the crisis and redistributed their resources to İstanbul and the “white Turks,” the supporters of the state elite.

After winning the elections in 2002, the AK Party was very careful not to lose its support and so tried hard to isolate its opponents and fortify a wide front against them. To do so, it pursued a policy of building alliances both at home and abroad with pro-reform democrat groups as a “defense line” against the secularist/militarist elements within the state. The agenda of democratization, which included curbing the military's power, spreading welfare to the masses and seeking EU membership, was thus linked to the AK Party's search for security vis-à-vis the state that was controlled by Kemalist-secularist institutions and actors that regarded the AK Party as an anomaly.

The struggle within the state and society continued between the AK Party based on conservative social support and aligned with pro-reform democrats, and the secularists/Kemalists that held significant institutional power and enjoyed widespread media backing.

Out of this struggle it appeared that while the AK Party was in power holding the majority in Parliament it acted as if it were an opposition party trying to overcome the resistance put up by the Kemalist state elite to democratization. This relationship constantly rejuvenated the AK Party's democratic credentials within the system in comparison to other political currencies and institutional traditions. It thus emerged as the most progressive and reformist party.

The ruling party had to fight against many plots as disclosed in the Ergenekon case and the Balyoz trials. Gangs organized within the military with civilian extensions tried to finish off the AK Party by violent means. When these were not successful the military as an institution directly called on the government to step down and refrain from electing a president in April 2007 -- the 27 memorandum of the military. Holding almost two-thirds of the majority in Parliament, the AK Party was obstructed from electing a president due to the military's unacceptable interference and an unlawful decision made by the Constitutional Court. Even after the AK Party's victory in the 2007 elections the state power continued to intimidate the ruling party. It was almost shut down by the Constitutional Court in 2008.

In short, the AK Party was in government but not in control of the military, judiciary and high bureaucracy, largely regarded as the “state.” This historical binary between the state and the government worked to the advantage of the AK Party and made the ruling party almost immune from criticism. The priority of the AK Party was to take the state under the control of the democratically elected government. This, to a very large extent, was achieved by a constitutional referendum on Sept. 12, 2010, which changed the balance of power within the state in favor of the elected government.

Now the AK Party seems to hold the state power while at the same time representing people power. And here comes the predicament for the ruling party: No longer can it hide behind the excuse that it cannot control the “reactionary forces within the state.” Thus, the AK Party government is accountable for whatever the “state” does, including bombing to death 35 civilians in Sirnak.

The intelligence mistakes that the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) makes, whose president is the appointee of the government, are the mistakes of the AK Party government. It is no longer possible to escape criticism by pointing to the state. Such a defense is no longer possible. The state is the AK Party.

The operational mistakes of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), whose commanders are appointed by the government, are the mistakes of the AK Party. So when the Taraf daily runs a headline like “The state bombs its own people,” it is a state that includes the AK Party. Knowing this, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan comes out and says, “The state does not bomb its own people.” But it was him who apologized only a week ago for the massacre of the people in Dersim by the state, which bombed the entire area back in 1937-1938. A government in control of the “state” is accountable to the people for whatever the state does.

Any judicial mistakes made by the courts, whose central institutions -- including the High Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) -- are determined by the government, will be the mistakes of the AK Party. So, for all the detentions, long prosecution periods, miscarriages of justice, etc., it is the government that is accountable and responsible.

The AK Party cannot hide behind the excuse that it cannot control certain “reactionary” institutions within the state. It is now in a position -- and proud to be -- where it can determine all these institutions. Yet by “defending” the state, the AK Party risks becoming a pro-status quo power and diminishing its democratic credentials.

The French disconnection

2011-12-25T00:30:00.000-08:00

The resemblance between France and “old Turkey” is striking. One similarity regards their attitudes towards history. The French government is attempting to construct a “historical truth” for its citizens, who are not considered capable of making up their own minds about the events of the past.

I know this Jacobin attitude very well from the Kemalist experimentation in creating a “new nation” with a constructed history and identity. But France is the birthplace of imposing “good” on the minds of the “folk,” down in the streets. From this perspective the rulers thought they knew what to believe and how to think better than ordinary citizens.

It is not a simple coincidence that French President Nicolas Sarkozy told Turkey not to interfere with French beliefs. So President Sarkozy thinks that he or Parliament is in a position to pass a law that regulates people's beliefs in any history or faith, and punish those who do not subscribe to the official belief.

This is obviously nonsense but makes perfect sense given the Jacobin legacy in France that seems to be experiencing a revival under Sarkozy's presidency.

The French Parliament, with a ridiculously low level of participation (only around 50 members of Parliament were in attendance when the bill was approved), has attempted to construct an “official belief” on the Armenian massacre of 1915.

The bill describes the 1915 massacre of Armenians as “genocide” and allows for the punishment of those who express a contradictory opinion. So France has moved into an era where it punishes the beliefs that contradict its officially imposed belief. This certainly reminds me of the Inquisition, fires, stakes and the Middle Ages.

There can be no official belief or official history in open and democratic societies. People are free to explore, experience and expose different claims to truth.

A democratic state cannot attempt to hold a monopoly on historical interpretation. Democracy is about plurality of interpretations. Only totalitarian states claim to monopolize interpretations and control people's minds.

The French Parliament has gone too far to discredit its reputation. This has been done while Turkey, despite its authoritarian state tradition, has come to face its past. Only two weeks ago Prime Minister Erdoğan apologized in the name of the state for the massacre of the Dersim people in 1937-1938. This is certainly a move forward towards confronting Turkey's troubling past.

It should also be remembered that Prime Minister Erdoğan, while referring to past atrocities directed at non-Muslims including the Armenians, stated in May 2009, “Through fascist approaches, we forced many non-Muslims to leave this country.” He asked, “Did we do any good?”

While Turkey seems to be abandoning its “official history,” it is really ironic that France is writing one for itself. It is up to the French people to decide whether they silently accept the Parliament's intervention in their freedom of expression. It is, after all, primarily the French citizens whose freedom of expression is severely violated by their Parliament's decision. If the French people accept that their government is in a better position to think and pass judgment on their behalf, it is fine for me.

Regardless, the French attitude neither helps the Armenians who suffered nor the Turks who do not acknowledge their suffering. We can right the atrocities of the past not by labeling them but by discussing them. Calling them genocide is the shortest way to close the debate.

I wrote some time ago: “Anyone who wants to close the debate on what happened to Armenians in 1915 should start by describing the events as genocide. They are, of course, free to speak as they wish. But if Turks are expected to be part of this debate, then a more constructive approach is needed. This requires avoiding language that closes the debate when, in fact, a lively discussion has already been going on.”

A war America lost

2011-12-18T00:29:00.000-08:00

American troops left Iraq last week. President Barack Obama declared that the objectives in Iraq were accomplished.

This I do not agree with. The occupation of Iraq was a big mistake by the US, led then by a neoconservative gang. The cost of the war was high for the US. Five-thousand died, 30,000 were injured and over a trillion dollars were spent.

All these may still be bearable losses, but when we look at the Iraqi side, the scope of destruction goes beyond one's imagination. The number of dead is said to be at around 1.2 million. Those who fled from their homes numbered 2 million. These figures tell us the extent of the human cost the Iraqis had to bear.

While credit for the removal of Saddam Hussein certainly goes to the US, moral and political responsibility for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis falls on the US as well.

Despite this heavy human cost and financial burden, the US did not get what it wanted.

The occupation has handed the power in Iraq to Shiite groups, a scenario of power-sharing that the Americans would have never considered prior to the war. Given the historical and theological relationship between Iraqi Shiites and Iran, it will now be very difficult to prevent the influence of Iran on Iraqi politics. Even Shiite elements that are relatively distant from Iran come under the pressure of pro-Iranian groups, as both derive their legitimacy from the teachings of Shiites, heavily influenced historically by Iranians.

After the US left Iraq, the rising power in the region is certainly Iran. The occupation of Iraq only facilitated the spread of Iranian influence in the region, and particularly in Iraq. Did American policy-makers envisage such an outcome, detrimental to their regional standing in the Middle East?

While the central government of Iraq has to a very large extent fallen to Shiites, the country appears divided along sectarian and ethnic lines. Once Iraqis fail in power-sharing among the Shiites, the Kurds and the Sunnis, the country may fall to pieces. Thus the occupation has resulted in a new power configuration that shakes the feasibility of Iraq as a state. Will such a divided Iraq serve American interests in the region? I doubt it.

As a result of the war, the US also lost support worldwide. Before and after the invasion of Iraq, mass demonstrations were held in different parts of the world. Anti-Americanism hit its highest levels. This was not only a phenomenon in the Middle East among Muslims but was seen all over the world, including in Europe and Latin America. America lost its soft power once it used its hard power against Iraq. The global standing of the US suffered tremendously as the war dragged on, with hundreds of thousands of civilian casualties and the revelation of atrocities committed by American troops against civilians and prisoners. Only recently has the US begun to recover from its dark decade of anti-Americanism fueled by the Iraqi occupation due to worldwide affinity for President Obama.

The US also lost some of its allies. The unilateralism of the Bush administration alienated US friends in Europe. Those who supported the American war in Iraq, like Tony Blair of Britain, lost their own political battles at home.

Moreover, relations with Turkey were severely damaged as a result of the war. At some point this even took the form of hostility. The trust between the two sides at the governmental level disappeared. Many in Turkey believed that the neocons in Washington had plotted with their Turkish supporters against the Turkish government to end Justice and Development Party (AK Party) rule. Moreover, anti-Americanism rose to a record high among the people of Turkey. The relationship between the two sides was repaired only after the US started to contemplate withdrawal from Iraq.

In short, the occupation of Iraq shows the limits of using military power, even for a superpower. Iraq will continue to haunt America in the Middle East and the world at large.

Reforming Europe, abandoning Turkey

2011-12-12T05:09:00.000-08:00

Looking at the economic crisis that led a number of member states to the brink of bankruptcy, some question the future of the European Union.

Whether the EU is an effective institutional framework for dealing with economic crises and bringing prosperity to its citizens may be debated, but it is premature to question the EU’s future.

The EU is the Europeans’ most ambitious project in modern history. I don’t think it will easily be given up. It is a zone of peace and prosperity despite the presence of some countries shaken by recent economic crises.

For the anti-EU circles there is still no ground to celebrate. The union is not passé. Criticism of the EU should not underestimate the ability of the EU to overcome challenges and adapt itself to changing circumstances.

It is a union bringing together different national interests, styles and identities. We always hear about how difficult it is to make decisions in such a big and diverse community. But we see that the union is capable of making speedy and fundamental decisions concerning itself.

Just take last week’s European Council meeting in Brussels as an example. Amid a debate on the future of the EU and the failures of its economic institutions and policies, European leaders decided to enhance integration, not loosen it. Within three months a new union treaty is going to be prepared to tighten financial management within the union.

This decision means that the current crisis will not lead to the disintegration of the union, as argued by some. On the contrary, it will trigger further integration within Europe.

This reaction of the EU to the crisis tells us an important characteristic of the union; namely, that is able to understand change in the environment and respond accordingly.

There is indeed a history of this. Just think of the union treaties made since the end of the Cold War. Starting with Maastricht and moving on to Amsterdam and Nice, and now to the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has been more flexible, responsive and changing than it is given credit for. What we have is a union that has made four “constitutions” in the post-Cold War era, and agreed to make a new one.

This tells us about the EU’s ability to renew itself in the face of crisis, and also its flexibility to change despite a heavy Brussels bureaucracy and diverse membership profile. This is so, I think, because the Europeans are still convinced that peace, prosperity and liberty will best be brought about by European-level cooperation that requires working together instead of going on their own.

Compare the EU’s responsiveness to the changing circumstances in terms of coming up with a new set of rules and norms to Turkey. We have been ruled by a military-made Constitution since 1982. There were numerous amendments introduced since then, but we failed to make a new one despite overwhelming public demand. Even now it is rather doubtful if the new Parliament will reach an agreement on a new democratic constitution.

In trying to catch up with the EU, Turkey sped up its reforms since the late 1990s, strengthening its democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. But as of today the EU lost its role to push Turkey for democratic reform not only because Turkey reached a point at which it does not need an external stimulus for democratization but also because the EU is no longer willing or cares to play such a role.

Such thinking prevails on both sides and neither serves the interests of Turkey nor those of Europe. I hope Turkey won’t be an abandoned or failed case of Europeanization as a result of ignorance or false confidence.

Why Turkey is for ‘regime change’ in Syria

2011-12-04T22:46:00.001-08:00

Changes in the Middle East that were triggered last year by the Tunisian revolution are continuing to shake the region. The Abant Platform this weekend organized a conference titled “The Future of the Middle East after the Arab Spring,” which has the aim of understanding what this means for the world at large as well as for the region. The roots of the revolutionary changes, its processes and its implications were thoroughly debated with the participation of a range of academics and journalists from the Middle East and the West.

Among the topics debated was the situation in Syria and Turkey’s policy towards it. I think there is confusion about Turkey’s Syria policy. The most expressed criticism raised against the Turkish government was its ever changing policy towards the Assad regime. Only last year the two countries were closely cooperating, building personal ties among its top leaders and holding joint cabinet meetings. Now, critics say, Turkey and Syria are on the verge of conflict.

I think we should be fair. What the Turkish government was trying to do was to help Syria materialize political and economic transformation gradually and in an orderly way. Well before the start of the Arab Spring the Turkish government had been engaging with the Syrian regime to integrate it in international economic and political structures, despite some opposition by its Western allies.

This was the policy by Ankara simply because it was not a secret that Syria, as a neighboring country with a very long shared land border and a fragmented domestic social structure, could become a headache for Turkey if it unraveled during radical changes. So Turkey, by engaging with Syria early on, tried to influence a slow, gradual and orderly change so as to avoid the potential spillover effects of a radical shake up in Syria.

When demonstrations started in Syria in March of this year against the Assad regime, the Turkish government was initially optimistic that the regime would respond to the demands of its people by introducing broad reforms. The Turkish side believed Bashar al-Assad would take the advice offered by Turkey seriously and meet the demands of the people. But to the contrary, the regime resisted and blamed the people.

Now that demands for change are knocking at Damascus’ door and the regime is killing thousands of its own people, the very security and stability of Turkey is also being threatened. The Turkish government could not remain indifferent to this and so it called on Assad to step down and later worked together with the Arab League and the EU to impose sanctions on Syria.

This is to say that Turkey, in cooperation with Arab countries and the West, has come forward with a “regime change” in Syria. It will not be easy, of course. But what will also not be easy is maintaining the regime in Syria.

It is safe to argue that unless the regime is changed in Syria, the relationship between the two countries will not be normalized. Not only will the relationship with Syria not be rehabilitated unless Assad is gone, but neither will that with Iran.

The Iranian dimension is important. Turkey is rightly concerned about possible social chaos and civil strife and its spillover into Turkey. But this is not the whole story: I think Turkey is also worried about Iran’s rising influence in the region. The regime in Tehran will maximize its political, social and religious influence in the aftermath of a total withdrawal of American troops from Iraq. In Syria it is clear that Iran is its only ally in the region, and this means it currently exercises a broad influence on the Syrian government. It is obvious that Iran regards Syria as being at the frontline facing Western and regional pressures. If Syria falls, Iran will be next. So the Iranian government, in supporting the Assad regime, is in fact fighting for its own future.

In this context, I think Turkey feels surrounded by an Iranian zone of influence. To break the Iranian containment, a key strategic movement for the Turkish government is a regime change in Syria that can diminish this Iranian influence.

The Iranian influence on Syria cuts Turkey off from its southern gateway to the Arab world. Establishing economic, social and cultural networks with Arab countries is very important in Turkey’s new foreign policy. This cannot be expanded without a cooperative regime in Syria. So for Turkey to reach out to the Arab world and free itself from this Iranian containment, the Assad regime must be changed. The big question is, how will this be achieved?

Dersim massacre as a civilizing project

2011-11-27T04:25:00.000-08:00

Dersim is the subconscience of the republic. It cannot be suppressed for long. One way or other it surfaces and shames all who were involved in the massacres of 1937 and 1938, and those who cannot still face the crime committed then.

What happened in Dersim tell us what Kemalism is all about. It is a shameful burden on the shoulders of all Kemalists. The recent debate provided an opportunity for the Kemalists to relieve themselves of this burden. Not only have they wasted this opportunity but also embraced wholeheartedly all the sins and crimes committed by their forefathers decades ago. This is probably understandable because Kemalism comes with its historical baggage.

And this historical baggage is not clean. Dersim is just one of many, but illustrative of what the Kemalist project is all about and what is used to implement its project.

The people of Dersim were targeted because they were “different” in their language, ethnicity and religious sect. Government officials prepared various reports starting from 1925 describing the people of Dersim as outlaws who had to be disciplined. An extraordinary administration overseen by a military commander with absolute power was established. Prior to 1937 thousands of them were forced to move to other parts of Turkey as part of the 1934 Settlement Law. Every spring the military conducted operations to silence notables in the region. With the final operation that started in 1937, according to official figures, 14,000 people were killed, and 12,000 people were forced to leave the area. The killings were indiscriminate. According to Ihsan Sabri Cağlayangil, then a police inspector in the region and later the minister of foreign affairs, the Turkish military used poisonous gas to kill people hiding in mountain caves. Orphans were taken away.

It is not only difficult but also impossible to defend such a crime. But the Republican People's Party (CHP) is doing the impossible. Its leader from Dersim, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, refuses to apologize for the role his party played in the massacres. What is more embarrassing is the attempt of some CHP deputies to justify the massacre. I do care about those nationalist CHP deputies who rebelled against their leader to defend the historical record of the CHP.

I was shocked though by a statement of Gülsun Bilgehan, a member of Parliament from the CHP and also its member in the party assembly. Of course what is also relevant is that Bilgehan is the granddaughter of İsmet İnönü, the “second man” of the republic, who was among the architect of the CHP's Dersim policy in the 1920s and 1930s.

For her we should judge the Dersim events with its successful “outcomes” and accomplishments. I know it is hard to believe but such a perspective reveals the truth about the way in which the CHP historically looked at the matter, and it tells us why the CHP is an anachronistic political entity.

In the interview Bilgehan acknowledges the method used to resolve the question does not fit the contemporary understanding of human rights but she adds: “At that time there was no other way to resolve the question. I think we had better look at the outcome. As a result the people of Tunceli (Dersim) today are the most well-mannered, educated and committed to democracy. Some, for example, talks about forced internal exiles. But among those exiled are the young girls who were brought up very well. If they had remained in this region (Dersim) in such medieval conditions, they would not have found those families.”

This is the mentality -- not the personality -- that is the matter, which justifies the most hideous crimes committed against people.

I do not see any reasonable people in the West defending the “white man's burden.” But the Kemalists in Turkey can defend and justify such horrific massacres by a reference to their “civilizing mission.” Goodness me, they still live in the medieval age of ideas.

The indiscriminate massacring of people is justified as an act of civilizing people. This is the CHP and its mentality. Because of this the current leader of the CHP, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who is from Dersim and knows very well what his people suffered, cannot apologize. This mentality tells us why the CHP has never won and will never win an election in Turkey.

Well it is the outcome I think that really matters. The granddaughter of Inonu is right to argue that we had better look at the outcome. Yes, the “oppression” worked in Dersim in the end. Today Dersim is the only province in which the CHP has won every seat for Parliament!

Abandoning the old paradigm in the Cyprus dispute

2011-11-20T23:21:00.000-08:00

Abandoning an ever-widening scope of Turkish foreign policy, the Cyprus question no longer occupies center stage as it once used to. Yet it is still likely to emerge as an important issue in the coming year. Two imminent developments make this inevitable: The first is the upcoming rotating presidency of the European Council by the “Republic of Cyprus” and the second is the exploration of natural resources around the island.

Perhaps it is in response to these that negotiations seemed to have been sped up. The last round of negotiations among parties in New York at the end of last month was deemed positive and productive. Thus they have raised expectations. However, there are still delicate issues to agree upon before an agreement is reached.

Yet even if an agreement is reached between Turkish and Greek political leaders on the island, the people of both sides, who are still skeptical, will still have the final world. The referendum in 2004 proved that public opinion does matter. Unless each community is fully prepared to live together with risks and opportunities, their political leaders cannot resolve the dispute among themselves. It is not an issue to address at the top but requires engaging the people at the grass roots.

Hopefully there will be new initiatives taken up by nongovernmental actors in Cyprus to bring members of the two communities together with a common agenda. One such new civic initiative is the Cyprus Academic Dialogue (CAD) established by Turkish and Greek Cypriots to work towards preparing the public, pressuring governments and coming up with concrete suggestions on controversial issues.

This unique group organized a workshop this weekend in İstanbul bringing academics, journalists and writers from both sides of Cyprus and Turkey together. For the first time Cypriot Greeks and Turks as academics and intellectuals worked together to agree upon a joint statement in which the main parameters of a solution were outlined. This is, I think, a historic initiative. Civil society on both sides of the island is taking the matter (that is, in fact their common future) into their own hands.

Such initiatives are important because they come from the people, the ultimate source of legitimacy and sovereignty. We know that even if an agreement is reached at the political level, it has to be sold to the public. Therefore, CAD's efforts are paving the way to build a “common vision” for the island by engaging in a constructive and courageous search for alternatives in settling the dispute on the island.

We know that their task is really difficult. This is because finding a solution on the island requires abandoning the old paradigm of the “national idea” that still prevails on both sides. I do not blame them for this. Given that the history of the conflict on the island and looking at the experiences of mainland Turkey and Greece, the idea of living together with the principle of political equality in an ethnically and religiously diverse state seems very difficult to “imagine.” In fact the modern history of Turkey and Greece is the history of a quest to create a “nation state” with ethnic and religious homogeneity.

I think we, Turks and Greeks, are the victims of our “nation states,” imagined as survival units necessitating subordination and, if possible, the elimination of ethnic and religious diversities. The result is that we, Greeks and Turks on the mainland and on the island, have forgotten how to live and share with the “other.”

Now we are asking Cypriots to forget this “national idea” and form a “federal state.” This totally goes against our experiences. The islanders have the memory of a short-lived experiment in the early 1960s that only vindicated their separate “national ideas.”

My point is that it is really challenging to get out of this old but comfortable paradigm and go for a “post-national state.” It is not easy to materialize such a mental transformation.

Are the people of Cyprus prepared to live together even in a bi-communal and bi-zonal community? I am not sure. I think people are anxious. The issues of returnees, the rotating presidency, cross-voting, etc., are all related to this anxiety.

The root of the anxiety is that this “federal” model goes against the notion of “good” and “ideal state,” as we have grown to learn in our separate “national idea.”

I think Cypriots also feel that they are going against the current. As the world gets ever more fragmented along ethnic lines and witnesses the emergence of new nation states, they are asked to become united and forget about their national ideas.

Well, this sense of going against the current makes a united federal Cyprus even more worthwhile. Cypriots, who once achieved this, may set a new example and trend with a moral high ground. It is a relief to see that there are people on both sides of Cyprus who defend a “post-national” united state as a way out of the deadlock.

Was Atatürk a dictator? Ask him

2011-11-13T23:46:00.000-08:00

A journalist last week claimed on a TV debate that “yes, he was a dictator.” This statement has kicked off a new debate on the manner in which the founder of the republic ruled the country.

This new debate indicates a shift from questioning Kemalism as an official ideology to the person who inspired with his ideas and practice this very “ideology.”

It still is not an easy thing to discuss Atatürk. His life and his ideas are taboo. I remember that a documentary, “Mustafa,” made by journalist Can Dündar a couple of years earlier showing Atatürk with his human face, received a strong reaction. Though Dündar was very sympathetic to Atatürk, he simply dared to uncover his personal life, his worries and his fears. But this amounted to touching upon the “sacred” and provoked Kemalist rage.

Journalist Nagehan Alcı, from the Akşam daily, called Atatürk “a dictator” and now faces prosecution, having been accused of committing the crime of “insulting Atatürk.” This strange “legal action” reminds us that remnants of “dictatorial” methods are still in use in this country and that laws inherited from the past lag behind political progress and individual enlightenment.

Such strange laws like the Law on Protecting Atatürk, which is a tool used to silence opponents not only of Atatürk himself but also of Kemalism, are still around. A few years ago a professor of political science, Atilla Yayla, was sentenced to prison for referring to Atatürk as “this man” and describing Kemalism as a “backward-looking” ideology.

Even in this restricted legal and political environment in which freedom of expression is hard to exercise, I find it very important to move on from Kemalism to Mustafa Kemal himself.

I remember raising this question some years ago in this column, “Is Kemalism compatible with democracy?” (Oct. 4, 2007). My answer was sharp: No. I then explained why Kemalism constituted the main obstacle to forming and consolidating democracy in Turkey.

A similar question can be asked about the person himself. “Was Mustafa Kemal a democrat?” Again, the answer is obvious: He was not. He did not even claim to be a democrat. He ruled the country as a single man under a single-party regime, suppressing all dissenting voices -- be they individuals, the media, political parties or associations. He was a “revolutionary” trying to create a new nation as he imagined it to be, a loyal nation that would not question his “truths.”

Was he a dictator, then? He gives the answer to this question himself. In 1930 Atatürk went on a tour of the country, visiting various cities and talking to officials and people as he traveled. He felt the discontent of the people, with the government, its economic policies and even with the “revolutions.” He asked Fethi Bey, a former close friend and then ambassador to France known for his “liberal economic views,” to write a report on the economic situation. Fethi Bey produced a lengthy report that was very critical of the government’s “statist” policies.

Atatürk then requested him to form an “opposition party.” According to Fethi Bey, he said: “The state of affairs today appears ‘dictatorial.’ Though we have a parliament, we are still seen as a ‘dictatorship’ both at home and abroad.” This description of the regime as “dictatorial” is by Atatürk himself in 1930. To change, at least in appearance, Fethi Bey established a new opposition party called the “Free Republican Party” upon a request by Atatürk. But within three months this “official opposition party” intended to keep up appearances got out of hand as people -- especially those from the more developed western parts of the country -- poured into this new party, alarming the ruling Republican People’s Party (CHP), including its chairman, Kemal Atatürk. After that, the 1930s turned out to be even more “dictatorial,” especially with the marriage of the single party and the state and the insertion of the party’s principles into the constitutional principles of the state.

It is impossible to defend a non-democratic regime today -- even if it is headed by Atatürk himself. But strangely enough some contemporary Kemalists proudly admit today that “yes, Atatürk was a dictator. He was not an ordinary dictator, but an enlightened one.” For them, then, he did not have any other option but to use “dictatorial means” to educate the people, create a new nation and carry out a “revolution.”

Well, we know that for them we still need a dictator, enlightened or not. A dictator for them is better than someone elected by the people. Those who defend Atatürk as an enlightened dictator display their intellectual poverty, not that of Atatürk.

Whether they like it or not, Kemalism is dead. They had better come to terms with it and get ready for a post-Kemalist republic in which democracy reigns and freedom of expression is respected.

Are the Islamists ready to govern?

2011-10-30T02:49:00.000-07:00

The Arab Spring is not only an opportunity for Islamists but also a test case. How the Ennahda movement of Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt respond to the challenges will determine the future of both the Arab Spring and the Islamists.

Islamist political movements in Tunisia and Egypt are poised to come to power through the electoral process. This is a new challenge for democracy expected to emerge from the Arab Spring. The question is whether Islamists, once in power, will remain committed to and respectful of democratic institutions and processes. As such, it is also a challenge for Islamists as well, who used to be excluded and oppressed by the prevailing authoritarian regimes in the region.

It is a challenge for Islamists to adapt themselves to the new circumstances. Their ability to change is being tested. Political Islamism is designed as an opposition movement. In an authoritarian political environment where all dissenting voices were suppressed, an opposition in the name of Islam was the only remaining ground to challenge the oppressive governments. This is what happened in almost all Muslim countries in the Middle East. Opposition in the name of Islam appeared as the only legitimate form of opposition, with discursive superiority over authoritarian ruling regimes, and it also promised strong popular support, given the influence of religion in the formation of Muslims identities.

Thus from the 1970s onwards, political Islam emerged as a platform for opposition, a kind of protest movement challenging the established order. It called for change in the midst of the stagnant political orders of Arab authoritarianism. Following the failures of Arab nationalism and other secular ideologies, the simple slogan of “Islam is the solution” made sense to the Arab masses and attracted them. It was expected to resolve all the problems of the Muslims, from unemployment to healthcare, from education to housing. Islamism was the blueprint. What the secular-nationalist Arab regimes failed to produce was to be provided by the Islamists.

Islamist opposition movements, however, never developed a comprehensive program on how to resolve all the problems the people encountered. It did not really matter because the authoritarian Arab regimes never allowed them to perform in government. And it was unlikely for the Islamists to one day be in a position to make good on their promises. The Islamists in the region remained for a very long period in opposition, a position in which they could freely criticize the regimes without having to offer anything as an alternative. This was really comfortable. They did not have to offer something concrete in terms of programs and projects as a solution to the problems of the people. They remained in the opposition, comfortably criticizing the government in a way that also increased radicalism and the sweeping political stance of the Islamists.

It was not therefore only the oppression the Islamists experienced that radicalized them, but also the absence of governmental responsibility.

With the Arab Spring the Islamists now face, at least in Tunisia and Egypt, a new situation.

First, they have been freed from governmental oppression. Now they are in a position to express themselves and appeal to the masses with a positive agenda, not just a series of criticisms directed against the ruling regimes, as in the old days. So they have to develop reasonable programs and come up with sensible projects to address the problems of the people. The old days in which mere criticism of the regimes and an assertion that “Islam is the solution” are gone, and this will not be enough to come to and then remain in power.

Thus the Islamists in the region face their first serious challenge before the people. Will they be able to deliver what they promise?

This is the question. In opposition they were radical, uncompromising and comfortable. When they are in power on their own or share it with others on the political terrain, things will be fundamentally different. Responsibility in government requires meeting demands and delivering services. What also changes under governmental responsibility is the radicalism of the Islamists, who will not be able to hold on to their radical political stance.

This will be so because people who bring the Islamists to power will not be satisfied by a mere radical rhetoric; they will also ask for concrete achievements in delivering services.

So, as the Islamists get closer to taking over governments through democratic means, like in Tunisia and Egypt, they moderate their discourse, embrace non-Muslim social groups and appeal to the West.

In this, certainly the experiences of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) will be very instructive for Islamist movements in the region. They should study and understand the AK Party's transformation into a post-Islamist political entity, enabling it to win three consecutive elections in Turkey. The success of the Arab Spring will be measured by the extent to which people's power is institutionalized in the form of democracy. This requires integration of the Islamist movements in the democratic process, which in turn requires that the Islamists transform their political language and strategies to adopt the “rules of the game.”

A burden for all Kurds

2011-10-23T22:48:00.000-07:00

Whenever the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) hits targets in Turkey, it makes the Kurds of northern Iraq targets for Turkey. Cross-border airstrikes and operations with land forces in northern Iraq in hot pursuit of PKK guerillas have become inevitable on the part of the Turkish government. Each time pressure emerges for an outright occupation of the region where the PKK has its bases. Waving the Turkish flag in the Kandil Mountains has become a demand by many in order to stop the PKK’s logistical support.

It is known that following the latest PKK attacks Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan told Iraqi Kurdish authorities to eliminate the PKK presence on their own or in cooperation with Turkey, otherwise Turkey would do it on its own. Either way this is a clear defiance of boundaries and the sovereignty of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), an entity that is the greatest achievement of Iraqi Kurds in their decades of struggle against the Iraqi central government.

The KRG needs to work together with Turkey to stabilize the country and achieve economic development. It needs stability and peace to consolidate the formation of an autonomous Kurdish political entity. Turkish goodwill is essential not only for the security but also economic development of the region. Since 2003 Turkey has gradually increased its engagement with the Iraqi Kurdish administration. Political dialogue developed with high level visits from both sides and economic cooperation thrived with hundreds of Turkish companies investing in the region. Trade with Turkey brought prosperity to the region and enabled the regional government to collect huge tax revenues as a result of this trade.

What does the PKK want from its Iraqi Kurdish brothers? Does it want Turkey to destroy the achievements of Iraqi Kurds? It is really hard to understand. As long as the PKK continues to carry out terrorist activities using its bases in Northern Iraq it pulls Turkey into northern Iraq and into a confrontation with the KRG.

For more than 50 years the Kurds of Iraq have fought for a better life, respect from the central government, participation in the political process and a just distribution of economic benefits. Mustafa Barzani devoted his whole life to this struggle and his son, Massoud Barzani, has achieved what he dreamed of. What is the point of risking such a great success?

I believe that for Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, the fate and future of Iraqi Kurds does not matter. One can even sense a kind of jealousy. Öcalan is perfectly aware how humiliating his position is among the Kurds. Of the three prominent Kurdish leaders, Jalal Talabani is the president of Iraq and Massoud Barzani is the president of the KRG, while Öcalan is only a prisoner. He once threatened both Barzani and Talabani’s power and prestige in the region; now he is a prisoner on an island, isolated from the world.

Comparing his situation with that of the two Kurdish leaders in Iraq, Öcalan and his followers must feel a deep sense of failure, anger and frustration. Yes his organization is still capable of waging terrorist acts, but that’s it. He is a prisoner. The best he can hope for himself is “house arrest.” I think this causes him and his followers to act in an irrational way, risking not only the gains of the Kurds in Turkey but also the achievements of Iraqi Kurds. The PKK has become a burden for all Kurds, blocking their rights, liberties and welfare. I think it is now the task of the Kurds to get rid of this burden called the PKK.

New constitution: Is it possible?

2011-10-16T23:48:00.000-07:00

The people's overwhelming demand for a new constitution has forced political parties to work together in Parliament. For this, a parliamentary commission consisting of four political parties, each with three members, was set up.

The first meeting of the Constitutional Reconciliation Commission, whose mission is to prepare a draft, is expected to take place this week. Because this is a historic opportunity to make a “democratic constitution” with the true participation of the people for the first time in history, expectations are high.

But we have to be realistic. It is not easy to reach a consensus among political actors as diverse as the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the Republican People's Party (CHP) on one hand, and the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) on the other.

Before tackling the content of the new constitution, the Reconciliation Commission has to agree on the procedure for reaching a decision. A 100 percent agreement among the participating parties may be desirable but it is almost impossible on contentious issues like citizenship, secularism, compulsory religious education, Kemalism, the composition and elections of the high court and so on. A kind of qualified majority may be sought to pass decisions, but in this case, three-fourths of the commission may bypass the AK Party and reach an agreement among themselves, disregarding the AK Party's parliamentary majority, which precludes approval by Parliament, let alone the people's approval in a referendum. This is not a baseless concern, as something similar happened last year in a referendum on a constitutional amendment.

On the other hand, to give the AK Party a kind of veto power in the commission, given its parliamentary majority, will not be acceptable to other political parties, which accepted Parliament speaker Cemil Çiçek's invitation to the commission on the principle that each party is equally represented in the commission. Whether the draft prepared by the Reconciliation Commission will get through the formal Constitutional Commission, where the AK Party has the majority, is another issue to be resolved.

All these have to be resolved before there is a debate on the content of the new constitution. The “good office” of the speaker of Parliament may not be enough to resolve the differences in the procedure and the content of the new constitution in the preparation period.

Besides, it would be naïve to think that political parties will act “responsibly and constructively” in this process. The politicking will continue, this time in the background of the new constitution. The AK Party will try to appear enthusiastic about a new constitution, knowing that giving the nation a new constitution will be its own success in the end. It will discursively push for it because a new constitution is a great opportunity for the ruling party to underline its “reformist credentials,” which slowly fade away after years in power.

For the CHP, the making of a new constitution is a new battleground to fight against losing the constitutional bases of Kemalism as an ideology and the independence of its institutions from the government. The attempt at reinterpreting secularism in the constitution may provoke the CHP supporters.

For the MHP, the making of the new constitution is a perfect occasion to argue that the ruling AK Party is giving in to the demands of the Kurds and, should the CHP play soft on secularism, to show that it has abandoned its secularist sensitivities. The MHP will use this process in any way possible to make gains at the expense of the AK Party and the CHP, which manipulates the Kurdish question and secularism.

As for the BDP, the constitution-making process is an excellent opportunity to voice its demands for “democratic autonomy,” education in Kurdish, referring to Kurds as a constituent ethnic element in the constitution and so on. Let us assume that the BDP has decided not to exploit the situation, but be constructive and offer to work with the AK Party on the new constitution. Even in this scenario, I think the AK Party will refrain from making a new constitution with the support of the BDP, due to concerns about the possible reaction of the Turks and the MHP's exploitation of the situation at the expense of the AK Party.

The AK Party cannot make a new constitution on its own. It needs the support of other parties. The most likely candidate is still the CHP. This is because the CHP has lost is traditional power base in state institutions like the military, judiciary and universities. Thus it needs, like all groups that feel insecure vis-à-vis the state power, constitutional protection. If the CHP leadership and supporters forget about their fixation on secularism and seek protection from the AK Party-controlled state, then they can push the AK Party for a genuinely liberal, pluralist and democratic constitution.

In short, Turkey certainly needs a pluralist and democratic constitution that is non-ideological and ethnically blind, but the likelihood of it coming through is slim.

A post-Kemalist constitution for Turkey

2011-10-03T01:31:00.000-07:00

The Parliament elected in the June elections has gathered to begin its legislative activities.

The new constitution is high on its agenda. Political parties seem to have agreed to set up a special commission in Parliament to work together on the new constitution. It will certainly not be easy for political parties that differ fundamentally from each other to reach a consensus.

I have not paid much attention to the details. The most important thing is to make a new constitution liberating Turkey from the ideological straightjacket of Kemalism. The new Turkey needs a post-Kemalist constitution. I understand the call for a liberal and democratic constitution as a demand for a non-ideological constitutional base of the state.

This does not mean denouncing Kemalism as an “ideology,” but leave it to the people to choose among the set of ideologies available from the free market of ideas. Let the people follow ideologies if they chose, but keep the state neutral as the basis of a wider consensus on the mechanism of living together without threatening each other.

Turkey is too developed and diversified to be ruled by any ideology upheld in the constitution. The age of ideological states has passed, passed with great pains, agonies and disappointments. What matters now is a state that provides people not with ideas, ideologies or lifestyles, but with services and protection.

Ideological states, be they socialist, fascist or Kemalist, have failed to meet their promises. They have failed to produce freedom, welfare and security for their citizens.

To build anew or maintain an ideological state is practically impossible in the contemporary complexities of the global economy, social networks and political interactions. It is a struggle against the current that risks confronting not only global trends but also the demands of the people at home. People want liberty, welfare and security, which cannot be provided by an ideological state, as proven by the political history of the 20th century.

Any ideological state formations cannot survive in a flourishing open society, deepening market economy and penetrating globalization. So it is futile to resist.

The demand for a new constitution reflects the crisis of Kemalism in itself. First, it is the crisis of Kemalism as the elitist modernization model. With its revolutionary ethos, Kemalism does not allow for the establishment of a full democracy since it does not trust the choice of people. It is not inclined to leave the people to choose their lifestyles, leaders and beliefs. People need to be guided, enlightened and ruled. This notion of tutelage that appoints vanguard institutions and actors over the people can no longer be sustained. People do not want tutelage from anyone, including the military and anything involving Kemalism. Thus, a new and post-Kemalist constitution is needed to form a polity that secures and enables the people to rule themselves through liberal democracy.

A new constitution has also become urgent due to the crisis of secularism established and practiced by Kemalism. It is now impossible to dictate that secularism is a way of life, and that those who are not secular in their lifestyles are treated unequally. Such a notion of secularism that excludes the conservatives and religious masses cannot be sustained. Thus a post-Kemalist constitution is needed to remove the authoritarian model of secularism and eliminate the artificial tension between the religious and non-religious groups, the latter being favored by the state and the constitution.

And third, we need a post-Kemalist constitution because the current Constitution's notion of a homogenized nation is not true. There is no point in pretending that there is only one ethnicity in Turkey called Turks. We have to accept the plurality of ethnicities among the citizens of Turkey. Not every citizen of this country is a Turk. But Kemalism from its inception imagined a homogenous nationhood and those who did not subscribe to this notion were denied, suppressed and forced to be assimilated.

All the above explains why we need a new constitution to remove the major clashes between the social reality and the official imagination of the state based on Kemalism.

Therefore, a post-Kemalist constitution will be a prelude to a fully functioning democracy and the rule of law in Turkey as well as to a peaceful relationship between the Kurds and the conservatives on the one hand and the state on the other.

Are we ever closer to a Kurdish solution amid violence?

2011-09-26T23:47:00.001-07:00

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is committing suicide. It kills civilians, both Turkish and Kurdish, in various parts of Turkey. This obviously points to a desperate position on the part of the PKK.

As a result of the killings both in Ankara and Siirt last week, the PKK has received very harsh criticism and reaction from the Turks and the Kurds. A group of Kurdish activists started a campaign and called on the PKK “to not kill on my behalf.”

This indicates that the PKK is losing its moral high ground among the Kurds, who are denouncing the violence that is being directed at civilians. Even among the ranks of the BDP strong criticism has been voiced pointing out that even in times of war there are moral limits not to kill civilians.

It is therefore hard to understand the rationale and objective behind this new wave of terror. From an optimistic point of view one could think the PKK is trying to put pressure on the government by using such violent acts in order to force it to accept a negotiated settlement. But we know that the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government is engaged with both Abdullah Öcalan in prison and the PKK’s other leaders to facilitate a solution. The leaked tape recordings of a dialogue between the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) and the PKK shows that even at time when the Kurdish opening seemed publicly abandoned by the government, in practice, the same government was trying to negotiate with Öcalan and the PKK. Therefore, it is hard to question the government’s willingness to address the Kurdish question and even engage with the PKK for this matter.

We also know that negotiations with Öcalan continued right into the summer as Öcalan declared substantial progress in the talks with the state. What bothers many observers is that the PKK’s attacks were intensified following a message from Öcalan, where he claimed to have reached an agreement with the state and that there was no need to continue the war.

This gives rise to speculation that it is not the state but the PKK that is turning away from a negotiated solution. If this is not true for the entire PKK, there are at least some radical elements within the organization that may not approve the peace process conducted by Öcalan. Instead, by intensifying violence they could be trying to convey a message that the counterpart of the state for negotiation is not Öcalan, but the warlords who effectively control the PKK on the ground. This takes us to a vicious circle. It took decades for the state to talk with Öcalan for peace and settlement, now if it appears that Öcalan is not the right person to speak with because he is not in control of the PKK then there could be no one on the table to talk to.

Anyway, it is a fact that the PKK can survive as a terrorist organization without Öcalan, but it cannot enjoy social and political support among the Kurds. So, Öcalan may not be in total control of the PKK, but the PKK warlords cannot survive without Öcalan’s blessing. If they, both Öcalan and his warlords, want peace and want to exist without violence they should stop wrestling with each other by killing innocent people, which has turned into a way of showing muscle, not only to the state but also to each other.

The PKK has come to a crossroads. While using violence can never be justified, the terrorist organization has even expanded the use of violence against the civilians. This is self-defeating, irrational and inhuman. This should be stopped at once.

Despite the confusion over the objectives, rationale and actors behind the recent PKK violence I’m still keeping my hopes high. The rising violence may be heralding that peace is ever closer. Before a full-scale peace talk, both sides are trying to raise the stakes and signal that the current state of violence is not sustainable, affordable or favorable for either side.

Secularism for Arabs and Turks

2011-09-19T01:04:00.000-07:00

Will the Arab Spring countries embrace secularism as described by the Turkish prime minister?

It is certainly odd to hear Recep Tayyip Erdoğan preaching about secularism in Egypt and Tunisia given that he comes from a political tradition that was constantly suppressed in the name of secularism and that his party, described as the center of anti-secular activities, was threatened with closure by the Constitutional Court only three years ago.

Now Erdoğan is advising the Arabs not to be afraid of secularism. What he has in mind, however, is of course not the secularism of the Kemalists or the Nasserites or the Baathists. He, in fact, is putting forward a notion of reformed secularism, the kind that is emancipatory and non-interventionist.

This is a departure from the one implemented in Turkey by the Kemalists. Turkey's experience with secularism is not a happy one. From its inception during the republican era, secularism was conceived as a “device” to exclude and oppress religious groups. Exclusion on the grounds of secularism served to delegitimize social and political actors and their demands, while elevating the Kemalist elite as the legitimate vanguard of the system. Secularism was thus a shield behind which the Kemalists conducted a struggle for power vis-à-vis the conservative periphery.

It was not a model in which the state and religion were separated, with each commanding its own realm free of intervention from the other side. In the Turkish secular model the state controlled religion -- the way in which it was organized, believed in and taught. Thus, while the state, in the name of secularism, kept religion at bay and even controlled it, religion was not supposed to define rules or norms of the state's affairs. As a result, Turkish secularism created its own institution of religion within the state apparatus so it could rule and regulate religious activities. Even in this the state was not impartial since the institution was only in charge of Islam, and only one interpretation of it. So Sunni Islam became the “official religion,” in practice excluding non-Muslims and Alevis. Moreover, this notion of Islam became compulsory in schools reinforcing the state's monopoly over Islam, its interpretation and teaching.

While regulating the relationship with religion in such a way, on the other hand Turkish secularism has also attempted to erode paradoxically public displays of Islam. This was conducted through an understanding of secularism as a “way of life.” So on one hand the state ran religious institutions, published religious books, employed preachers and taught Islam, but on the other religion/Islam was to be kept to one's self not appearing in social or political life.

Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party (AK Party) in the course of its rule has attempted to reinterpret the Kemalists' radical version of secularism as a concept and practice it in line with a more liberal, democratic and plural perspective.

The prime minister has linked secularism with democracy and social peace in an attempt to remove the built-in authoritarian political content of radical secularism. He also emphasized two important aspects of secularism: impartiality and the equal treatment of all religions by the state. Erdoğan defines secularism “as an institutional attitude and method that ensures that the state remains impartial and equidistant to all religions and thoughts,” whereby secularism is essentially regarded as the freedom of religion and conscience. On the anniversary of the adoption of secularism last year Erdoğan issued a statement emphasizing the centrality of secularism as a guarantee of emancipation for different beliefs and lifestyles.

What is also emphasized is that secularism is not an attribute of the state but of the individual. For Erdoğan: “Secularism is not a religion but Islam is. Thus we cannot treat them as the same. … It is not the individual but the state that is secular.” By such an approach the AK Party challenges the understanding of secularism as a way of life. While welcoming the “secular state” as a framework for guaranteeing freedom of religion, they oppose the secularization of the social space by the public authority.

What Erdoğan advised his Arab “brothers” is not the secularism of the Kemalists but its new, democratic and emancipatory version as put forward in Turkey by the AK Party leadership.

At the moment Erdoğan seems to have settled for a “secularism” as defined by freedom of conscience and religion, and separation of religion and the state, which grants autonomy to religious activities and equal distance to all religions in state affairs.

His approach to secularism is very simple. He attributes secularism to the state, not the individual. He effectively says, “I am a Muslim, and by being and remaining as such, I can run a secular state.”

For sure this is a common ground for a rapprochement between secularism and Islam. This is important ground on which secularists and Muslims can reach a consensus in Islamic communities, too.

Israel’s missed opportunity

2011-09-12T01:03:00.000-07:00

I do not understand why the government of Israel finds it so difficult to apologize for a mistake that it has committed. Yes, it expressed regret that nine civilians were killed by its own soldiers and offered its condolences. Why not an apology, then? Is it worth triggering all this tension and provoking a potential hot conflict?

I am afraid that without a change in Israel’s attitude, the tension will continue to increase. The news that the Israeli government is considering countermeasures against Turkey that include extending a hand to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and supporting efforts for the recognition of Armenian genocide claims have agitated the public and Turkish government further. With such news, it will be impossible for the Turkish government to calm down and mend the damage already done. Moreover, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will be touring Arab Spring countries Egypt, Tunisia and Libya this week. In his visits, the Turkish Prime Minister will certainly underline the importance of the people’s will, democratic institutions and change as brought up by the Arab revolts, but I also expect that Erdoğan will speak up against Israel, denouncing the blockade of Gaza and calling on them to stand against Israel’s aggressive policies in the region. Thus, Erdoğan’s Middle East tour will, at least on a rhetorical level, increase tension between Turkey and Israel. The Arab Spring may turn into an anti-Israeli public and political rally through the efforts of the Turkish prime minister, whose popularity in the Arab street should not be underestimated. Some elements of this could be seen in Cairo in this last week’s demonstration against Israel.

Furthermore, Palestinians are to declare an independent Palestinian state before the UN on Sept. 20, a project enthusiastically supported by Turkey. The declaration will be an occasion to rally international support against Israel’s occupation, continuation to build settlements in the occupied territories and blockade of Gaza.

All these mean that in the coming days, Israel will face increasing pressure from the international community on a series of topics, including that the Israeli position is not defendable under either international law or civic morality.

Another development that places Israel under tremendous pressure is that the tension between Israel and Egypt is growing. The Camp David accord seems to have been demolished. The Egyptian masses are getting out of control, forcing the Israeli ambassador to flee, and the interim government is not willing or able to do anything to stop them. This and other incidents may lead the Israelis to believe that the Arab Spring may not be a “good thing” for Israel. This may be so if Israel is still stuck in the old habits of defying international law and preferring to deal with the autocrats in the region without taking the public mood into account. This “old Middle East” has gone, gone at least in the Maghreb and Mashriq regions. It is time for Israel to understand and act according to the parameters of the new, emerging Middle East, to which Israel can contribute by pursuing a policy of peace. This seems to not be the case so far, as demonstrated in Israel’s policy on Turkey. As a result, Israelis will feel more isolated, and thus threatened, in the coming days. Mending relations with Turkey with an apology over the Mavi Marmara raid would have brought relief for Israel. It seems that the extreme right wing in the government has prevented such a reconciliatory move to enable Israel to cope with change in the Middle East and Turkey. The long-anticipated change has arrived in the Middle East, but not Israel.

Who will decide the future of Turkish-Israeli relations?

2011-09-05T22:38:00.000-07:00

The Palmer report on the Mavi Marmara raid has triggered another wave of tension between Turkey and Israel. Turkey’s demands from the government of Israel for an official apology, compensation for the victims and the lifting of the blockade of Gaza have not been met, and it is now very unlikely that they will be in the future.

So the Turkish government has decided to move ahead with several sanctions against Israel, making it clear that they are targeted at the Israeli government and not the people of Israel, who deserve a better government, according to Turkey’s president, Abdullah Gül.

Some Israeli commentators have rushed to explain the new sanction policy and the deterioration of the relationship between the two countries in general between the two countries by referring to the Islamist past of the Turkish ruling party and its leader, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, which is the most shortsighted explanation of the current situation. We should remember that Turkey’s relations with Israel proceeded without any crisis under the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government for six long years, from 2002 to the end of 2008. During these years the AK Party welcomed Shimon Peres, the president of Israel, to Ankara, where he addressed the Turkish Parliament, a rare gesture offered to a close friend. Meanwhile the Erdoğan government tried to help mediate differences between Israel and Syria in order to pave the way toward permanent peace in the region.

The downturn in Turkish-Israeli relations started with Israel’s war against Gaza in December 2008, in which hundreds of Palestinians, mainly elderly people, women and children, were killed. It is important to remember that when Israel attacked Gaza in December 2008, Turkey was trying to get Israel and Syria to agree to direct peace talks.

It is therefore nonsense to explain the current crisis by referring to the so-called Islamist background of the Erdoğan government. Israel’s policy of violence could not be accepted by the people of Turkey, and the AK Party government has simply been responsive to the public mood provoked by Israeli aggression. The raid on the Mavi Marmara was surely beyond tolerance. The Israeli government has chosen to deal with the old issue using outdated and inconclusive methods that have resulted in their losing the friendship of Turkey.

I think recent Israeli governments have failed to understand the dynamics, actors and policies essential to the “new Turkey.” Turkey is no longer a country ruled by its military, which suppressed different points of view on domestic as well as foreign policy matters. Any state that wishes to be a friend of Turkey should first win the support and sympathy of its people. A government that is accountable to the people under democratic rule cannot remain indifferent to the demands of its people on foreign policy matters.

Normalization between the two countries will not begin without Israel coming to terms with this “new Turkey,” with its government, civil society, economy and support in the world. The Israeli government should abandon any daydreams of a return to the late 1990s, when they had a working relationship with the Turkish government, and the Turkish military disregarded what the people actually wanted.

Public opinion has had an increasing impact on Turkey’s foreign policy-making in recent years. Democratization and a growing participation in civil society, due to economic development and the EU accession process, have empowered public opinion to assert itself on the matter of foreign affairs, which was not the case a decade ago. Thus Turkey’s relationship with Israel was questioned whenever Israel engaged in violent policies in the region, like the war in Lebanon and the attacks on Gaza. Public reaction to Israeli aggression in the region is bound to be taken into consideration by a government that is accountable to its people.

Especially after the killing of eight Turks and one Turkish-American aboard the Mavi Marmara by Israeli soldiers, public opinion is ever more important. It will be very difficult to win the people over to a rapprochement with Israel, without at least an official apology and compensation.

It is therefore a mistake to assume that the Erdoğan government is the source of the problem, and to claim that Turkish-Israeli relations would return to normal under a non-AK Party government. To refute this I will say two things: First, the AK Party government is only responding to the public mood and demands. Second, the AK Party is very unlikely to disappear from the political scene in Turkey. That is to say that both the current public mood and the AK Party’s rule appear as though they will be around for a while. So instead of sitting and waiting in vain for them to disappear, Israel and its friends should try to not lose Turkey’s support permanently.

My advice to the Israeli government is that it should get used to living and working with the AK Party government, and to try to understand the “new Turkey” because even in a future post-AK Party period things will never be the same as in days past.

Military as a national security problem

2011-08-28T22:42:00.000-07:00

I am really tired of writing about the Turkish military. But it is really impossible to avoid it as a day rarely passes by without some scandalous affair about the military's unprofessional activities.

You most probably have heard or read about Gen. Işık Koşaner voice recording. This is a true confession that simply proves that all criticism voiced about the military are correct. The chief commander of the military admits the wrongdoings in the fight against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) as had been told by many journalists who were then accused of “asymmetric propaganda” against the military. Forget it, the critiques were right…

The chief military commander admits that the military does not abide by law and views those who abide by law as “stupid.” As the officers are naturally not stupid they act as if they are above the law. Therefore, people in uniform violate the law expecting that they can get away with it. They expect this because they know the General Staff headquarters will stand behind them. The chief commander admits that the military as institution is trying to guard its officers from being brought to justice. This has been said and written about many times by liberal and democratic journalists who were accused of trying to weaken the military. Forget it, the critiques were right.

From Gen. Koşaner's speech what I understand once again that this is not a military designed to defend the country against external threats but to guard its power and privileges vis-à-vis its own people. Gen. Koşaner has spoken about how and why the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK)should fight for the Turkish Armed Forces Assistance Center's (OYAK) tax exemption status and not pay taxes because in such a case their benefits will drop by 10 to 15 percent. He has talked about how to cover up the mess, how to bully the police, prosecutors and judges. He openly declares that whatever is written in the law the TSK would not give up contemplating military coups…

Such a military cannot of course perform its main function since it is preoccupied with politics as if it struggles against its domestic opponents. It is not difficult to understand why. A military accustomed to rule since the 1960 military coup cannot but be involved in politics. Any political party, newspaper, association or individual who asks or tries to force the military back to its barracks are then seen as “adversaries.” In turn the military would follow them, spy on them, make files on them, discredit them and eliminate them whenever possible.

If you listen Gen. Koşaner carefully you will get a sense that the military sees itself as a rivaling political organization vis-a-vis the political parties. Such an attitude is poisonous. I keep saying that the virus of politics has been eating up and spoiling the Turkish military. They should learn before it becomes too late that the country is ruled by elected governments accountable to the people. Such a democratically elected government should have absolute control over the military, just like in other democratic countries. There is no other way, there is no way that they can exercise unwarranted authority over the government and the judiciary, quite to the contrary, the military is or should be under total civilian control.

Turkey' growing regional profile requires the military to be professional, strong and modernized to carry out duties when asked and prevent possible external aggression. To do this, the first thing is to forget about politics.

This of course cannot be left to the wisdom, vision and understanding of the military. It is primarily the responsibility of the civilian actors, the government and the parliament, to hold the military to the norms and rules of democratic governance. To give a picture of civilian supremacy in the Supreme Military Council (YAŞ) meeting is important but not enough as seen by the speech of Gen. Koşaner, the most seemingly moderate chief of General Staff in recent years. The problem is structural and psychological. It requires an organizational restructuring of the military and educating new cadets with democratic loyalty not with Kemalism that justifies the military's unlawful and undemocratic intervention into politics.

This has to be done without delay because Gen. Koşaner's speech indicates once more that the current state of the Turkish General Staff has become a national security problem.

Towards a Kurdish solution without the PKK

2011-08-21T22:35:00.000-07:00

I think it is time to seriously consider a solution to the Kurdish question without the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). This is because the PKK does not seem interested in facilitating a solution even with the involvement of its leader, Abdullah Öcalan.

A comprehensive solution, of course, requires disarmament of the PKK, which could be negotiated with the PKK leadership. The Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government, in addition to a political initiative calling for a democratic opening within which the Kurdish demands could be met, also started a round of talks with Öcalan.

Yet, the Kurdish political movement regarded these initiatives as serious challenges to its very existence. While the “democratic opening” was viewed as an attempt of the ruling party to be more advantageous vis-à-vis the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) in the competitive political arena, “talks” with Öcalan were seen as a process of dissolving the PKK and selling out its members.

In short, the government's efforts were taken as threats, not as steps to ease the problems of Turkey's Kurdish populace. What naturally followed was not cooperation but obstruction on the part of the Kurdish political movement.

All these could have been tolerable if there had been no such acts of violence committed by the PKK. Within the last month over 40 members of the Turkish security forces were killed by the PKK. The attacks in Silvan and Hakkari in particular sparked a public outcry calling for a response from the government, resulting in a cross-border airstrike by the Turkish military.

In today's political and psychological environment the best the government is expected to do is to carry on with the “democratic opening” while trying to “punish” the PKK with operations on the ground and stop talks with its imprisoned leader.

This means that at the end of this process, even if the “democratic opening” survives, “talks at Imrali [the prison where Öcalan is being held]” will not. That is to say, the PKK and Öcalan are out of the picture in the search for a settlement. This is not only due to the anger accumulated against the PKK following the recent attacks but also due to the emerging picture that there is no single PKK to talk to and that its leader Öcalan is not in control of his organization.

To me it is clear that the PKK is no longer an organization controlled by a central and hierarchical leadership. The long imprisonment of its leader, Öcalan, has resulted in the emergence of new centers of power within the movement. To me the PKK is now a network of warlords without a central leadership.

There would be significant implications of such a structure. First, we will have difficulties in defining what the PKK is and who runs it. The PKK seems to have been divided up in various groups and their own perspective. The recent acts of violence by the PKK in Silvan and Hakkari may be the acts of this or that group within the movement. It will be impossible to claim responsibility on the part of the organization and it has become obvious that we can no longer talk of a singular PKK.

If the organization is not clearly defined and if its leadership is not properly named then it is impossible to “talk” to the PKK. That is to say, even if the Turkish government is engaged in a “negotiation” with the PKK it cannot be certain whether the terms of a possible agreement would be accepted by the whole PKK structure.

I think the recent attacks of the PKK aimed to convey such a message to the Turkish state, implying that the state is talking to the “wrong” person, namely Öcalan.

If it is not to Öcalan himself then whom to talk to in the PKK in order to reach a settlement? This is the puzzle. I think the intended objective is to raise exactly such a question. The logical conclusion of this is to stop talking to Öcalan, who is not in a position to deliver on his promises.

Let's say the state has understood this message. What would be its response? Would it instead talk to several warlords within the PKK? I think no one would take a fragmented leadership seriously. Therefore all these would mean abandoning the talks with anyone associated with the PKK.

As a result the PKK will be increasingly isolated in the region, in the international community and also among the Kurdish people. It will remain a terrorist organization but will lose its social base and support among the Kurds, which in long run will result in the dismemberment of the PKK.

There is no need for the PKK that does not contribute to the solution of the Kurdish question.

The AK Party, 10 years later

2011-08-14T22:34:00.000-07:00

There is no doubt that the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) is a success story. It is now celebrating its 10th anniversary and the party has been ruling the country for nine out of those 10 years.

This has been achieved despite the party leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan having been sentenced to a prison term, when he was removed from his position as mayor of İstanbul and sent to prison just before founding the AK Party. So this party did not emerge from a position of strength but rather from disadvantage, to become the central actor in Turkish politics over the last 10 years.

The AK Party's success lies in the ability of its founding leaders to transform an Islamist movement, Necmettin Erbakan's Milli Görüş (National View), into a center-right mass political party. This took place at a time when conventional center-right parties and leaders like Süleyman Demirel had aligned themselves with the military and secularist forces, which alienated their conservative and anti-militarist social sectors, who were attracted by the AK Party's conservative and anti-militarist discourse.

In this context, the way in which Islamic social, political and economic actors were treated by the secularist establishment, led by the military and the judiciary, played a crucial and educating role for Islamic circles. During the Feb. 28 process, the so-called postmodern coup era, from 1997 to 1999 their political parties were banned, their NGOs were intimidated and closed down, and their businesses were boycotted.

The suppression of Islamic groups by the secularist establishment certainly played a role in speeding up and even facilitating a process of transformation. But there was more of an internal debate on how to survive politically, economically and socially in a strictly secularist and authoritarian environment. It seemed that the old way of confronting secularist opponents directly and on their own was bound to fail. They needed a new strategy, if not to come to power, certainly to secure protection vis-à-vis undemocratic and unlawful pressure by the secularist establishment.

The AK Party is the result of this search for security. But the new political strategy, the language developed and the circumstances in which all these took place were so positive that they came to power in the first general elections.

It would, however, be a mistake to explain the rise of the AK Party by merely looking at the political landscape. The leadership, identity and policies of the party were also shaped by the emerging conservative middle class and business elites who had started to flourish in the mid 1980s under the liberalizing and export-oriented policies of Turgut Özal. Their expansion had been blocked in the late 1990s by an alliance of the secularist İstanbul based business elites and the military during the so-called Feb. 28 process, in which pro-Islamic Erbakan was forced to resign as prime minister in the summer of 1997. Their companies were black-listed as “Islamist capital,” their associations were intimidated and some were even tried.

The new conservative business elite came to realize that the rise of Islamism under the banner of the Welfare Party (RP) was detrimental to their business interest and social existence.

Islamist intellectuals, NGO activists, journalists, etc., all experienced similar pressures. To get out of secularist pressures they needed to build alliances with non-religious, secular but democratic social and intellectual circles.

In order to do this first they had to reform their political language, adopting democracy, human rights, liberties, pluralism and the rule of law as central values of the party. This was certainly a significant departure from a self-referential ambiguous Islamist terminology. This way, former Islamists were able to reach out to new social and political groups beyond religious people. In fact, the AK Party managed to develop a “shared agenda” with non-religious segments of society. Democratization, liberalization, EU membership and economic development were the key factors in these shared objectives. Thus the party assumed the role of an agency bestowed with transforming the authoritarian politics of Turkey and opening it up to the world.

Over the years it has been hard to deny that the AK Party has done pretty well. Winning a third consecutive term is proof that it has satisfied people's needs and demands. It has emerged as the most reformist party in Turkey in terms of democratization, the Kurdish question and civil-military relations.

The question now is whether the AK Party will remain this way, given resisting bureaucratic and judicial forces have been significantly weakened. In other words will the AK Party be a reformist party on its own when it no longer feels insecure in a new constitutional and institutional environment.

Has the military lost?

2011-08-07T22:31:00.001-07:00

No military can win a political battle. This is so, especially if some elements of the free market economy, democratic politics and open society have been developed into the system.

A military that is waging a political battle is bound to lose. This is what has happened to the Turkish military that could not see the determination of its people to build a genuine democracy in which the military does not control politics but is controlled by political actors. Officers wrongly thought that they could continue their old practice of shaping politics, economy and society.

It is of course futile to remain superior to political actors in a country that is progressing toward democracy. Anyone who agrees on democratic governance cannot object to the principle of democratic civilian control of the military. Thus democratization has been detrimental to the military's regulative power over politics, society and economy. Realizing this, the military has tried to resist democratization. At the point they thought they could not stop the process, some in uniform planned to take up arms against the democratically elected government (see the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases). When they could not materialized this they switched to disseminating “black propaganda” through more than 40 websites operated directly by the General Staff to weaken the government that they were supposed to be working for.

A military that has resorted to this clearly crosses the boundaries of democratic politics. As a result, around 250 officers, one fifth of them generals, have been arrested by the courts. Democracy is defending itself with its institutions and civil society, and the military with political ambitions is on its own, discredited and isolated. The resignation of four generals just before the Supreme Military Council (YAŞ) meeting was their last resort. Those commanders who resigned showed that there are still some high-ranking officers who have not understood the demands and expectations of the people, who want a genuine democracy in which the military is subservient to the elected government.

What is expected of the military at this stage is that it understands that it is waging a “wrong battle.” It cannot win a war against its own government and the people. Sooner or later they would realize that the process of civilianization and democratization cannot be stopped without endangering not only the country as we know it but also itself.

So the military has to make up its mind. Meanwhile let me give it some advice.

First, the military should stop taking an interest in political developments. It should be left to the people, who can decide the best for themselves. Engaging in politics is not welcome by the people, the democratic world or democratic principles. Moreover a politicized military damages itself. Merit political criteria used in promotions would corrupt the whole system.

Thus, second, the military should be professional. It had better prioritize the profession and try to excel it. Instead of following or monitoring its people and its government, the military follow organizational and technological developments within the military. They should not forget that their job is to be ready for defending the country.

My third piece of advice to the military is that it should cease considering itself as a “revolutionary guard,” which it is not and should not be. It must be a professional military safeguarding the country against external threats. What is consuming the military is its dogmatic Kemalism. An ideologically oriented military cannot develop the required professionalism. The military should not think that it is the military of the Kemalists, but of the whole people who have diverse ideological preferences.

The Turkish military should be ready for war that it should win on the battleground against aggressive foreign armies. This can only be possible after it loses the unfortunate war that it has been waging against their own people and government since 1960 and is still the case now.

What's next for Kurdish politics?

2011-07-17T22:56:00.001-07:00

Can we still remain optimistic about the possibility of a final political settlement of the Kurdish question? Recent developments raise serious doubts about that.

Tension had risen even before the June elections, but many attributed this to the politicking of parties competing for an ever greater number of votes. Unfortunately, tension continued to rise after the elections. First, the decision of the Higher Election Board (YSK) to nullify the election of Hatip Dicle as a member of Parliament from Diyarbakir province, and later the verdict of the court not to free six other elected deputies currently in detention played a part in that. The result was the Peace and Democracy Party's (BDP) boycott of Parliament by not taking the oath and holding its weekly group meetings in Diyarbakir instead.

Meanwhile, increased activity by the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK) in Diyarbakir signaled something was brewing in the region. The killing of two soldiers right in the very center of Yüksekova and the abduction of soldiers and civilians were testimony to that. Despite this upheaval, there were positive indicators as well. The BDP was engaged in a dialogue with the speaker of parliament and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) to return to Parliament after receiving the go-ahead from Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK. Öcalan had been talking about the progress made in his talks with state authorities. He even disclosed that an agreement had been reached on the formation of a Peace Council and came as close as suggesting a permanent cease-fire.

Then, however, we got word of the killing of 13 soldiers in Silvan last Thursday, sending shockwaves through all parts of Turkey.

Given the recent developments I summarized in the text above, my first reaction when I heard the news was that this act of violence was not only directed against Turkish soldiers but also against Öcalan. By conducting such an attack, some within the ranks of the PKK sent a message out to Öcalan, saying that he cannot negotiate a peace settlement on his own. The same message was also sent to the state, conveying that Öcalan is not in control of the organization and that the state is talking to the “wrong person.”

Some groups within an organization such as the PKK who think that their sacrifices have been in vain tend to resort to violence or the escalation thereof. This has happened with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), too, so why not with the PKK?

The PKK has taken responsibility for the attack in Silvan and I guess Öcalan himself will not directly denounce the act because doing so would mean admitting he is not in control. This is the last thing Öcalan would do as the state has engaged in talks with him, assuming that he is still in charge of the PKK. So for him to appear not to be running things will significantly weaken his bargaining position with the state and diminish his hope of somehow getting out of prison one day. So he will swallow this. But the question remains: Who is in control of the PKK if not Öcalan?

This question is important if the government is still interested in talking to anyone associated with the PKK. At the moment I have serious doubts about this. With the latest attack I think the PKK has risked becoming an irrelevant party in finding a solution for the Kurdish question. The organization and its associates, including the BDP, may never be taken seriously again as partners in a political dialogue, leaving the PKK isolated and marginalized due to its continued use and support of violence. And no one in the world will question the decision to cut off all communication with an organization using violence for political purposes, would it come to that.

The signs, for now, are that the government -- while ending political dialogue with the BDP -- may go back to employing the old method of taking security measures and precautions against all kinds of violent activity and their political supporters. In doing so, the government is also in a position to mobilize regional and international pressure on the PKK given the turmoil in the Middle East.

Thus, while targeting the PKK and the BDP, the AK Party government can continue to increase investments in the Kurdish region, making social services available in order to underline its indispensible role in assuring the welfare of Kurds. These social policies may be accompanied with veiled identity policies with some Islamic overtones, but can just as well result in gaining a strong foothold for the AK Party among the Kurds. It is a fact that the support among Kurds for political parties tending to the BDP line is stuck at 5 to 6 percent of the vote in Turkey. This has not changed since 1995. With policies such as those of the AK Party, relying on providing social services and recognition of the Kurdish identity, coupled with Islamic overtones, may well halt the spread of the PKK and BDP's political influence in the region.

This is a strategy. The AK Party government may decide that Turkey is used to living with the threat of PKK terrorism anyway, so why should it take the risk of negotiating with Öcalan or advancing the “democratic opening” while at the same time it enjoys the support of a considerable section of the Kurdish people?

Well, the final analysis will take us back to where we started. The PKK, the BDP and Öcalan should not take the risk of going back to square one. We have never been this close to resolving the Kurdish question and it should not be sabotaged by the PKK.

What is the opposition doing?

2011-07-03T00:13:00.000-07:00

What is the opposition trying to do? There is no use in heightening tension as if there were an election next week. Even before seriously studying the election results and their strengths and weakness compared with the winning party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) have thrown themselves into an all out war with the Justice and Development Party (AK Party).

What is worse is their first move to boycott Parliament should have been their last option. Now there is no other option left to stage another more meaningful protest.

This is therefore a self-defeating strategy that has locked the opposition parties out of politics. This strategy may damage the ruling party too if it does not work to bring the opposition back into Parliament.

Democracy is a game not only performed by the ruling party. As I understand, the CHP is trying to portray the AK Party as the sole party playing its own game. This is not right or fair. Only a few weeks earlier the nation elected the AK Party for the third term, so it is useless to question the mandate of the people that has been given to the AK Party.

By boycotting Parliament the opposition parties did not consider “normal” political struggle as legitimate and effective, and so they chose this way.

The CHP and the BDP are absolutely right to protest but in doing so they should be very careful not to undermine the legitimacy of democratic political struggle. My main concern is that by boycotting Parliament may add only to the frustration of the people who voted for them. By perceiving political competition through elections as futile, people may lose their faith in democracy. Such a feeling is not helpful in a country like Turkey that struggles to reach a consensus on the rules of the game of democracy as a precondition for democratic consolidation.

If some people end up being alienated because democratic struggle is the only possible means to bring about change, deepening and consolidating democracy will not be possible. This has been a problem in Turkey. For years the main opposition party and the main social groups in opposition to the AK Party have looked to the military and the judiciary to stop its rule. Encouraged by such an environment, the juntas within the military plotted against the government and the high courts made unconstitutional and undemocratic decisions. All of which have, in fact, backfired as people with different political and ideological outlooks who reacted to such anti-democratic methods sided with the AK Party.

Understanding the failure of the old methods, the “new CHP” under the leadership of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, developed a new strategy based on a new language of democracy, a new constitution and civil society. In other words, the CHP brought in new politics as a strategy to oppose the AK Party. I think this is the only way that it is likely to build an effective opposition against the AK Party. I thought this was also the conviction of the leaders of the “new CHP.”

However, I feel I have been mistaken about the “new CHP,” who after the elections ended swung back round to the “old CHP.” It has withdrawn from politics and abandoned democratic political struggle within Parliament and supported Ergenekon. This is not good for the CHP in long run.

Kılıçdaroğlu might have chosen this line of action in order to do away with the rift that erupted within the party after the election defeat. By shifting attention to such a big crisis affecting the party and the country, CHP leadership might have hoped it would unite the party with an urgent need for solidarity. Well, the result might be quite the contrary. Due to the fact the CHP has weighed itself down because of the crisis caused by not taking the oath, it may not find any way to get out of the mess and therefore encounter pressure from those who want to desperately get out of it.

What I am suggesting is that the crisis might be a catalyst for the division of the CHP between the more social democrat wing and the Kemalist-nationalists who support the Ergenekon suspects.

Judicial sabotage

2011-06-26T23:39:00.000-07:00

Is the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) aware that it is being lured into a trap by the decisions of the judiciary? If it has not yet woken up, let me tell it what the trap is.

It is one that will prevent the party from making a constitution and resolving the Kurdish question, the two actions most needed for ultimate reform. It is really odd. Before the new Parliament has even commenced Turkish politics seems to have gotten out of hand. Once more Turkey’s judiciary has played a central role in driving politics into chaos. Political actors and democrats cannot allow the judiciary to hijack politics.

What I am referring to is two decisions taken by branches of the judiciary. One is the decision of the Supreme Election Board (YSK) to nullify the election of Hatip Dicle as a member of Parliament from Diyarbakır -- the same YSK that decided Dicle was eligible to be elected as a deputy. Now the same institution and the same judges have ruled Dicle is not eligible to be elected. Such a scandalous case cannot occur in any civilized country. Are they joking or committing institutional suicide?

There can be no defense against the argument that the law is clear on this matter and that anyone sentenced for “crimes against the state” would lose the right to be elected. First, if there is such a law, it is shameful. An ordinary criminal, say a rapist or a murderer, may be able to stand as a candidate and win a parliamentary seat, but anyone who is convicted of “thought crimes” cannot. How can we defend such a “law”?

Second, the YSK cannot hide behind even this shameful “law” simply because it does not have any authority written in any law to nullify the election of a deputy. Dicle, under the authorization of the YSK, entered the elections and the people of Diyarbakır elected him as their representative, period. From this moment onwards, the YSK is out of the picture and has no authority whatsoever over an elected member of Parliament. It is a shame on the part of the rest of Parliament and political parties that they do not defend “their space” against the unwarranted intervention of the YSK. I would have expected the AK Party, the majority party in Parliament, to act in a way to defend the will of the people who elected Dicle just two weeks ago. But, on the contrary, it remained silent, and even rushed to take the offer made by the YSK in Diyarbakır, granting Dicle’s spot to another deputy from the list of the AK Party. It should have at least restrained itself from accepting the undeserved seat unjustly taken away from the BDP. I think this is not being faithful to the will of the people who elected Dicle as their representative. The AK Party has nothing to win out of this one seat but a lot to lose: its commitment to the supremacy of the will of the people. Anyone who is elected as a deputy should be treated as a precious jewel of democracy for his/her representative capacity. Whoever he or she is -- whether an Ergenekon suspect or an ordinary person -- it does not matter. For the court not to decide to free the detained suspects in the Ergenekon case who have been elected as deputies is another blow to the will of the people and the belief in the supremacy of Parliament. I am of the conviction that the Ergenekon case together with the Balyoz trial are the most important proceedings in Turkey to eliminate the deep state and consolidate democracy, but I still cannot accept that representatives of the people are kept in prison. The belief in the supremacy of Parliament and the people’s choice requires respect for anyone elected as a deputy. Apart from a moral high ground, there is also a practical reason why we should resolve these crises immediately. It is that we need this Parliament and we cannot afford damaging its public standing.

I am deeply upset about these two decisions of the judiciary because they damage the legitimacy of Parliament, the most important matter above all other concerns and gains. Once the legitimacy of the current Parliament is in question, it will become impossible for it to carry on with the most challenging task ahead: making a new constitution. For this I am shocked and upset not only about the YSK decision but also the attitude of the ruling AK Party. I think it has been lured into a trap.

The trap is to render the AK Party unable to make a new constitution and resolve the Kurdish question. The decisions of the judiciary about Dicle, Mustafa Balbay, Mehmet Haberal and Engin Alan are attempts at sabotaging Turkey’s normalization and democratization by hindering the making of a new constitution and the resolution of the Kurdish question.

Why do people vote for the AK Party?

2011-06-19T23:01:00.001-07:00

Some foreign media outlets have become as blind as the Kemalists of Turkey in understanding what goes on in this country. One of them, following the Justice and Development’s (AK Party) landside victory last week, described Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as a “good dictator.”

This degree of blindness is possible either with total ignorance or loss of interest. In the case of The Wall Street Journal I do not know which, but I know very well that people of this country would not vote for a dictator, good or bad. Would the American people vote for a dictator? I don’t think so. People do not elect dictators; they chose the one who has served or is expected to serve them.

The people of Turkey know very well what elections are all about. In the first free elections in 1950 they overthrew the dictators. So, the ballot box is very precious, a kind of magic box for the people who know that there they exercise the ultimate power to decide who will govern the country.

They have voted once more for the AK Party. It is now the first party to have won three consecutive elections while at the same time increasing its votes This was not even managed by the legendary Democrat Party (DP) in the 1950s, whose share of the vote dropped in its third term victory.

The June elections mark a record in Turkish democracy. The significance of this is better understood if we remember that from 1987 to 2002 five general elections took place, and in each one of them a different political party came first. This means that in recent years, the success of political parties fluctuated greatly as people would change their favorite political party until the emergence of the AK Party came about. Whatever they have found in the AK Party since 2002, people have stuck to it. Instead of questioning the choice and wisdom of the people, as is still done in Kemalist circles at home and abroad, it should be understood properly.

The magic is that the AK Party appears to have stood for change and stability at the same time. While change means new opportunities, stability guaranties holding onto what is already at hand. People ask for change simply because they ask for better, which does not happen in a static and hierarchic society. Change is expected to bring new opportunities to the economy as well as to politics. Thus for people, the AK Party is like a ladder -- it leads people up to a higher social, economic and political status. Yes, the AK Party receives votes from all segments of society. Among its voters are the poor and the rich, the Turks and the Kurds, the Islamists as well as the liberals. For all, the AK Party is seen as a ladder with which to climb up economically and socially. Thus, the AK Party functions as an agent of social mobilization. The last nine years in power proves that such a function has been performed by the AK Party. Its policies in education, health care, transportation, social security, etc., have had positive impacts on the lives of many.

Yet this is not the whole story: The democratic performance of the ruling party is also important for attracting voters. People who vote for the AK Party are mainly conservative, patriotic and democratic from the “center right.” They demand services and wish to have better living conditions, but they also want greater democracy, civilian control of the military and the non-interference of the state in their private affairs including what they believe in.

For these people the AK Party meant taming the Jacobin-Kemalist state and keeping its agents under control. Therefore the AK Party, for them, stands for expanding the realm of freedom, freedom of entrepreneurship as well as freedom of religion, association and expression.

As a result the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the main opposition party, has lost once more. In fact it has never won in the entire history of free elections in this country. This is so because the CHP is not a political party “designed” to win “free elections.” It was conceived as a mere instrument of the state to lead the masses under a single party government. It cannot compete with other political parties in a democracy as it represents the official ideology, the state and the privileged minority. Even if the party leaders appear to have changed, its very name, history and tradition say otherwise.

Whatever the rhetoric, the CHP is the party of a minority that is composed of staunch secularists, Kemalists and the old elite in bureaucracy and business. It cannot appeal to the masses to win elections as the people who represent the CHP still continue to look down on the people. For them people are to be educated, enlightened and put in order. This civilizing attitude is irritating for the ordinary people. They claim to sit at the top of the people as if they are the owner of the land and even the people living on it. Would people ever vote for such a patronizing attitude? They would not, of course, just as the people of a colonized country would not vote for the colonizers who claim to be on a civilizing mission.

The CHP is the party of the “old Turkey,” and as such it cannot win elections in the “new Turkey” where the official ideology is dead, institutions that would force it have lost its power in the process of democratization and people are increasingly celebrating their differences, be they ethic, religious, ideological or sexual as opposed to the homogenized vision of the nation by Kemalism.

The result is that the CHP has lost every election since 1950, while the parties that position themselves against what the CHP stands for have always won.

Turkey the day after elections

2011-06-12T22:32:00.000-07:00

It appears the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) has won another term in office. It is the first party in the last 50 years to have won three consecutive elections. This is a phenomenal success that has to be studied by political scientists.

However, Turkey post-elections will be a better country. The ballot box is the best cure for any kind of political or social disease, provided that all parties accept the rules of the game. For any reasonable community there is no better alternative than upholding the will of the people. Let’s hope this election will be a turning point in coming to terms with the rules of the game. No one can question the mandate given to a political party disregarding its ideology, identity or program.

I think what the people are best aware of in this country is their power to determine who is to govern them. It is important to note that the people of this country have experience in determining who is to rule through the ballot box. This power has been in place since 1950. So it is better not to doubt the wisdom of the electorate.

Political parties have also behaved themselves despite the occasional tension and polemics. Campaigns conducted by all political parties reflected their priorities. Whatever they are, no one can argue that political campaigns are constrained in any way. Election campaigning in languages other than Turkish was possible for the first time. Therefore, Kurdish candidates from all political parties were able to use Kurdish to convey their messages to the people.

Polemics were commonplace among the political leaders, which is almost inevitable in an election campaign. It is hoped that these polemics will remain after the elections and that political parties will settle their differences on important issues.

Anyhow, I think what marked this election is the absence of ideological quarrels. We have not discussed the future of secularism and republican values being threatened by Islamization under the government of the AK Party.

During the second term of AK Party rule, one would have expected that Islamization of the state and society would have gone further, and thus the quest to defend secular values would have intensified. But this has not happened. On the contrary the Republican People’s Party (CHP) has almost abandoned this issue, never mentioning such things either in its election manifesto or during public meetings.

What has changed since then? The sensitivity of the CHP towards secularism, or the intentions of the AK Party to undo secularism and the republic? What has happened to the “hidden agenda” of the AK Party?

If secularism and the republic are not in danger today, then they were also not in danger four years ago. So, what was the idea behind this? I think in the post election period this will be discussed.

Nonetheless, it was good to experience an election period in which real issues were raised and discussed, and pledges were made concerning these real issues. This is certainly an indication of Turkey’s normalization.

Yet, the thing that will institutionalize Turkey’s normalization is to resolve the Kurdish question and to make a new, liberal, democratic and pluralistic constitution. And this is under the responsibility of the AK Party once more.

Why is The Economist afraid of democracy?

2011-06-05T05:33:00.000-07:00

It is very unusual for an international journal to name a political party to be voted for in a parliamentary election. The Economist has done this, asking the people of Turkey to vote for the Republican People's Party (CHP).

Is this a joke or a plot against the CHP? Yes, I do mean “a plot against the CHP,” though many supporters of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) would argue that it is their party that has been targeted. Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan has already put it bluntly, saying that a “global gang” is conspiring against the AK Party.

Well, this can't really be the case, simply because such a statement will only harm the one who is supported, not the one who is targeted. I think the AK Party will be grateful to the Economist for this favor. It came at just the right time, as some polls have shown AK Party support declining over the past two weeks. I am now sure that Erdoğan will use this “golden pass” to win right up until the elections and even into the first speech after the elections.

No doubt it will have an impact on the debate and choice of some people in the last week of the election campaign. The AK Party will portray The Economist's open support for the CHP as an international conspiracy not only against the AK Party but also against Turkey and the will of the people.

Even the supporters of the CHP, who are the most nationalist and anti-Western among the Turks, will be confused after The Economist's editorial. For nearly a decade they have accused the AK Party of selling out Turkish interests to Westerners, making unacceptable concessions to the EU, giving in to Greek demands on Cyprus, allowing foreigners to take over Turkish companies and properties, and so on. Now suddenly it has turned out that one of the most powerful magazines in the West not only supports their party (the CHP) with an editorial piece but also calls on people to vote for it in the elections.

This is really hard to understand for the ordinary CHP voters who are nationalists and isolationist fearful of “Western designs” over Turkey. Knowing the public mood, the CHP grass roots and the nationalistic tendencies among the public at large, I am certain that The Economist has done great harm to the CHP's cause.

But strangely enough, CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu is happy with The Economist's request, saying that the international community understands the true nature of the AK Party. Let me tell you, after their third electoral defeat at the hands of the AK Party, he may utter quite the opposite and accuse The Economist and the West as a whole of saving the AK Party. Believe me, they will do this because they said exactly the same concerning the military's April 27 e-memorandum before the elections in July 2007. Remember that when the military issued the ultimatum, the CHP applauded and placed itself behind the republican rallies that followed, but after it was proven that the people reacted strongly against the military's intervention and voted for the AK Party, Kılıçdaroğlu himself argued that the e-memorandum was issued in order to secure an electoral victory for the AK Party; a plot organized by the military and the AK Party together. Yes, such logic, reasoning and argumentation cannot be taken seriously, but what about The Economist's editorial and the CHP's response to it?

Do the editors of the Economist really think that when they point to a political party, in our case the CHP, a party that throughout its entire history -- which is equal to the history of Turkey -- has never won a single democratic election, the people of Turkey will listen to them and vote for the CHP?

They must be joking, or naïve or totally ignorant of the dynamics of politics in Turkey. Such a tactless move may also come out of desperation. Knowing that the AK Party is certain to win one more time and that its leader is angry with İstanbul-based capitalists like İnan Kıraç who interfere in the election process and heard from Erdoğan that he was “taking a risk” by openly supporting the CHP, The Economist is throwing itself into the ring. But desperate moves do not usually produce the expected results.

The Economist says, “we would recommend that Turks vote for the CHP.” Who are “we”? What would you recommend for the Kurds? And why should we not vote for other opposition parties? Can you please enlighten us on these questions, as well? Quick please, only a few days are left. I cannot vote without your “recommendation.” Or should I have said the recommendation of “İstanbul's secular establishment”?

Since the publication of the editorial in the Economist I have been asked what happened. My answer is clear: If a government fights with big capitalists like the Koç group and İnan Kıraç, the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Foundation (TÜSİAD) circles and Aydın Doğan, it will get a response via such news and editorials in The Economist.

Will the military come to rescue the secularists?

2011-05-29T11:41:00.001-07:00

Sure, it is a change that we are not discussing secularism and the military as its vanguard during an election campaign.

These two have come to the agenda following the confessions of veteran journalist Mehmet Ali Birand, who admitted that secular circles have always pushed the military to stage coups and that the mainstream media are inclined to be pro-coup. They do this, continues Birand, because they do not want to share the things they think belong to them, which are political power, economic privileges and social status.

He also named some of these secular circles: the Republican People's Party (CHP), the military, the judiciary and the media. I think after years of ignorance Birand has got them right now and has disclosed their identity.

Their problem was that they thought the state and the people in charge of it belonged to them. No one would tell another what to do with their property. They did whatever they wished and however they liked. While enjoying their privileges, they looked down on the people, described as not being committed to “republican values” and “secular revolutions.” This was true because many people knew well that these terms were nothing more than “ideological tools” of the hegemon in Ankara. Thus the people of the nation were portrayed as untrustworthy. They needed education, meaning indoctrination and tutelage of the “republican elite,” who posed as the “masters” of republican Turkey. What people were expected to do was obey the rulers in Ankara and work for those who claim to own them. The new regime fought against any alternative source of loyalty and being, be it Islam, Kurdish ethnicity, Alevi belief, communism or a liberal creed. Authoritarian politics, a command economy and a disciplined society were the core of this system, which can broadly be described as Kemalist Turkey.

Some in the West applauded this, assuming that the Kemalist vanguards were modernizing and Westernizing the masses. In fact “modernization and Westernization” were mere means to discipline society at the hands of the state. What mattered was compelling the people to obey Kemalist rulers and refrain from questioning the “Kemalists' right to rule.”

But by May 14, 1950 the people of Turkey declared to the whole world that they did not accept the Kemalists claim to rule and rejected the yoke of the self-proclaimed “masters.” The Democrat Party (DP) came to power, overthrowing the single-party regime of the CHP in the first free elections in Turkey. So, the power and privileges of the Kemalist vanguard were taken away by a democratic competitive regime, and the people whose only right was to obey the Kemalist elite started at last to have a say in the government. This was a white revolution, a revolution that occurred through the ballot box.

Since then the Kemalist elite has strongly disliked democracy and seen it as a life-threatening invention that empowers the people while sidelining the elite. Moreover, in the 1950s the political agent of the Kemalists, the CHP, lost two more elections to the DP in 1954 and 1957. As a result they understood that it was not possible to beat people power through the ballot box and started to provoke the military to move in and “correct” the situation, as described by Birand 50 years later.

The first military coup of May 27, 1960 came into existence under such circumstances. It was an attempt by the “old elite” to take back the power from the people by using the military. Those who could not win in free and competitive elections gained power by force. Moreover, through a new constitution they managed to set up a new system that limited the power of the people and its representatives while transferring a huge proportion of power to unelected institutions within the bureaucracy, establishing a tutelary regime under the military.

The fact that they managed this back in 1960 helped to cement this mindset and political attitude. Whenever the built-in power and privileges of the Kemalists-secularists were threatened by democratic demands, the military was pushed, as described by Birand, to move in and “save” the system.

We know now that when they cry to “save the regime” what they really mean is saving their interests, power and privileges. But it is over. The military cannot respond to their call and rescue their sectarian interests without risking the whole future of the state. Thus it is time for Kemalists-secularists to forget about past privileges and accept being equal with the rest of the citizens of Turkey.

Politics of elections, politics of change

2011-05-22T00:02:00.000-07:00

When compared to the last general elections, which took place in 2007, the June elections appear calm and normal. There is no controversy surrounding the future of the regime, secularism and the secular lifestyle being threatened by the ruling party or over Turkey becoming Islamized. Now the debates evolve around personal matters and the promises of political parties.

If politics is persuading people on how to meet their needs and fulfill their demands, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) has an advantage since it has been in power for last nine years and has done a great deal with respect to this. Thus, in its election campaign the AK Party underlines as its “successes” the management of the economy and foreign policy. Under the AK Party government advancements have also taken place in the fields of health care, education and transportation as well as social security and solidarity.

Moreover, Primer Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan appeals to the public and manages political debate through mega projects like the ones in İstanbul. He also refers to the new constitution as the “greatest project of the AK Party.” This, however, does not stop some criticism that the AK Party has abandoned its efforts to reform the political realm, concentrating only on self- developmental efforts. An understanding of politics without a democratic perspective has been the weakness of central-right politics since the 1950s. Whether or not the AK Party falls into this trap will be clear after the elections.

The novelty of this election is the position of the Republican People’s Party (CHP). It is good for the country that the CHP has stopped basing its politics against the ruling AK Party on the grounds of “regime security” and “secularism.” These themes have not only proved “ineffective” to stop the rise of the AK Party, but also poisoned the will of people with different lifestyles to live together.

Now the new leadership of the CHP has devised a new language of opposition. It accuses the AK Party of being a pro-status quo party and presents itself as the party of change. It constantly tries to distance itself from the state and claims to represent “people power.” In its election manifesto there is no reference to Kemalism and its six principles. Where it mentions the “six arrows” of the CHP it refers to secularism, republicanism and for a surprise, democracy. The party defines itself as advocates of freedoms, solidarity, equality and pluralism.

All these indicate a change of mind, or at least strategy, on the party of the CHP. Whether this is sustainable or not depends, I think, on the election results. If the party manages to get a vote of around 30 percent, the new leadership may be able to hold on to its position and continue with its ideological transformation of the CHP, which is the sine qua non for the normalization of Turkish politics.

The way in which the AK Party responds to the “new CHP” shows that it is not really prepared to deal with such new political language. Thus, it resorts to highlight the policies of the old CHP, like the one that banned the publication of a Kurdish literary classic, “Men u Zin.” Erdoğan also rightly capitalizes on the exaggerated promises of CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, which damages the credibility of the latter.

The Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) is expected to increase its seats in Parliament. With “civil disobedience” in the region it is mobilizing Kurds to back the independent candidates it supports. The central strategy of the BDP is to stop, and if possible, roll back, the success of the AK Party in the Kurdish populated cities. This was done to some extent in the 2009 local elections. Now, by pushing the AK Party out of the region, the BDP tries to live up to its claim that it is the sole representative of the Kurdish people. Even if the AK Party continues to lose some votes in the region this does not mean that all Kurds will abandon the AK Party. I think Kurds will continue to be represented by both the AK Party and the BDP, which is in fact a good thing to address the Kurdish question.

And the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)… I think the fate of the elections will be determined by this party. If it falls short of the national threshold of 10 percent the parliamentary composition will be advantageous for the AK Party. Yes, in such a case the representative character of Parliament will be questioned. But my main concern is that if the MHP is left in the street unable to be represented in Parliament we may not be able to address two fundamental questions that will come up after the elections: the new constitution and the Kurdish issue. Radical nationalism of the MHP under a new leadership that is more inclined to put pressure through the streets may block “great solutions” and threaten the stability of Turkey.

What people think of bin Laden and Assad

2011-05-15T00:12:00.000-07:00

Will the post-Osama bin Laden world be more peaceful or more violent? It is hard to answer such a question with any certainty. Al-Qaeda cells can act in a decentralized manner so they do not need a leader, experts comment. But in any case, the killing of their leader will shatter the morale and shake the determination of the terrorists.

It is also argued that though short-term revenge attacks are expected, the killing of Osama will mark a new era in the fight against terrorism in the long term.

The latest terrorist attack took place in Pakistan in retaliation for the killing of bin Laden. This may be regarded as a typical revenge attack anticipated by many and openly threatened by al-Qaeda. It indicates that Pakistan will be the battleground for the fight against terrorism and is likely to be targeted by al-Qaeda.

One of the grounds on which we will be debating bin Laden and al-Qaeda is the way in which he was killed. Many liberals and human rights activists worldwide have criticized the US government’s way of handling bin Laden, arguing that he should have been tried. The point of the criticism is that even the worst terrorist is entitled to a trial.

A public opinion survey conducted by MetroPOLL shows that this is also the view of the Turkish people. Of the people in Turkey, 62 percent disapprove of the killing of bin Laden without a trial (those who approve stand at 25 percent). A large majority, 79 percent, thinks that bin Laden should have been tried instead of killed.

This is in no way sympathy for bin Laden on the part of Turks. A vast majority is of the opinion that bin Laden does not represent the Islamic world. That is to say that the people of Turkey distance and disassociate themselves from bin Laden but wish that he were tried, in line with the views of some Western human rights activists.

On the uprisings in the Arab world, Turks also take a “liberal view.” They think that the uprisings in the region should be supported by the Turkish government (60 percent), though many have concerns that these uprisings might have been encouraged by Western powers.

It is no secret that the Syria crisis is putting Turkey in a very awkward position. Instead of siding with demonstrators, as it did in Egypt and Tunisia, the Turkish government expects the Bashar al-Assad regime to introduce reforms to disperse discontent among the people. But so far it has not come through to any substantial degree, putting the Turkish stance in question.

Only 41 percent of the people surveyed by MetroPOLL approve of the Turkish government’s policy towards the Syrian crisis, while 36 percent disapprove. The major policy stand of Turkey has been to persuade Assad from going along the path of reform. It has been the line taken up by Turkish government right from the beginning, expecting that the Assad regime will listen to Turkey’s advice, given the good relations the two sides have built up over the years.

It seems that this has not produced any results so far. People have also found this to be true, as 45 percent of people are of the view that Turkey’s diplomacy has been ineffective, while 37 percent think otherwise.

This is a source of concern because 65 percent expect developments in Syria will have a negative impact on Turkey, as a neighboring country. While the majority expects the Assad regime to fall, it is not clear how this will come about. Since 63 percent of those polled oppose Western intervention in Syria in favor of the opposition forces, it seems that the Turkish people see the opposition as potent enough to succeed in regime change in Syria.

Sacrificing the ‘Kurdish solution’ to the elections

2011-05-09T23:01:00.000-07:00

Will the Kurdish question be addressed after the election? Many are optimistic about this. The presence of a stronger Kurdish political movement in the new Parliament and another Justice and Development Party (AK Party) majority government are expected to take the “Kurdish opening” further. Moreover, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) seems engaged and willing to cooperate for a political settlement that will be deepened after the elections.

But in recent days the positions of both sides have been hardening. There are incidents of attacks and killings that have raised misunderstandings and anger. Kurdish political representatives as well as government circles now utter threats.

All these things may be regarded as final attempts to have the upper hand in the process of negotiations, thus as tactical positioning by the parties. But even if it is so, I think, they should know that such tactical moves may make building bridges very difficult when the time comes for striking a final settlement. All these may be natural “politicking” in the election process, but the situation may get out of hand if the tune of words and deeds are not softened.

The Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) is stressed. It is under pressure from the PKK, its leader, Abdullah Öcalan, and the state authorities, particularly the judiciary. Due to the 10 percent national threshold it cannot participate in the elections as a political party because its popular support has been stuck at 6 percent for many years. So they opt for running as independents in the elections, which is really challenging.

Moreover, they are competing with the ruling party to claim representation of the Kurds. In the local elections of 2009 they performed very well and stopped the advances of the AK Party among Kurds, but they are still worried about being beaten by the AK Party, which has the resources and institutions of the state behind it.

What is more is that the BDP still does not and cannot separate itself from the PKK. Instead of being an independent political agent it is an extension of the PKK. This places the party in an awkward position and raises the question: Is intimidation and bullying an acceptable form of political struggle?

On the other side of the equation sits the ruling AK Party. I think the problem can only be resolved by a leadership that manages to reach out to both Kurds and Turks. For that the AK Party, and its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, seem the most likely candidate to play a key role in this.

By initiating a process some two years ago the AK Party demonstrated its will and vision to address this question. But it has faced much resistance from various political actors as well as within the state. Moreover, people in the street also reacted to the AK Party’s “Kurdish opening” negatively.

The result was that Turkey debated the question thoroughly due to the government’s initiative. But realizing that the expected support is not coming from other political parties and especially from the people, the ruling party started to slow down the process. But even at this stage the government did an important thing: talking the solution over with Öcalan. Thus, striking some sort of deal with Öcalan has become a “normal” thing.

However, during the election process the AK Party took a critical stance on the Kurdish political question. The prime minister went as far as claiming that “there is no Kurdish question in Turkey, but only the problems of Kurdish brothers.”

This stance was regarded by many as a backward move for a person who many times has referred to the problem as the Kurdish question. Seeking votes in all parts of Turkey requires a difficult balancing act. So it seems Prime Minister Erdoğan is trying not to lose votes among non-Kurdish voters. But what about Kurdish votes? The critical point is that if the ruling AK Party loses significant votes among Kurds as a result of its anti-Kurdish discourse, then it will no longer be an actor that can bring Kurds and Turks together.

As the cleavage between “secularists” and “conservatives” lessens and ceases to be a source of tension, it is time to overcome the Kurdish question, too. This requires that the government and the Kurdish party not burn bridges. Their pre-election positioning for more votes should not make it difficult for them to come together after the elections. The Kurdish solution should not be sacrificed for a few more votes.

A constitution without an official ideology

2011-05-02T22:41:00.000-07:00

The June elections seem predictable. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) is expected to win another term. What is not predictable is the process of drafting a new constitution or its contents.

In the aftermath of the elections a new constitution will be high on the national agenda. Political parties as well as the public have already been mobilized on this. According to a survey conducted by MetroPOLL in April, 69 percent of people want a new constitution.

It is not only people at large but civil society that seems enthusiastic about a new constitution. Almost all civil society organizations have been engaged in background preparations to start the process after the elections. They have been organizing conferences and workshops, establishing principles and writing their own preliminary drafts.

All these activities indicate the presence of a high level of sensitivity among people who are unlikely to leave the making and content of the new constitution to the politicians. As political parties continue to talk of “participation” as being key to the drafting of the new constitution it seems that civil society is already gearing up to participate qualitatively in the process. All this is good news and it does not really leave any choice for political parties but to engage with civil society. This also means that the drafting of the new constitution is not solely dependent on the goodwill of the AK Party; there is a genuine popular demand and preparations by civil society. Certainly it will not be easy, since a new constitution means a redistribution of all state power within the system. There may be resistance and unreasonable demands that cannot be met; but there is still a basic principle on which a consensus can easily be built. That is in fact the very logic of a constitution, which is to guarantee the rights and freedoms of citizen’s vis-à-vis the state authority.

I guess we may not be far off from agreeing on the principle that, irrespective of who is in government or who has the majority in Parliament, people should be safe from the assaults of state authorities. The citizens of Turkey should see that it is not “their” political parties but “their” constitution that guarantees their rights and freedoms.

I believe a set of principles outlined last week by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) is worth examining closely. Prepared by notable academics and opinion leaders and written by professors of constitutional law Mustafa Erdoğan and Serap Yazıcı, the TESEV report has created high expectations. Any step back would be regarded as serious deviation from a democratic constitution. As stated in the TESEV report, we should first agree on a very fundamental principle that a democratic state does not own an “official ideology.” Because an ideologically neutral state will enable us to view the state and society in the right order; that is, it is society that builds the state, not vice versa. Thus it will prevent us constructing a system in which the state, its ideology and its elite dominate society. If we mean to achieve an emancipated society, the first place to start is by getting rid of an ideology of state built into the constitution.

Who will oppose this and on what grounds? If an ideology is turned into a state ideology protected by the constitution then there could be no competition among various ideologies. It would mean that one is superior to the rest.

There can be no ideology of the state, and people may have more than one. There is more than one ideology competing in the free market of ideas. Therefore, a democratic constitution guarantees the free competition of ideas, ideologies, lifestyles and belief systems. There should be no single superior one that has privileges over the others.

On this and other issues we do not really know much about what the political parties are thinking and planning. In their election manifestos all are calling for a new constitution but without going into detail about the content and basic principles of their vision for this new constitution.

If the new Parliament is to draft a new constitution after the elections, political parties should be disclosing more of their opinions on this issue. Some time ago Ergun Özbudun, a professor of constitutional law, called on political parties to prepare and share their drafts for a constitution in advance of the elections, thus enabling people to cast their votes accordingly. But none have done so. It has turned out now that this is also the expectation of the people. MetroPOLL’s recent public opinion survey shows that 75 percent of people want to see drafts from political parties before the elections.

What this means is very simple: People want some sort of guarantee, not only for the drafting of a new constitution but also for the content. While the outcome of the upcoming elections seems pretty predictable, I guess debate about the new constitution after the elections will be more heated and unpredictable.

Towards normalization of Turkish politics?

2011-04-25T00:43:00.000-07:00

The election campaigns have started. Political parties have nominated their candidates for Parliament and announced their election manifestos.

But just when things seemed pretty normal, the Supreme Election Board (YSK) vetoed the nominations of some independent candidates supported by the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), creating a wave of political and social reaction. But it quickly took a step back and rectified the situation. However, what has remained are agitated supporters of the BDP and the increasing sensitivity of Turkish nationalists. The short-lived crisis benefited both.

Despite this short-lived crisis, so far Turkish politics certainly appears more stable and predictable when compared to the circumstances prior to the elections of 2007. Then the military was in the game of politics, determined to block the election of a president by the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) majority in Parliament. Moreover, the opposition to the ruling party was based on an Islamist-secularist divide without putting forward any policy alternative. It was a time described by opponents of the AK Party as when the republic was in “danger.”

Four years later this nonsense has been stopped. The military seems to have understood that its attempts to influence the election process often backfire. People tend to react democratically and side with those victimized by the military. So, I expect that the military will remain silent during this election process.

In addition, the main opposition party seems more sensible in its approach to political competition. With the resignation of the old leader of the party, Deniz Baykal, also went the old form of politics based on defending the state and the regime against the people. This old perspective utterly failed in creating an alternative to the AK Party. It is no surprise to me that the June elections will take place without Baykal’s leadership. The day after the 2007 general elections I wrote in this column that “Baykal has led his last election campaign as leader of the CHP.”

Since then, the CHP has changed not only its leader but also its political discourse. The 2011 election manifesto of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) presents a break from the CHP of 2007. It no longer calls on the people to defend the regime, secularism and Kemalism, but instead outlines how the CHP will protect and empower the people. In many ways the election promises of the CHP are crude populism, but nevertheless they indicate that the CHP is now much more interested in addressing the needs and demands of the people. This is good for both the CHP and Turkey as the party becomes less ideological and more policy oriented.

So this election will be an election in which “visions” of political parties will compete with each other, signifying the normalization of Turkish politics.

This might be advantageous for the ruling AK Party as it has mastered developing projects and delivering services during its years in power. No doubt its strength lies in its performance over the last nine years. Management of the economy, which has generated remarkable economic growth under low inflation, is one of its greatest assets. With projects that improved services in health care, transportation, education and social security, as well as conditions in villages and small towns, the AK Party government has managed to satisfy needs and demands of large segments of society. Steps taken in the direction for democratization that include constitutional changes and the Kurdish initiative are also very positive.

But a problem for the AK Party is that although it has a very strong record to defend in this field of projects and services, it is not used to this kind of opposition. Because it was futile for opposition parties to organize their resistance against the AK Party on secularism and the lifestyle issues, the AK Party felt most comfortable countering this form of opposition. The CHP with a new policy style is a challenge for the AK Party. It may push the AK Party to be defensive, as turned out to be the case with the issue about the duration of compulsory military service.

Anyhow, Turkey is sailing in the realm of rational politics, not the realm of irrational fears about the future of the regime, as we witnessed four years ago.

Central bank governor and the poverty of White Turks

2011-04-18T23:39:00.000-07:00

I keep writing that the old business elite and the White Turks are incapable of understanding the new Turkey. They are blinded by their Kemalist and secularist prejudice, coupled with their thirst for privileges.

Their opposition to the appointment of Erdem Başçı as governor of the Central Bank of Turkey in 2006 and the later smear campaign against Durmuş Yılmaz, who was eventually appointed governor, clearly illustrate how poorly they see the new dynamics and new actors in Turkey. Today some of the Kemalist White Turks are ashamed of themselves, given the outstanding performance of these two economists leading the central bank.

Başçı is now the governor of the central bank. His appointment is yet another indication of the defeat of the so-called White Turks, who the new Turkey does not need.

Başçı’s appointment was vetoed in 2006 by the then Kemalist President Ahmet Necdet Sezer. The reason for this veto was that Başçı’s wife wore a headscarf. This “simple-minded” attitude back in 2006 tells us a lot about the poverty of the myopic White Turks. They were not looking for merit but checked whether he was religious or not, and for that looked at his wife’s choice of clothing.

It is not really difficult to understand why the Kemalist White Turks have lost. For them what matters is not merit and qualification but loyalty to the Kemalist ideology and the continuation of their privileges. They are educated but ignorant, and rich but poorly connected to society and the world around them.

The fact that the international financial sector increased Turkey’s credit rating on Başçı’s appointment is, I think, a slap in the face of the arrogant but incompetent White Turks, who had blocked his appointment as governor five years ago.

This is only one side of the situation. On the other side is a shameful episode brought on by the White Turks. Back in 2006, when Başçı was vetoed, the Kemalist president had no choice but to appoint another person, Yılmaz, as governor, but the appointment was accompanied by an immediate smear campaign. Journalists poked into his private life, revealing his house and his wife, publishing big pictures of shoes left outside the door. The self-proclaimed ideologue of the White Turks, Ertuğrul Özkök, then wrote in his column in the Hürriyet daily a commentary on Yılmaz, his lifestyle, his wife and his house. It was disgusting. Even as I write these sentences I find myself scowling as if I were looking at those dirty, revolting campaigns conducted by Özkök’s Hürriyet.

The campaign against Yılmaz was a reflection of hatred and jealousy, implying that while there are “presentable” White Turks ripe for this prestigious job, the government nominates those “ordinary” Turks with Islamic lifestyles. Then and now I only feel pity for them. Pity on them who have lost their privileges, turning them into “ordinary” Turks like the ones they look down on. But these “ordinary” Turks who lost their privileges are not able to compete in the free market of ideas and skills with real “ordinary Turks.”

On succession in the Turkish Central Bank, the Wall Street Journal writes: “The new governor will take over an institution whose credibility with markets has improved dramatically over the past decade. Mr. Yılmaz’s five-year tenure saw Turkey’s inflation rate fall to record lows, while the economy rebounded strongly from the impact of a global recession.”

Poor White Turks, the person they tried to belittle has succeeded in running the central bank with a first-rate performance. In doing so, Yılmaz’s main aide was Başçı, whose appointment was vetoed by the Kemalist president in 2006. No doubt Yılmaz was one of the best governors in the world and, as a result, was recognized as the best central bank governor by Euromoney in 2009.

I think the White Turks should stop pretending that this country belongs to them. Sorry guys, there are alternative elites everywhere -- in business, in bureaucracy, in academia, in politics. You are only one among many and the one least competent to govern this country.

If you learn of Turkey from the old business elite

2011-04-11T22:31:00.000-07:00

They are rich, well-educated, in touch with the world and can hire the best brains in the world, but they constantly fail to understand trends and developments in Turkey. As a result they and those who listen to them get things about Turkey absolutely wrong.

Given their continuous failures I really wonder how they can survive in business. This must be the success of the Turkish economy independent of the old business elite’s inability to make the right analyses.

I really pity these “white Turks” who are out of touch with reality. They do not understand the changing Turkey in which the demands, priorities and preferences of the people have become central to the economy and politics of the country. I think the problem for them is that Turkey is increasingly ruled by bottom-up dynamics and actors. The old business elite know little about all this because in the old times they did not need to learn. Now things are different and they have not caught up with the changes. As you may guess, I will speak on the comments of Mustafa Koç, the chairman of the Koç Holding, Turkey’s number one business group, and the chairman of the Turkish Industrialist’s and Businessmen’s Association’s (TÜSİAD)Higher Advisory Board.

As revealed in a WikiLeaks document, talking to former US Ambassador James Jeffrey, with his CEOs Koç predicted in 2009 that the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) would be beaten in the forthcoming elections, and that a Republican People’s Party (CHP)-Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) coalition was very likely to be formed. The poverty of such foresight is really striking. OK, the realm of politics is something businessmen are not expected to master. But Koç makes a prediction on a topic he is supposed to know best, the Turkish economy. He and his entourage of CEOs tell the American ambassador that the Turkish economy cannot survive the crisis without the IMF. Now compare this with the facts. Turkey has not concluded an agreement with the IMF, but turned out to be the country that got out of the crisis the fastest without any major damage to the Turkish economy. Last year the economy grew at the rate of 8.9 percent. This means that the Turkish economy is the third fastest growing economy in the world and the first in Europe. And a big share of this growth comes from the investments and production of the private sector.

What more can be said about the old business elite’s ability to know, understand and predict Turkey. Figures speak louder than words and disprove what Turkey’s white Turks say, believe and expect.

Do you know what? They would be right if Turkey was ruled, as in the “old good days,” by the white Turks and their political and bureaucratic allies. Then they would guess what would happen in Turkey because they would make happen what they want. But in an increasingly democratic country I am sorry for them. It is time for them to try to understand the new Turkey with its emerging actors and dynamic instead of trying to determine political and social events.

Last week I said “the old bourgeoisie cannot make a new constitution” because they neither understand the new Turkey nor are ready to say farewell to the old regime that favors them.

If you want to learn about Turkey, its directions, trends and predict the future in order to invest in Turkey or engage with Turkey you had better to be very careful about what you hear from the old business elite and its media extensions. They are blinded by their Kemalist/secularist ideological disposition and a psychological wound inflicted upon them with the rise of a new and alternative business elite. So my advice is do not learn about Turkey from the losers.

‘Old’ bourgeoisie cannot make ‘new’ constitution

2011-04-04T03:01:00.000-07:00

Work on the new constitution is under way. Responding to popular expectations many civil society organization and platforms have started new initiatives to discuss various aspects of the constitution and to come up with suggestions.

Yet, we have to be realistic and know that to make a new constitution will not be easy. There will be resistance from the pro-status quo forces whose privileges will come to an end. Those who defend their own individual or group interests behind the façade of defending an ideological/Kemalist state are likely to put up severe opposition to a liberal and truly democratic constitution.

Thus, to make a new constitution requires courage as well as determination, both of which is lacking in the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (TÜSİAD). We noted this once more last week. TÜSİAD, with the presentation of its Chairwoman Ümit Boyner, announced a report that outlined principles to guide the making and the content of the new constitution. Yet, when confronted with a few criticisms, TÜSİAD made a U-turn and disowned the report, putting the whole “blame” on the shoulders of the academics led by professors Ergun Özbudun and Turgut Tarhanlı.

This latest backpedaling by TÜSİAD on the new constitution did not come as a surprise given its history of zigzags. Just remember how in the last constitutional referendum it did not support change and remained silent, an implicit opposition to constitutional amendments. The reason for its silent opposition was understandable: The TÜSİAD administration was simple trying to protect its old ally in the system, the state elite, out of a feeling of being faithful and thankful for old favors.

In the latest incident it seems that some powerful elements, corporations or families within the organization pressed the TÜSİAD administration to take a step back and disassociate itself from the report, which is not a draft constitution but a set of principles to keep in mind while drafting one. Criticisms were raised on two points, and TÜSİAD could not stand behind them. One was on the articles that are defined as unchangeable by the current constitution, and the other was on the empowerment of local governments.

If TÜSİAD cannot defend these simple principles of a non-ideological state and the empowerment of local government, what is the use of having a report on the new constitution? I think there is none. But this unprincipled attitude of TÜSİAD is understandable.

Many TÜSİAD members, especially its heavyweight members, do not have faith in free market and free competition. Their wealth is the result of privileges extended by the state during the time of Turkey’s closed-economy era. They benefited from import licenses, high customs, tax exemptions, etc. They know well that they made their accumulation of resources not from free market and free competition, but from the favors granted to them by the state that controlled the economy. Since the mid-1980s they have also realized that free competition resulted in the emergence of new competing companies in the business. Thus the İstanbul-based capital longs for the good old days of state patronage. Just remember in the mid-1990s that they even opposed the customs union with the EU. Their excuse was the protection of national industry. Of course, we know what they were trying to protect.

What we make out of this is that a bourgeoisie that is dependent on the state and owes its wealth to the state’s favoritism cannot act independently and ask for full democracy, accountable and transparent administration. Therefore, we understand where TÜSİAD’s loyalty lies. They know from their own experiences that the state is a source of both fortune and destruction. So while benefiting from the former they are trying to avoid the latter. Simply put they are scared of their old patrons who do not like democracy and do not function under democracy.

Thank God democracy and a new constitution in Turkey does not need the support of TÜSİAD. Yet, I still wish TÜSİAD were an active proponent of democracy and a new constitution. But it is not, and understandably so. The good thing is that Turkey can do without the support of TÜSİAD for a new and democratic constitution. The people of Turkey at large, the new rising Anatolian bourgeoisie and the professional elite will make a new constitution for a “new Turkey.”

Turkey towards elections: What will change?

2011-03-28T00:45:00.000-07:00

As we get closer to the general elections to be held in June, it seems there is no serious challenge to the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party).

A recent MetroPOLL survey shows that the AK Party is most likely to win for a third time with 48 percent of the vote. If this happens, it will be the first time since the 1950s that a political party will have won three consecutive elections.

The poll indicates that Turkey’s opposition parties continue to fail to attract people’s confidence and vote. The Republican People’s Party (CHP) is expected to get 27 percent and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) is at the threshold with 11 percent. The trend in the last few months is that the AK Party is slightly up, while the CHP and MHP face drops of around four points each.

Certainly such a situation before the June elections is a success for the AK Party after nine years in office. However, it is also a failure of the opposition to come up with the right strategies, policies and leadership. Because the center of opposition to the AK Party for the past nine years has been the military, the judiciary and the media, the opposition parties seem to have left their jobs up to these actors, who capitalized on the weakness of the parties and filled the gap, destroying the potency of civilian/political opposition.

The result is the opposition parties’ inability to rally the people, 69 percent of whom said that there is currently no “strong and effective opposition” to the AK Party. This makes it crystal clear that the opposition does not pose a viable alternative as it fails in gaining the confidence of the people to the scale required to topple the ruling party. Just think of this example: two opposition parties, the CHP and MHP, have committed themselves to naming Ergenekon suspects as candidates in the upcoming elections. Yes, they committed themselves without knowing how the people would react to such a controversial issue. If not calculated well, such a critical and controversial step could be deadly for any political party. On this, the MetroPOLL survey shows that 64 percent of the people oppose Ergenekon suspects being nominated in elections. Likewise, 64 percent of MHP voters and 45 percent of CHP voters oppose the idea. This is just one example of the opposition’s suicidal policies.

Another problem is that the main opposition party, the CHP, is still preoccupied with the internal rivalry for power, forgetting to focus its efforts on gaining governmental power by winning elections. I think they are busy trying to reach advantageous positions for the day after the party loses the elections, so they can attempt to remove Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu from leadership. The latest news about CHP deputies collaborating with journalists to finish off Deniz Baykal, deputy leader Gürsel Tekin’s remarks about him and preventing social democrat politician Fikri Sağlar from returning to the party all have to do with the CHP’s internal strife, which will break out after the elections.

Those who believe that Kılıçdaroğlu can bring the CHP to power comprise only 19 percent of those polled, a number that was much higher just a few months earlier. On the trust scale for politicians, Kılıçdaroğlu got 16 percent, while Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has 44 percent of the people’s trust. It is pretty obvious that Kılıçdaroğlu’s public rating is as low as Baykal, his former leader.

Despite these figures, some journalists continue to talk about the rise of the CHP. Well, they can do whatever they like, just as they did four years ago, but misguiding the CHP is not good for the party itself. My concern is that raised expectations might cause a great psychological setback in the aftermath of the elections. I think the CHP voters cannot stand another disappointment. The shock after the election might shake the CHP voters’ belief in democracy and electoral politics, leading them to search for undemocratic alternatives.

The MHP has no better prospect in the elections. It stands on the edge of a knife regarding the 10 percent national threshold. Its future depends on the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) decision on a ceasefire and the Peace and Unity Party’s (BDP) election campaign style. The PKK and BDP’s choosing violence may save the MHP and push it to reach 10 percent of the vote. If, however, it fails then current leader Devlet Bahçeli cannot keep his position in the party, clearing the path for more radical elements, close to the so-called “deep state,” which have been recently incorporated into the party. This is how Turkish politics look at the beginning of the race for the June elections. From this picture one can say that not much will change after the elections and this will continue until the opposition learns from their defeats.

The right to stop dictators like Gaddafi

2011-03-21T00:36:00.000-07:00

There are limits not to cross even for dictators. They think they have the right to do whatever they wish to their people. But the conscience of people and the dynamics of global politics do not allow them.

Likewise the international community stood up and told Libya’s Gaddafi that he has no right to massacre his own people. This is a late but welcome move. Its importance goes beyond the Libyan case as it sends a clear message to all dictators of the world that they are not free to kill.

Once more we understand the moral limits to territorial sovereignty and the old principle of non-intervention. No one can hide behind these outdated terms from the 19th century to go ahead with massacres under the protective shield of sovereignty and non-intervention. No concept can serve to protect a state that engages in massive, widespread and systematic killings of its own citizens.

The borders of a state are not the walls of a prison in which the lives of its “inmates” are left to the mercy of the “guards,” that is, the dictators. The conscience of the people as well as international humanitarian law does not accept turning a country into a prison camp. People interfere, international organizations get involved, democratic governments take part to stop the dictators who cross moral limits. However late, limited, calculated and in some cases ineffective these may be, the dictators would know that one day they will be held accountable by their own people and the international community.

In this context humanitarian intervention is a means to force dictators to comply with international human rights laws. I know some who, based on the idea of sovereignty and order, would oppose humanitarian intervention. To them we should issue the reminder that the “rights of states” come from the rights of individuals/citizens and therefore do not have any autonomous moral standing. The right of autonomy and thus sovereignty for states is derived from the respect on the part of the state for the right of the individual’s autonomy. If the ultimate justification for the existence of states is the protection of the natural/basic rights of citizens, then, as Fernando Teson argues in his book “Humanitarian intervention,” “a government that engages in substantial violation of human rights betrays the very purpose for which it exists.” As a result the government loses not only domestic but also international legitimacy. Therefore, in such a case even foreign armies are morally entitled to help victims of oppression in overthrowing dictators.

The subject of international direct action should not be confined to genocide, enslavement and mass murder; serious, disrespectful, yet not genocidal oppression also justifies international military action.

Moreover international order and peace are sustained better in an international system that consists of countries respectful to the basic rights of its citizens. This is repeatedly acknowledged by the UN Security Council (UNSC) in the post-Cold War era. Starting with Resolution 688 on Northern Iraq, the UNSC considered humanitarian crises emanating from massive human rights violations as “threats to international peace and security,” authorizing the use of force under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. Today it is crystal clear that there is a linkage between international peace and security and humanitarian crisis.

Furthermore from an international law perspective it can be argued that the non-intervention principle is not an absolute norm in the contemporary international normative system. The UN Charter 2(7) forbids intervention in matters that are within the domestic jurisdiction of another state. But what are the “matters that are within the domestic jurisdiction”? International lawyers argue that to the extent a matter has been internationalized, the traditional prohibition against “intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of a state” is inapplicable. International undertakings have transformed the human rights violations that constitute a humanitarian crisis from domestic jurisdiction to international jurisdiction.

When and if, as Michael Walzer writes in his book “Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad,” the violation of human rights is on a scale which “shocks the moral conscience of mankind,” direct military action authorized by the UN is morally and legally justified to stop the continuation of gross violations of human dignity and rights. This applies to the Libyan case as well.

My only concern is that this humanitarian cause should not be sacrificed to the eccentricities of French President Nicolas Sarkozy and his tendencies to show off in order to secure a re-election next year. This will be really, really ugly.

Shall we take The New York Times seriously?

2011-03-14T23:00:00.000-07:00

No, we shall not, unless it takes what it does seriously. If it joins blindly in the opposition bloc in Turkey, led by the Doğan Media Group, then The New York Times (NYT), too, becomes one of the parties with biased reporting and editorials.

In the last few weeks we have seen signs of such a bias. Take as an example its latest editorial on Turkey. It seems not interested in facts but in the construction of a particular image about a criminal investigation and the government.

The attitude is neither sincere nor honest. Referring to a journalist who was arrested last week, the NYT editorial reads, “His lawyers are not permitted to see any evidence the government may have against him.” Do you notice the emphasis on the “government.” Tell me what you make out of this. The NYT tries to make us believe that it is the government that has evidence against the suspects and it does not allow the lawyers to have access to them. First, there is no such thing; it is a lie. Second, the government does not hold evidence because the investigation is conducted by prosecutors. Based on the evidence brought forward by prosecutors it is the court with judges that decides whether to arrest a suspect or not. This is what has happened in the case of journalists Soner Yalçın, Nedim Şener and Ahmet Şık.

The NYT editorial continues, “These arrests are the latest fallout from the Erdoğan government’s seemingly out-of-control conspiracy investigations.”

How does it sound? It sounds very clear that it is the Erdoğan government that is investigating the conspiracy. It is the government. Why does the NYT resort to such manipulation?

I really wonder what the problem is. Is it Turkey’s rising profile? Its solid economic success? Its growing influence in the region? Or its position of standing up for the rights of Palestinians against Israeli aggression?

Are the Americans fed up with democracy in Turkey? Have they gotten tired of it? Are they ready to sacrifice democracy in order to rescue a media group and ease the life of a troubling ally in the region?

Well, as far as military coups are concerned, the image of the US in this country is not clean. Many on the streets and in high places believe that all of the military coups that we have had since 1960 would not have been taken place without implicit or explicit American support. If the US now appears to be trying to rescue the Ergenekon suspects who are alleged to have plotted a military coup, then this will be a strong blow to the already worsening image of the US among the democrats of this country, who make up the huge majority.

Some American journalists, diplomats and politicians may regard the Ergenekon case as something distant and unimportant. Fine, it is up to them, of course. But for the people of this country the possibility of a military coup is terrifying after the experiences of 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997. It means executions, torture, deaths in custody, trials in military courts etc. So for us uncovering and trying a plot against democracy is a serious matter. People at large regard the Ergenekon trials as an opportunity to clean up the “deep state” responsible for the murders of around 30,000 in summary executions in the ‘90s alone and to consolidate democracy. The coup plotters and the gunmen of the deep state have always gotten away with what they have done. This time they have been caught red-handed with authentic documents, munitions and weapons buried underground and confessions. Therefore, anyone, including Turkey’s American friends, who is in favor of democracy in Turkey should be very careful not to be part of discrediting the trial process of the Ergenekon case.

But a piece in the Washington Post (WP) describes the Ergenekon as an “alleged hard-line secularist network.” Can you believe this? A “secularist network” being prosecuted by the Islamist government in Turkey is what the WP tries to make us believe. This is not merely ignorance but seems to be deliberate manipulation. As if C-4 explosives, hundreds of hand grenades, rocket launchers, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), AK-47s, light anti-tank weapons (LAWs), two tons of ammonium nitrate, Glock handguns, Uzi guns, long-range assault rifles, sniper rifles and many other weapons were not found in the Ergenekon hideouts the WP claims held evidence that were “flimsy and even fabricated.”

If the NYT and WP reports and editorials continue in this vein, democrats of Turkey will not take them seriously. Because as the victims of numerous military coups in this country, we know what a coup means very well. Anyone who tries to belittle such a real threat to our lives and democracy cannot be taken seriously, be they newspapers or states.

Gaddafi’s right to bomb his own people

2011-03-07T05:58:00.000-08:00

Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi is exercising his “right” to bomb his own people. This is a “right” enjoyed by dictators. But the implementation of such a “right” threatens not only the nationals of Libya but regional and international security, thus the international community cannot remain indifferent to the massacres of people in Libya by Gaddafi.

The UN Security Council decided to impose sanctions and the International Criminal Court will be investigating the events in Libya to determine whether they constitute a crime against humanity. These are all welcoming measures but they still may prove ineffective to stop the massacres of the people.

Imposing an arms embargo, a travel ban and freezing the assets of Gaddafi, his family and his close associates, will not prevent the regime from committing further crimes. Besides, contrary to the claims by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, they do not harm the Libyan people. The UN Security Council sanctions can only be criticized for not being strong enough. I think more should be done.

The Libyan case forces us to rethink the link between a legitimate regime based on respect for human and citizens’ rights and international security. We should be aware of the fact that there exists a link between respect for human rights and maintaining national and international security. A working human rights regime constitutes one of the prerequisites for providing national security, which is domestic peace based on a wide-ranging social consensus concerning the legitimacy of a political regime.

Those who approach politics from a security-centric point of view should keep in mind that demands for human rights are, in fact, generated from the security concerns of individuals. Thus, human rights in their essence reflect the search for physical and moral integrity of individuals. The idea of the inviolability of basic rights and freedoms aims at “securing” the individual as a moral agent. Thus one can ground human rights in a search for security at the individual level with undeniable links to security at a national level.

There exists, therefore, a tight link between individual security put forward as demands for human rights, and collective security at national level. It is rather impossible to reach the objective of national security in countries where systematic and persistent human rights violations take place, let alone the massacres we have been seeing in Libya. Massive human rights violations destroy domestic peace and security by undermining the legitimacy of the political system. What is left then is not a legitimate government but a sheer mechanism of violence.

Furthermore global peace and security is built through a legitimate government nationally that respects the basic rights of its citizens. Therefore, while the respect for human rights enhances national security, the state that is involved in systematic and massive violations of human rights endangers not only national but also international peace and security.

It is necessary and relevant to investigate the interplay between respect for human rights and international security for at least two reasons. First, the behavior of a state in the international arena cannot be separated from the way in which it treats its own citizens at home. This is to say that the kind of political regime prevalent domestically strongly influences its policy towards the outside world. Second, violations of human rights do not only harm individuals, groups or the people in the country concerned but may well endanger others, particularly in regional countries, as the repercussions of human rights violations cannot be confined within national borders. For instance, the outflow of refugees, which is one of the most tragic outcomes of human rights violations, may reach a massive scale in some cases with grave security implications for both the sending and receiving countries, damaging both regional and international security. This is clearly being seen in the Libyan case as hundreds of thousands of foreign workers are either trapped in Libya and the outpouring into neighboring countries, which is creating a humanitarian crisis.

Hence, the kind of political regime and the form of state-society relationship lay at the heart of the stability-instability problem determining, to some extent, prospects for international peace. This is to say that international security is dependent on domestic peace, which is in turn heavily influenced by the level of respect for human rights and a legitimate national government.

No ruler has the absolute right to treat its people any way he wishes. There are moral and legal limits to a sovereign’s right to kill his own people. And I think Gaddafi has passed that limit and this necessitates measures to stop him.

Towards the end of military tutelage?

2011-02-28T23:09:00.000-08:00

Today is the anniversary of Turkey’s last “successful” military intervention, Feb. 28, 1997. A former chief of General Staff had declared that the “Feb. 28 process” will continue for a thousand years. He was determined to bully the people and their democratic aspirations. Even this simple statement was testimony to how the military viewed its people’s will. For these generals, the right to rule belongs to them, not the people. But the people demand what they deserve and get it in the end.

After all these years and revelations about the misconduct the military engaged in, is the Feb. 28 process still continuing? Well, there are many in business, politics and particularly the military who wish it continued, but I am sorry, for them, to say it is over. The generals and others who were involved in this process of imposing sophisticated military rule over Turkish politics and the economy are now being prosecuted. The media group that wholeheartedly supported this “soft coup” is in trouble economically and image-wise. And the person who was targeted and put in prison for nothing at the time has been prime minister of Turkey for eight years after winning two elections and is set to win for the third time in June 2011.

What did happen during the Feb. 28 process? The whole process was staged by a few strong generals with political ambitions. The military, led by them, aligned with some sectors of civil society, launching a campaign justified by the fear that secularism was under “threat” in the face of the “Islamist challenge” represented by the Welfare Party (RP), then the greater partner in a coalition government. Within the General Staff a special “working group” was formed to investigate so-called “Islamist activities” as a result of which thousands in the bureaucracy, civil society and business were unlawfully “monitored.” Not only Islamic groups, but wider democratic sectors were targeted as well. Journalists who did not collaborate with them were publicly discredited with fake confessions and fired by their newspapers. Proof of the “threat” was documented with newspaper reports that had in fact been serviced to newspapers by the military-staffed “working group,” then all these reports were used in the prosecution of the accused. In short, it was a time when the rule of law, human rights and democracy were shelved by the military and its allies in the judiciary and the media.

Numerous “briefings” were organized by the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), where judicial personnel, journalists and other professionals were asked to “submit” to the military’s views and strategy. As a result, the ruling government was forced to resign, the biggest political party in Parliament was closed down by the Constitutional Court, the popular mayor of İstanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was imprisoned, private companies described as having “Islamic capital” were investigated and hundreds of NGOs were shut down. The government was offered another political party “in a golden tray,” as the chief of General Staff put it then.

In short the “Feb. 28” experience was an attempt by the military to design Turkish politics, control the Turkish economy and redistribute the sources to their allies. It cost a lot to Turkey, economically and politically but it failed in the end.

When it became clear that they failed to design Turkish politics in a way that served their personal and sectoral interests, the generals started right away on a new strategy, which was one of taking over the government directly -- this time not by “soft” methods as they used in the Feb. 28 process. This is in fact how the Sledgehammer plan was conceived and put in practice only a few months after the Justice and Development Party’s (AK Party) November 2002 electoral victory. The Sledgehammer commanders involved wanted to finish off the job they started in 1997. But they were late, and domestic and international circumstances were not conducive to such a direct military take over. Turkey’s deepening involvement with the EU, improving economic performance, the increasing inflow of foreign capital as well as the government’s tough and determined position, pro-democracy public opinion and new democratic media outlets thwarted the plans to finish off democratic rule.

In short, the Feb. 28 experience shows that the greatest obstacle to Turkish democracy lies in the form of civil-military relations. Unless the military is confined to its barracks and prevented from interfering in politics we cannot establish a working democracy. And Turkey has taken great steps in this direction. Alleged coup plotters are being tried, the media is diversified and business is aware that democratic stability is the key to economic growth. It is also increasingly understood by global forces that sustaining and consolidating democracy in Turkey is vital for the stability and security of not only Turkey but its wider region.

Why do we need a post-Kemalist republic?

2011-02-21T00:03:00.000-08:00

Unless Turkey abandons Kemalism as a constituent element of the state and society, we cannot consolidate democracy and resolve the Kurdish question. The best a Kemalist paradigm can offer is a “tutelage democracy” under the supervision of the military.

Kemalism has left its mark on the state apparatus, the political culture and the national psyche. In its essence, Kemalism envisages a homogenized nation and a disciplined society. Since the nation was not homogeneous but diverse ethnically and religiously, the state apparatus was used to eliminate sources of difference, or at least silence claims of difference. This resulted in assimilation efforts aimed at Kurds and the expulsion of many non-Muslims during the republican period. This positioned the state elite as a hegemonic authority vis-à-vis society that was subjected to the interferences of the state.

Moreover, the top-down modernization project as reflected in the radical reform movement in the early republican period assumed the possibility of constructing a “new society” in accordance with the ideological proposition of the state elite. Society was supposed to be “modern, secular, Turkish and loyal,” as taught to them by the Kemalist vanguard. Viewing society as subject to the interferences of the state elite to be modernized, secularized and nationalized built a “hierarchical relationship between the state and society.”

All these reflected the belief that a “new society” can be built through state intervention according to the model imagined by the Kemalist elite. It is obvious that democracy which prioritizes society over the state could not be established under such a hierarchical relationship. This Jacobin attitude that still prevails among the secularists and the Kemalists prevent them from embracing democracy and its political outcomes. It is then possible to assert that under a strict Kemalist order, which places the state and its ideological vanguards above society, democracy cannot flourish. To make the democratization process irreversible and consolidate democracy in Turkey then, a post-Kemalist republic is needed.

A related problem is the form of military-civilian relations. Since the 1960 military coup the military established itself as autonomous from the political sphere. With the 1961 constitution it created tutelage over politics. While it was autonomous from politics, the latter was subordinated to the priorities and preferences of the military. This was done by claiming that the military was the vanguard of the Kemalist republic. Such a self-appointed role after the 1960 military coup constituted the grounds for the constant interference of the military in political affairs.

Thus Kemalism of the formative years was reinvented in the 1960s to limit democratic politics and justify a role for the military to assert its will over the people’s will. Backing up Kemalism with the armed forces created a fatal power against democratic forces. To get out of this trap what is essential is to reform the military as a “professional” unit and not as an ideological one seeking political power, which requires total control of the military by civilians. This, however, cannot be done in a Kemalist state in which powerful institutions will always try to derive the right to rule from their ideological commitment to Kemalism. Thus, a post-Kemalist state is needed to eliminate the possibility of using ideological justifications over national will and representative institutions.

Another reason for the need to form a post-Kemalist order concerns the Kurdish question. It is not only the continuation of the question itself but its usage by the state elite that is an obstacle to democratization. The Kurdish question has always been used as a pretext for authoritarian political formations in Turkey. This was first carried out over the Kurdish rebellion in 1925 by Sheikh Said. To suppress the rebellion, the regime in Ankara did not limit its measures to the Kurdish areas and people. But the occasion was used to suppress all opposition in Ankara and İstanbul. The new opposition party, the Progressive Republican Party, was closed down and the dissenting İstanbul press was silenced as part of the crackdown following the Sheikh Said rebellion.

Since then the pattern has not changed: “Kurdish demands” have been used by the authoritarian elements in the state to postpone full democracy, suppress human rights, ignore the rule of law and spread a militarist political culture provoked using the threat the Kurdish demands were supposed to pose to the integrity of Turkey. Therefore, to build and consolidate democracy in this country, the Kurdish question should be resolved. The Kurdish question has to be resolved, first to address the demands of the Kurdish question and second to deprive the state of an excuse to postpone meeting the requirements of full democracy.

And the Kurdish question cannot be resolved within the paradigm of Kemalism that imagines a homogeneous Turkish nation denouncing even the presence of the Kurdish people. In short, we need to have a post-Kemalist republic in order to consolidate democracy, establish civilian control over the military and resolve the long-standing Kurdish question.

Turkish model: neither authoritarian nor Islamist

2011-02-14T09:19:00.000-08:00

For years the people of the Middle East were squeezed between “two ways.” They had to put up with a repressive regime, fearing that the alternative is a totalitarian Islamist state. Or an Islamist regime was tolerated to avoid social and political chaos that would invite foreign intervention.

The latest people movements in Tunisia and Egypt bring up the possibility of a third way for the Middle East. In this context the Turkish experience with democracy shows that Middle Eastern peoples do not have to choose between an authoritarian government and an Islamist regime. There is a third option, which is a representative and accountable government with free and fair elections conducted regularly.

Turkey and the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) represent a third way in the Middle East. The “new Turkey” is certainly a success story with its advancing democracy and flourishing economy under a free market and an open economy. The AK Party with its “conservative” social and cultural outlook but “liberal” political and economic program stands as an interesting case to look up to.

During the revolutionary change in Egypt, the role played by the Turkish government has also positively contributed to this image of being a role model. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was the most vocal in the Muslim world about the demonstrations in Egypt. From the beginning he called on Mubarak to be responsive to the demands of the Egyptian people and to quit. As far as I know there was no other leader in the Islamic world clearly asking Mubarak to leave office. Erdoğan was direct when he called on Mubarak and his close associates to “meet the democratic demands of the Egyptian people.” Even before Mubarak’s downfall he called for a transitional government that would supervise the election of a new parliament and president as well as constitutional reforms. He was bold in meeting the expectations of ordinary Arabs on the street. The Erdoğan government was engaged in Egypt from the beginning of the demonstrations until the downfall. This was so because, first of all, the government was under pressure by people at home. From the very beginning the people of Turkey sided with the Egyptians who were asking Mubarak to go. The government could not remain indifferent to public opinion in a democratic regime. Besides, it was impossible for the AK Party, as a party that stands for “change” and “people power” in Turkey, to side with an authoritarian government that represented the status quo and the oppression of popular will in the Middle East. Thus the claim of the ruling AK Party to be the champion of challenging the status quo at home and being respectful to people power did not leave any other option but to side with the aspirations of the Egyptian people and take the risk of standing up to the Mubarak regime.

Second, the pressure on the Arab streets was also felt in Ankara. Prime Minister Erdoğan had gained the trust and respect of Arabs on the street through his stance on the Iraq war and the Palestinian cause. Speaking out against Israeli atrocities in Gaza before the international community, as in the case of the “one minute” incident at Davos, had turned Erdoğan into a hero among many Arabs. Moreover, the fact that Erdoğan had a “brotherly” approach to the Arabs as opposed to the “typical” Kemalist-secularist politicians of Turkey, endeared him to the hearts of many people in the region. So, his popularity among the Arab peoples forced him to support the people vis-à-vis the Egyptian establishment.

Third, the Turkish government assessed that democratic change in Egypt would resolve a long-time and structural problem of the region -- that is, the lack of legitimacy. As such, a representative government in Egypt with wider democratic institutions is expected to contribute to regional stability through legitimate governments. The Turkish side assumed rightly that a democratic government is a strong government due to its undisputed legitimacy. It is good that democracy is not regarded as a risk but an opportunity to establish a stable and durable regional system.

Fourth, the Turkish government expects a post-Mubarak regime in Egypt to create a new regional equilibrium of power which would be conducive to resolving the Palestinian question. Israel’s loss of unconditional Egyptian support may be forced to be more accommodating in its approach. Besides, the PLO may feel at unease with a possible representative government in Egypt in which there will certainly be some elements of the Muslim Brotherhood more sympathetic to Hamas. In the end, if and when a democratic government is formed, Turkey expects this would put greater pressure on Israel and push the PLO to diffuse its differences with Hamas, bringing peace to the Middle East ever closer.

I think this is the rationale behind the assertive stance by the Erdoğan government in Turkey, which was criticized by some Egyptian officials during the crisis as “unwarranted interference in the domestic affairs of Egypt.”

Well, the “old elite” of Egypt should learn quickly that democracy is a business not only for people at home who demand it but also for the international community that strives for peace and stability in the world. If today we are talking of a deepening of democracy in Turkey, this is in large part due to international interest as well as the people of this country.

Is the AK Party experience relevant for the Middle East?

2011-02-07T08:08:00.000-08:00

Demands for reform shaking the Middle East have once again brought up the debate over the model that Turkey can offer its region. For years some thought Turkey could be a “secular-democratic model” for the Muslim Middle East. But the problem was that Turkey’s secularism was authoritarian, not leaving any autonomous space for religion and, moreover, significantly limiting freedom of conscience.

So it was not something to aspire to. Second, Turkey’s democracy was far from a model to be imported as it was under the tutelage of the military, which intervened regularly to discipline political actors and society when there was any deviation from a strict Kemalist ideology. The “old Turkey” had nothing to offer, but as Turkish secularism and democracy have been in the process of restructuring under Justice and Development Party (AK Party) rule, “Turkey as a model” has more relevance today. But on this topic I still think it is not Turkey per se but the experience of its ruling party, the AK Party, and its conservative constituency that can offer a model for the democracy-aspiring masses in the Middle East.

The AK Party’s story has relevance for the people of the Muslim Middle East. It demonstrates that Islamic identity is not in contradiction to democracy and that there is no inevitable clash between Islamic identity and the West, globalization and the market economy. The AK Party’s story tells Islamic movements in the Middle East that once they abandon their radical political stand and thereby manage to reach out to a broader public, they will be better equipped to deal with an authoritarian state apparatus. The AK Party experience tells them that instead of fighting against globalization, getting the system behind your cause for greater freedom and greater welfare for people will make your objective more reachable. The story of the party is the one that demonstrates what a reformed Islamic party can achieve through democracy. The party rejects describing itself as a political movement with Islamist roots or objectives. It has transformed itself from a marginal Islamist movement to a mass political party. No doubt it originated as an Islamic-oriented party, the Welfare Party (RP), which was closed down in 1998 on the grounds that it was a center for anti-secular activities. Having won two subsequent elections since 2002 and having been able to elect the new president, Abdullah Gül, from among its own ranks, the party is now poised to win for the third time in the 2011 elections. It claims to represent the “center” in Turkish politics, not a marginal Islamist or nationalist trend.

Since its establishment in 2001 the AK Party has developed a three-layered strategy. First, it adopted a language of human rights and democracy as a discursive shield. Second, it mobilized popular support as a form of democratic legitimacy. Third, it built a liberal-democratic coalition with modern/secular sectors at home and abroad that recognize the AK Party as a legitimate political actor. By gaining a discursive supremacy over its opponents and building a broader social and political front, it has managed to outmaneuver its secularist/Kemalist opponents. It seems that the AK Party has overcome the central problem of its predecessor, namely legitimacy and systemic security, by speaking the language of human rights, democracy and popular will that built up its democratic credentials.

As they witnessed their political parties being closed down, their leaders banned from political activities and their associations and foundations intimidated, the old Islamists have moved to embrace the language of civil and political rights that provided them with both an effective leverage against the pressures of the state and a base on which to build up international coalitions. And they forged a unique coalition with pro-reform groups at home and abroad that bolstered the position of the Islamic polity vis-à-vis their Kemalist/secularist opponents.

Thus, the main body of the Islamic movement has adapted a new and positive stance on approaching the West, Turkey’s membership in the EU and the integration of Turkey into the global structures and process. This was a clear break from its tradition that used to be based on outright rejection of the West, a deep suspicion of modern political discourse and an objection to the Turkish experience of Westernization. It was this transformation that paved the way for an electoral victory in 2002 for the AK Party, which has been ruling the country since then. AK Party leaders seem to be aware of the fact that to have an Islamist agenda, or to develop one, would be a self-defeating strategy for the party. The AK Party has chosen to be a party representing those conservatives and democrats on the center right, not ideological rigidity. As a mass political movement, the AK Party carries messages and credentials that are conservative, nationalist, Islamic and democratic. Its social base is heterogeneous, too, made up of both the urban and rural, the rich and poor, as well as the highly educated and less educated.

If studied properly, I think the AK Party can offer a new way of thinking about Islam, democracy and the West in the “new” Middle East.

People power in the Middle East and the West

2011-01-31T23:13:00.000-08:00

Calls for change have been shaking the Arab Middle East from Tunisia to Egypt and Yemen. Are people becoming “agents of change” in this part of the world? Is what we see an emergence of people power in the Middle East?

In the meantime, however, the people of these countries should not be deprived of international support for democratization. For a change, the West should not side with dictators in the Middle East but with the people.

For decades now the West has been trapped by analysts who advocated supporting despotic regimes in the Middle East to stop the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, even if this meant oppression, violence and poverty. This was, in fact, not the correct strategy. The ensuing accusations of Western double standards were then not unwarranted. It was obvious that after the end of the Cold War the Middle East was exempt from the wave of democratization.

The Algerian case is exemplary in this context. A democratic electoral process was stopped by the military in 1991 when it became clear that the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was to form a majority in parliament. Implicit and explicit support of the West for the military intervention that resulted in chaos and the death of tens of thousands of people in Algeria is still well remembered.

Such an attitude adopted by the West constituted one of the grounds for widespread anti-Western sentiment. While democracy was applauded in every part of the world, it has been denied to the people of the Middle East. This fueled anger towards Western governments that supported suppressive regimes in the Middle East. The excuse for this unprincipled support was to stop the rise of radical political Islam.

Have Western policymakers and analysts not yet understood that suppressive and corrupt governments in the Middle East use the “threat of Islamism” as a convenient tool to secure the support of the West? With the “threat of Islamists” having become a fruitful “strategic asset” in the hands of repressive governments, it became impossible to expect from these governments that they would finish off the “threat.” The paradox for the West is evident. Oppressive and corrupt regimes in the Middle East used the “Islamist threat.” Thus, even if there was no such threat, they created one or kept such existing “threats” in order to “sell” themselves to the West.

In the wake of uprisings in the Middle East, Western governments and media should do away with this vicious circle. It is time to realize that suppression through authoritarian governments is not the way to deal with Islamic radicalism.

Second, important rethinking relates to the process and outcomes of democratization. It is not a process that merely benefits radical Islamists. The process also does not necessarily bring radical Islamists to power. It is fundamentally misleading to equate democratization with Islamization in the Middle East. What people want is a representative and accountable government. A democratic mechanism may bring the Islamists to power, but it also has the built-in mechanisms to oust them from power. It is Orientalist reductionism to assume that Muslims will blindly vote for an Islamist party, disregarding their program and performance once in power. The inclusion of Islamists in the political process is absolutely necessary to establish representative and accountable governments in the Middle East.

I think the people of Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and others in the Middle East are capable of electing their representatives and holding them responsible for what they do and what they do not do while in government.

Whenever we talk of Middle Eastern politics, one concept is key: legitimacy or, to be more precise, the lack of legitimacy of the regimes in the Middle East. Some buy it through a rentier economy, some cover it up through ideological or nationalist sentiment and some silence the masses with oppressive apparatuses and measures. But I think it is becoming evermore difficult to sustain such regimes. Legitimacy generated through democratic participation is an absolute must.

Discontent can no longer be contained. There is a moment when the cost of oppression outweighs the cost of tolerating democratic change. The Middle East is at such a crossroads. And the international community should decide with the people of the region on what they prefer. Will they stand for the durable stability of democracies or the fragile and shaky stability of dictators?

Officers or members of a criminal gang?

2011-01-24T08:01:00.000-08:00

With the documents recovered from the Gölcük Naval Command, the Sledgehammer plot has become impossible to deny. In an attempt to cover up the plot some had claimed that the documents first published by the Taraf daily a year earlier were fabricated, despite the evidence to the contrary. Part of this assertion was based on the fact that the documents were brought to Taraf in a suitcase and that their origins were unknown.

So the recent disclosure of the documents hidden at the Gölcük Naval Command has left no room for doubt that the plot was real. No one can argue against the authenticity of these documents that were discovered in a military compound under the supervision of military authorities, public prosecutors and under video surveillance.

It also appears that the Sledgehammer plot went beyond the personal circle of Çetin Doğan, then the commander of the 1st Army in İstanbul, but also directly linked to some other high-ranking commanders like Naval Forces Commander Adm. Özden Örnek and Gen. İbrahim Fırtına. After 2003 these two progressed further in their careers and became commanders in the navy and the air forces, respectively. This fact tells us that the coup plotters, according to the Gölcük documents, climbed to the highest ranks in their forces. That’s some military, isn’t it? It is a nightmare for democracy, individual rights and the security of the people of Turkey. The Gölcük documents reveal that the plan was not prepared in 2003 and abandoned there after its failure. It was updated as recently as in 2008. With what I know of the military here, I claim that the “updating” still continues. Some in the military, who are poisoned by their ambitions for political power, will never give up. For that reason a comprehensive investigation into the military as well as a further, more determined, judicial process is needed.

What are in the plans? Terror, death squads, detentions, intimidations, open prisons, exterminations, assassinations, war, incitement. In short, a sledgehammer blow to the people. Journalists such as Nazlı Ilıcak, Mehmet Altan, Fehmi Koru, Hasan Cemal and Taha Akyol were to be targeted; non-Muslim religious leaders and prominent individuals like Hrant Dink were to be assassinated; the Fenerbahçe stadium was to be turned into an open-air prison; mosques were to be bombed, etc.

The Chador plan defines the duty that “to create favorable conditions for a military intervention acts of terror will be conducted at the Fatih Mosque…” This is a phrase in the plan defining the “duty” of “conducting terror.” That such a thing was written in an official document by officers of the Turkish military; this is unbelievable.

The plan is simple and very familiar: Bomb mosques and ensure camera footage shot the scene, causing the incident and its related media coverage to incite people to take the streets and make them raid a military building and then move in to stop an “Islamist uprising” and “save the secular regime.” Well done our dignified Turkish officers, well thought out.

Have you noticed how these are similar to many other events in Turkey’s recent past? This is not only a plan. I am pretty sure that parts of this or similar plans have been implemented before.

The danger is an over-politicized military with uncontrolled ambitions that are beyond the reach of civilian control. Having a free hand and also the resources, they manipulate the masses through surgically planned provocations. In recent years they have worked on creating a “secular/Islamist” divide. For the junta the secularism/Islamism divide was and still is justification for a coup.

Having seen these documents, I would now argue that all political murders, especially the murders of the secularist academics and journalists starting in the early 1990s, should be investigated in light of this information. Their perpetrators have never been uncovered. It is not too far of a stretch to think that they were victims to a grand strategy to create such a secularist/Islamists divide over which a military regime would be placed. With such an “excuse” the junta expects to generate some support from the secularist social groups and also from the West, who are always anxious about fundamentalism. A very good plan, isn’t it? “Justified” by saving secularism against the Islamists, the coup plotters would secure the support of secularists at home and Islamophobic Westerners abroad.

The Gölcük documents also confirm the original Sledgehammer plan that envisages escalating tensions with Greece. What was the expected outcome of this? To provoke nationalist feelings and mobilize the people with a nationalistic campaign behind the junta. How clever and disgusting they are. This also tells the world that coup plotters in Turkish military are not only a threat to the Turkish people and democracy but to regional peace, stability and security. They would threaten neighboring countries, be it Greece, Bulgaria, Greek Cypriots or Iran.

In short, maintaining and deepening democracy is not only a matter for the people of this country, but for the international community that cares for peace, stability and security in the region.

Gamble of a media tycoon

2011-01-17T23:53:00.000-08:00

Mehmet Barlas, an experienced journalist from the Sabah daily, wrote the other day that in the upcoming general elections the real opponent of Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan is not Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the leader of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), but Aydın Doğan, the owner of Doğan Holding.

His argument is based on the recent high-level appointments of former members of the Doğan group to the CHP. The journalists from the group, their close relatives and its CEO are, of course, entitled to join any political party that they wish. But this is only a visible part of the support, direct and indirect, given to the CHP by the group. It has a history and a rationale.

For years we have pointed to the lack of a credible opposition to the ruling party. The main opposition party, the CHP, under Deniz Baykal’s leadership, could not present itself as a real alternative to the AK Party. This became a fact as displayed in the four elections lost against the AK Party. The vacuum in the opposition was filled by some institutions and groups. Among those we particularly know well are the military and the judiciary.

What we have not talked much is the media as a complementary force of the opposition against the ruling party.

With its newspapers, news magazines and TV stations Doğan media presented a tough opposition to the AK Party, almost positioning itself as a “main opposition party” replacing the CHP. Editorial policies and columnists of the group tried to define the general political agenda and influence public opinion.

The group’s ultimate contribution was the creation of a public opinion driven by fear -- fear of the government, Islam, globalization and the West, including the US. Isolationist and xenophobic nationalistic attitudes, if not created by, were certainly spread and were enhanced by the publications of this group.

The group did not do this because it necessarily shared these views but because these tactics were instruments to oppose the ruling party that was conservative and in favor of market economy, privatization and EU membership. By creating an atmosphere of insecurity and hatred towards the West and globalization, the group wanted to limit the AK Party’s supporters and ability to rule the country. It was calculated that the AK Party was vulnerable to an ultranationalist public opinion reflected itself perfectly in the readers’ comments in the groups newspapers, Hürriyet, Vatan and Milliyet. The arguments were that government was Islamizing the state, selling out national assets to foreigners, giving in to the Kurdish claims – and that all of these were carried out with implicit or explicit support of the West.

These views were disseminated, normalized and reinforced in the Doğan group’s media outlets as a means of mobilizing a nationalist opposition against Erdoğan’s government. But why? Though it more than tripled its assets under AK Party rule, the Doğan group was not satisfied, demanding more as it used its own media outlets as leverage, similar to the past. When it did not get what it wanted, the group moved in to become the center of opposition to the AK Party.

When the government responded by way of a sometimes open confrontation led by the Prime Minister Erdoğan and at other times the use of its executive powers like tax inspections and fines, a kind of war erupted between the two sides.

The group determined to do what the military and the judiciary failed to do: oust the AK Party government. The restructuring of the CHP was part of it. The cassette scandal of Baykal was skillfully turned into an opportunity to get rid of Baykal, who proved unable to topple the AK Party. Encouraging and supporting Kılıçdaroğlu then and after, the group is playing its final round.

Now the group brings in whatever it has behind the CHP before the June elections, which is seen as the last chance to topple the government through the ballot box. For this end all means are likely to be employed. This will include the manipulation of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the exploitation of Hizbulllah until the general elections through media means.

It is and was wrong for the Doğan group to assume the role of a political party linking its future to the removal of the AK Party from government. What I do not understand is how a business group like Doğan Holding throws itself and all of its assets in favor of one political party and in opposition to another. This is too much of a risk. And thus I wonder what is expected to be gained from this gamble. The group is playing big -- very big. If it wins, it will rise above all of its rivals in business as it will effectively hold political power; if it loses, Aydın Doğan will be reduced to nothing. Well, this is a gamble…

Turkey’s ‘number one’ enemy?

2011-01-10T03:01:00.001-08:00

Once Turks thought that Turkey was located in a very hostile environment and was surrounded by enemy nations. Now things seem different; they think that the threat to their country comes mainly from afar, the United States.

A recent public opinion survey conducted by MetroPOLL on the threat perception of the people of Turkey rings alarm bells. As a person who was part of the research team, I was shocked when I learnt the answer to a question we asked about “the greatest threat to Turkey.” People point to two countries, the US and Israel, both of which are supposed to be Turkey’s allies and neither of which Turkey has ever been involved in a hot conflict. According to the poll, 43 percent of people feel threatened by the US and 24 percent by Israel, while only 3 percent regard Iran as a threat and 2 percent Greece.

It is good to see threat perception is down so much for regional countries, some of which are considered Turkey’s historical enemies, but bad that the perceived threat of the US and Israel is so high. To conduct a strategic relationship with such public opinion is not possible in the long run, especially in a democratic country.

I keep repeating in this column that democratization at home is having serious foreign policy implications. In a globalized world as it is today, people are better informed about developments abroad and the effects on their lives. In an open society and with the means of communication these issues are widely debated. Thus people are increasingly empowered by democratization and globalization to influence decision-making bodies. In a democratic government no one can remain indifferent to what people perceive and believe.

Without winning the hearts and minds of the people, a lofty discourse of friendship and alliance cannot be sustained. Therefore, people’s threat perceptions should be addressed. This cannot be done only by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party), though it should really strive to tell the people what they believe in when they talk of alliance and cooperation with the US in particular. In fact, there is no significant difference of opinion among the voters for the AK Party and the rest as revealed by the MetroPOLL research. As always, foreign policy issues cut across domestic political fragmentation.

While Turkey preaches peace, stability, cooperation, interdependence and mediation abroad, it is unacceptable to plague ourselves with an unreasonable, unfounded threat perception that would restrain Turkish foreign policy.

To point to the underlying reasons for the perceived threat from the US The Wall Street Journal used the news about the research with a subtitle, “Ask Uncle Sam.” It is indeed true that this perception has a lot to do with US foreign policy. The occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, the Armenian issue regularly surfacing in the US congress, pressures over the Iran issue and the unconditional support extended to Israel are the main policy issues that raise eyebrows about the US. One should also add the perceived support of the US for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) or lack of support to fight against it, which is taken as a proof of the support anyway.

This is what the new US ambassador, Francis J. Ricciardone, to Ankara is going to find in Turkey: a very skeptical public. As the Obama factor could not be a remedy for the deteriorating image of the US in Turkey, he should pray that no shocking document comes out of WikiLeaks while he is serving in Ankara.

The number two threat to Turkey as perceived by the people is Israel, according to the MetroPOLL survey. Given the recent tension between the two countries this may not be surprising. But if there are going to be future Turkish-Israeli relations, such a perception is poisonous. Yet Israel cannot expect better if it continues its policy of using violence to settle the problems that it encounters in the region. I am not only talking about the flotilla aggression, but also refer to its dealings with the Palestinians both in Gaza and the West Bank as well as Lebanon, Syria and Iran. The Israelis should understand that the future of Turkish-Israeli relations depends on the relationships it develops in the region. No Turkish government can develop normal cooperative relations with Israel while a huge majority of people in Turkey are deeply annoyed by Israel’s aggressive regional policy.

It may really take time to repair the damaged image of Israel among the people. Israel should care what “people think.” It would be wrong if Israelis think it is all about the “Islamist AK Party” government, and that when it is gone everything will be normal. Not really: When we look at it in detail, it is clear it is not only the AK Party. For instance on the question whether Turkey should freeze its relations with Israel or develop them, 71 percent of Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) voters, 73 percent of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) voters, 60 percent of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) voters and 63 percent of the AK Party voters say they should be “frozen.”

In short, what people think and perceive matters, especially in a developing democracy like Turkey.

Will the new strategy of opposition work?

2011-01-03T04:27:00.000-08:00

The most important event in Turkish politics last year was the Republican People’s Party’s (CHP) change in leadership. It is a culmination of past events that indicates a fundamental change in their strategy to oppose the ruling party. With the leadership change, the opponents of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) decided to try a new strategy to bring down the ruling party, using democratic means with populist policies.

Their adoption of this new strategy came out of a process where undemocratic alternatives failed to bring about desired objectives. In the absence of strong political opposition to the ruling party, some had looked to the military and the judiciary as the center of the anti-AK Party block. These two institutions played just such a role, which they legitimized as protecting secularism.

For its part, the military tried to influence the presidential elections by issuing an e-memorandum against the ruling party in April 2007 in an attempt to prevent the AK Party majority in Parliament electing a new president. But it backfired. The military’s intervention created waves among the people, resulting in a landslide electoral victory for the AK Party, followed by the election of Abdullah Gül as president.

Using the military against the AK Party was not always so public. Behind closed doors, attempts were made to stage a direct military coup. According to documents revealed in the Ergenekon and the Sledgehammer trials between 2003 and 2005, the top brass contemplated several military coups in 2003 and 2004. The revelation of these attempts, along with the Ergenekon investigation -- which placed high-ranking retired generals on trial -- discredited covert operations against the AK Party government and pointed to the limits of toppling the government through a direct military coup.

Discouraged by the military’s apparent ineffectiveness, the opposition looked to the judiciary to block the AK Party’s way. The filing of a closure case against the AK Party by the chief prosecutor in March 2008 was therefore welcomed. The court’s earlier decisions on party closures and the AK Party’s legislative activities encouraged the opposition groups who wished to see the end of the AK Party at the hands of the court.

The Constitutional Court had emerged as an institution capable of blocking the legislative activities of the AK Party government but it could not make the decision to close down such a popular party. Thus the non-closure verdict highlighted the limits of the Constitutional Court to be a focal point of opposition against the AK Party.

Invitations of these non-political forces into the political arena, however, did not bring the expected results, so what was left was to pursue opposition to the AK Party by political means. Having lost all hope that the AK Party could be toppled by the court or by pressure from the military, the CHP was forced to develop more creative policies against the AK Party within the political sphere. There was increased pressure on the CHP to transform itself into a viable political alternative to the ruling party. The party’s performance under Deniz Baykal was tested for the last time during the March 2009 elections. It was a failure again as the CHP finished far behind the AK Party in votes. It was proven once more that the CHP under Baykal’s leadership was unable to present a viable alternative to the AK Party.

It was not just about the leadership. They revised the themes and discourse that they used to mobilize themselves against the ruling party. Focusing on secularism had proven fruitless. Because relying on that single issue was ineffective in bringing down the AK Party government, the opponents decided to challenge the AK Party on more concrete social and economic issues.

The video scandal and the ensuing election of Kılıçdaroğlu as the leader of the CHP took place under such conditions and in search of a political alternative to the ruling party. What they did is good for Turkey’s democracy because an alternative to the AK Party should be sought through democratic means and among political actors. The new strategy with its leadership and discourse-policy components developed in 2010 will be tested in 2011 with the June elections.

We will see if the new leadership and new political discourse will bring down the AK Party government. If the AK Party’s opponents fail again will they go back to their old strategy? Well, it is difficult; undemocratic means of opposition are hard to revive. The only exit is going forward through democracy.

Kurdish predicament

2010-12-27T03:30:00.000-08:00

The fact that today we discuss “democratic autonomy” and bilingual services in the Kurdish populated areas is not worrisome but promising. This means that politics is back to the Kurdish debate.

So long as violence is not involved, encouraged or applauded, there could be possibilities of an agreement coming out of political deliberations. For so long the Kurds were asked what they wanted, and today some of them have come up with a set of demands. Whether we like these demands or not, it is better to discuss them than fight.

The content of democratic autonomy draft presented at the end of Democratic Society Congress (DTK) gives rise to debate. There are so many points that do not make sense from a democratic point of view, and there are also some suggestions that worry the people in the region, like the self defense units and the Kurdish soviets.

Besides the content, it is obvious that the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) is trying to set the agenda on the Kurdish question. They are perfectly entitled to do so. But it seems that competition with the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) is poisoning the BDP. I think the BDP is pretty confused as to how to proceed with the solution process. It wants its negotiating counterpart to be the “state,” which is comprised of the military, security forces and intelligence service. This choice of the BDP/Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is justified by the following reasoning: “I can make peace only with those whom I fight.”

Yet behind this argumentation there is a deeper political strategy. The BDP does not want any other “political actor” involved in the process of finding a solution. Placing the state as the counterpart is convenient in this sense because in the end it will leave the BDP as the only political agent that forced through and secured a solution; the state could not compete with the BDP politically anyway.

Here I think it becomes clear what I mean by “competition with the AK Party poisons the BDP.” While the state as such cannot pose an alternative to Kurdish political loyalty even if it negotiates a solution the AK Party can. In fact the AK Party is the only rival of the BDP even in the absence of the Kurdish problem and the need to find a solution for it. The BDP/PKK fear that if the AK Party plays a central role in bringing about a solution, the AK Party will take over Kurdish politics as the strongest political party, thus eliminating the BDP/PKK line.

Because of this fear the BDP/PKK has been hesitant about the “Kurdish initiative” of the government from the beginning. It wants to take the trophy alone, not share it with any other political actor. Besides, they are worried that the outcome may push them out of Kurdish political center. This “insecurity” -- the fear for being “eliminated” with a solution -- is the greatest factor among the Kurdish segment that blocks the way for a solution.

They are concerned about the political implications of an AK Party-led solution. As the AK Party is its only rival among the Kurds, the BDP are rightly afraid that this would significantly strengthen AK Party’s popularity among the Kurds. Then what will be left of the BDP/PKK?

The BDP line does not want competition. With the support of its armed wing it wishes to establish a monopoly of power and representation in the Kurdish politics. One has to tell them that such an objective is not sustainable. Moreover the way to overcome their “insecurity” in Kurdish civilian politics is not to establish a monopoly but be equipped to compete with its rivals through democratic means.

I think the BDP should get rid of its “insecurity.” It is still the most powerful political movement among the Kurds and it will remain so in the foreseeable future even if the problem is solved. The party leadership should make a decision: Will they contribute to the solution or remain fearful that an AK Party-led solution will eliminate them, thereby blocking the way for peace and prosperity of the Kurds? I think there is no reason for post-solution anxiety for the PKK/BDP.

Leaders of the PKK/BDP have to face the reality: The state is run by the AK Party today and the Kurdish problem will be solved with the AK Party in government. There will be no better days for a solution.

Government’s embarrassing silence

2010-12-20T07:02:00.000-08:00

Last Friday a statement made by the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) on the Kurdish language debate went almost unnoticed. This silence may have something to do with the decreasing weight of the military on political issues. No one may have cared what the generals were thinking and saying about the Kurdish question.

Whatever the reason, that silence was not good for the consolidation of democracy in this country. The military should have been reminded forcefully that it was none of their business to make a remark on the Kurdish language. But all political actors, with the exception of the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), remained silent. Neither the prime minister nor any other political figure in the government went public, opposing the position of the military revealed through a statement placed on the TSK’s website.

On the contrary, politicians, including the parliament speaker, heavily criticized the BDP for bringing up the issue of bilingual social space in southeast Turkey. The latter even called on public prosecutors to make a case on the BDP’s stance on bilingual social space, which is a disgrace to the democratic credentials of the parliament speaker.

The ruling party did not pass the test on this case at the detriment of its own legitimacy and democratic credentials. Is it the military who decides how to address the Kurdish question? If they are in charge of defining the problem and drawing a line for resolving the question, what then is the role of the government and Parliament?

The government should see clearly that such statements from the military are attempts to hijack the role of the government. It then becomes impossible to erode the image that the government is soft, unreliable and ready to sell the country out, and thus it is the military that the people must turn to and rely on.

It is really hard to swallow a statement by the military in which it asserts that the debate on bilingualism, the usage of Turkish and Kurdish in southeast Turkey “goes against the founding philosophy of the Turkish Republic.” What does the military know about the “founding principles”? And how were they informed about their content? And, above all, what does it have to do with the military’s profession, which is to defend the country against external aggression?

Consider the mindset of the Turkish military revealed with this latest statement. It is as if they are not men in uniform trained in combat, but wise experts on history, language and political science. They proclaim: “Language, culture and ideals of unity are the indispensible aspects of being a nation. The result of a lack of linguistic unity has been portrayed by many painful examples in history.” Really? I think they seem to know about everything but their own profession because they pay the least attention to it.

This is not all. “The TSK has and always will continue to stand for and side with the protection of … the nation state, the unitary state and the secular state,” the statement claimed.

No democratic government can swallow a military that positions itself to tell political actors the “true way of conducting politics.” This cannot be the business of the military. One likes or dislikes the argument for the bilingual use of Turkish and Kurdish. Politicians and the public should debate it. But if politicians treat the military as the final “arbiter” in this debate, then we cannot claim to have achieved democracy and the end of military tutelage.

A government that remains silent on an intrusion meant to limit political debates behind a façade of the “founding principles of the republic” cannot oppose further intrusions conducted in the name of secularism or any other pretext. Once the military is allowed to draw the boundaries of the political debate, as we know very well in this country, there will be no limit to their political ambitions.

Human rights as a prerequisite for peace and security

2010-12-13T08:29:00.000-08:00

Last week Human Rights Day was celebrated around the world as well as in Turkey. Over the years slow but positive developments have continued on the codification of human rights in international law. It is certainly an impressive progress that we are talking about.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 was mere a declaration without any legal power, stating the goodwill and moral commitment of the world’s nations. But now the international community has a series of conventions and protocols that legally bind the signatory countries concerning human rights. The establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is the most striking accomplishment of this process.

Human rights are generally based on moral values and philosophical preferences. As such they tend to be understood as abstract intellectual endeavors. Yet it is undeniable that respect for human rights has a more day-to-day outcome that includes security at the individual and national as well as global level. First, demands for human rights in its essence reflect the search for the physical and moral integrity of individuals. The idea of the inviolability of basic rights and freedoms aims at “securing” the individual as an independent and moral agent. Second, a working human rights regime constitutes one of the prerequisites for providing national security, that is, domestic peace based on a wide-ranging social consensus concerning the legitimacy of a political regime. Thus the maintenance of national security depends on the realization of individual security built on the respect for human rights. Third, individual and national security built through a human rights regime domestically is an indispensible part of global security. As such human rights are not only grounded on moral or philosophical arguments but also on a practical and pragmatic base.

The old notion of security was based on a concept giving priority to the protection of the state against external threats. Security was defined through penetration by outsiders. Now, crises that do not involve warfare and do not come from outside yet threaten the very wellbeing of nations are catching the attention of both policy makers and the public at large.

The revival of nationalism and micro-nationalism in the post Cold War era has reinforced the need for international protection of human, and particularly minority, rights. What the rise of ethnic clashes has also shown was the interaction and interdependencies between domestic peace and regional/international security: Both secessionism and suppression of ethnic identities proved to be insecurity-generating policies for the international system.

Post Cold War developments have shown that human rights should be conceived as a necessity for strengthening national and international security and thus they are an asset, not a liability. As a result the place of human rights in international politics has also been legitimized by an increasing understanding that the international protection and promotion of human rights contributes to national and international peace. Thus the debate now seems to be set in a way that human rights and national/international security are complementary concerns and objectives. One does not necessarily exclude the other; instead both can be secured at the same time.

There is wide agreement today that human rights have become a global issue within which there has emerged a multiplicity of linkages and interconnections that involve, but also transcend, nation states. As a result, violations of human rights in one country may create unprecedented consequences for other countries, peoples and individuals. While territorial boundaries are becoming more penetrable, transnational implications of human rights violations turn out to be unavoidable. This adds to the source of tension among states. The most striking case that illustrates how human rights violations have transnational impacts and how they create security threats for other states is the massive flow of refugees. The cases of Bosnia, Rwanda, Haiti, Iraq and recently Kosovo clearly illustrate that violations of human rights cannot be contained within national boundaries and that they have transnational implications which in the end provoke and necessitate regional or international interventions, further complicating a basically domestic problem.

While the respect for human rights enhances national security, states that are involved in systematic violations of human rights endanger not only national but also international peace and security.

This leads to an understanding that the search for global peace and security starts with improving human rights conditions at a domestic level since there exists a clear-cut linkage between national and international security. Human rights considerations thus give birth to a notion of global security. The link between individual, national and global security justifies a concern about the fate of individuals everywhere as part of a search for global security.

Fifty years after the Universal Declaration it has become even clearer that peace requires respect for human rights at national and global levels.

Emergence of a ‘new Turkey’

2010-12-06T20:28:00.000-08:00

The talk of a “new Turkey” is generating lively debates both in Turkey and abroad. Last week we discussed Washington, where the US government was trying to recover from the embarrassment of WikiLeaks.

It was a conference organized by Insight Turkey, a quarterly published by the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA), in Washington, D.C. At the conference Levent Köker, Ersel Aydınlı, Dilek Cindoğlu, Taha Özhan, Amjad Atallah, S. Trisa, İbrahim Kalın, Hajruddin Somun, Ömer Taşpınar, Stephen Larrabee and Nuh Yılmaz elaborated on Turkish politics, Turkey’s regional policy and Turkish-American relations. What seemed certain at the end of the debates was that a new Turkey is in the making.

Indeed, knowing the “old Turkey” well, I strongly sense that the country where I live now doesn’t look much like the old one.

The old Turkey was a country where people were supposed to serve and remain loyal to the state and satisfy the demands of the state elite. It was a country that existed for the state and its owners, i.e., the state elite. Citizens were commanded to be stripped of their ethnic, religious and even ideological identities. In the old Turkey, the nation was imagined to be homogenous despite the diversities on the ground. The old Turkey was based on a notion of the superiority of the state over the society -- an understanding that gave a privileged status and power to the bureaucracy over the citizens, which is an anomaly by any democratic standard. It was a republic in which the civilian and military bureaucracy imagined for itself a “right to rule.” Thus, military takeover was the rule in the old Turkey. Our generals thought they were not only commanding their troops but the country. They hanged a prime minister, made constitutions, closed down political parties and destroyed the lives of millions. Civilians were not in a position to challenge the power of the juntas in the military; they were imprisoned by their own military.

In the old Turkey, the economy was run by the state, to be more specific, by unrepresentative and unaccountable bureaucrats, sitting in a position to redistribute the resources of the nation. The old Turkey was an inward-looking country where relationships with the world were at a minimum. This was a country and society in which it was convenient to be “ruled by fear.”

The old Turkey thus feared anything foreign and different. It not only had external enemies but also plentiful “internal enemies.” Any different identity, ethnicity, religion or ideology was treated as a threat. The old Turkey was a burden for its Western allies, too. It was unable and unwilling to resolve its own problems at home and abroad.

Since 1999, with the start of the EU integration process, which unleashed domestic dynamics for change, the old Turkey has begun fading away. The ideas and ideals of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and minorities and a market economy have gained currency in this old country. As a result, for the last 10 years or so Turkey has been going through a tremendous process of change. Change is everywhere: in politics, business, civil society and foreign affairs. We should try to understand the dynamics and actors of this new Turkey. And we should not make a mistake in identifying the driving forces behind the efforts to build a new Turkey. I think it is not the political leadership but social and economic forces that we need to look at to understand the dynamics pushing for the new Turkey. We make a fatal mistake if we think that the new Turkey is the Justice and Development Party’s (AK Party) Turkey. It is a phenomenon that goes far beyond it. The new Turkey is being created by a new business elite, new media, a new generation of intellectuals and an assertive civil society. A feature of the new Turkey is its self-confidence. It is now a country that says, “Yes, we can.” Democracy is becoming firm and irreversible. The military is being increasingly controlled by civilian authorities, just like in other Western democracies. The will to make a new liberal constitution is strong as demonstrated by the latest constitutional referendum held on Sept. 12. The economy is increasingly being integrated in global markets and institutions.

It seems that continuity and stability characterize the new Turkey. As democratization and economic development unsettles the status quo and disturbs established interests, it encounters resistance from the circles who think they would be the losers in the new Turkey. But their power to dominate political, economic and social space is so limited now that they are unable to stop the process of transformation. Stability and continuity are likely to go hand-in-hand with the process of change. Therefore, a new Turkey experiencing change in stability and continuity awaits us. The outcome of this will be further prosperity and democratization.

It is a relief for democrats that the new Turkey is a post-Kemalist republic based upon the virtues of democracy, pluralism, an open society and a market economy.

Women in headscarves: Who are they and what do they want?

2010-11-29T21:59:00.000-08:00

Last week the Turkish Businesswomen’s Association (TİKAD) released a study on the controversial headscarf issue in Turkey in a public opinion survey conducted all over Turkey among more than 3,000 people, including women with headscarves. I was part of the academic research team and some results of the research surprised even me.

This research questions our preconceptions about headscarves and compels us to rethink the issue. Who is using the headscarf and why? What do they think of those women who do not use the headscarf? Do they feel suppressed or liberated with the headscarf? Do they prefer engaging in social and economic activities or the traditional role of being a housewife and raising children?

TİKAD’s research, titled “The headscarf and social consensus,” contains data that will change the direction of the headscarf debate.

One of the key results concerns the reasons for using a headscarf. It has long been argued by the secularists/Kemalists that the headscarf is used as a political symbol, and therefore is not innocent. They view the headscarf as a uniform and headscarved women as the soldiers of Islamism as a political ideology. On this ground they justified banning them from universities. By twisting and misusing the concept “public space,” they even tried to exclude women with headscarves from state owned buildings such as hospitals, guest houses and even the Çankaya Palace.

Our research has proved that this is a fallacy. Of women with headscarves, 93 percent say they use it as part of their religious beliefs, while only one out of 1,000 headscarved women take it as a political symbol. This makes it crystal clear: they do not politicize the headscarf. Those who politicize headscarf are the ones who ban it, claiming that it is a political symbol. Overall, 85 percent of the people in Turkey assert that wearing a headscarf is an act of religious belief, while only 1 percent think of it as a political symbol.

Among headscarved women, 77 percent assert that using the headscarf is their own “personal choice,” and if they were in a position to remake the choice, they would cover their head again. If they were asked to make a choice between the headscarf and performing their profession without it, 76 percent reported that they would choose the headscarf. All these data show that using a headscarf is a highly “individual” choice and women persist in their choice.

Our research also indicates that women with headscarves are not a homogeneous group. They differ from each other according to their level of education, income and profession. While only 19 percent of all covered women say using a headscarf affected their lives negatively, this percentage rises to over 60 percent of graduates, civil servants, professionals and high income groups. Among graduates, professionals and high income groups, 90 percent feel that they have suffered injustice due to their headscarves.

There is another interesting piece of data along this line. While 23 percent of women think that the headscarf restrains them from engaging in social and economic life, this sense of restraint rises to over 60 percent among educated, urban, rich and professional women with headscarves. This is an interesting paradox; for “traditional” women the headscarf is an emancipating form of dress and they feel comfortable going out and working in a headscarf. For them, the headscarf is a sort of passport, but for the “modern women with headscarves” it is a restrictive form of dress, simply because these educated, urban, rich and professional women encounter prohibitions when engaging in social, economic and political activities. As they face the ban they feel restricted and suppressed. Thus, the headscarf ban forces these “modern women with headscarves” to withdraw from public life.

While they are not satisfied with the traditional roles assigned to them by conservative circles and seek for ways to engage in the “modern sectors,” they are pushed back by those claiming to be “modern,” i.e., secularists/Kemalists.

This is very ironic. I really wonder how the secularists/Kemalists can justify their restrictive attitude towards these women. Do they really want all women be educated and join social, economic and political realms? If so, they cannot advocate formal and informal bans on women with headscarves in universities, Parliament, public services and the private sector.

If they insist on the ban, then I would argue that the secularist/Kemalist circles are scared of the competent competition with headscarved women and they are not interested in the emancipation of women, instead excluding around half of all women from public life.

NATO’s common enemy or common values?

2010-11-22T09:50:00.000-08:00

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been suffering from the absence of a common enemy to justify and cement the alliance. In response, the presence and coherence of the organization is tried to be justified by references to “common values,” as reflected in its revised “strategic concepts.”

The Lisbon summit approved the third such “concept” since 1991, searching for a rationale for the alliance in the absence of a common enemy. NATO is attempting to go beyond a “defense organization” and to evolve into a political entity. In an era with no “common enemy,” NATO has embraced “common values” that were spelled out long ago in the Washington Treaty. Since its foundation, NATO has always claimed to defend the common values of its member states as well as their territories. The confrontation with the Warsaw Pact countries during the Cold War was often justified by reference to defending the “free world” and liberties cherished by it. However, defending liberties and promoting values and institutions of the “free world” was taken up as an essential mission of NATO in the post-Cold War era. The question is, to what extent has NATO succeeded in living up to its claim?

In the aftermath of the Cold War and the demise of a Soviet threat, NATO moved to be a “community of values” more concerned about threats to its core values. The “maintenance of democratic order” was often cited as a rationale for NATO’s assertiveness in the definition of non-Article 5 tasks. It appeared that NATO was moving from a collective defense organization to a Euro-Atlantic politico-military power. Thus it was perceived that repression, economic failure and human rights abuses leading to massive flows of refugees and environmental degradation could, though indirectly, affect the security and stability of NATO members. In the post Cold War era, the “new NATO” claimed to have become an institution that intervenes to protect certain principles and values, a power for peacemaking and post-conflict peacekeeping, and a model for developing democratic national security structures. In response to the post Cold War politico-security environment, the 1991 strategic concept developed a “broader” concept of security threats for NATO that includes instabilities and insecurities prompted by human rights violations. It was then declared that “security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension” and NATO’s leaders decided to enhance the “political component” of the alliance.

After eight years of experimentation with the 1991 document, the 1999 Strategic Concept observed that “the last 10 years have seen … the appearance of complex new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability, including oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, [and] the collapse of political order.” Here the alliance declared that issues of “software security” threaten peace and stability in the NATO area. Among the “purpose and tasks of the alliance,” the 1999 strategic concept committed NATO to “contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations.” Here NATO clearly defined a role that went beyond its conventional task definition that required a constant interest in the state of politics in peripheral states. The strategic concept also talked of “fostering democracy” as a means of reaching the objective of peace and stability. Among the possibilities the document mentions are uncertainty and instability generated by “ethnic and religious rivalries,” “the abuse of human rights” and “the uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people.” It was understood that security and stability of NATO required an interest in the wider environment, focusing also on software security threats.

Thus, the non-Article 5 tasks of crisis management and crisis response have become some of the fundamental security tasks of the new NATO. In this context, NATO peacekeeping in the Balkans and other parts of the world seem to be long-term commitments. This is reiterated in the new strategic concept approved by NATO leaders in the Lisbon summit. The alliance commits itself to preventing crises, managing conflicts and stabilizing post-conflict situations around the globe. This is obviously not the NATO we knew in the Cold War years. To justify a political role in the absence of a common enemy, the Lisbon concept emphases “common values” among member countries. It is reaffirmed that the “alliance is based on common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.” NATO’s essential mission is described in a similar manner: to ensure that the alliance remains an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security and shared values.

It is true that a coherent alliance identity requires common values. These, however, cannot be achieved by stating them but by practicing them. Old habits of looking for an enemy (be it Iran or Russia) contradict the claims of the new NATO as a “community of values.”

Will European liberal values survive: the Austrian case

2010-11-15T06:31:00.000-08:00

Did you hear about the statements made by Turkey’s ambassador to Vienna, Kadri Ecvet Tezcan, on mistakes being made in the process of integration of Turks into Austrian society? And do you know about the reaction by the Austrian government to the ambassador’s criticisms?

It is time to remind you all: Everyone is watching everyone else. There is no way to hide behind national boundaries when it comes to human rights, basic freedoms and the threat of racism. It seems that a number of European countries need a good lecturing on human rights.

For decades now Turkish intellectuals, NGO activists and journalists have joined Europeans in criticizing Turkey’s human rights record and pressed for improvements in this field. Thank God their concerns have been gradually addressed by Turkish governments. But we know that at the beginning the Turkish side was rather reluctant, frequently accusing foreigners of meddling in Turkey’s domestic affairs. These days have now passed for Turkey. Our government has learned that it has to be transparent on human rights issues and be ready to face criticisms raised in international platforms by governmental and non-governmental bodies.

In this latest incident I cannot see that level of understanding from the Austrian government. While Turkey has been improving itself, getting to know the trends in international law, global politics and international social movements on human rights, it is a pity that a country in the center of Europe fails to understand any of these.

You have criticized Turkey for decades but feel offended when concerns about right-wing movements are expressed by the Turkish ambassador. You freely and rightly point to the question of the integration of Alevis and Kurds in Turkey, but you think you are exempt from criticism about the way in which immigrants are treated in Austria, or for that matter, in any other European country. You tell us everyday what to do in our domestic matters but get upset when we tell you how to handle the problem of racism and integration.

Please, no one should embrace this old notion of “non-interference in domestic affairs.” This is the habit of authoritarian governments, you may remember, all over the world. It is an embarrassment for Europe to have governments that try to defend their wrongdoings in domestic affairs by hiding behind the non-interference principle.

Sorry guys, as you watch us we watch you too. We all have to be sincere and open to criticism.

Just look at the way the Austrian government has responded to the Turkish ambassador’s remarks: Tezcan was summoned to Austria’s foreign ministry and the Austrian foreign minister telephoned his Turkish counterpart to complain. A spokesman from the Austrian foreign ministry claimed that Tezcan “crossed many red lines.”

Well, I really loved this typical reactionary response by the Austrian side! Do they really think that they live in an age of absolute sovereignty in which they can do whatever they wish to people living in their national boundaries, and still expect the world to remain silent? This is totally anachronistic. When it comes to human rights and fundamental freedoms this Westphalian principle has long since been abandoned in international law. Just remember the human rights conventions that the Austrian government is also a signatory to.

The spokesman argued that the Turkish ambassador does not represent all Turks in Austria because half of them are Austrian citizens. Well, it is even more embarrassing, isn’t it?

Instead of blatantly rejecting the criticism, the Austrian government should take the problem of immigrants, whether they are their own citizens or not, very seriously. We all know that this is a serious problem. Do not get me wrong: It is serious not only for those migrants trying to make ends meet in Europe but also for what Europe stands for. The way foreigners are treated in Europe may slowly ruin the values of Europe such as equality, freedom and human rights -- including the right to be different.

Increasingly some EU member countries need “progress reports” on the way in which they treat their own citizens with migrant backgrounds as well as new migrants. It is not ethical at all to talk about human rights abroad while not facing your problems at home.

I think Europe should take warning signs and criticisms very seriously, if not for the sake of immigrants then for the survival of European liberal values

Statesman of the year

2010-11-08T20:20:00.000-08:00

Chatham House, the pioneering British think tank founded in 1920, is tomorrow giving its 2010 prize to the president of Turkey, Abdullah Gül.

Chatham House justifies the selection of President Gül for its prize as follows: “President Gül is recognized for being a significant figure for reconciliation and moderation within Turkey and internationally and a driving force behind many of the positive steps that Turkey has taken in recent years. Mr. Gül has worked to deepen Turkey’s traditional ties with the Middle East, mediate between the fractious groups in Iraq and bring together the Afghan and Pakistani leaderships to try to resolve disputes during 2009. He has also made significant efforts to reunify the divided island of Cyprus and has played a leading role, along with his Armenian counterpart, in initiating a process of reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia. President Gül is also recognized for being an unwavering proponent of anchoring Turkey in the European Union. Under his leadership, Turkey is consolidating civilian democratic rule and undergoing extensive political and legal reforms to bring the country closer to European standards of democracy and human rights.”

Gül’s election as president back in 2007 had signified Turkey’s straight path towards full democracy through reform policies at home and the EU anchoring abroad. Since then democratization has expanded and EU membership negotiations have continued. Yet there are still things to do.

The Chatham House statement refers to Gül’s contribution to Turkey’s EU accession process. In fact, as the minister of foreign affairs from 2003 to 2007 he was the architect and engineer of the process that resulted in the accession negotiations that started in 2005. Now as the president he is still an important actor who pushes for EU accession. If EU membership is Turkey’s “state policy,” as some describe the dynamics behind the EU process, then President Gül as the head of the state has a greater role to play. His high-level diplomacy in Europe along with the government’s efforts is absolutely essential. He is expected to be more visible in the arena of European public diplomacy.

Moreover, as president he is in a position to advise and encourage the Turkish government to take initiatives, possibly risky initiatives, to advance the EU process. Governments may be reluctant from time to time to take some bold and risky decisions as they are held responsible by the people. But sometimes leadership requires risk taking. At such moments encouragement by the head of the state, I think, matters. And such moments are approaching as negotiating chapters are blocked because of the Cyprus question. I have no doubt the Turkish government and the president are strongly supporting the talks in Cyprus. But the thing that will ease Turkey’s EU negotiation process is to open Greek Cypriot vehicles to Turkish ports, and this has to be done without delay or at the latest after the June 2011 elections.

The second such issue is the rapprochement with Armenia, a process that was initiated by the president’s historic visit in 2008 to Yerevan. The Chatham House Prize also recognizes President Gül’s role in the reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia. Yet the protocols signed in Zurich between the two countries have not been effective so far. The president rightly defined the protocols as “not dead,” but they have to be revived. For that he must be more active in diplomatic efforts in mending differences between Turkey and Armenia as well as Turkey and Azerbaijan.

Third, the Chatham House Prize praises President Gül’s contribution to reconciliation, mediation and moderation in Turkey and abroad. He is not a person who sits in the Çankaya presidential palace disconnected from the world around him. President Gül is indeed engaged with domestic and regional actors in order to build bridges and mutual understanding. He is certainly an additional force for the foreign policy efforts of the government in a region where diplomacy at the head-of-state level is highly valued. As such, President Gül has contributed to stability in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the normalization of Turkey’s relations with the Kurdish regional government in northern Iraq.

Moreover, he was the person who pushed the search for a solution to Turkey’s Kurdish question. His statement that “good things will happen” on the Kurdish question is still remembered. In line with this, President Gül explained on his trip to Britain that it is Turkey’s responsibility to develop ways to bring Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) members down from the mountains. What this means to me is that Turkey should take initiatives instead of waiting and thus wasting the opportunities presented by the cease-fire.

In short I must say that Chatham House has made the correct decision by presenting its 2010 prize to President Gül. While watching the award ceremony at the Banqueting House in London tomorrow evening, I will think that this prize is also recognition of Turkey’s maturing democracy and rising regional and global profile.

08 November 2010, Monday

Republic: a democracy or dicta?

2010-11-01T21:11:00.000-07:00

There is no value or meaning in a republic that doesn’t have democracy. If what is meant by democracy is “the sovereignty of the people,” then this is not possible without a democracy in any case. A republic is a style of state. What forms its essence is the principal that the source of power is the people. What is meant by the principal is that “sovereignty belongs to the people” is that the legitimacy of the leading power is dependent on the will of the people and not that of God or a dynasty.

In a republic where there is no democracy it is not the people, but the bureaucracy, those who have weapons at hand, who will remain sovereign. What will enable the people to be sovereign are free and fair elections, the freedom of ideas and beliefs as well as the freedom to form organizations, in other words it is democracy. A “plain” republic connotes nothing other than the digestion of people by those who prevail, this other than the exception of the general discourse regarding the sovereignty of the people. A republic without democracy is an administrative model in which the sovereign body is in possession of a people to direct and exploit, and not one in which the people maintain sovereignty.

The republic creates an understanding of sovereignty that gives way to the budding of democracies. However, it may transform into a sultanate not of a dynasty, but that of a “republican” state elite for many years, as in our case. However, “hakimiyet-i milliye” (the sovereignty of the people) is the main idea behind the Anatolian movement. Furthermore, the first assembly exaggerated this notion so much that it saw it’s self as the decisive power overlooking not just the legislation, but execution and judiciary. Because for the pro “hakimiyet-i milli” group, the only legitimate source of power was the people and the national will. They had no patience for the dominance of a single person let alone a dynasty and for this reason, a portion of them were discharged in 1923 and the remainder in 1925 and again in 1926. With the enactment of the “Takrir-i Sükun” law (The Sheikh Said rebellion martial law), sovereignty was taken from the parliament, meaning the people, and given to the government. Following this, the “single party dictatorship” was formed, but the name of the “regime” was always referred to as the “republic.” For years, discourse on national sovereignty was repeated and this is what was inscribed on the wall of parliament; however, deputies were appointed through party headquarters while the actuality of the sovereignty of the people was shelved.

Despite this, the people haven’t forgotten about the founding philosophy of the “Anatolian movement” -- The first free and just elections demonstrated that the republic took seriously the sovereignty of the people, overturning the bureaucratic dominants and appointing their own representatives as the leading power on May 14, 1950. Ever since that day the struggle has been between those who say that a republic is meaningless without a democracy, however, noting that it is something which will become a narrative vehicle for the bureaucratic dominion, and those who use republican discourse in order to legitimize their own sovereignty. This conflict continues because democracy is not an empty ideal; it is one that is worth the struggle. Democracy rests on the notions that the individual carries a moral value on their own and this quality then makes “freedom” both necessary and indispensible and that the market economy and a state of law work to complete these qualities. It is fundamental that respect is shown towards people’s cultural, ethnic, religious and financial differences.

Democracy is the name given to the regime wherein citizens are given a voice and honor through general and equal voting, free and just elections and the constitutional reassurance of basic rights and freedoms. Social and political truth is not “absolute” or “single.” There is no truth, but rather truths and democratic politics is a public activity in which these different truths and perceptions of advantage can compete freely and at times reach reconciliation. It carries with it a pluralism that does not contain a single perspective, method of solution or goal.

It is well worth the struggle for democracy because, in democracies people are equals. It makes possible the plural existence and representation of differences in society and the co-existence of different lifestyles. Democracy is a frame based on the competition between different views, attitudes and preferences; it requires that differences compete and reconcile, not that they become eliminated.

Can these values be given up on? The so called “republicans” should think again. How can the sovereignty of the people be possible without a democracy? Or is their main concern to maintain their own sovereignty in the name of a fake republicanism?

01 November 2010, Monday

Stop dog fighting, start dancing zorba and zeybek

2010-10-25T13:10:00.000-07:00

Last week Turkish and Greek leaders met once again to discuss ways to improve the relationship between the two countries. One issue on the agenda was to stop the “dog fights” of jets over the Aegean Sea.

In a world in which political borders are increasingly becoming blurred and insignificant this tension over airspace in the Aegean Sea region has become absurd. Social and economic dynamics would not allow the continued militarization of relations between the two countries. Being locked into such a narrow issue prevents the ability to reach full cooperation. It will be the business sector and civil society that will lose if they sit back and idly watch cooperation opportunities become hijacked by security concerns and historical prejudices.

Turkey and Greece share much in common. One such commonality is the militarism that still haunts both countries. Greece has been luckier than Turkey as it moved faster on the EU track in consolidating its democracy. Another advantage was that Greece did not have an “official ideology” that served as an obstacle to democratization and created a strong solidarity among the privileged state elite. Ironically, Turkey’s official ideology is named after Kemal Atatürk, who was born in Thessaloniki, a city within the borders of Greece today.

The Greeks have another source of militarism: the fear of Turkey. The fact that Greece was under Ottoman-Turkish rule for nearly 400 years has influenced the Greek identity. The Greek adventure in the Asia Minor that resulted in heavy defeat and the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Greeks from Anatolia has left an indisputable impact on the Greek psyche. Being a Greek had meant being anti-Turkish for a long time. Greek national identity was largely built in the shadow of their historical encounters with the Turks. The Cyprus question, the Aegean sea dispute and Western Trace added to this picture and justified their adversarial positioning vis-à-vis Turkey.

But for a decade or so things have started to change slowly yet significantly. Membership in the EU and the welfare it generated built Greek national confidence enabling it to rethink the “Turkey question.” I think current Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou was among the first who initiated the rethinking about Turkey by supporting the Turkish bid for full membership in the EU. Together with his “friend” and colleague, former Minister of Foreign Affairs Ismail Cem, he laid the groundwork for a new approach that regarded Turkey’s integration into the EU as a stabilizing development in the region. In this new thinking the integration not exclusion of Turkey is expected to strengthen regional peace, security and stability. Moreover, the consolidation of democracy in Turkey is believed to ease Greece’s security concern, given that Turkey under authoritarian rule would be a far greater problem for Greece as well as other regional countries. As a result, Greece by 1999 started to support Turkey’s EU accession process through which democratization would be consolidated.

Greece under the leadership of the senior Papandreou had failed in understanding the calls of Turkish Prime Minster Turgut Özal for new beginnings in bilateral relations. In late 1980s Turgut Özal wanted the Greek government to focus on expanding economic relations while shelving off hot political issues. His approach reflected a liberal position: Once economic and social interdependencies were formed the contested political disputes could be solved more easily.

It has been more than 20 years since then and Turkey and Greece are now closer to settling hot political issues with the understanding that economic and social interactions should not be disturbed in the pursuit of political competition.

Greece and Turkey can be conceived as a single economic zone. They can work together in Europe, the Balkans and the Middle East. I cannot think of better natural allies than Turks and Greeks. They should rediscover each other. Once they do so I am pretty sure that they will be inseparable. It is time to stop “dog fighting” and start dancing the “zorba” and “zeybek” together.

25 October 2010, Monday

Three reasons why the CHP cannot change

2010-10-18T20:18:00.000-07:00

Having changed its leader, will the Republican People’s Party (CHP) be able to adopt a new political language and program? This has been optimistically expected of the “new” CHP. It seems that Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and his new team are aware of the need to do something to reach out to new social sectors in order to make the party electable in the upcoming elections.

But they face resistance within the party, as reflected in the controversy over whether the CHP will join in the Republican Day reception at Çankaya, where the wife of the president will be present, wearing her headscarf. While Kılıçdaroğlu has hinted that he might go to Çankaya on Oct. 29, other party officials had already declared that they would boycott the reception.

These confusing messages show that changing the CHP is not an easy task. The key debate in this is “secularism.” Will the CHP remain a single-issue party focusing on the claim that secularism is in danger or will it adopt a moderate notion of secularism and move on to develop a social democratic agenda?

It will not easy for the CHP, which has based its policies for years on the claim that “secularism is under threat,” to suddenly say that “secularism is not under threat.” Obviously it is hard to explain this radical shift to the grass roots and the party elites, and justify such a shift in ideological terms.

Even if the party leadership wishes to transform the party into one which has a moderate republican stance with a social democrat agenda there are structural obstacles before the CHP undertaking such an endeavor. First of all there is the resistance of the party elites and the old guards who rightly calculate that policy change will undermine their presence in the party. Although some of them supported Kılıçdaroğlu’s leadership, they now accurately conclude that if the party transforms itself into a social democratic entity it will not need the old guards, who do not have any significant social representation. They supported the leadership change but will not tolerate the change of identity and polices from the old radical Kemalist-secularist notion of republicanism.

The second important obstacle before the transformation of the party is the grass roots. For some people the CHP is a safe harbor in a rapidly changing environment -- the last bastion of secularism. It has been more than a political party; it is a safety net, a front. Under the pressure of such elements, the CHP turned into a reactionary party of those who feel insecure in the face of radical social, economic and political transformations. These people are now shocked by the Kılıçdaroğlu’s statements about the headscarf issue and secularism not being under threat.

The dilemma for the CHP is that it cannot change its discourse without risking losing at least some of its supporters. The CHP has been imprisoned by its own strategy of rallying people through fear, the fear that secularism and republican values are in danger. Now it is extremely difficult for the CHP to calm those people who have been alarmed by the CHP itself.

The third obstacle is ideological. Unless the CHP abandons Kemalism and denounces the Kemalist past, it cannot evolve into a social democrat party since Kemalism gives priority to the state and state authority over the people. Kemalism is the ideology of single-party rule in which the state apparatuses were extensively used to coerce the people. For any party competing in democratic race Kemalism is not an asset but a liability since it is incompatible with democracy and free choice. This is a hard fact that the new CHP leadership should understand if they really wish to “renew” the party.

In sum, the political elite, grass roots and Kemalism are three obstacles before the transformation of the CHP. To reach new social segments, the CHP must be ready to sacrifice at least some of its old grass roots. This is the dilemma. The fact that the next election is so close ties the hands of the new leadership. If they do not meet expectations and perform better than the former leader, Deniz Baykal, it will be hard to keep their posts at the top of the party. The referendum might have been a source of strength for changing the party if the “no” votes had gotten the majority. With the heavy defeat in the referendum, the CHP leadership cannot risk splitting the party in the name of change. But, unless they change the party and adopt a new political language and strategy, it is unlikely that they can appeal to new social segments in order to win majority in the next general elections.

18 October 2010, Monday

The ‘deep state’ that Demirel knows

2010-10-11T20:42:00.000-07:00

Encountering and admitting past mistakes are the keys to building peace, reconciliation and democracy. Then, one day, apologies will come, too. What raises hopes for the future of Turkish democracy is the increasing willingness of the people to question past mistakes.

There are many examples. For instance, this is the 50th anniversary of the 1960 military coup, which overthrew an elected government and executed its prime minister, Adnan Menderes, and two of his ministers. Never in the past had the 1960 coup and its unlawful and disgraceful policies been discussed and denounced as has been the case this year. Even the leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, openly criticized the coup’s instigators and the executions. This was important because the CHP had always welcomed the coup and the regime that it established.

In the spring of 2008, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan raised the issue of non-Muslim minorities and the way we behaved towards them. He described the treatment as “fascistic policies that cannot be defended.” In this context, the 1915 Armenian massacre and the Sept. 6-7 events of 1955 were debated much more openly. Later, we discussed the massacre of Alevis in Dersim in 1938 in heartbreaking detail that I have never before witnessed in the past.

Encountering and admitting past mistakes is not limited to these events, of course. The Ergenekon case enabled us to learn about the activities of the “deep state.” During the recent referendum the Sept. 12, 1980 coup was widely discussed in public.

An important addendum to this debate came from Süleyman Demirel, who was prime minister at the time of the military coup. He argued that the “bloodshed prior to the coup was there in order to bring Kenan Evren [then the chief of General Staff] to power.”

Demirel refers to widespread violence that claimed thousands of lives before the military took over the government. He implies that the violence was organized in order to pave the way for the military takeover. For that he asks, “How [is it that] the blood that was shed on Sept. 11 stopped suddenly on Sept. 13?” He implies the violence that preceded the coup was orchestrated, or tolerated, under the martial law to justify the military coup. This, of course, overlaps with a well-known confession of one of the leaders of the coup who said that they “waited until the conditions were ripe to intervene.”

Demirel’s unexpected challenge is very important. He is not an ordinary politician. He was the one who knew the most about the “deep state,” as prime minister repeatedly since 1965 and president between 1993 and 2000. As president, Demirel became very popular in the military and among the secularists as he openly supported the so-called Feb. 28, 1997 post-modern military coup. He worked closely with the military to topple the coalition government formed by the Welfare Party (RP) and the True Path Party (DYP) – a party that had been founded by Demirel himself.

If Demirel is saying something about the deep state, he must be taken seriously. Once he said that the “deep state exists, and it is the military.” Today he is implying that the deep state arranged the conditions for a military coup. I wonder what he thinks of more recent “preparations” for a military coup, as displayed in the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases.

Is he contributing to uncovering past mistakes, or has he lost hope for the “deep state” that he has earned the trust of in recent years? Well, my guess is that even Demirel has understood that the process of democratization is irreversible.

11 October 2010, Monday

Ever closer to a Kurdish solution?

2010-10-04T21:05:00.000-07:00

Hopes for a solution to the Kurdish question are rising again. In this, the referendum process and its results seem to play a significant role.

The result in general vindicated the ruling party’s “democratic initiative” directed at solving the Kurdish question. This was so especially due to the fact that the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) based its “no” campaign on the government’s democratic initiative, re-named the “destruction plan.” The government was sensitive to such opposition given the strong nationalist constituency within the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) itself. Therefore, the results relieved the ruling party from the nationalist pressure encouraging it to take bold new initiatives on the Kurdish question.

Furthermore, the referendum results indicated that the ruling party is very likely to emerge victorious from the upcoming elections, remaining in power until 2015. With this confidence the AK Party is in a position to strike some sort of deal with the Kurdish elements in Turkey. In addition to the confidence of the ruling party, the Kurdish elements, including the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Abdullah Öcalan, the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) and Iraqi Kurdish leaders, have understood that their counterpart in Ankara is the governing party that is here to stay for some time to come. The weakened position of the military in Turkish politics and the unlikely prospect of the Republic People’s Party (CHP) winning the next election have compelled the Kurdish elements to look to the government instead of the military or the CHP in order to proceed with a solution process.

The referendum results displayed the strength of the BDP in the Southeast. Yet it also demonstrated the limits of its power. The BDP managed to hold on to its constituency but could not dominate the whole region. Moreover, it faced ever-growing pressure of the locals, civil society and emerging Kurdish bourgeoisie for a cease-fire and peace. All of these constituencies may have pushed the BDP to settle for a political process.

So conditions are ripe for the “second democratic initiative” to be built on the experiences of the “first,” which was not successful in achieving concrete results aside from promoting discussion of the Kurdish in society at large. The government launched its initiative in August 2008, but slowly grew hesitant, especially over the way the PKK members entered Turkey through the Habur border gate and after the PKK’s Tokat assault. The government felt that it was left on its own and that the initiative may cost losing the upcoming elections.

All opposition parties, including the BDP, opposed the government initiative one way or another. There was also an unspoken element in the process: public silence and operational activism of the military. The concern was that the military high command expected that the AK Party government would pay the price of the democratic opening at the polls. As a result, on the one hand they kept silent to be able to place the blame entirely on the ruling party when it was all said and done, and on the other hand adopted a policy of operational activism in the region, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides.

The resultant picture was that the government felt left on its own, carrying the whole burden, and so they took up a cautious policy approach. Now we are in a new stage. All sides are more confident and appear transparent. We should never forget that the process is fragile, but at the same time there is a room for optimism.

The key to the solution is to recognize the fact that resorting to violence is now a serious barrier to finding a political solution to the problem. This position is gaining strength among the Kurdish constituency. The second key problem is “who to talk to?”

If we want to stop violence we have to talk to the PKK and persuade it to lay down arms and secure its political existence. Yet this has to be done through a “political agency.” In Turkey one cannot bargain directly with the PKK and then make this deal acceptable to the people at large. For that a “legitimate and representative political agent” is an absolute must. Otherwise a durable solution will not come about simply because the government that reached a deal with the PKK would be overthrown in the next election, reversing the entire peace process.

Therefore, to secure a last solution to the question, the PKK should not be a public and direct “counterpart of the government.” There the role and responsibility of political actors arise. There could be no better counterpart than a political party that holds many local governments and is represented in the parliament. The BDP cannot escape from its responsibilities. It cannot pass the ball to the PKK and Öcalan. There could be deals with the PKK and Öcalan, but any deal can only be sold to the Turks via the agency of the BDP. If BDP leaders really want a solution they should take their responsibility in mediating a settlement.

04 October 2010, Monday

Post-referendum Turkey

2010-09-27T22:51:00.000-07:00

In light of the recent referendum, Turkey will for the medium term be characterized with stability and continuity. The referendum results show that after eight years in power the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) is still the most formidable political movement on the scene.

Given the failure of its opponents in six electoral tests in the last seven years, one can safely predict another term in office for the AK Party after the upcoming 2011 general election. The referendum proved the weakness of the AK Party’s opponents even when they unite all their forces. This tells us that the presidential election to be held in 2012 is very likely to be won by the AK Party candidate.

From this picture one can argue that Turkish politics have entered a new stage of predictability under the leadership of the conservative-liberal-democrat block. This does not mean that there will be a consensual political process engaged in by all political, economic and social forces. As democratization and economic development disturbs established interests, witnessing harsh debates and conflicts will come as no surprise. But domestic and international actors should not expect turmoil, chaos or even uncertainty in Turkey.

Stability and continuity will go hand-in-hand with a process of change. Therefore, a new Turkey that experiences “change in stability and continuity” is ahead. The short-term outcome of this will be twofold: economic development and democratization.

The crisis is over. The Turkish economy is now expected to grow quickly, faster than any European economy, and compete with China’s growth rate. Turkey is poised to become a rising star of the global economy. As such, it is no longer a burden on its partners, particularly the EU, but an asset. A strong and expanding economy complements Turkey’s rising regional profile. It is in fact the infrastructure of an active and assertive foreign policy pursued in recent years. Turkey today is in a position to carry an active regional policy supported by its flourishing economy, dynamic society and stronger democracy.

Economic development will also contribute to the redistribution of wealth, spreading into the depths of Anatolia. İstanbul-based big capital will continue to lose the share it holds in the Turkish economy while so-called Anatolian capital, in cooperation with the dynamics of a market economy and globalization, will continue to rise. So the reign of İstanbul capital in both economy and politics will go without any prospect of a comeback. Those who try to understand the Turkish economy should, therefore, pay more attention to the trends and dynamics in increasingly diverse Anatolian business. Another element of change will take place with respect to the process of democratization, which will have at least two central themes: a new constitution and a solution to the Kurdish question. The ruling party has committed itself to working for a new constitution. All other political parties, in one way or another, express the need for a completely new constitution. In the run-up to the next election, a brand new constitution will, therefore, be on the agenda.

Pandora’s box has been opened. The “democratic opening” cannot be reversed. Expectations are high for a solution. While the referendum result vindicated the government’s policy and encouraged it to launch a brave new initiative, the Peace and Democracy Party’s (BDP) boycott strategy demonstrated both its strength and the limits of its power. Thus, both sides are in a position to break the deadlock. The search for peace and a durable solution seems supported by a significant segment of society both among Turks and Kurds. Civil society representatives and independent intellectuals are pressuring the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the BDP front to demilitarize the Kurdish question as a prelude to a democratic solution. In short, Turkey is in a position to address its problems in an era of stability under the continuing power of the conservative-liberal block. I think foreign observers should note Turkey’s new characteristics.

In this context I would advise EU officials to speed up the accession process not only because Turkey deserves it but also because the EU needs it. As Turkey stabilizes its economy and politics, there should be a place for it within Europe.

This stable Turkey under the leadership of the conservative-liberal block should also be properly understood by the Obama administration. In Ankara there exists an ally with democratic legitimacy and a mandate. This ally is prepared to work together to build regional peace, security and stability.

And one message to Israel and the Jewish lobby: Instead of supporting those who try to topple the government using whatever means available, they should learn to work with democratic representatives in Ankara. Turkey’s friendship is not independent of what Israeli policies are in the region; an aggressive Israel will never be an ally of Turkey. My advice to Israeli officials and the Jewish lobby is that their partners in Turkey are not the military and the media patrons but the elected government.

27 September 2010, Monday

How to modernize Kemalism

2010-09-20T23:01:00.000-07:00

After the defeat of the Kemalist-nationalists block in the referendum some have suggested to “modernize Kemalism.”
Is it possible?

Kemalism is all about authoritarian politics, a disciplined society and a controlled economy. Moreover, it envisages a homogenized nation. As such Kemalism is an ideological and bureaucratic device to control politics, the economy and society.

Please go ahead and modernize such an anachronistic model!

It is futile to try. Better to abandon it altogether and start thinking the fundamentals of politics, economy and society anew. Otherwise the legacy of Kemalism will continue to distort anything “modern” in the re-thinking.

Kemalism is not dead. It will survive, not as an official ideology, but one among many other ideologies that compete in a free and open society. What is ending is the domination of Kemalism over the state, economy and society.

I have no problem with such a state of affairs. What bothers me and many liberals is the exhortation of the Kemalists to surrender from all segments of society, its pretention that Kemalism is the supreme ideology, the one to which everyone is obligated to show allegiance.

Once an ideology acquires state protection, through which it establishes an unfair supremacy over the rest, then there can be no free market of ideas. Each idea should be freely competing with one another without unfair external interferences. Kemalists are worried because their ideology cannot compete in the free market of ideas. It needs the backing of the state apparatus which is being eroded.

Those who suggest modernizing Kemalism should understand that “modern Turkey” has gone beyond Kemalism, soft or hard-line, modernized or conventional. It is a straight-jacket torn up by the development of economy and society.

Yes, “neo-Kemalism” is possible. In fact such a revival of Kemalism has occurred in recent years influencing urban, educated and professional “white Turks.” But their displayed ideological poverty is striking. They invite the military to rule the country and oppose EU membership, an alliance with the West and globalization. The “neo-Kemalists” envisage an inward-looking Turkey disconnected from the world because they know that this is the only way to re-establish control over politics, economy and society. They also deeply dislike the Kurds, disturbed by any reflection of “difference” in the public sphere.

The most hated three things for the neo-Kemalists are “democratic politics, open society and market economy.” The reason for this is apparent: these are the things that make the control over politics, economy and society impossible.

Kemalism reminds people of arbitrary rule, exclusion, and oppression. It is a system of indoctrination devised to generate a right to rule for the bureaucratic elite and its civilian allies. Thus Kemalism has been alien to the idea of democratic competition and the belief in the rule by the people. Kemalism and democracy are incompatible. Not only is Kemalism alien to the idea of democracy but also it cannot live in a democratic competition.

These two, Kemalism and democracy, are mutually exclusive.

Any political movement that wishes to appeal to the masses should disassociate itself from Kemalism because Kemalism has been an apparatus of control and oppression from the very beginning.

Take the example of “social democracy” in Turkey. Some are shocked by the fact that those who claim to be social democrats in Turkey, like the Republican People’s Party (CHP), have never built a movement consistent with universal ideas and ideals of social democracy. Instead of defending the poor and the disadvantaged, they struggled for the rights of the privileged; instead of calling for a just distribution of wealth and social solidarity they primarily focus on the “lifestyles of the secular, urban, educated elite.”

The reason for this ill-birth of social democracy in Turkey is that the CHP, the vanguard of Kemalism, emerged claiming to be a social democrat party under the leadership of Bulent Ecevit in early 1970s. Out of the marriage between Kemalism and social democracy is the current CHP. The result is that Kemalism poisoned social democracy, and social democracy has never recovered.

I think the Kemalists, too, had better to get ready for a post-Kemalist republic in which Kemalism is only one among other ideologies, without state protection, seeking the acceptance of people in the free market of ideas.

20 September 2010, Monday

Towards a Post-Kemalist republic

2010-09-13T11:07:00.000-07:00

People power is rebuilding Turkey politically by getting rid of Kemalist tutelage through referendum. By approving overwhelmingly the constitutional package people have overcome by democratic means the resistance of the Kemalist power elite that did everything to defend their position.

It has become crystal clear once more that people in this country have always opted for a more democratic regime when they are asked.

For this very reason, for many years the Kemalist elite tried to hijack power from the people through authoritarian means. They produced hundreds of excuses not to give the right to choose to the people who were treated by the Kemalists as uneducated and unable to make decisions about their lives. Yet each democratic election in this country since 1950 proved the democratic maturity and wisdom of the people, and the poverty of Kemalist thinking. Whenever the people had the right, they gave historic lessons to the Kemalist Jacobeans as was the case in 1950, 1961, 1983 and 2007.

The referendum results shows once more that the Kemalist elite in media, politics, academia and business are incapable of reading the new dynamics of Turkish politics and understanding the democratic aspiration of the people. This is a pity for them. Those foreigners who look to them to make sense of Turkish politics miss what goes on in Turkey. The Kemalist elite live in a dream disconnected from the realities of Turkey and the world. Even the top social scientists among them are blinded by ideological/Kemalist prejudices -- unable to grasp the process, dynamics and actors of change in Turkey.

Let me explain what has happened: The referendum result has proved people are capable of making their own constitution and that the CHP and its Kemalist allies are not in a position to stop it.

The liberal/democrat/conservative alliance for democratic reform has won over the nationalist pro-status quo front. Once more it has been proved that the Kemalists’ resistance to change is futile. They have been defeated by the dynamics of change.

This is a step forward to a post-Kemalist republic. A republic that is not ruled by the state elite but by the people like in all democratic regimes; a republic in which power is not monopolized by a few high bureaucrats and judges but shared by the people. This is a move from a republic under the tutelage of a civilian-military bureaucracy to a fully functioning liberal democracy.

The masses at large understand quite well that sovereignty belongs to people, and this comes only through democracy.

The referendum results will have political implications. First, it demonstrated that there exists a very strong pro-change and pro-reform social base that is undoubtedly represented by the ruling AK Party. From now on AK Party leadership is expected to be bolder with democratic reforms. My guess is that the AK Party will abandon its hesitant reformist stand and embrace its reformist agenda that includes a brand new constitution and a solution to the Kurdish question.

The CHP with its Kemalist allies, the white Turks and civilian and military bureaucracy, will hopefully understand the limits of their power, that they cannot veto the process of democratization and that they cannot sustain their unfair privileges, which were acquired in the ancient authoritarian regime. Otherwise they will remain as marginal elements in Turkish politics hopelessly fighting for privileges in an open society and democratic polity.

Turkish and Kurdish nationalists who allied with the CHP are the absolute losers. The MHP leadership will certainly face increasing opposition in the coming days. Traditional MHP voters will never forgive Devlet Bahçeli for allying the party with the CHP. This may push the MHP below the 10 percent national threshold in the upcoming elections in 2011. A leadership change in the party is inevitable. Another loser is the BDP. While the grassroots of the party was overwhelmingly positive about the constitutional package, the leadership insisted on a boycott. The result is a defeat.

Anyhow, a post-Kemalist republic is in the making…

13 September 2010, Monday

Who is afraid of Europeanization?

2010-09-06T13:25:00.000-07:00

The proposed constitutional amendments bring Turkey closer to European standards of democracy and human rights. From the beginning, many EU representatives have acknowledged this fact.

A constitutional change that introduces ombudsmen, provides civil servants with the right to bargain collectively, establishes the principle of positive discrimination for the disadvantaged and protects an individual’s privacy can hardly be opposed from a European perspective.

In this context, it is important to note who is, on one hand, initiating and supporting the proposed changes, and who is, on the other, opposing this latest attempt at Europeanization.

One expects the Kemalists represented by the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the civilian-military bureaucracy, including the judiciary, to be behind the democratic novelties introduced by the constitutional amendment package. But this is not the case. The Kemalists, who used to claim to be the Westernizing force in Turkey, are opposed to the constitutional amendments. And this is not the first time they have been the ardent anti-Western, staunch defender of the status quo in Turkey. It has been going on for a long time, and it is not an accident of history.

I have come to the conclusion that the Kemalists have not abandoned the idea, and ideals, of Westernization. In fact they have never taken up such an objective in their entire history. What they were interested in was to capture and maintain power. The key for the Kemalists was to exclude, marginalize and delegitimize conservative/Islamic elements that appeared in the early 20th century and to make the conservatives stick to traditional practices and remain skeptical about the West and modernization. To the Kemalist, they represented the East, Islam and backwardness. As such they had no right to rule the country or to share in power. The more the new ruling elite, the Kemalists, emphasized their “Western” orientation, the more they generated their “right to rule.”

Thus, Westernization was not something to achieve but a tool of discourse used to exclude conservative Islamic groups. In the name of Westernization the Kemalists justified their monopoly of power.

They also told Westerners the same story that the conservatives looked towards Arabian Islam, that they could not be trusted, that they had to be controlled by the progressive, and Western oriented, Kemalists.

Westerners, lacking contact with, and insight into, the ordinary people of Anatolia believed this grand lie of the Kemalists. For them, the authoritarian ruling-elite, the Kemalists, were progressive and were trying to establish a modern state and society -- while the backwards Islamists fought to stop this process.

The story was quite the opposite right from the beginning. The first anti-Kemalist opposition in the first Turkish Grand National Assembly (1920-1923) is known as the Second Group. They struggled against the dictatorial tendencies of Mustafa Kemal. They believed in the supremacy of the parliament and were committed to the motto that in a republic, sovereignty belonged to people. The members of the Second Group were largely liberals who managed to pass a law -- known as the Law for Individual Freedoms in 1922 -- that guaranteed individual rights and freedoms. The second opposition party established in 1924, the Progressive Republican Party, had a party program and parliamentary record that are described by experts like Erik Zürcher as a liberal party. It was closed down by the government after the Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925. The third party, the Free Republican Party, was established with the blessing of Mustafa Kemal in 1930 and was also a liberal party.

In sum, even in 1920s and 1930s there was a liberal opposition whose values were consistent with modern ideas and ideals of democracy, human rights and people’s sovereignty. From the beginning, the Kemalist authoritarianism did not allow the emergence of a plural, competitive and democratic polity in Turkey. They justified this on the grounds that the people were not ready. People were in fact ready, ready to the extent that the war of independence was fought with a people’s parliament that was jealously guarding its authority from the president of the parliament and the leader of independence movement, Mustafa Kemal. But in the “Second Parliament,” elected in the summer of 1923, there was not a single deputy from the opposition Second Group. All were eliminated. The Kemalists managed to wield total power and started with a policy of homogenizing the nation. All ethnic, religious and ideological groups seen in competition with the Kemalist regime were suppressed.

In this historical juncture, “Westernization” was utilized to legitimize the Kemalists’ power and exclude the conservatives, despite their being the dominant social force. But things started to change in 1999 when the EU recognized Turkey as a candidate country. Westernization along the EU membership process turned into a tool to control the excessive state power dominated by the Kemalists and to democratize the Kemalist polity, and thus began to empower the people vis-a-vis the state.

The conservative/Islamic people have woken up to this reality by supporting accession to the EU. They have understood that that Europeanization meant a democratic, plural and open society and market economy emancipating the masses from the Kemalist yoke. This re-positioning of conservative social and political forces has placed the Kemalists at the off-side of history. The Kemalists, who stood naked in their authoritarian and anti-Western disposition, have waged a war against Turkey’s Europeanization and democratization through their representatives in politics, business and bureaucracy.

This is the background to the Kemalists’ opposition to constitutional change. They do not accept the principle that people have the right to choose who will represent them.

06 September 2010, Monday

Headscarf: yardstick for democratic credentials

2010-08-30T01:45:00.000-07:00

The headscarf issue is a useful yardstick to measure one’s democratic credentials. An attitude that dares to interfere in people’s choice of clothing would drag us all the way down into authoritarianism. There, others would move further and interfere in the way in which people think, believe and live.

My position on this is issue is simple: nobody is in a (superior) position to determine how the others dress. Banning headscarves goes against the very spirit of this age of liberty and equality.

When the Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader announced that the issue will be resolved by their initiative many, including myself, were nicely surprised. A committee within the party headed by Professor Sencer Ayata has started an investigation into the matter. The expectation was that the sociology professor in charge would dump the old policy of the CHP that blocked the way for the freedom to wear headscarves, particularly in universities.

The outcome so far is disappointing. Last week Professor Ayata proposed a middle-way solution: cover only some part of hair and keep the rest open as is exemplified by the traditional way of wearing the headscarf in Anatolia in order not to offend the secularists. He also declared their intention to consult Islamic scholars to see if this was in perfect harmony with the notion of a secular state that should be free from the rulings of religious authority. Instead, the CHP’s steering committee could have come up with a simple idea: that they have no business interfering in the choices of individuals. No, they have once demonstrated that the CHP is incapable of transforming itself. The headscarf issue has in fact become a way to test the ability of some social and political forces to adapt themselves to new circumstances. In this, Islamic circles in Turkey have proved their ability to develop new responses to old problems. When headscarves became a problem in universities during the 1980s, the argument of Islamic scholars and intellectuals was that wearing a headscarf was an “Islamic obligation” for Muslim women. That is to say that they defend the headscarf through an Islamic language of “obligation.” They engaged in debates with the secularists to prove that wearing the headscarf is part of Muslim women’s religious duties. But in the late 1990s, Islamic groups changed their language, logic and basis for defending the headscarf, which was portrayed by secularists as a symbol of jihad against the Kemalist regime.

Islamic groups brought in the idea of human rights to justify the headscarf, talking about the freedom of choice, the right to an education, equality before law, freedom of expression and conscience. They frequently referred to international human rights conventions and applied to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on the grounds that their fundamental rights had been breached by state policy in Turkey. Activists often gave examples from European countries and the ECtHR, not from Iran or Saudi Arabia, to establish the right for girls to wear headscarves in universities. All this shows that Islamic groups began using the language of modernity to defend their lifestyles and belief system.

The right to an education, the principle of non-discrimination, the ECtHR and international human rights conventions are often referred to in defense of the headscarf, not Islam which they believe is the absolute source/frame of reference. This is because universal norms and values have been discovered by Islamic groups as a way to protect their identity and lifestyle. In order to preserve the particularities of Islam and Islamic identity they needed, and therefore utilized, the universal; to enjoy and protect the particular (Islam) they approved and then applied the universal. This came out of the belief that Islamic self-references do not explain much, that they do not justify any demand in the context of real-politik and that they do not bring about any results in contemporary Turkey. Thus they started to speak with modern notions/concepts of rights. They departed from an Islamic self-referentialism in favor of a universal language with a transformation of discourse and probably identity as well.

Some Islamic intellectuals use the term and idea of a “social consensus” to resolve the problem of the headscarf. The basis of such a consensus is to present the headscarf as an issue of religious freedom and a basic human right. The search for a social consensus implies that it can be sought on a non-religious/secular ground, that is, liberal rights theories not that of the language of obligation within Islam.

While all these changes are taking place on the Islamic front, the Kemalists, politically represented by the CHP, continue to view the headscarf issue as a means to oppress, exclude and marginalize conservatives. But this authoritarian attitude has led to the marginalization of the Kemalists themselves who now appear as a movement that opposes the values of political modernity.

The result is striking: While Islamic circles have emerged as the new champions of individual rights and liberties, the Kemalists have stuck to anachronistic, authoritarian politics denying people the right to chose what to wear. I think the Kemalists have no idea how to deal with the post-Islamist turn in Turkey.

30 August 2010, Monday

The shame

2010-08-23T23:24:00.000-07:00

Hrant Dink was murdered on Jan. 19, 2007. Three days after his death my second column article appeared in Today’s Zaman, titled “Hrant Dink: the victim of the nation state.” There I explained how the murder of Dink was linked to the idea of a homogenized nation-state erected by expelling or silencing ethnic, religious and ideological “others.”

The same understanding of the nation state that is incapable of apologizing for the wrongs it has committed, as put by Orhan Kemal Cengiz last week, continues to hurt Hrant Dink’s memory. In a defense submitted to the European Court of Human Rights, Dink was compared to a Nazi leader and it was argued that restrictions on his writings could not be regarded as a breach of freedom of expression, since they contain “hate speech.” As if this embarrassing comparison was not enough, the defense of Turkish government also implied that Dink’s murderers were justified: It was Dink who was to blame for his own murder because he was found guilty of insulting Turkishness by the Turkish judiciary.

This shameful “defense” was prepared and sent to the European court by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs without the knowledge of the foreign minister himself. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu expressed his shock and sadness about the language used in the defense prepared in his own ministry, noting that he was not aware of such content. President Abdullah Gül received Dink’s family and tried to heal their renewed sorrow, while the Minister of Justice expressed his disapproval of the defense submitted to the European court.

All of this tells us something: Those who write the opinions of the government in ministry offices do not care what the government feels, thinks or does on this issue. The reason for such an attitude is simple: They regard themselves as above the government, representing something “deeper.”

Thus the explanation from the Foreign Ministry that came after all these statements was no different. It stood behind its shame, describing the defense as consisting of “merely legal and technical elements.”

This incident reveals that the Foreign Ministry bureaucracy is a state within a state independent of the people and their representative government. They feel accountable not to the people and government but to something “deeper.” What they are not aware of is that the circles they owe their allegiance to have lost their power vis-à-vis the people through the process of democratization. Once the “modernizers” of Turkey, diplomats have for some time been unable to read the transformation of modern Turkey and the spirit of the time that reigns in Turkey.

I think time has come to look into the structure of the Foreign Ministry and the mindset of its diplomats. It is an institution that has remained untouched by the process of democratization.

One should tell them that they are not above the people and their representative government. The defense sent to the European court reflects the logic of the “old state elite” whose time has passed. We are sick and tired of this understanding of the state, interest of the state and defense of the state.

Defending the so-called interests of the state, whatever they are and whoever defines them, at the expense of citizens’ rights is no longer acceptable. This has to be conveyed to the bureaucrats in the Foreign Ministry who seem to have missed the changes taking place in Turkey recently.

Yes, the government has done a great job in many foreign policy issues, and Foreign Minister Davutoğlu is among the most successful members of the cabinet. Yet the need to face the old habits and mindset in the Foreign Ministry is obvious. Diplomats are not untouchables. The government should not work with those who embarrass the nation.

The Turkish Foreign Ministry should withdraw this shameful “defense.” It is not a “defense” of Turkey but a text that leaves Turkey “defenseless” before the eyes of the world.

23 August 2010, Monday

Turkish generals: Command the military or the country?

2010-08-02T23:22:00.000-07:00

I cannot imagine a democratic country where the promotion of some generals in the military is regarded as this important and debated this much as is the case in Turkey. People of a “normal” country would not care who is promoted and who retires in the military, knowing that such changes would not have any impact on his/her life.

For weeks now we have been debating the process and outcomes of the Supreme Military Council (YAŞ) meeting that convened yesterday. This is supposed to be a routine meeting deciding on the cases of promotion among the generals. But in reality it is different. The military attaches great importance to this meeting because it is the occasion where they shape the command structure of the military with long-term impact. Competition is fierce among various groupings, and what is at stake is very high.

Observing the whole process gives one the impression that it is not a simple change of military command but a change of government. And this is partly true. Simply because generals do not only command troops but lay a claim on commanding Turkey.

This is unacceptable, yet not untrue. This simple fact reveals undemocratic elements that still remain in Turkish polity. If Turkey were a fully functioning democracy why should we be concerned about a process of bureaucratic appointment?

Turkey is still struggling to establish full democracy that requires taking the military under civilian-democratic control. In this context YAŞ meetings are important for democratic forces, too. It is a mechanism that has to be utilized in order to bring the military accountable to the civilian government.

Yet through the YAŞ meetings the military resist changes. Civilians, the prime minister and the minister of national defense do not have any significant influence in YAŞ with 15 members where each has one vote. Thus, the prime minster sits there and accepts what the full generals decide in majority.

Under normal circumstances the military may be left to decide about its own high command. But this is an unusual year when one out of 10 generals is accused of plotting a military coup against the government according to the indictment of the Sledgehammer trial. In other words, 25 generals, 13 of whom expect promotion during this year’s YAŞ meeting, are “suspects” being tried for sentences of up to 20 years.

The court decided two weeks ago to arrest these generals. The arrest was warranted by the court’s “strong suspicion” about the suspects. Since then they have not turned up before the court and have not been arrested by the police. There were reports, not denied by the military so far, that those generals investigated by the police have been taken to “safe areas” by the General Staff.

This is really unbelievable. How can the military protect the suspects from justice?

Last week it was also leaked to the press that the General Staff provided legal advice to the suspects of the Sledgehammer trial. All these aimed at securing the promotion of those “suspected generals” since, according to the military personnel law, any military personnel who is arrested or accused of a crime punishable with more than a five years sentence cannot be promoted.

It is obvious that the military high command does not respect the law. But a military that does not abide by the law will lose the trust of the people. Many in this country rightly ask: What is more important, the promotion of a few “suspected” generals or the credibility of the military as a whole?

What is more is the fact that the generals who are on trial being accused of plotting a military coup are still in command of their troops. The alleged crime was to be committed by the troops under the command of these generals. They still hold their control over the means of the alleged crime.

This poses a great threat for Turkish democracy, and it is the duty of the government to remove it. If the government fails in this the people, who want the military to remain in its barracks respecting law and obeying civilian rulers, will hold the government, not the military, accountable.

02 August 2010, Monday

The CHP and European socialists: Any common ground?

2010-07-26T05:49:00.000-07:00

European social democrats seem puzzled by the Republican People’s Party (CHP). That a member of Socialist International opposes reforms for democratization and Europeanization is hard to believe, but if you just remember the history of the CHP it makes sense because this party is not a social democrat party.

It is a Kemalist party that envisions the nation as a homogenous whole, relies on bureaucratic, not people, power and is more concerned about protecting the ideology of the state, than the poor and dispossessed. Instead of standing for the international values of social democracy, the CHP stands for a narrow nationalism that sometimes seems xenophobic and anti-Western.

For those who follow the party line in recent years it is not surprising at all to see them
campaigning against the constitutional reform package. This party is opposed to any changes that weaken the established power of the state (bureaucracy) simply because it views itself as the “state,” and as the representative of the bureaucracy. People do not matter much.

Yet with the new leadership many, including some Europeans, expected some changes. They expect change because it would be natural and logical to change the old policy line that proved wrong, ineffective and failed. But the problem with the CHP’s leadership is that they are not even rational. Proof of this is the fact that a change in leadership only came about because of a sex scandal, not because of defeat in four elections and one referendum.

This is not a political party that the Europeans are familiar with. Assuming it is a social democrat party is totally mistaken. On this the European socialists have learned their lesson. Some European socialists called on the CHP to support the constitutional reform, arguing that it promotes social democratic values. They, of course, got the point. Positive discrimination for women and children is a part of a social democratic agenda. Expanding workers’ rights to allow them to stage a “general solidarity strike” is well-known demand and practice used by European socialists. Collective bargaining for civil servants, the ability to appeal to an ombudsman, trying coup plotters and enhancing the representative character of high courts can hardly be opposed from a social democratic point of view.

I think because he subscribes to this way of thinking and believes that the constitutional package promotes reform and freedom, Hannes Swoboda, an important figure among the European socialists, advised the CHP and its new leader “to stand behind this package and support it.”

The CHP reacted strongly by arguing that the European socialists are meddling in Turkey’s domestic affairs and that they are siding with a “right-wing political movement,” the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party). The letter sent to the socialist group in the European Parliament (EP) by the CHP’s Brussels office described the socialists’ call for yes as “scandalous” and shocked Europeans, who found it difficult to understand that this was how the party actually perceived the reforms.

Yes, that is how they view them, indeed. This is a pro-status quo party defending the indefensible: an ideological state ruled by a vanguard elite that disregards what people think.
The CHP is blinded by its ideological (Kemalist) stand. Democratization and Europeanization are believed to water down Kemalism and its constitutional, social and political base. Because of this the CHP has long been in alliance with the conservative military and the judiciary to stop, or at least slow down, steps taken in the direction of democratization and Europeanization. In order to maintain Turkey’s Kemalist character, from which the CHP derives the power it is unable to obtain through democratic means, it is ready to sacrifice anything, including social democracy and the friendship of European socialists.

I do not see any common ground between the European socialists and the CHP, which, if I may borrow a phrase from the letter sent to the European socialists by the CHP’s Brussels office, is a “right wing, authoritarian and non-European” political party.

26 July 2010, Monday

The CHP and the Kurdish question

2010-07-19T10:09:00.000-07:00

Given the ethnic and sectarian roots of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, some expect that the Republican People’s Party (CHP) under his leadership may take bold, new initiatives to resolve the Kurdish question.

Unfortunately, this has not been forthcoming. Since his election to the highest post in the CHP Kılıçdaroğlu has made no significant policy call to address the Kurdish question. He even tried to hide his Kurdish and Alevi origins. This has been the typical attitude of a “devşirme” ever since the time of the Ottoman Empire -- a person who climbed up through the state apparatus turned out to be the most ardent supporter of state policies to show his gratefulness to the system that brought him up to such a high position.

It appears Kılıçdaroğlu personally owes a lot to the Kemalist regime in which he succeeded to attain a high post in the state, becoming the leader of the CHP. Grateful to the regime, he appears ready to forget his ethnic and sectarian background, both of which are defined by the state as “problematic.”

Furthermore, there are more structural problems for the CHP to change its stance on the Kurdish question. The party represents something more than its current leader; its history, set of ideals and an agitated grass roots all stand against a democratic solution to the Kurdish question. Even if Kılıçdaroğlu wants to, he could not transform the CHP.

It is the CHP that holds the copyright to the policies that historically denied the existence of the Kurds, who at first were supposedly nonexistent but were later claimed to be “mountain Turks.” During the single-party rule of the CHP, the main policy towards the Kurds was to suppress and assimilate them. After a trip in the East in 1935, İsmet İnönü, the then prime minister, prepared a report on the “Eastern Question” in which he bravely outlined the need to accelerate policies of suppression to be accompanied by assimilation. In response to such policies, after 1925, dozens of Kurdish revolts took place in the region. During the Dersim revolt in the area where Kılıçdaroğlu’s grandfathers lived, thousands were killed in their villages and mountains by poison gas and air raids.

Following each rebellion by the Kurds, thousands were exiled to western Turkey, where they were excluded and marginalized.

All this was conducted simply because the presence of the Kurds went against the Kemalist idea of a homogenized nation-state for which the Kurds either had to perish or be assimilated. Thus the Kemalist regime was in fact not racist: It accepted the possibility of conversion!

We should, of course, be aware of a broader anomaly in the formative years of the Kemalist regime. The state had problems not only with the Kurds but with almost any “distinct” ethnic, religious, political and ideological grouping. Anyone who did not accept Kemalism as the ultimate source of authority, knowledge and wisdom was considered disloyal and subsequently suppressed.

This continued uninterrupted until 1950, when the Democrat Party (DP) won the first free and fair elections in Turkey, putting an end to the CHP’s single party government. The 1950s ruled by the DP were the calmest period in the region, seeing no revolt. Development and democracy were the two key factors to explain this. For the first time in the republican era, the Kurds started to get economic benefits instead of oppression from the center and were able to be represented in the center through Parliament. Thousands who were sent into “internal exile” were able to return home under the DP. The distribution of wealth and the participation in the political process eased the Kurdish perception of the central government, though there was still no policy change in the recognition of the Kurdish identity.

But there was a change in attitude. The DP under Adnan Menderes tried to integrate the Kurds into the new state. The CHP at the beginning of this period, however, warned the DP against doing this. İnönü, the president and chairman of the CHP, in late 1945 asked that the founders of the DP not do only one thing: “Do not open party branches in the East.”

But the DP approached the situation differently. Numan Esin, a member of the military junta that overthrew the DP government in 1960, shares information in his memoirs of their visit to Menderes, the prime minister who the junta hanged in 1961. Esin asks Menderes how they planned to resolve the “Eastern Question.” Menderes replied: “Our solution was democracy. By giving the liberties people deserve, we thought to solve the problem.”

Not much has changed in the 50 years since. While there was a proposal to solve the Kurdish question via a “democratic opening,” the CHP refrained from supporting it, even describing it as an act of treason. But it seems the CHP does give full support to military measures the government is working on. I think this tells us a lot. The CHP is still not far from its past policies concerning the Kurdish question. The only way they think of addressing the question is by using military means. We should not be unfair; they also suggest that some economic measures be taken, missing the whole point about the nature of the problem.

19 July 2010, Monday

Is democracy possible with Kemalism and the military?

2010-07-05T02:57:00.000-07:00

Last week the Friends of Turkey in the European Parliament organized a panel discussion in Brussels on “democratic changes in Turkey.” The panelists, including myself, touched upon various aspects of the process of democratization.

I particularly emphasized the role of Kemalism and the Kemalist military in the underdevelopment of Turkish democracy. Based on the questions I received at the end, it appeared that some Turkish participants with nationalist leaning were not happy with my selection of topics as they believe such “domestic issues” should not be discussed before Europeans. Sorry guys, but you better get used to all these disclosures about Kemalism and the military in any circles that discuss democracy in Turkey.

Is it possible to talk about democracy in Turkey and not mention the role of the Turkish military and the legacy of Kemalism as obstacles to democratization?

Of course not. It was the military that overthrew elected governments three times since 1950, finishing off whatever we had of democracy. Since 1961 Turkey has been ruled by constitutions made by coup makers who designed the order of things in this country according to their views and interests. While the military maintained a position of autonomy vis-a-vis elected governments, it reinforced itself as a “supervising” force over the social and political elements in Turkey. A regime of tutelage owned by the military in alliance with the high judiciary was established by the constitutions introduced by the military following military coups.

Democratization can be defined in Turkey as any step taken to get out of this tutelage regime installed by the military. It is therefore not surprising to see the privileged institutions of the state, including the military and the judiciary, resist change to the “system.”

Furthermore, it is nonsense to justify the military’s interventions by references to its so-called “role to safeguard secularism.” In three cases since 1960 in which the military deposed elected governments, those who sat in power were not “Islamists” but “center-right political parties” whose leaders had rather liberal political viewpoints and lifestyles.

Similarly, it is impossible to refrain from talking about Kemalism if the debate is about democracy in Turkey. There can be no official ideology in any democracy protected by the constitution and professed by state institutions as is the case in Turkey. In its preamble, the Turkish Constitution promises no protection for any views and activities that contravene Kemalism. Could there be freedom of thought and expression in such a system?

Unless Kemalism is abandoned as an ideology protected by the Constitution and the law, there can be no full-fledged liberal democracy in Turkey. Kemalism envisages a homogenized nation, a disciplined society and authoritarian politics. To achieve this it uses coercive means and state apparatuses. As such Kemalism is incompatible with democracy.

Furthermore, a system of coercion justified by an ideology (Kemalism) is not capable of evolving into democracy. Thus, in order to build a genuine democracy, Kemalism should be dropped as the state ideology.

In the panel discussion I mentioned above, a British member of the EP, Michael Cashman, claimed that Kemalism has always been for Westernization and Europeanization. Well, this is simply wishful thinking. Yes, they used to be the Westernizers of Turkey when they thought it was all about “imitating some cultural aspects of the West.” But realizing in the late 1990s that Westernization via EU membership requires a transformation of the Kemalist state, its hegemonic control over the economy, society and politics, they turned away from the idea and ideal of Westernization.

For contemporary Kemalists, the West is now an imperialist bloc determined to destroy Turkey as it tried through the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920 and to change the secular regime. For that the Kemalists believe the West is working with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Islamic groups, including the ruling party.

The Kemalists’ understanding of the West is limited to the Western lifestyle, listening to Western music and dressing like Westerners. But when it comes to Western political values like democracy, human rights and the rule of law, they immediately shy away from the West. And rightly so, because through such Western political values the Kemalists would lose their hegemonic position in Turkey. They do not want this because they think that they were “born to rule.” Being a loyal Kemalist is enough to be entitled to rule the people, who do not know what is good for them and who thus need the tutelage of the Kemalist vanguard elite. They have no respect for “democratic legitimacy.”

We cannot debate democracy in Turkey without discussing Kemalism and the military, and we cannot consolidate democracy without questioning the very role Kemalism and the military have played in the construction and maintenance of authoritarian politics.

05 July 2010, Monday

PKK calls for ‘deep Turkish state’ to return

2010-06-28T08:52:00.000-07:00

The new wave of violence committed by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) invites the “deep state” back in. I understand very well the logic behind this.

As a terror organization that seeks social and political support among the Kurds, it prefers an oppressive and violent state, not a democratic one, to reign in Turkey. The golden era of the PKK in the region was when the deep state made thousands of Kurds disappear, burnt down villages and suppressed social life.

What would the return of the “deep state” mean to the Kurds, Turkey and the region today? Is it worth taking such a risk?

I think the return of the “deep state” would be devastating for both the Kurds and the Turks. It would not only mean abandoning democracy and the rule of law, prosperity and EU membership, but also lead to killings, torture and even a civil war or regional war. No one can afford such a state of affairs in this region.

To give you an idea, let me remind you of a “modest” suggestion on what to do about the Kurds. Last year a veteran Kemalist, Mumtaz Soysal, a columnist for the Cumhuriyet daily, in the midst of debate on the Kurdish initiative, suggested an “absolute solution” for the Kurdish question. His ultimate solution was to “exchange the Kurds of Turkey with the Turkmens of northern Iraq.” In essence, the professor and former foreign minister under the CHP ticket was calling for an “ethnic cleansing” of the Kurds.

This was an idea inspired by the previous policies of the Kemalist regime in the 1920s and ‘30s. The aim of creating an ethnically homogeneous state by force led to fascistic policies.

There are still some who think that such policies are possible. The bad news is that the increasing violence committed by the PKK justifies and strengthens this line of thinking in Turkey.

With the recent wave of violence the only thing we can get is a revival of the repressive state apparatus. There is logic, of course, behind this. Organizations like the PKK cannot survive in times of peace. Because of this, the PKK sabotaged the government’s Kurdish initiative right from the beginning out of the fear that it would be eliminated in the process of a democratic solution.

We should remember that one of the characteristics of the PKK is its constant attempt to monopolize “agency” in the Kurdish question. It does not allow for the emergence of autonomous or semi-autonomous agencies that claim to represent the Kurdish people. To this end, it uses violence and intimidation. In this context we can understand the reluctant position of the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) towards the Kurdish initiative. During the last year, the only demand of the BDP that we remember today is to recognize Abdullah Öcalan as a “counterpart” in negotiating a solution. The party, under the shadow of the PKK, could not come up as a “political agent,” a denial of its possible role in the solution. This was a policy to force the government to talk directly to Öcalan, a policy that was doomed to fail as it would be suicidal for any government, thus killing the initiative from the beginning.

The Kurdish people are not only tired of state policies that deny their ethnic identity but also of the spiral of violence inflicted by the PKK that provokes the Turkish deep state and makes Kurds’ lives extremely difficult.

The PKK, by increasing its terrorist attacks, invites the fascistic, oppressive, authoritarian state to re-emerge as it is used to fighting against such a state. To direct violent attacks toward a state that is evolving into a liberal democracy with increasing respect for minority rights and with improving economic benefits does not make sense, not only for the Turks but also for the Kurds.

The PKK is bound to lose its social and political support base among the Kurds in “normal times” of stability, democratization, economic development and peace. Thus the PKK sabotages stability, peace and democratization in order to survive.

It is obvious that the PKK wants the Turkish deep state to return, because such a violent state is the only recipe for the survival of the PKK. A violent organization, the PKK, needs a violent, not democratic, state as a counterpart.

28 June 2010, Monday

A ‘sickening’ letter from Congressman Ackerman

2010-06-21T22:25:00.000-07:00

I borrowed the word “sickening” from Congressman Gary Ackerman himself, chairman of the House Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia.

He sent an angry letter to Lee Hamilton, director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, asking him not to honor Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu with its Public Service Award. Wisely no one paid any attention to such a “hate letter” as the Woodrow Wilson center presented its award to Davutoğlu in İstanbul last week.

Yet the letter remains as the making of a mindset that tries to turn Turkey, the long-term ally of the US, into an enemy. In the letter, Rep. Ackerman uses words like “sickening,” “illegality,” “irresponsibility” and “hypocrisy” to describe Turkish foreign policy and Minister Davutoğlu.

He also threatens Turkey with the Armenian genocide claims and the Cyprus question. I really wonder if “blackmailing” is part of Woodrow Wilson’s political heritage that Rep. Ackerman seems anxious to preserve. I do not think so. Then he makes a “sickening comparison” of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to Hamas.

From the letter I understand that Rep. Ackerman would be interested in sending what the PKK needs: weapons and ammunition. So giving such an impression will only confirm a belief that is shared by many nationalists and military commanders in Turkey that the US is behind the PKK. I do not share in such nonsense, of course, but they use such statements as the representatives of the official line to prove that there is a link between the PKK terrorist organization and the US administration. Thus people like Ackerman do no good for the image of America in Turkey.

Turkish and American governments are bound to work together in various parts of the world and on a variety of issues. Cooperation between the two countries and the two nations should be based on mutual interests and common values. There can also be disagreements. It is only natural. Does the US administration share in full the position of the Turkish government on the Cyprus question and the Armenian claims of genocide? No it does not.

On Iran, Ankara differs from Washington in the methods of getting a shared objective, which is to prevent Iran developing nuclear weapons by using all diplomatic means possible and refraining from confrontation. And it has good reasons for doing this. Turkey does not want to see its long-term ally, the US, and its permanent neighbor go to the brink of a war. It is aware that when your neighbor’s house ablaze it threatens your house as well.

Making adversarial statements out of such a disagreement would leave the US without friends. Describing Turkey and the Turks as “sickening,” “illegal” and “hypocritical” is not fair and friendly. Rep. Ackerman’s letter is utterly rude and does not suit a respected US lawmaker. But it reveals a mindset that is very problematic. Such a narrow-minded stance cannot represent the American viewpoint. I think his is a total blindness.

How can these friends of Turkey turn into “adversaries” overnight. The reason is disturbing, not for Turkey but for the US. They simply want unconditional support for Israel. Any country that does not do so is declared an “enemy.” I think this is the mindset of all radical movements including the ones that the US is fighting against in the Middle East. Now it is shocking to see the same attitude from a US congressman.

There could be no unconditional support even among the allies independent of the acts taken up by the allies. But what Israel and its allies in the US expect is this: Whatever Israel does, continue to support it without questioning its policies. This is no good even for Israel; this is not the way a good friend behaves.

Do what they suggest and lose all the friends of America. I think those who advocate such policies do not care if they are pushing the US towards trouble or not. They are simply turning the US into Israel that is questioned, distrusted and disliked by all.

21 June 2010, Monday

If not doomed to misunderstand Turkey on Iran

2010-06-14T00:13:00.000-07:00

Radicals in the US administration won last week when a resolution that imposes tougher sanctions against Iran was passed in the UN Security Council. Voting against the resolution, Turkey and Brazil kept the door of diplomatic negotiations open on the Iranian nuclear issue.

My guess is that radicals who are in favor of using coercive means against Iran will eventually lose. This is so because despite the rhetoric US President Barack Obama cannot afford to become Bush III. With the resolution at hand he will, I think, continue to search for diplomatic dialogue with Iran to find a peaceful solution to the problem.

But those who want to use the current crisis as an opportunity to punish Iran will press hard to go beyond imposing sanctions. In fact they will soon start complaining that sanctions are not working and that more direct action is needed. So the recent Security Council resolution will be used by radicals in the US as justification for a “final solution”: military strikes against the Iranian nuclear facilities.

While some in Washington, D.C., may contemplate such a showdown, President Obama and sensible Americans are likely to avoid this “neocon” plot. Even minimal reasoning would conclude that such a scenario would be the end of the Obama vision in American foreign policy.

Ask these two simple questions: Does President Obama want to get out of Iraq? Is he interested in stabilizing and pulling American troops out of Afghanistan?

If the answers are “yes,” then the Obama administration cannot afford escalating tension with Iran simply because this will jeopardize American policies in the region. Iran, as a neighbor to these two countries, has the potential to make life for American troops and American allies there even more difficult.

So, if Obama wants to withdraw American troops from Iraq and wants to stabilize Afghanistan under the presidency of Hamid Karzai, then he has to stick to his original plan, which is to establish dialogue with Iran and find a diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue. Then he will need Turkey and the Tehran agreement that was struck by Turkey and Brazil to go back to diplomatic negotiations with Iran.

When the American administration asks for Turkey to mediate the nuclear issue it has to understand what Turkey is trying to do and why. Let me explain.

First of all, Turkey does not want conflict in the region. As the Iraq war demonstrated, Turkey is deeply affected by instability and conflicts in its neighborhood. It is trying to avoid yet another conflict in the region with undesired repercussions on Turkish politics, economy and society. As such it is doing its best to calm tension and build peace in its region while concerned about the possibility of an intense conflict between Iran and the US. Turkey is after peace and stability in its region simply because these are absolute requirements for Turkey to reach its “great goals,” namely democratization, economic development and EU membership. Turkey’s grand objectives require a zone of peace and tranquility in its neighborhood. By trying to find a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue Turkey wants to contribute to peace and stability in the region.

Secondly, the reason for Turkey’s diplomatic engagement to settle the nuclear issue is that Turkey does not want Iran to develop nuclear weapons. I think this has to be clearly understood by the Americans. How on earth does Turkey act softly on a neighboring country that tries to develop nuclear weapons? This would be suicidal. On the contrary, Turkey wants to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons. The way to do so for the Turkish government and the public at large is not to impose sanctions on Iran and force it to ignore international control mechanisms. In order to achieve this objective Iran has to be kept within the international system and be forced to be open to the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Otherwise, Iran may withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and then go its own way.

I think what the Americans do not understand is that an Iran armed with nuclear weapons is a direct threat to Turkey leading to a nuclear arms race in the region. No reasonable person in Turkey wants its neighbor to develop nuclear weapons. Americans need keep in mind that an Iran armed with nuclear weapons is not a direct threat to the US but is to Turkey. Therefore, this is an issue that concerns Turkey more than the US. Turkey is not only sincere in its efforts to stop Iran developing weapons but also regards this as a matter of utmost national security.

It is therefore nonsense to accuse Turkey of being soft on Iran. What the Turkish government is doing is to find an “effective way” to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons while recognizing its right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

So if the Americans are sincere about preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons, they should follow through the path Turkish diplomacy has opened for them. But if their real intention is to harm Iran, they cannot do it without risking their troops in the region and their vital interests in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the end of the day the neocons in Washington may not lose, but Obama and the Democrats will certainly be the losers.

14 June 2010, Monday